

# VADIRAJA'S YUKTIMALLIKA

## A CRITICAL STUDY

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
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C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that this thesis "Vadiraja's Yuktimallika-  
A Critical Study" presented by Shri G.K. Nippani represents  
his original work and has not been submitted for any other  
Diploma or Degree in any University. The work has been  
carried out by him at the Department of Studies in Sanskrit,  
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## P R E F A C E

The Dvaita system of Vedānta, expounded by Madhva, has made history in Indian philosophy. The followers and thinkers of this system have made many outstanding contributions to the field of philosophy. They have elaborately discussed the views expressed by Madhva and also have endeavoured great exercise to meet with the objections raised by opponents and disregard the contentions of them. The works of these scholars could also be studied with advanced methods of objective approach and comparative criticism.

It is well observed that next to Madhva, according to the need, the eminent scholars like Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha ventured and wrote the works which have been, no doubt, deep in argument, critical in exposition and of great admiration, but rooted in logical techniques and niceties and hence, are beyond common approach. The Yuktimallikā of Vādirāja, in this respect, is a novel attempt and first of its kind to feed the demand, fulfil the need and, indeed promises and helps both, the scholars and other faithful readers to understand the doctrines of philosophy, particularly the Dvaita, since it happens to be a unique combination of scholastic way of argumentation.

interpretation and clever common approach.

A systematic, comparative and critical study of the Yuktimallikā has not been made so far. And this thesis is an attempt to bring out the significance of the contribution of the Yuktimallikā. It is well attempted in this thesis to show as how best Vādirāja adduces the reasons or arguments (Yuktis). It is also discussed in length that what the Yukti of Vādirāja consists of. The first chapter gives a brief account of Vādirāja's date, life and works. The second chapter contains an elaborate critical exposition of the Yuktimallikā and helps for the better understanding of the contents of the work. The third chapter deals with and discusses the contribution of Vādirāja, through the Yuktimallikā, to the Indian philosophy in general and the Dvaita, in particular. In the fourth, concluding chapter, some conclusions are drawn in respect of salient distinct features of the Yuktimallikā and of relevancy of the Yukti (reasoning). As this thesis, in this regard, a new attempt to bring out the significance of the Yuktimallikā and Vādirāja's unique contribution, it is hoped that it would be an useful addition to the field of Dvaita Vedānta and its literature.

✓ It is with great pleasure, I express my deep sense

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Date:

GURURAJ -K. NIPPANI

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ABBREVIATIONS

AV	Anuvyākhyāna
BG	Bhagavadgītā
Bh. Vi	Bhāvavilāsini
Bhā	Bhāṣya
Bhāg	Bhāgavata
Br. Sū	Brahmasūtra
Br. Sū, Bhā	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
Brh. Up.	Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
B.S.	Bhedasaurabha
Ch.	Chapter
Chā. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Com.	Commentary
Fn.	Foot note
G.S.	Guṇasaurabha
H.D.S.V. & L.	A History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature
Īśa. Up.	Īśa Upaniṣad
M	Madhvā
Māṇḍ. Up.	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Muṇḍ. Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
P	Page
Pp	pages
P.S.	Phalasaurabha
RV	R̥gveda
S.M.	Sumadhvavijaya
S.R.M.	Stotrarathnamālā
S.V.S.M.	Śrī Vādirāja Stotramanjari
S.Vr.A.	Svapnavṛndāvanākhyāna
Sū. Bhā	Sūtra Bhāṣya
Ś.	Śaṅkara
Ś.S.	Śuddhisaurabha
Śwet. Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Ś.Y.S.	Śukla Yajurveda Saṁhitā
Ś.Y.K.S.	Śukla Yajurveda Kapva Saṁhitā
Tait. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Up.	Upaniṣad
Upādhi Kh.	Upādhi Khaṇḍana

V.G.C.	Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmrta
V.G.M.	Vādirājaguṇaratnamālā
Vol.	Volume
V.R.S.	Vādirājārgutvasiddhānta
Vṛt.R.S.	Vṛttaratnasāṅgraha
V.S.	Viśvasaurabhā
Y.M.	Yuktimallikā

DATE, LIFE AND WORKS OF VĀDIRĀJA

Madhva, the historical reviver and propagator of the Dvaita system of Vedānta, flourished during 13th century A.D.<sup>1</sup> He vindicated the Dvaita system on firm grounds and also wrote authentic works in its defence. He erected a temple in Udupi and installed a Saligrāma statue of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Madhva worshipped Lord Kṛṣṇa for many years. Then he ordained eight celibate monks and entrusted to them the worship of Lord Kṛṣṇa and also the propagation of his system. He made them incharge of separate mutts. Among the heads of these mutts, Viṣṇutīrtha, who was a direct disciple and brother of Madhva in his Pūrvāśrama, was foremost. His greatness is being described in the S.M. at length.<sup>2</sup> It is known that then a mutt was named after him. In that hierarchy started by Viṣṇutīrtha, there had been great personalities and the nineteenth was Vāgiśatīrtha. He was a great scholar, saint and devotee. He lived in Kumbhāsi, 18 miles away from Udupi observing the austerities and also teaching the noted works of the Dvaita system. It is this Vāgiśatīrtha, with whose blessing, Vādirāja was born and then being ordained by him, graced the pontificial seat of the mutt initiated by Viṣṇutīrtha.

DATE

Vādirāja, a mystic, a profound scholar, a well-known

debator and a gifted poet, was born in 1480 A.D. He lived for 120 years. He entered the Vṛndāvana at Sonda, near Sirsi in the present Uttara Kannada District of Karnataka, in 1600 A.D. The Carama Śloka<sup>3</sup> and also some inscriptions belonging to years 1582 and 1593<sup>4</sup> prove that he was born in 1480 A.D. and disappeared in 1600 A.D. As it is, there is no difference of opinion so far as the date of Vādirāja is concerned. The V.G.C. states that his date of birth was the 12th day of Māgha Śukla of Śārvatī Samvat.<sup>5</sup>

#### LIFE

To know the life history of Vādirāja, fortunately we have authentic and authoritative works such as Vṛttaratna-saṅgraha (V.R.S.), Vādirāja-guru-vara-carita-mrta (V.G.C.), Vādirāja-qaṇu-paratna-mālā (V.G.M.). The V.R.S. was written by Raghunātha-cārya, a disciple of Vādirāja. It is not merely a historical work, but is also a good piece of poetry. It appears that the author might have had passed away early, i.e., when Vādirāja was still alive and hence he does not narrate the latter part of Vādirāja's life. The V.G.C. has been written by Rāmacandra-cārya, a disciple of Vedanidhi-tīrtha, a pontiff second from Vādirāja. It deals with almost all the incidents of Vādirāja's life. It runs into nine chapters. The eighth one is devoted for the discussion connected with the Rjutva of Vādirāja. The authenticity of

this work is unquestionable since it has been written just after the demise of Vādirāja and also as per the instructions of Vedanidhitīrtha.<sup>6</sup> There is every possibility to state that, the author, at his early age of life, must have had seen Vādirāja. The V.G.M. has been written by Vāsudevacārya Nippāni during the latter part of the 19th century. It closely follows the V.R.S. and V.G.C. and also narrates some other incidents following the conventional information of tradition and also then available Purānic evidences.

Apart from these three major works, we do get a good number of stotras and songs of Haridāsa, that glorify the greatness of Vādirāja, his mystic life, achievements and adventures.

Vādirāja was born of humble parents, Gouri and Rāmacārya, in Huvinakere near Kumbhāsi in Taulava region i.e. the modern Dakshina Kannada District. He is stated to have been a Tulu Brahmin by birth. His father, Rāmacārya, was a follower of Sāma Veda.

Vādirāja was born by the grace of Vāgiśatīrtha, the 19th in the succession from Viṣṇutīrtha.<sup>7</sup> His birth name was spelled as Varāha as he was graced with the blessings of Lord Varāha (favourite and presiding deity given by Madhva to his

brother Viṣṇutīrtha). Varāha's Upanayanam was celebrated at the age of five, and he was ordained the Saṁnyāsaśrama at the age of eight. He studied primary works under Vidyānidhi (a senior disciple of Vāgiśatīrtha) and after his demise, Vādirāja continued his studies under his Guru Vāgiśatīrtha.

When Vādirāja completed the core of Śāstric study, he made up his mind to go on a sacred tour to propagate the Dvaita Siddhānta, to have the holy bath in sacred rivers, to have the Darśana of the Lord in all places and also to bless the qualified devotees. It was also a tour to gain wide experience. He travelled the entire country twice and as a result he composed a unique work in Sanskr̥t viz., Tīrthaprabandha that gives an account of the various Hindu temples and places.

Vādirāja introduced some changes in Paryāya system of Lord Kṛṣṇa's worship in Udupi. Before Vādirāja, the duration of Paryāya, as introduced by Madhva, was of 2 months each. It was Vādirāja, who, taking into account the convenience of other monks, changed it into that of 2 years. He made arrangements for the construction of individual mutts for all the eight. He also chalked out the programme of worship, which is even now followed and can be witnessed by one and all.<sup>8</sup>

When Vijayanagar emperor Kṛṣṇadevarāya was facing financial crisis, he made an appeal to Vādirāja. Vādirāja blessed him with abundant wealth, found in the ancient cave of Vāli and Sugrīva. Then Kṛṣṇadevarāya honoured Vādirāja with a crown, an umbrella, a jewelled throne and the like. Thereafter, both Kṛṣṇadevarāya and Acyutarāya gifted generously to Vādirāja who rebuilt the Kṛṣṇa temple at Udupi on an extended plan. It was in 1532-33 A.D. The inscription describing this event is seen even now in the Kṛṣṇa temple at Udupi.<sup>9</sup>

In 1585 A.D. Venkatapati devarāya graced the royal throne of Vijayanagara empire. After the completion of Paryaya in 1580-81, Vādirāja, on his eastern tour, came to the capital of Vijayanagara, then at Penagundi. The king wanted to celebrate the victory and hence he invited all his subordinate kings, scholars, poets, artists and others. In the assembly hall, Vādirāja was requested to grace the Chief seat and to preside over the function. There, he was supposed to face the attacks from different scholars in different fields. Vādirāja, though alone, succeeded in tackling the arguments and faced them easily, politely and successfully. The assembly, realising the extra-ordinary calibre and wide and deep scholarship of Vādirāja in all arts and lores, honoured him with the title Prasāṅgābharaṇatīrtha.<sup>10</sup>

Vādirāja once came to Pune and he heard that scholars, in assembly, had decided to honour the Māghākavya viz., Śīṣupālavadha, as the best among all, since that was enriched with poetic excellences in all respects. Then Vādirāja sent a word informing that he too had a best Kāvya and he would submit the same for consideration within 20 days. Thereafter, Vādirāja composed a Mahākāvya by name Rukminiśavijaya within 20 days and sent it to the assembly. The scholars were very much pleased with its unique poetic excellences in composition, in narration, in description, in imagination, in poetic beauties and the like. All of them recommended for honouring it as the best among all such compositions.<sup>11</sup>

Vādirāja came to Prayāga (Allahabad) and lived there for some days. One day Lord Vedavyāsa in the guise of a sage coming from Badarikāśrama, met Vādirāja, who welcomed him with great reverence. Vedavyāsa reminded Vādirāja that Vādirāja's mother had, before his birth, promised Laksālakshkara to God if she would give birth to a worthy son. He also reminded Vādirāja's promise to fulfil that vow. Actually it was not possible for every one or even for the wealthiest to offer one lakh golden ornaments. So Vedavyāsa asked Vādirāja to write a gloss-like commentary on one-lakh difficult words of the Mahābhārata and to offer it at the feet of God, so that, that would easily fulfil the promise of

his mother. He also invited Vādirāja to Badarikāśrama and then disappeared. Vādirāja went to Badarikāśrama, saw there Vedavyāsa, Madhva and other sages. He received the message of Vedavyāsa and Madhva and then wrote Laksālaṅkāratīkā in simple but erudite style. He offered this at the feet of Lord Vedavyāsa who was very much pleased with that.<sup>12</sup>

Once Vādirāja wished to have the Darśana of Lord Venkateśvara. When he came to Tirupati, he saw the rocks appearing as Sāligrāmas and felt uneasy to trod on them. So he climbed the hill on his knees singing the glory of the Lord. Vādirāja worshipped that Presiding Deity to his entire satisfaction and offered Him a garland of 108 Sāligrāmas which adorns the Lord even today.<sup>13</sup>

Vādirāja's was of a many sided personality. It is said that, under his occult power, there was a mysterious goblin (Bhūtarāja) who served Vādirāja closely and devotedly. This Bhūtarāja, at the instructions of Vādirāja did many miracles. It is said that this Bhūtarāja, at the order of Vādirāja went to Badarikāśrama and brought the Trivikrama-idol with the chariot. Vādirāja installed that idōl in the newly constructed temple in Sondā. He also placed the stone-chariot there which could be seen even today.<sup>14</sup>

It is believed that he was a disciple of the great Dvaita preceptor, Vyāsarāya and studied under him. But it is very strange to note that Vādirāja has not acknowledged Vyāsarāya as his Guru in any of his works. But it is the tradition and also some of the songs of Dāsas, that refer to Vyāsarāya, as the Guru of Vādirāja.

Vādirāja, who introduced the change in the period of the Paryāya, performed four Paryāyas in Udupi.<sup>15</sup> When the turn of fifth Paryāya came, he realizing the intention of his disciple Vedavedya; gave him the chance of performing the Paryāya in Udupi; while he, at the same time, worshipped Venugopālakṛṣṇa in Sondā for two years and thus completed the fifth Paryāya.<sup>16</sup>

There are many more such incidents that happened in the life of Vādirāja. To sum up, he was a great saint philosopher, the most facile writer in the Dvaita system, a gifted poet, a great mystic, a noted Haridāsa and the like. His life was full of miracles and achievements.

B.N.K.Sharma observes "Vādirāja was another eminent successor of Vyāsarāya who carried forward the work of theological polemics and critical reinforcement and defence of the Dvaita system."<sup>17</sup>

L. Stafford Betty remarks, "Vādirāja is a Hindu theologian and writer for the Dualist system of Vedānta. He was active in Kanara district of India throughout all the sixteenth century."<sup>18</sup>

C. R. Rao glorifies Vādirāja as "Śrī Vādirāja was an all-knowing mystic by birth. He was a profound scholar, a trenchant debator and a successful organiser."<sup>19</sup>

K. T. Pandurangi writes "He was a poet, a philosopher, a social organiser, a great debator, prolific writer, and to crown all this a saint of mystic eminence."<sup>20</sup>

As Madhva sowed the seed of Bhakti, it is Vādirāja, who nourished and brought it up carefully to grow and to bear fruits. His message and mission were not only restricted to the scholars but flowed fluently to the line and lane of common man. He was a terror and at the same time a source of inspiration to the Prativadins. He was a saint of salient features, man of merits, devotee of devotion and overall a religious and social reformer too. The tradition believes that Vādirāja is one of the Rjus by name Lātavya.<sup>21</sup>

The span of Vādirāja's mortal life was running out. He fulfilled the conditions and instructions of Lord Vedavyāsa.

He also did the entrusted and promised work. He dispelled the doubts and delusions of the learned. He gave Sannyāsaśrama to a celibate, naming him Vedavedya, ordained him as the successor. He then made up his mind for his voluntary exit from the world. He fixed the date and time.<sup>22</sup> He got done the Vṛndāvana under the supervision of Arasappanayaka<sup>23</sup> and Rāmacandranayaka.<sup>24</sup> When the designed construction of the Vṛndāvana was completed, Vādirāja worshipped it. He installed the statue of Lord Vedavyāsa in front of the Vṛndāvana, made a small temple for Bhūtarāja. He also got done the sacred reservoir Dhavalagaṅgā, behind it.

For a week before the appointed day, Vādirāja celebrated the Utsava of Lord Trivikrama on a grand scale and also instructed all the devotees for its continuation. On the day of his disappearance, he worshipped Lord Hayagrīva, Bhūvarāha and then also Madhva. He blessed Vedavedya, Vedanidhi the next two pointiffs and also other followers. He gave his parting message. He then entered the holy Vṛndāvana alive.<sup>25</sup> He sat in a perfect pose and then controlled the breathing. Soon after this the Tulasi garland fell from his hand. Then the front door was placed as instructed.<sup>26</sup> Since then it is believed that Vādirāja continues to dwell as a source of divine grace and spiritual solace in that Vṛndāvana.

The holy Vrndavana of Vadirāja, which is a place of solace for grief-stricken devotees and a source of inspiration to the scholars is attracting at Sonda<sup>27</sup> even today, thousands and thousands every year.

#### WORKS OF VĀDIRĀJA

Vadirāja was a prolific and facile writer of the Dvaita literature. His works are of unique characteristics. The works are packed and graced with variety of material, minutely reasoned out and profusely documented. Vadirāja was a versatile genius and proved himself successful by contributing a good number of works to the various branches of knowledge.

As he has been a gifted poet, his works embellish with poetic beauty. Even the Vedānta (Śāstric) works enshine with poetic beauty. He was a profound scholar and successful debator of repute. He was a gifted religious poet in Sanskrit and also a well-known saint in the line of Haridāsas of Karnatak. He has composed devotional songs in Kannada, Tulu and also it is learnt in Telugu.

The style of Vadirāja is unique and peculiar of its kind. It is simple, lucid in exposition, deep in devotion and novel in narration. The alliteration and other literary merits of his language have enriched his style. His hair-

splitting criticism, appealing argument and enlightening exposition cause thrilling sensation to the admiring readers.<sup>28</sup>

According to the tradition and also the reference in the V.G.C. (III-66), more than hundred works stand to his credit.<sup>29</sup> Though half of them are of the nature of stotras they are also significant since they too delineate the philosophic truth in most appealing manner in a nutshell.

B. N. K. Sharma, the great Dvaita scholar of the present times, remarks about Vādirāja- "His fine poetic faculty and human touch, the quick flashes of his wit and humour, his apt analogies from life and literature and his racy way of putting the things have made him the most popular and enthusiastically applauded writer in Dvaita literature. He thinks in poetry and argues in it with all the richness and irresistibility of its appeal..."

His works show an intense personal fervor and passionate faith in the religious and metaphysical satisfyingness and superiority of Mādhva Siddhānta. He pays deep homage and unstinting tribute to the memory of Madhva and modestly disclaims all originality for his views."<sup>30</sup>

K. T. Pandurangi observes that "His works have scholastic

appeal as well as devotional appeal. We find in him a scholar, a poet and a great saint of mystic eminence... The sharpness of the logic of Śrī Vādirājatīrtha pierces the heart, while the poetry of his illustrations moves the head in delight."<sup>31</sup>

The works of Vādirāja may be classified broadly as follows:-

1. Vedānta works - Original  
- Commentaries
2. Kāvyas
3. Stotras and others
4. Kannada works
5. Tulu works

#### I. INDEPENDENT WORKS

##### A. ŚĀSTRIC WORKS

1. Yuktimallika:<sup>32</sup> It is the magnum opus of Vādirāja. It is written in defence of the Dvaita system. It is a critical exposition of all the doctrines of the Dvaita system of Vedānta. It also examines the passages of Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa, Purāna and the like. Critically interpreting the statements of these texts, that have been misinterpreted by others, it unfolds the relevancy of them.

There are five main chapters as Saurabhas in this work. They are: Gunasaurabha, Śuddisaurabha, Bhedasaurabha, Viśva-saurabha and Phalasourabha. In the Gunasaurabha, Nirguna concept of the Advaita is refuted and Sagunatva of Brahman is established. In the Śuddhisaurabha, the Advaita concept of Ajnāna is proved baseless and the Nirdosatva of the Lord is vindicated. The Bhedasaurabha explains the five-fold differences in the most befitting manner. The Viśvasaurabha disproves the Advaita view of Mithyātva of the world and establishes the Satyatva of the same. In the last, viz. the Phalasaurabha, the nature of the salvation is described and the several means to attain it are enumerated. There itself, Madhva is glorified as the third incarnation of God Vāyu.

Thus, the Yuktimallikā is a rare work of its kind. It is well said: 'This work combines great erudition with an incredibly simple yet poetically charming style characteristic of Vādirāja, full of puns, alliteration and wit and analogies from life.'<sup>33</sup> The works V.R.S., V.G.M., and S.Vr.A. also describe the greatness of the Yuktimallikā.<sup>34</sup>

2. Nyāvaratnāvali:<sup>35</sup> Like the Yuktimallikā, the Nyāvatnāvali is also written in poetic form. There are five chapters by name Sāra. It runs in 899 verses. As a whole, it attacks successfully and refutes rationally Śaṅkara's

non-dualism and establishes the doctrines of dualism (Dvaita). The title is significant since it comprises the jewels of Vedānta Nyāyas. The work is also called as Anuyuktimallikā.

3. Cakramīmānsā:<sup>36</sup> The Cakramīmānsā critically examines the relevancy of the Taptamudrādhārana and states that the Taptamudrādhārana is most essential for the fulfilment of Vaisṇavatva.

4. Haribhaktalatā:<sup>37</sup> The Haribhaktalatā is written in anustub verses, in all there are 394 verses. The work summarises the concept of Bhakti, its importance in receiving the grace of the Lord. The supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu is related by perusing some Vedic passages, Purānic statements and episodes.<sup>38</sup>

5. Śrutitattvaprakāśikā:<sup>39</sup> In the Śrutitattvaprakāśikā, the six Mahākāvyas of different Upaniṣads are critically examined and are convincingly explained. This work is written in the poetic form, running into 507 verses.

6. Upanyāsa Ratnamālā:<sup>40</sup> It is said that Vādirāja originally wrote ten lectures which are known as Upanyāsa-ratnamālā. But unfortunately, only three are available and are published. There are deformed manuscripts in Sode

Vādirāja mutt, that are incomplete and unreadable.

The ten lectures are as follows:

- (1) Two lectures, giving the exposition of the two  
verses of the Rukminīśavijaya;
- (2) Seven lectures relating to the Pramāna Paddhati;
- (3) One relating to the Upādhikhandana.

The lectures, falling under II category below, are not available in their complete forms.

7. Ekādaśi-nirnaya:<sup>41</sup> Vādirāja, following closely Madhva, has written the work Ekādaśi-nirnaya. He has determined the aspects relating to the observance of Ekādaśi with authority. This work runs in 57 verses.

8. Bhugola-nirnaya:<sup>42</sup> The Bhugola-nirnaya gives the geographical data of the entire earth as explained in the fifth chapter of the Bhāgavata and other works.

9. Sadācārasmṛti:<sup>43</sup> The Sadācārasmṛti gives a brief account of Madhva's work having the same name.

10. Pāsandamatakhandana:<sup>44</sup> The Pāsandamatakhandana is the refutation of the views of Jainism. Vādirāja, in

refuting the views of the Jainism, has followed the way of Tārīka school and thus has skillfully refuted them. It is written in verse form running into 129 verses.

11. Saṅkalpa Paddhati:<sup>45</sup> The Saṅkalpa Paddhati gives the clues regarding the Saṅkalpa observed at the commencement of any regular sacred (religious) worship of the day.

12. Kalpalatā:<sup>46</sup> The Kalpalatā is written in prose. It is the refutation of the work Pramāṇanirṇaya of Jainism written by Vādirājasūri. There are four parts each termed as Prasūna-māla. Vādirāja has refuted the Pramāṇanirṇaya line by line and word by word. Mainly the seven tenets of the Jainism, such as Syādasti and the like, have been proved baseless. Vādirāja's subtle and close examination of this Syādvāda and its refutation is an outstanding contribution [ ] to polemical literature.

13. Vivaraṇavṛṇa:<sup>47</sup> The Vivaraṇavṛṇa work is a refutation of Pañca Pādikāvivarana of Prakāśatmayati, a commentary on Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda, a disciple of Śaṅkara. In this, Vādirāja, not only refutes the text of the Pañcapādikāvivarana, but also its commentary Tattvadīpana simultaneously.

14. Śakunamāla:<sup>48</sup> The Śakunamāla is an interesting booklet

that deals with omens that presage good or evil.

15. Sanskrt Sūtrārtha:<sup>49</sup> The doctrines of Dvaita Vedānta, in aphoristic style, have been enlisted in śloka form.

16. Adhikarananāmāvali:<sup>50</sup> There are 564 Brahma Sūtras and 223 Adhikaraṇas. The Adhikarana is the topic wherein same object of exposition is discussed with some sūtras. The Adhikarananāmāvali of Vādirāja is a rare work of its kind which elucidates the gist and the import of each Adhikarana in a nutshell.

There are some other works mentioned in Śrī Vādirāja Stotra Manjari as original. They are: (17) Tāratamya<sup>51</sup> (18) Muhūrtarāja,<sup>52</sup> (19) Nayasiddhāntasahgraha<sup>53</sup> and (20) Madhvavāgvajrāvali.<sup>54</sup>

The first two i.e. 17 and 18 are unpublished. And regarding the third, though published, there is difference of opinion in respect of its authorship. Some do not regard it as the work of Vādirāja. The style, language and the like do not guarantee the claim that it is the work of Vādirāja. The fourth is not found.

B. COMMENTARIES

1. Mahābhāratatātparyanirnayabhāvaprakāśikā:<sup>55</sup> Madhva has written the Mahābhāratatātparyanirnaya - a work that summarises the import of all Śāstras, that gives the main running story of Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata and the like. The significance of this work lies not only in the description of the story of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, but more than Madhva has tried his best to remove the apparent contradiction, seen in the story of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata.

The com.of Vādirāja is not elaborate in length since it does not explain each and every verse of the text. But it is significant and exhaustive in respect of its dealing with and tackling the critical and crucial points of the text and also in giving the most appealing exposition.

2. Mahābhāratalaksālāṅkāra:<sup>56</sup> Vadiraja, interpreting one lakh difficult words of the Mahābhārata, has consecrated the work at the feet of Lord Vedavyāsa. It is not the running com.of the Mahābhārata but gives the relevant meaning of one lakh words.

3. Tantrasāratīka:<sup>57</sup> Not found; only mentioned in the V.S.M.

Vādirāja has also written commentaries on some of the Upaniṣadbhāsyas of Madhva:

4. Talavakāropanisadbhāṣya<sup>58</sup>
5. Māndūkopanisadbhāṣya<sup>59</sup>
6. Atharvanopanisadbhāṣya<sup>60</sup>
7. Kāthakopanisadbhāṣya<sup>61</sup>
8. Tattirīyopanisadbhāṣya<sup>62</sup>
9. Purusasūkta<sup>63</sup>

#### C. GLOSSES

1. Nyāyasudhāgurvarthadīpikā:<sup>64</sup> It is one of the ancient glosses on the celebrated Nyāyasudhā of Jayatīrtha. When compared with others, it is not elaborate or lengthy in size. But, though short, it gives critical exposition of the topics and extracts of the text. Vādirāja in some places, gives his own exposition of the original text. Vādirāja deals with different Vedānta Nyāyas enumerated in Nyāyavivarana.

2. Tattvaprakāśikāgurvarthadīpikā:<sup>65</sup> The Tattvaprakāśikā of Jayatīrtha is the detailed com. on Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Madhva. Although there are a number of coms. on the Tattvaprakāśikā, Vādirāja's is a rare of its kind. As in the com. on the N.S., here also some points of the original text are interpreted distinctly.<sup>66</sup>

Vādirāja has also written Tippaṇis on Upaniṣadbhāṣya-tīkās:

3. Iśavāsyopaniṣadbhāṣyatīkā<sup>67</sup>
4. Satprāśnopeniṣadbhāṣyatīkā<sup>68</sup>

#### D. POEMS

1. Rukminiśavijaya: Vādirāja's Rukminiśavijaya is a Mahākāvya, containing 19 cantos and running into 1238 verses. It is embellished with all requisites of a Mahākāvya. The source of the work is the tenth chapter of the Bhāgavata. All the sentiments are delineated in a befitting manner by the author. As an addition or as a crown to these, the sentiment of Bhakti flows from the beginning to the end. It is a master-piece of literature to the critics and tasteful readers, a devotional song to the devotees of the Lord and a philosophical poem to the philosophers.<sup>70</sup> B.N.K.Sharma remarks, "It is given the rank of a 'Mahākāvya' in traditional circles. The descriptions are effective and natural. The style is deeply alliterative sense and sound match well and the imagery is fine and lofty."<sup>71</sup>

2. Sarasabharatīvilāsa:<sup>72</sup> The Sarasabharatīvilāsa is a poetic work consisting of 12 chapters designated as Vilāsa and runs in 695 verses. Each Vilāsa deals with the different topics of the Dvaita Siddhānta such as supremacy of Lord

Viṣṇu, Nirdosatva nature of Goddess Lakṣmī, Jīvottamatva of the God Vāyu and the like. Its language, style, description etc. prove that it is also enriched with the literary merits.

3. Tirthaprabandha:<sup>73</sup> The Tirthaprabandha is a Khanda-kāvya that describes the holy places and rivers of our Indian continent. Vādirāja describes the holy centres and rivers with reference to mythological evidence and historical significance connected with them. As he toured far and wide in all the four directions of the land, the work is divided into four chapters, named after the directions. It is an informative work as it helps the pilgrims to know the importance of the holy places and rivers. It is glorified in the V.G.C. and the Vr.R.S.<sup>74</sup>

4. Kavikadambakanthabhūṣā:<sup>75</sup> Though the Kavikadamba-kanthabhūṣā is in stotra form, it is enshined with literary merits. The alliteration is most appealing one.

5. Svāpnavrndāvanākhyāna:<sup>76</sup> Vādirāja might not have composed, the Svāpnavrndāvanākhyāna with his pen but it is he, who spelled and recited in the dream of an illiterate Brahmin who was deaf and dumb. And hence, the authorship of this work is ascribed to him. It had been drafted by

Rāmacandrācārya, a disciple of Vedanidhitirtha. It is acclaimed as a divine work since being spelled in a dream of an illiterate. It was with the grace of Vādirāja that the Brahmin was capable to reproduce the verses in front of Vedanidhitirtha. There are 22 chapters and 2340 verses in total. The description herein is in accordance with and agreeable to the Dvaita view. By the by, it also unveils the nature of Vādirāja and others who have been blessed by him. The style of the work is simple and it is rich with elements of poetic beauty. The glorification of this work is seen in the V.G.C. and the V.G.M.<sup>77</sup> The gist of this work in a nutshell has been collected by Vedanidhi. It was inscribed and that stone has been placed (installed) by the side of the Vrndāvana of Vedavedya in Sondā which could be seen even today.<sup>78</sup>

#### E. OTHER WORKS

Mention is also made about Vādirāja's com. on Visnu-sahasranāma separately.<sup>79</sup> Recently one more work of Vādirāja by name Bhāgavatasaṅgraha is discovered by me in Śrī Sode Vādirāja mutt, at Udupi. The beginning portion of the manuscripts is in a deformed condition. It is the collection of verses from the Bhāgavata. The last verse is quoted here as a proof.<sup>80</sup>

One more work by name Śrīmadbhāgavatānukramanikā is found published,<sup>81</sup> wherein Vādirāja has enlisted the incidents of the Bhāgavata in due order.

The Sanatsujātiyabhbāsya<sup>82</sup> an exhaustive com. found in the M.B.Laksālankāra, is sometimes treated as an independent work of Vādirāja. The original text contains the enumeration of advice, given to Dhṛtarāṣṭra by Sanatsujāta.

Apart from these, Vādirāja has also written a good number of stotras in Sanskrit.<sup>83</sup> Except one or two, all have been published.<sup>84</sup> Mention is made in the V.S.M.<sup>85</sup> as well as in the Śrī Vādirājaru.<sup>86</sup>

Over than the Sanskrit works, Vādirāja has composed several Devaranāmas in Kannada<sup>87</sup> with the Ankita of Hayavadana as independent works such as Vaikunthavarṇane,<sup>88</sup> Lakṣmīśobhāna,<sup>89</sup> Svapnapada,<sup>90</sup> Gundakriye,<sup>91</sup> Bhramaraqīte,<sup>92</sup> Namaskarastotra,<sup>93</sup> Keśavanāma,<sup>94</sup> Naivedyaprakarana,<sup>95</sup> Harisarvottamasāra,<sup>96</sup> Gajendramokṣa,<sup>97</sup> Kīcakavadhe,<sup>98</sup> Avatāratraya Suvvāli,<sup>99</sup> Kṛṣṇabālalīle,<sup>100</sup> Tulasīsaṅkīrtana<sup>101</sup> and good many individual Kīrtanas, Uggābhoga, Sulādis and the like. He has also written the Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya<sup>102</sup> in Kannada. Other than these, there are some unpublished independent works such as Tattvasuvvāli, Birudinasuvvāli, Nāradakoravañji.

Vādirāja has also written some devotional songs in Tulu language by name Pāddana.

Two more independent Kannada works by name Pancabhedastotra and Venkatesakalyāna of Vādirāja are found in manuscript form.

Recently, it is known that Vādirāja had composed some devotional songs in Telugu language, collection of them could be seen with K. Narahari Rao of Suratkal.

It seems to be beyond doubt that Vādirāja might had indeed composed few more works other than those mentioned above, both in Sanskrit and Kannada, that are unfortunately missing.

THE CRITICAL EXPOSITION  
OF THE YUKTIMALLIKĀ

### THE YUKTI MALLIKĀ

"Philosophy attempts to arrive at a conception of the reality as a whole. It seeks to have a world view. It investigates the nature of the reality including nature, soul, God. It tries to interpret the meaning and value of human life and its relation to the world in which we live. Philosophy in this sense is the criticism of life and experience."<sup>103</sup>

Philosophy and culture are the two eyes of human life. If culture could be treated as light that exposes the worthy path or way of the life, philosophy would be the pioneer guide that ensues the thoughts as to how to lead the life on that path. Thoughts, flashed from philosophy, would be more meaningful and useful if they are referred to and related with real aspects of knowledge. The philosophy is the branch of knowledge or science that pursues an inquiry into Truth (Ultimate). It is defined: "Philosophy is the highest form of inquiry just because it alone involves no presuppositions."

Philosophy as the knowledge ultimates... Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines philosophy as "that department of knowledge which deals with ultimate reality, or with the most general causes and principles of things."<sup>104</sup> In course of inquiry, it also discusses and reviews the sources and means of

realizing the Ultimate Truth and also related aspects, that are also truthful (real).

There lie different opinions among Scholars regarding the existence of Ultimate Truth and also related aspects. If some negate verily the existence,<sup>105</sup> others, though admit, disregard the auspicious form<sup>106</sup> of that, and some others go to the extent of depriving it of being an object of knowledge.<sup>107</sup> And it is Madhva, who for the first time in the history of philosophy, has tackled this issue convincingly and also in a manner agreeable to thought and reason. The propriety lies in his argument and exposition that the Ultimate Truth must be real at ~~all~~ times.<sup>108</sup> When truth is real, the sources and means to realize that must also be real. Madhva is not silent at this point of argument but traces the valid sources and means thereof precisely.

The reason,<sup>109</sup> emerged from thought, must have the support of infallible means. The reason cannot work independently, since it may sometimes give scope to counter-arguments and the like.<sup>110</sup> Therefore, Madhva stresses the valid support and in his opinion, the infallible testimony, the Veda is the valid support. Madhva shows the significance of this and of others in his works.<sup>111</sup>

Vādirāja, closely following Madhva, upholds the view in his works.<sup>112</sup> He affords the important place for reason in his works, particularly in the Yuktimallikā. In his opinion, Yukti is not merely the bare reason but something more. Yukti in the Yuktimallikā, not only appears in the form of reason, but it is an activating element that enables the mind to have the knowledge of discrimination. Its scope is wider and broader. It is reason with series of arguments graced with befitting and apt analogies. It stands supported by valid proofs - Pratyakṣa, infallible testimony, the Vedas and the like.

#### I. GUNASAURABHA

Vādirāja begins his Yuktimallikā with benedictory verses.<sup>113</sup> The verses abound in deep devotion and are graced with poetic charm. The very first verse begins with the word Bhakti. Vādirāja offers salutations in the first verse to his favourite deity Lord Hayagrīva. From the second verse, he pays homage to Lord Vedavyāsa and then Madhva and others.

In the sixth verse, he modestly declares that, it is only the devotional service at the feet of Lord Hayagrīva that prompted him to write this work.<sup>114</sup>

Then, he proceeds to state as to why he has selected

the Dvaita Siddhānta as a topic and theme of his work. He says that starting from Jainism and Buddhism to the Advaita, all have been the Pūrvapakṣa and it is the Dvaita Siddhānta which is claimed as the Uttarapakṣa.<sup>115</sup> He assures and promises that it can be ascertained by a close examination of the tenets of different schools and also of the Dvaita Siddhānta. Vādirāja expresses that he has resorted to this Siddhānta, only after having examined the merits and demerits of other schools and thus being fond of Yukti has written this work.<sup>116</sup>

Vādirāja then shows the impracticability of the Advaita system in brief. He says that neither the Mithyātva nor the identity of the Advaita stands firmly and pleases the scholars. He also points out that Brahman would be degraded and be stained with blemish of reproach when identity and Mithyātva are referred to and related to. Further, he states that as Māyāvāda is unhelpful for developing the theistic sentiments, he has preferred Dvaita Siddhānta to others.<sup>117</sup>

Thereafter, Vādirāja praises the Yuktimallikā in about nine verses. He says that it is not an ordinary work, to be compared with others. It is rare and peculiar of its kind. He states that it is an opportunity for him to reveal his poetic talent, logical skill, devotional fervour and also to

propagate the right doctrine. He says that this work is useful to both the scholars and the layman, like a flower, rejoiced by both gods and bees. And this work does not owe any likes and dislikes for any particular view point, but it is solely guided and supported by the infallible reasons.<sup>118</sup>

#### THE VEDAS ARE APAURUSEYA

"As the oldest Indian, and at the same time, the oldest Indo-European literary monument, a prominent place in the history of world literature is due to the Veda... As the Veda, because of its antiquity, stands at the head of Indian literature, no one who has not gained an insight into the Vedic literature can understand the spiritual life and the culture of the Indians."<sup>119</sup>

Rādhakṛṣṇan writes: "The Vedas are the earliest documents of the human mind that we possess."<sup>120</sup>

Man is living in this world of wonders. He is its part and parcel. The environment wherein he lives, the society wherein he interacts and the ideals with which he is infested, are variegated. As he grows up and attains maturity, he inclines towards making an inquiry in every step of his life. He is enthusiastic about the objects of the world. To know the objects of the world in their reality, it is but inevitable

that the knowledge of the means that produce the knowledge of the objects is to be gained and made use of properly.<sup>121</sup>

The means of knowledge or Pramāṇas such as Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama, are widely accepted by one and all.<sup>122</sup> Pratyakṣa,<sup>123</sup> the first and the foremost means, produces the knowledge by the contact of flawless sense organs with relevant objects. The Anumāna,<sup>124</sup> depending upon the valid data of the Pratyakṣa, in the form of Vyāpti<sup>125</sup> (invariable concomitance) produces the knowledge of objects. The Āgama<sup>126</sup> is the verbal testimony. It is the declaration of a reliable person that produces knowledge. The Vedas fall under the third category of Pramāṇas, namely Āgama.<sup>127</sup>

The Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Āgama declaration of a reliable person, become valid means of knowledge in secular level, but they are not competent in case of super-sensuous level. Because, there are some super-sensuous and abstract objects of knowledge, the knowledge of which cannot be gained neither by Pratyakṣa nor by Anumāna nor by Āgama of ordinary kind or of secular type. These objects are Dharma, Adharma, Truth, Sin, God and the like. Hence, it is the Vedas that are competent to deal with these objects.<sup>128</sup>

The Vedas are the sacred treasures and back-bones of

Indian culture and thought. They are the original and remote sacred texts. The Vedas are limitless in number.<sup>129</sup> The Vedas are divided into four. Regarding the division of the Vedas, it is said "One undivided mass of Vedas was made four-fold to facilitate the performance of sacrifices."<sup>130</sup> About the remoteness and the authorship of the Vedas, there is diversity of opinion among traditional and modern scholars. The tradition holds that, the Vedas are impersonal, beginningless and eternal; whereas the modern scholars opine that Vedas are the compiled texts of seers of ancient times.<sup>131</sup>

The four Vedas are Rg, Yajus, Sāma and Atharvāṇa. Therein, again, are four divisions in each - Sāmhitā, Brahmana, Āranyaka and Upaniṣad. In its derivative sense, the term Veda stands for knowledge. According to some, Veda stands for Mantras (Sāmhitās) and Brahmanas.<sup>132</sup>

Vādirāja, in his Yuktimallikā, discusses Vedapauruseyavatva first, since the Vedas are the valid means of knowledge of super-sensuous objects.<sup>133</sup>

The main points of the topic, as summarised by K. T. Pandurangi, are:<sup>134</sup>

"1. Vedas are not the authority but respective founders

of the systems are the authorities.

2. Neither the Vedas nor the founders, but the reasons are the authority.

3. Vedas are authority, but they are not Apauruseya, they are produced by Iśvara at each Kalpa in the same manner.

4. Vedas are authority; they are Apauruseya; but there is no Iśvara. Iśvara has nothing to do with Vedas.

5. Vedas are authority; they are Apauruseya and Nitya; they are revealed by the God exactly in the same way at each Kalpa."

Vādirāja tackles all the first four issues and justifies the fifth one in a lucid and logical manner.

There is a view that the Vedas are not the authority, but the founders of the various systems of philosophy are the authority. This view is not tenable because the opinion of one founder is not accepted by others. His explanation of Dharma, Adharma and the like are rejected by others. He alone cannot justify and establish his doctrine since opponents are more in number and hence a single man cannot

contradict many.<sup>135</sup> And moreover, that particular founder cannot declare himself as omniscient. As he is not omniscient, the statements made by him become not valid. Hence his statements are not authority since, they do not decide as to what is Dharma and what is Adharma. And his omniscience is not recognised and accepted by other founders.<sup>136</sup> To explain, the supposed creator of this universe is not accepted as omniscient by one and all. The Naiyāyikas say that the creator of this universe is the Over-Lord and authority. But the Buddhists do not accept this view. To them, the Buddha is the authority. The statements of Buddha oppose the views of the Naiyāyikas in respect of the performance of sacrifices, worship of the Lord and the like. Thus, the views of the founders of such systems oppose each other. Whatever becomes Dharma to one, becomes Adharma to another. Performance of the sacrifice is opposed by the Buddha whereas it is upheld by others like Lord Iśvara.<sup>137</sup> Hence, nothing can be concluded and be declared as authority with the help of the views of such founders of the different systems.<sup>138</sup>

The second view is also not advisable. The Yukti (reason), an outcome of human intellect,<sup>139</sup> cannot work properly and decide about super-human things.<sup>140</sup> Reason becomes valid only when it is supported by explicit data of other means. Otherwise it fails at every step, particularly in respect

of Dharma, Adharma and the like. If reason is unduly recommended and accepted, then it may lead to disharmony and accredit blemish in character and thus spoils the very purity in the society. To explain: Thinking, repetition to be useless duplication, one may give up repeating the mantras. One may kill others saying that one wants to free the soul suffering bondage in the body. In the same way, human logic or reason is apt to lead to so many ridiculous results. So every one should depend upon the sacred verbal testimony which is eternal and beginningless.<sup>141</sup> Our (human) activities may lead to good results, sometimes to no results and sometimes to wrong results. Therefore, human logic, as it is not independently competent, sometimes even in case of secular things, cannot help to conclude anything about Dharma, Adharma and the like. Hence, the sacred verbal testimony, that has come down to us through tradition since time beginningless, should be accepted as valid means of knowledge since it is devoid of any personal faults or defects.<sup>142</sup>

The third point is that the Vedas are the authority; but, they are not Apauruseya. Vādirāja discusses the view and justifies that the Vedas are Apauruseya.

The authorship of the Vedas cannot be assigned to any one of the founders of the schools of philosophy. Among the

founders of (1) Cārvāka, (2) Buddhism, (3) Jainism, (4) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, (5) Sāṅkhyā-Yoga, (6) Mīmāṃsa and (7) the Vedānta; the first three do not recognise the authority of the Vedas. The remaining four have no where declared that they are the authors of the Vedas. But, they agree so far as the authority of the Vedas is concerned.<sup>143</sup>

The Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins contend that the Vedas were not written and produced by the Lord. But, the Naiyāyikas hold that the Vedas were written by the Lord.

But, the view of the Naiyā-Vaiśeṣikas is not tenable since their God<sup>144</sup> has nobody<sup>145</sup> and as such cannot produce the Vedas.<sup>146</sup> And this cannot be the origination or production like their atomic theory.<sup>147</sup> The sound of a word, a product of articulation needs the efforts of the constituents of the mouth. Thus, it is possible only when the being has a body of such kind. Even if it is granted that after creation, their god assumes the physical body, the authorship of the Vedas cannot be assigned to him, since even before that, the Vedas were existing which is evident from the statements like 'Sāmas originated from Rks.'<sup>148</sup> Without the Vedic hymns, the various sacrifices could not be performed. And even at the time of creation, the Lord

instructed the Vedas to His son and declared that He was not the author or producer of the Vedas. And during Pralaya (before creation) the goddess Durgā, recites the Vedic hymns to awaken the Lord.<sup>149</sup> So, it is clear that the Vedas were existing even before the world-creation.<sup>150</sup> The explicit personality of Lord Hayagrīva also justifies the same, since He is holding the sacred books of the Veda in His hand. He teaches the Vedas to God Brahmā in the same eternal order.<sup>151</sup> The Lord, although Omniscient and Omnipotent, does not alter the order in the wording of the Vedas to disturb the eternal order.<sup>152</sup> So the order, found in the Vedas, is unaltered and is eternally the same.<sup>153</sup>

Vadirāja, in this context, as an allied topic, discusses the eternity of the Vedas in all respects. In general, order of words in a sentence are not the same everywhere and at all times. It may differ from man to man, place to place and time to time since they are the product of human intellect. But, in the case of the Veda, even the syllable, the word and the sentence, from eternity, are all put in the same order. The order is eternal since it is there in Iśvarabuddhi which is Nityopadhi. As Iśvara is eternal, His Buddhi, in the form of Upadhi (eternal source of manifestation) is also eternal; hence, the order of the sentence etc., in the Vedas, is eternal. So this order is due to the Nityopadhi of Iśvarabuddhi.<sup>154</sup>

The Pancarātra texts and the Purāṇas are Pauruseya as they are the compositions of the Lord. Because there are no statements in the Purāṇas to say that, like the Vedas, the Purāṇas are also Apauruseya. Perhaps, there are valid statements to prove that they are Pauruseya. The god Brahmā and others learn and remember the Vedas articulated by the Lord. And the same is followed by all the teachers. So the Vedas are Apauruseya. Otherwise, the order etc., in the Vedas might be modified and reshaped by all and as such the authorship might be attributed to one and all. In the case of non-eternal and secular texts, dual-authorship may be accepted since everything is there in the Iśvarabuddhi and it is then produced through a particular human being of supra-natural calibre.

It should never be inferred that the name of the author of the Vedas is missing unknowingly. Normally, even sometimes the secret and unknown work attains popularity through the author's popularity. Here, the Veda is not secret and unknown and moreover, the eternity of this is held by tradition. But, the same tradition has never and nowhere referred to the author's name. And nobody can hide the author (name) of limitless Vedas of eternity. Therefore, the Vedas are authorless.<sup>155</sup>

The fourth view, that of Mīmāṃsakas, is also not correct since that rules out the necessity of the presence of the Lord. They accept the Apauruseyatva of the Vedas but they have no faith in the existence of the Lord.

Vādirāja refutes this view very skillfully, saying that the Mīmāṃsakas are Anāthas or orphans whereas he and the like are Sanāthas having care-takers. The Vedas are Apauruseya according to them. If the existence of the Lord is not accepted then, how are the Vedas retained in Pralaya or annihilation and how are they reproduced and articulated at the time of creation. The reproduction and the articulation is possible only when there is a living being such as the Lord. So, the existence of the Lord should be recognised; otherwise, the Vedas might be known as Pauruseya - a view, not accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. Therefore, the existence of God should be recognised by all.

The fifth view which is upheld by the Dvaita system is that the Vedas are Apauruseya and Nitya. They are the sole authority in respect of Dharma, Adharma and the like. They are reproduced and revealed by the Lord exactly in the same way in each Kalpa.<sup>156</sup> Thus the Vedas should be recognised as primary and ultimate source of evidence. As irrespective of any Kalpa and Yuga they remain authority, one can understand

properly as to what is right (Dharma) and what is wrong (Adharma) by studying the eternal Vedas. And moreover, the effects or the results (fruits) of the Vedic hymns are also experienced by so many aspirants.<sup>157</sup> The Vedas are so called since they convey the sense of Dharma.<sup>158</sup>

The Vedas are uncreated and as such they are not defective due to the inclination of personal attachment. Because, the inclination of personal attachment may be found where the works are written or composed by some persons of same sect. Or, sometimes it is found in case of close relatives on account of relative intimacy towards them. But the Vedas are neither written by any person nor are they defective due to the inclination of personal attachment. So this is the primary and ultimate source of truth and of knowledge of the Lord.<sup>159</sup>

#### CRITICISM OF CĀRVĀKAVĀDA

In general outlook, materialism represents the tendency that seeks to reduce the higher to the lower or explain the higher phenomena in the light of the lower ones.<sup>160</sup>

The Cārvāka of Indian Materialism seems to be an old system and is known as the atheistic or Materialistic School of Indian Philosophy. The reference about this system, are

found even in the Pre-Buddhistic and the Buddhistic literature.<sup>160A</sup> The founder of this system is known as Br̥haspati. The references to this system, are also seen in the Upaniṣadic literature.

The main tenets of this system are described thus:

1. Earth, water, fire and air are the four elements.
2. Bodies, senses, and objects are the results of the different combinations of the elements.
3. Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast.
4. Soul is nothing but conscious body.
5. Enjoyment is the only end of human life.
6. Death itself is the liberation.<sup>161</sup>

Vādirāja refutes the views of the Cārvāka system logically.

The epistemology of the Cārvāka system is that the perception alone is the valid means (Pramāṇa) of knowledge. But this belief is not sound. Because, if perception alone is admitted as the Pramāṇa, then this statement itself becomes invalid. The perception is the contact between the sense-organs and their objects. Everywhere and at all times this type of contact is impossible. In that case one has to advocate some reliable statements causing the same

sense. If one does not make any statements, then one cannot make others know the things or gain the knowledge.<sup>162</sup> Because, the very statement is verbal testimony which is not accepted as a valid means of knowledge by the Cārvāka. Thus, he cannot open his mouth to convince others or to teach others. When a statement is made as "Perception alone is Pramāna" and if this statement is accepted as valid, then the very statement becomes invalid. If it is not considered as valid, then also it is useless. Thus, by both, there is futility in advocating and accepting perception as the only means of valid knowledge. The invalidity accrues with the means when they fail to convey the sense and do not denote the objects to be denoted.<sup>163</sup> So the theory of Pramāna, advanced by the Cārvākas is not acceptable since it does not fulfil the required conditions. Thus, the verbal testimony becomes valid as it has not faced adversity in any way. The single Pramāna i.e., perception cannot protect the Cārvākas, as it causes injury to themselves.<sup>164</sup>

As Anumāna (inference) is not considered as a valid means, the Cārvāka has to shut his mouth in scholarly debates. Because, there he cannot participate since he cannot advance any arguments. Advancing arguments is the core of inference. When the inference is not accepted, there is no scope for arguments. The knowledge of perceptive observance cannot

clear the doubts of opponents and satisfy them. Thus, he becomes ineligible and incompetent to participate in the debates.<sup>165</sup> If something is said about the thing perceived, it does not convey any sense, since that expression itself is invalid. If he argues for validity to that, then it is but inevitable that he has to accept both Anumāna and Śabda as valid. Then only he can advance arguments. Even when he does not argue, his silence cannot disregard and debar the possibility of the validity of inference.<sup>166</sup>

The rejection of inference and verbal testimony narrows down the scope to express our thoughts and ideas which cannot be perceived.<sup>167</sup> So, those who incline to think and to discuss, should necessarily and involuntarily or voluntarily resort to the inference and verbal testimony.

Accepting perception as the only valid means of knowledge and at the same time rejecting the validity to inference and testimony is not helpful to gain knowledge. Therefore, one has to accept the validity of all the three means of knowledge, namely perception, inference and testimony.<sup>168</sup> C.D.Sharma has rightly observed- "The Cārvāka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference... Thoughts and ideas, not being material objects, cannot be perceived, they can only be inferred..."

Pure perception, in the sense of mere sensation, cannot be regarded as a means of knowledge unless conception of thought has arranged into order and has given meaning and significance to the loose threads of sense-data."<sup>169</sup>

Vādirāja discusses the invisible destiny before coming to the description of the Jīva or embodied soul connected with this. It is said that Cārvākas have not accepted the theological truths such as Adrsta,<sup>170</sup> Karma and the like. We cannot deny the possibility of invisible destiny for it is this that has caused difference among the individual souls. The perceptible body, organs etc., cannot be held as the cause of this difference. Because, both the poor and rich may have similarity in their physic and desire. But even then such a notable difference is seen in the society. Thus, when the effect is clearly seen there must be a cause. When the cause is not seen, it cannot be said that effect resulted without the cause. The cause and the effect relation is a universal principle and it cannot be disregarded by any one. So, here an invisible cause Adrsta is to be accepted inevitably.<sup>171</sup> And this Adrsta differs from person to person and is also under the control of the Lord.<sup>172</sup>

The view of the Cārvākas that there is no Jīva as such,

apart from the body, is critically examined at length and refuted by Vādirāja. Just being dependent or being controlled by this Adṛṣṭa, the Jīva performs the activities causing different results. If Caitanya or consciousness is accepted as the very body then what is the difference between a living body and a dead body? - asks Vādirāja.

If the existence of the Jīva is not accepted on account of the presence of the sense-organs, one cannot differentiate a living body from a dead one. It cannot also be said that the breathing is the standard since we cannot perceive the breathing in the case of minute bodies like insects etc. So one has to accept the existence of soul in the body.<sup>173</sup> The Cārvāka's contention of this kind is the result of their epistemological point of view. As perception cannot behold the Jīva and prove its existence they took it for granted that there is no Jīva besides the body.

The Cārvāka says that the consciousness in the body, originates by the proportionate combination of the material elements - earth, water, wind, and fire<sup>174</sup> like the red colour that originates by the combination of pan-leaf, arecanut and lime. If it is accepted, then, why should the consciousness not be present in a dead-body wherein there are all the four elements. According to the Cārvāka, consciousness should also exist in a dead body.<sup>175</sup>

But this view is not correct. Because, the reddish colour that results from the combination of leaf, arecanut and lime, is also material unlike non-material consciousness. So whatever is not there in any constituents of a cause, cannot get resulted in the product. Consciousness is not an attribute of any of these constituents. So their combination cannot produce consciousness. On account of the proximity of red flower, marble appears red and that redness cannot be brought in formless air by any means. In the same way, if there would have been consciousness in any one of the constituents of the cause then the theory of Cārvākas would have been correct. But consciousness, an attribute of non-matter Jīva cannot be considered as a product of material elements.<sup>176</sup> The gathering of hundred blind persons cannot give rise to visual power, but only with the help of a visioned person there can be visual power. In the same way, a body also can live only when it is associated with Jīva an embodiment of consciousness. And moreover, with artificial means, a body cannot be made active or to live. Because, a well-painted eye in a picture can behold nothing. So one has to accept the existence of the Jīva voluntarily which is entirely distinct from the material body. Thus, one is called Dehī.<sup>177</sup> The term Dehī can thus be explained as one having a material body. Thus the derivative explanation also proves the existence of Jīva who is entirely different from the material body.<sup>178</sup>

The Jīva as different from the material body, can be established with reasoning. The just born infant voluntarily inclines towards breast-feeding. That infant is in no way taught regarding breast-feeding by anybody. It is the impact of past life (experience) that it inherits the experience and feels happy in breast-feeding. Here, there is not the same body to retain the experience. And it is seen clearly that the consciousness of an experience is not an attribute of the body. So, on this ground, one can infer the presence of Jīva apart from the body. It is something other than the body that constitutes the attributes such as consciousness, knowledge and the like and that is the Jīva.<sup>179</sup> Thus, the body may change whereas Jīva is the same since he is carrying the experience of past-lives, like food may change but experience of food-taken can be retained. In the same way, the body is different and the Jīva is different. If this is not accepted then breaking, splitting, cutting etc., would have to be attributed to the consciousness element which is not desirable.<sup>180</sup> Hence the Jīva is different and eternal.

When the existence of the Jīva is accepted, it cannot be said that he is formless. The nature (form) of the Jīva is of Jñāna and Ananda. The nature of Jñāna and Ananda is to be accepted since it is asserted in the Vedas<sup>181</sup> (Śruti) that the Jīva is the Pratibimba of Iśvara and it is described

in the Śrutis that the liberated souls experience all sorts of blissful enjoyments. As God is an embodiment of (nature of) unlimited and eternal Jñāna, Ananda and other auspicious qualities, the Jīvas being Pratimba of God, are also embodiments of eternal Jñāna, Ananda and the like, but "a limited scope. The reason also does not come in the way of proving the nature of Jñāna and Ananda to Jīva. As atomic form and nature is recognised and accepted in the case of atoms, likewise nature of Jñāna and Ananda can be accepted in the Jīvas.<sup>182</sup> As the minute atomic form and nature is invisible, in the same way the nature of Jñāna and Ananda of Jīvas is also invisible to our material eyes. As the atomic form (Parimandalya etc.,) can be recognised with the help of the advanced and scientific instruments; in the same way, the nature and form of the Jīva can also be recognised and realised by the divine power of sight. Thus, as atoms have the eternal atomic nature in the same way the Jīvas also have the nature of Jñāna and Ananda. They are lusture-natured or formed.<sup>183</sup>

It may also be sometimes questioned "why not the Jīvas be formless like ether?". But Vādirāja says that even the ether has its own form and nature. The natural form, giving scope to space for all, is the form of the ether. And moreover, it looks blue from a distance. In the same way

everything has its own nature and form. At this juncture, Vadirāja ridicules the Nirakāravāda of the Advaitins.<sup>184</sup> He states that everything is (including the Lord) having the form of Jñāna and Ananda.<sup>185</sup> The acceptable view is that the Jīva is lustrous and all his minute parts such as face, hands, feet etc. are also lustrous. Moreover, it is but practical experience to everyone that material should be different from non-material.<sup>186</sup> In this body made of material elements, fire has its own form; in the same way, let there be form to that also (Jīva) made of pure lusture. We do find the references regarding the lustrous and other formed Jīvas in their respective worlds.<sup>187</sup> So all the Jīvas are of the nature of bliss and knowledge and possess the limbs of Jñāna-nanda which are eternally real.<sup>188</sup> Otherwise, they cannot be treated as Pratibimbas of the Lord. The Pratibimba, although being entirely different, carries the same nature and form of Bimba as seen everywhere. Bimba Lord is of the nature of Jñāna and Ananda, so Pratibimbajīvas are also of the nature of Jñāna and Ananda. The Śruti also supports this view.<sup>189</sup> Hence, the form with hands, feet etc., is natural to the Jīvas, as being closely attached to this; the Linga-deha has also the form (of the same kind). And these Linga-dehas are made of Prakṛti contents. These contents of Prakṛti have atomic form. So, they themselves cannot take the form of hands, feet etc. So, it is by the close association with the

Svarūpa-body of Jīva (having the form of hands, feet etc.) Linga-dehas have the form of feet, hand, etc. Linga-dehas are the garments, made of Prakṛti. of Svarūpa body of Jīva. The Linga-deha gets the form of Svarūpa body of Jīva.<sup>190</sup> So the form of hands, feet etc., is there in the Jīvas naturally and eternally and Linga-Śarīra (form) is like the garment of that.<sup>191</sup> Otherwise let all the material products (forms) have the hands, feet etc., of their own like human beings, which is impossible and impracticable. Therefore, a natural and of its own kind form must be accepted in the case of the Jīva.<sup>192</sup>

Vādirāja then attacks the ethics of the Cārvākas. He says that the Cārvākas' ethics is not at all the ethics on account of the absence of any morals in the system. The doctrines of any philosophical system should have the base of morals or ethics. The system becomes sound and firm if it is supported by ethics.

The ethics of Cārvākas is a path unrestricted and unrestrained. Every one is given freedom of all kinds and of all sorts. It preaches the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. When the core of life is spoiled, when the society is polluted; the Cārvākas cannot control or overcome the misfortunes since there is no steps in his system to control all that.<sup>193</sup>.

The freedom sanctioned by Cārvāka system may lead to excess indulgence of worldly enjoyments, and that in course, indeed, causes bad results. Excess eating leads to indigestion and the like. So taking into consideration all these, one has to conclude that, everything has got its own limitations. Identifying and realising the limitations, one should try his best to gain the pleasure not mixed with displeasure.<sup>194</sup>

The scholars do not like the path of Cārvākas as it leads to troubles and then displeasure. And the illiterate do not require the help of Cārvāka system. Thus neither the wise nor the layman prefer this system. So, on account of its uselessness the Cārvāka system has become non-effective like the impotent weapons having no power.<sup>195</sup> There is no topic (good) to be studied and there is no proper relation among these as there is no utility. So the whole Cārvāka system lacks in having essential qualifications of a system (Visaya, Adhikārī, Prayojana and Sambandha). K.T.Pandurangi has rightly observed the defective ethics of the Cārvākas: "... This will certainly make his life and the life of his fellow-beings miserable because of excessive indulgence. No civics or ethics is possible for a selfless society."<sup>196</sup> C.D.Sharma remarks, "The ethics of the Cārvāka is a crude individual hedonism; pleasure of the senses in this life and that too of the individual is the soul end."<sup>197</sup>

CRITICISM OF JAINISM AND BUDDHISM

After bringing out the futility of the Carvākavada, Vādirāja takes up the Jainism and the Buddhism for critical consideration. Both these systems are being referred to simultaneously on account of similarities in so many aspects between them.

According to Vādirāja, the attack of the Buddhism and the Jainism on the Vedic religion is surprising. Their argument is, when killing of beasts is a sin in ordinary cases, then it must also be a sin in sacrifices. They question as to why alone killing of animals, in ordinary cases, is a sinful act? But they must know that Dharma and Adharma are super-sensuous elements and cannot be ascertained by inference. The inference cannot act independently since it is always dependent either upon perception or on testimony.<sup>198</sup> The baseless argument may even prove right what is actually wrong, like drinking of liquor may be admissible as it is also a liquid like milk. Hence, baseless inference is of no use. If baseless reason is resorted to, then, cutting the head of a person, just to relieve him from the bondage of Samsāra may also become a worthy act. So reason, unsupported, cannot be a Pramāna in ascertaining the Dharma and Adharma or what is sin and what is not. Vādirāja says that only on the basis of reason, eating of meat cannot be

prohibited which is done by the Jainas.<sup>199</sup> Because, as rice is the product of five elements, meat also is a produce of five elements. On this reason, eating of meat cannot be prohibited and for that one can kill animals. Thus the Jainas have to accept killing of animals and eating their meat.<sup>200</sup>

The total non-violence<sup>201</sup> is impossible and impracticable. Even the Jainas directly or indirectly engage in violence. While constructing the Jaina temples, during roaming about of the Jaina monks, lakhs of creatures are mercilessly slain. Holding the peacock feather and eating the salt etc. are also the acts of violence.<sup>202</sup>

The Jainas accept only two types of Jīvas, the liberated and bound. Vādirāja urges for the acceptance of the third, supreme Cetana (God) who is the doer of all the deeds in this world.<sup>203</sup>

Vādirāja takes up then the Svabhāvavāda<sup>204</sup> of the Buddhists.<sup>205</sup> According to this Vāda, matter acts on its own accord with the help of its intrinsic nature.<sup>206</sup> But, this is not sound because the Svabhāva accepted by the Buddhists is also Jada (insentient) like a pot. As pot cannot move by itself, in the same way, the Svabhāva, being Jada, cannot move and make the object move and act.<sup>207</sup> If Svabhāva is

regarded as Ajada (sentient) and Asvatantra (dependent) then also Svabhava is to be initiated by some Svatantra (independent) being. Because an Asvatantra being cannot do anything independently. It does require the help of a Svatantra being. And it cannot be said that let there be an individual Cetana (activating element) to each Svabhava. Because, then there may be limitless Svatantra beings acting in their own way creating chaos and confusion. So it is not tenable to admit limitless individual Svatantra beings. If an Independent Cetana is accepted, then, it would prove that the Buddhists differ only in terminology. Because, the Lord is the Independent Cetana who initiates and activates the whole world.<sup>208</sup> As a Cetana potter is required to produce and shape the pot, a supreme Cetana must also be there to create this wonderful world.<sup>209</sup> If Svabhava is the cause of everything then it should bestow upon the Buddhist the liberation. His engagement in the practice of rigid vows would be useless. So Svabhava of a Jada should be initiated by an Ajada or Cetana.

Even the unseen things like sin and merit cannot make the man act and attain the cherished goal. Because, they are also Jadas. To make them active, the help of a Cetana is required. It is only the God who makes them active. The power of activating the Jada, being present in That, is seen

clearly. Narasiṁha, who came out of a pillar and protected Prahlāda. So, He alone is Omnipresent and He alone dwells in the hearts of all to control and activate.<sup>210</sup> Thus even the Svabhāva of Jada is under the control of the Lord. Vādirāja, in this respect, cites some other examples and shows that Jada cannot act without the initiation of the Lord. Even the destiny cannot play its role without the help of the Lord. Adr̥sta or destiny becomes active only when the Lord minds it to be active. Thus Adr̥sta is also under the control of the Lord.<sup>211</sup> The logic also corroborates this view as all the effects (products) pre-suppose the presence of the doer. So, there cannot be found even a single instance where this law is violated.<sup>212</sup> So, Jada acts when motivated by Ajada. So the Lord is the controller and regulator of all. The Svabhāvādin cannot reply, when questioned, as to why gem alone has lustre and not in case of other stones, since gem is also a type of stone. It is the will of the Supreme-Controller that the gem should be lustrous. It does not mean that, the importance of the Svabhāva of objects is totally ignored. The Svabhāva of objects is accepted to the extents of the intrinsic capacity in the form of the eligibility as such. The raw-material mud has its own Svabhāva of becoming pot which is not seen in other things. Thus Svabhāva is not ignored and to make it active, the initiation of the Lord is necessary. Thus originally,

all the Jadas such as Svabhava, Karma, Adṛṣṭa etc.,<sup>213</sup> are inactive and they become active by the favour of the Cetana Lord.<sup>214</sup> Thus Svabhava establishes the existence of the Lord. The Svabhava cannot be said to be one uniformly present in all objects. It differs from object to object and place to place. It is the eternal will of God, that wills that with gradation the Svabhava should be different in all objects. And this difference of Svabhava is practically seen when one is blind and another is deaf. If it (Svabhava) were one and alone, blindness and deafness would have been there in all and there should not be difference between the two. But it is not so. Therefore, the Svabhava is different and unique in all objects.<sup>215</sup>

Likewise, Karma cannot be treated as an independent cause of all effects. It is also dependent and controlled by the Lord.<sup>216</sup> If it is held that Karma is the sole cause of birth and death etc., then, in practical life, killer-killed relation would become meaningless. And there cannot be any sin when one is slain, saying that he is slain due to his Karma. So it is not the cause of any effect. Like the Svabhava it also acts when being initiated by the Lord. The importance of Karma is accepted in this context as that of the Svabhava. Thus, Karma also seeks the help of a Cetana Lord. So, it is inevitable that one has to accept the

existence of the Supreme Lord who controls and activates all (the whole world) such as Svabhāva, Karma and the like.<sup>217</sup>

Thus, in this context, a few views of the Jainism and Buddhism are tackled, combindly. The excess indulgence in Ahiṃśā, the concept of Jīva, the Svabhāvavāda etc., are criticised; and with reason of practical value and authority, the existence of the Lord as the Sovereign and Supreme activating Agent is established.

#### THE RĀMĀYANA SVATASTVA (Self-validity of Knowledge)

M. Hiriyanna writes: 'Indian theories of knowledge are divisible broadly into two classes- one maintaining the self-validity (svatah-pramānya) of knowledge; and the other contending that it needs to be validated by an extraneous means (paratah-pramānya). In the former view, whenever knowledge arises, the presumption is that it is right; and verification becomes necessary only when there is some circumstance throwing doubt upon it. In the latter case, knowledge by itself guarantees nothing in this respect; and its truth or falsity is to be ascertained through some appropriate test.'<sup>218</sup>

In the system of Madhva the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge is the consideration of any knowledge as valid

by the intuitive agent (*Sakṣin*)<sup>219</sup> which experiences that knowledge without being hindered by any defects or any other obstruction.<sup>220</sup>

It is a well discussed topic in Indian philosophy. Whether the validity of the knowledge has its origin through the same conditions that produce the knowledge or by any other external conditions, and whether the ascertainment of the validity of knowledge is through the same conditions that make us to ascertain the knowledge or by any other external conditions. *Vādirāja* examines the question whether the validity of the knowledge needs external verification or not.

The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* opine that validity of experience or knowledge requires external verification. According to them, both validity and invalidity are originated and ascertained by the external conditions that are instrumental to the rise of knowledge.<sup>221</sup> It is called Pramānya-Paratastva.<sup>222</sup> They argue that if validity and invalidity were to be intrinsic then knowledge of any kind should not be false. But there arises falsity of knowledge. And hence we have to depend upon some external conditions for the validity. This school holds that knowledge is apprehended by mental perception whereas its validity is inferred by correspondence or texts. Hence, Pramānya is Paratastva.<sup>223</sup>

The Mīmāṃsakas<sup>224</sup> and the Advaitins<sup>225</sup> contend that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic.<sup>225A</sup>

The Bhāṭṭa view, referring to the Jnātata, (cognizedness) states that validity is inferred through this Jnātata.<sup>226</sup> Therefore, here validity is intrinsic, only in name and not in reality.

The Prabhākaras say that validity results from the knowledge itself and there is no invalidity at all.<sup>227</sup>

The Sāṅkhyas hold the view that both validity and invalidity are innate.<sup>228</sup> Both are organic to knowledge.

The Dvaita view is that validity is intrinsic with reference to its origin and ascertainment.<sup>229</sup> Both the knowledge and its validity are cognized by the Sāksin,<sup>230</sup> whereas invalidity originates by the defects associated with the instruments of the knowledge.<sup>231</sup> In the Siddhānta, it is the nature of Sāksin, that, gaining the knowledge of objects grasps its validity also without any external aid or verification.<sup>231A</sup> In common practice it is seen that when we acquire the knowledge of an object, we proceed to deal with that. It means, here validity of that knowledge is also gained. If at all, there is any need to verify the validity, then

there would not have been any hasty dealing with the object known.

The acceptance of the *Sāksin* is necessary because of the limitations of other means of knowledge such as mind and the senses.<sup>232</sup> It is evident that, knowledge derived through the sense-organs, sometimes, if not always, needs correction by the subsequent evidences. It may be better Pratyakṣa, inference or other means. And these means and tests, sometimes, would need further tests, and then as a result, that may lead to endless regression.<sup>233</sup> And moreover, different persons require different degrees of verification for validity of their knowledge. What satisfies one may not satisfy another. Thus there is no end. The problem at this stage stands unsolved in the hands of all the philosophers. But it is Madhva who has pointed out the principle of *Sāksin*, which is termed as Svarūpendriya of the knowing self and which is capable to reveal itself and its contents. Both knowledge and its validity are grasped by the *Sāksin* in the ultimate analysis. So far as invalid knowledge is concerned, the *Sāksin* cognizes the cognitive aspect of invalid cognition that is the bare content of cognition.<sup>234</sup> And its invalidity is ascertained by the *Sāksin* indirectly through Visamvāda and other tests.<sup>235</sup>

In the case of erroneous experience such as mistaking a rope for a serpent or Sukti for Rajata, the Sāksin is obstructed and it does not grasp the validity. It is the Manas that hastens to grasp the experience as valid and also initiates the action.<sup>236</sup> And when the error is realized later, that validity of experience is given up. And where there is no obstruction by any Dosa, the Sāksin obtains valid experience and also the validity of the knowledge without waiting for the need of any verification.<sup>237</sup> The insistence of verification in all cases, is unnecessary and impracticable. Because in that case, as already mentioned, there would arise the defect of Anavasthā - a chain of never ending experiences.<sup>238</sup> E.g. if the experience of water is to be verified by the experience of quenching the thirst, then the latter will also need further verification by another experience to prove that as not false. And then that experience may also require another experience to prove it real. Thus, there could be no end in this direction.<sup>239</sup> So, to avoid this never ending verifications, one has to accept the self-validity of the experience which is the very nature of the Sāksin. And this is capable of having knowledge and ascertaining its validity by itself. C.D.Sharma writes "The fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided since the knowledge of the external condition which is said to validate any knowledge, being itself knowledge, would require another external condition to validate it.

Hence, all knowledge must be regarded as self-valid.<sup>240</sup> There may be instances, where the error arises. But they are exceptions and not a rule.

In fact the Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas do not insist on any verification in the case of the inferential knowledge on the basis of Vyāpti (invariable concomitance). They opine that when Vyāpti and other ingredients of an inference are faultless, there is no need for further verification. Vādirāja, defends and argues that if that would be the case, then why the Sākṣin should not be given such a privilege when there are no Dosas in the gained experience.<sup>241</sup> And moreover, the inference is also not an independent Pramāṇa as it needs the data of either Pratyakṣa or of verbal testimony. So the Sākṣin should be admitted without any hesitation. The Sākṣin is the name of the spiritual sense-organ of the self through which it intuits its experiences.<sup>242</sup> But this instrument of intuition is not something different from the self (Pramāṭa). And this Sākṣin is competent to know its own flawless nature and the validity of the tests applied without resorting to further tests. The Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa is self-luminous, self-explicable, self-certifying and uncontradictable.<sup>243</sup> Thus, the Sākṣin is capable of ascertaining the validity of the knowledge obtained by it. The verification is needed only to remove obstructions that cause erroneous experience.

When once these obstructions are removed, the validity of even those experiences will be ascertained by the *Sakṣin* itself.<sup>244</sup>

Thus, it is evident that the validity of knowledge arises from the same conditions that give rise to that knowledge, and the validity of knowledge is ascertained from the same factors through which knowledge arises or as soon as knowledge arises. That means, ascertainment of validity of knowledge does not wait for further verification. And so far as the invalidity of knowledge is concerned, it is governed by external conditions.<sup>244A</sup>

The theory of self-validity of knowledge, in the hands of *Mīmāṃsakas* and others does not conform itself to be purely subjective though they define and claim to be so, as they have not accepted the concept like *Sakṣin*, which is inner-intuitive organ. Their advocating this theory is only to over come objective difficulties. (*Anavastha*- endless regression etc.).<sup>244B</sup>

The credit goes to Madhva as he, admitting the *Sakṣin*, which is none other than the inner sentience; has justified the theory as purely subjective and self-authentic. And, hence, criterion of truth need not be conformed and determined by

the criterion of falsity as a model, as misunderstood by some scholars who have not realized the significance of Sāksin.<sup>244C</sup>

By the by, Vādirāja refutes the doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, that the Pratibandhakabhāva<sup>244D</sup> or absence of obstructions is also a cause of effect. It means the Dosabhāva is also the cause of Pramaṇa. But this view is not tenable and acceptable. Because, an obstruction or Pratibandhaka may prevent the result of the effect.<sup>245</sup> And that does not mean that its absence is the cause of effect. Causes are distinct and different. Effect will not take place when these causes are prevented by an obstructing factor for their emergence. When that obstruction is removed, the same causes lead to the effect. Thus, the absence of the obstructing factor cannot be a cause,<sup>246</sup> it may only be a preventive factor that disables the causes to be effective. So the Dosabhāva cannot be the cause of Pramaṇa.<sup>247</sup>

#### CONSIDERATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF ŚRUTI PASSAGES AS TATTVĀVEDAKA AND ATATTVĀVEDAKA

After discussing the problem of self-validity, Vādirāja refutes the contention of the Advaitins that the Śruti passages are both Tattvāvedaka and Atattvāvedaka. The Tattvāvedaka means those passages conveying Truth and the Atattvāvedaka passages are those that give some tentative knowledge, being not true ultimately.<sup>248</sup>

This view of the Advaitins is not tenable since it cuts at the very root of the validity of the Śruti passages admitted by all. The very classification as Tattvāvedaka and Atattvāvedaka is invalid and as such unacceptable.<sup>249</sup> The Vedas are valid by themselves. The validity of the Vedas is established since they are free from human defects of faults. So they are self-valid. Hence treating some passages as Atattvāvedaka is most objectionable.<sup>250</sup>

By the Vādirāja criticises the Mīmāṃsaka view of Kāryatāvāda.<sup>251</sup> S. Dasagupta writes: "This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence."<sup>252</sup> According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Śruti passages become valid only when they become causes and produce effects. To explain, one desirous of heaven, after performing the sacrifice of Jyotiṣṭoma attains heaven. The Śruti passage viz., Jyotiṣṭomena Svargakāmo Yajeta becomes valid as there is Vedic injunction in it. The verb Yajeta is Vedic injunction that points to perform their duties and thus leads to successful activity. Hence, the statement is valid.<sup>253</sup> This is called Kāryatāvāda. They say that the Śruti passages do not convey the sense of accomplished objects (entities) such as the Lord. Therefore, the existence of the Lord is not admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas.

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The Kāryatāvāda of the Mīmāṃsakas involves the factor that the desired objects (Iṣṭaphala) must be an already established entity (Siddhārtha). The statements, that are related to the desired objects, means thereof, and also to the factors of injunction; are authoritative. The heaven, for attaining which they perform the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice, should be a Siddhārtha - an already accomplished or established entity desired by the sacrificer. The Śruti passages that convey the sense of such an entity and means thereof, become valid according to the Mīmāṃsakas. Consequently, the Lord, who is also an established entity (Siddhārtha) and who is glorified by all the Śruti passages as limitless in their primary and ultimate implications should also be admitted. Thus, by Mīmāṃsakas theory of the Kāryatāvāda also, existence of the Lord is established and all the Śruti passages are self-valid. The validity of the Vedas is thus proved by their theory of the Kāryatāvāda. So Siddhārthabodhakatva does not come in the way of the eternity and validity of the Vedas.<sup>254</sup>

Otherwise Asti Ayuh (Life-span is there) and such other statements may become invalid or meaningless since they also convey the sense of an established aspect viz., life-span. Therefore, the view upheld by Madhva, is defectless and right. According to him, all the Vedas are Tattvāvedaka and as such they convey the valid knowledge of the Truth. Treating some Śruti passages as Atattvāvedaka is, therefore, wrong.<sup>255</sup>

There may be some passages that appear to contradict the import of other passages. This apparent contradiction should be removed by changing the word-meaning with the help of implications of purport. Thus we cannot disregard those passages just because they apparently contradict others. Vadiraja contends that if two cows fight mutually, to stop the fight one should not kill either of them; on the other hand, one has to try his best to divert one cow by attracting it by grass and the like and thus stop the combat. To stop the combat, as killing a cow is unwanted, in the same way, to remove apparent contradiction, some Śruti passages need not be considered as Ātattvāvedaka and be rejected. The apparent contradiction among the Śruti passages should be removed by just altering the word-meaning with implication.<sup>256</sup> Thus all the Śruti passages convey the knowledge of Truth. And there are no Śruti passages as Ātattvāvedaka as believed by the Advaitins.

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AIKYAŚRUTIS ARE SĀVAKĀSA

There are some Śruti passages called Aikyaśrutis by the Advaitins. That means, those passages that convey the sense of identity expressively such as Tatvamasi, Ātmavedam, Ekamevādvitīyam and others. The Advaitins contend that these Aikyaśrutis convey the sense of identity between the Lord and Jīvatman or embodied soul. But the Aikya mentioned in these

passages does not convey the sense of identity asserts Vādirāja. The term Aikya in the Aikyaśrutis should be understood in different senses such as (1) Similarity, (2) Unity of place, (3) Unity of thought, (4) Unity of scope, (5) Uniqueness of qualities and (6) Uniqueness of independence. The Śruti passages do not give up the intrinsic or inherent sense of their own.<sup>259</sup> The Aikya is Sāvakaśa and hence does not give up the sense of the Advaitic identity. The Sāvakaśatva means restrained with some limitations. Here also the term Aikya is restrained with some limitations. Because everywhere and at all the times, it does not give the sense of identity. Hence, it is Sāvakaśa. The six types of meanings, stated above, should be taken into consideration as per the context.

If the sense of Aikya is pre-eminent, foremost and ultimate, then it would become Niravakaśa or unrestrained with limitations. But everywhere and at all times the Aikya (identity) is not the ultimate sense. It gets sublated on some contexts. Hence, the Aikyaśrutis are not Niravakaśa. Moreover, the meaning of the Aikya mentioned above in six types does not prove the identity by any means. The unity of space means coming together at one place, as Kauravas gathered at one place. In the same way, the term Aikya or unity, never gives the sense of identity.<sup>260</sup>

The term Aikya, according to the Amarakośa, denotes (1) Pradhānatva or pre-eminence, Kevalatva or alone (the state of standing by itself), (3) Anyatva or separateness and (4) First act.<sup>261</sup> So it refers to the Lord who is Pre-eminent. The character of Pre-eminence thus proves the Omniscience of the Lord and also difference from the Jīva and Jada which are not pre-eminent and omniscient. Thus the term Aikya in the Śruti passages conveys the sense of Pre-eminence of the Lord and His difference from all else.<sup>262</sup>

In the Advaita, as Brahman is not an object of knowledge, as it is not the primary import of any Śāstra (Veda), the very classification of Śruti passages as Tattvāvedaka and Atattvāvedaka becomes most untenable. In the same way, considering some passage as Niravakāśa and others Sāvakāśa is also not befitting as entire Śāstra is the product of Ajnāna.<sup>262A</sup>

#### PRAKRITAGUNANIRĀŚANA

As Aikya in the Śruti passages should mean pre-eminence etc., in the same way the term Nirguna also means that the Lord is free from inauspicious qualities. The term Guna means quality of any kind, auspicious and inauspicious. Here, Nirguna<sup>263</sup> does not convey total absence of all qualities. But it conveys the absence of ordinary or common or inauspicious qualities. Material qualities are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.<sup>264</sup>

All these qualities bind the soul and become the cause of his Samsara and the qualities such as delusion, jealousy and the like cause grief. The Lord is free from all these inauspicious and common qualities. So Nirguna means absence of such material and inauspicious qualities, and does not mean total absence of qualities. Thus, the Nirguna Sruti<sup>264A</sup> should be interpreted properly. So it should be understood as absence of inauspicious qualities.<sup>265</sup>

There are some passages such as Esaḥ Sarveśvaraḥ<sup>266</sup> which declare primarily the ultimate supremacy of the Lord. Here, since the meaning is not restrained, this is Niravakaśa statement. Thus, the unrestrained passages never give up the primary sense.<sup>267</sup>

When the sense of the term is restrained, it should be understood in a different fashion and sense. This change or alteration, on implication, is introduced elsewhere also. For example, the statement Na hiṁsyat<sup>268</sup> has its scope restrained out side the sacrifices. The statement is not valid everywhere.

Here Nirguna etc., are Savakāśas and Esaḥ Sarveśaḥ etc., are Niravakaśas. Savakāśa passages are to be understood in favour of Niravakaśa statements.

Vadiraja in defence of this quotes the statement of God Śiva given in the Padmapurāṇa. The Lord Śiva critically examines and explains the term Nirguna as devoid of all unworthy and ordinary qualities. So this is the true and real meaning of Nirguna passages.<sup>269</sup>

Vādirāja might be asked as to why Abhedāśrutis alone are Sāvakaśa and Bhedaśrutis are Niravakaśa. The reply is that the reason is obvious. Passages like Dvā suparnā convey the sense of two different objects. So when the primary meaning as well as the meaning by implication denote two objects of different nature clearly, there is no scope to get the meaning changed. So in such statements, simultaneously, mind gets acquainted with two different entities of two different intrinsic natures. There is no need to imply any other sense. Thus, the unrestrained (Niravakaśa) statements are ever valid and their sense is not contradicted. They always convey the reliable and proper sense.

So all these Śruti passages glorify the ultimate supremacy of the Lord and declare the difference between the Lord and the Jīva.<sup>270</sup> The word Nirguna refers to the Lord, who is also called Nārāyaṇa. So this Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahman and Eternal as He was there even before the creation. Like a pot, He is not created and not affected by any material

and ordinary qualities that throw one into the cycle of birth and death. On the other hand, He is endowed with unlimited auspicious qualities such as bliss, knowledge and the like. The derivative explanation of the word Brahman is an embodiment of unlimited auspicious qualities. And the word Nārāyana also signifies the same sense when explained etymologically. Arah means demerits, Nārah means auspicious qualities (merits), Ayanam means chief or primary source and substratum. Thus Nārāyana, who is Nirguna, is Brahman<sup>271</sup> an embodiment of numberless auspicious qualities and devoid of any material qualities. He is the primary object of glorification of all the Vedas as described in the Brahma-sūtras.<sup>272</sup>

After explaining the meaning of the Nirguna-śrutis, to substantiate his explanation, Vādirāja quotes the passages from the Nārāyanopanisad, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa and others and explains their import. He also points out that passages like Neha nānāsti declare that there is no difference between the Lord and His qualities. Vādirāja also points out that there is no such restriction as a rule to split the Śruti passage: Kevalo Nirgunasca as Advaitins contend, but it can also be split as Kevalo anirgunasca. Then, it explicitly states that the Lord alone is Supreme and an embodiment of auspicious qualities.

A CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE NĀRĀYANOPANISAD : SUPREMACY  
OF LORD VIŚNU

Vādirāja, in this chapter, quotes the Nārāyanopanisad and critically examining it, justifies that Nārāyana is the Lord Brahman. He alone can be called Lord Brahman and none else.

All the attributes of Brahman are referred to Lord Nārāyana, glorified in the Purusasūkta<sup>272A</sup> and in well known other Śruti passages. Hence Ultimate Truth or prime gist of all the statements is that Nārāyana, indeed, is the Lord Brahman (an embodiment of everlasting auspicious qualities). At the commencement of the Śruti as Upakrama and at the end as Upasamhara, Lord Nārāyana is referred to and glorified as Brahman.<sup>273</sup>

So in the opinion of learned Vedic scholars, who pursue an impartial inquiry about the Ultimate Truth (primary sense) of the Śruti passages, Lord Nārāyana is the Supreme God and He is the Brahman being endowed with unlimited auspicious qualities.<sup>274</sup>

The word Nirguna can be read as Anirguna, since there is no prescription for dissolving the conjunction of the words of Upanisads.<sup>275</sup> Then Anirguna wherein the two negative

prefixes, gives the positive sense. Thus Śruti can be read as Kevala and Anirguna, that means Lord alone is Supreme and is endowed with qualities. So the term Anirguna throws away the sense of Nirguna as absence of Guna. And these attributes or qualities of the Lord are not momentary but they are eternal and always real.<sup>276</sup> Thus, all the words, in the Vedas describe the glorious majesty of the Lord (one or other auspicious attributes of the Lord). So the word negating the attributes of Brahman is totally unseen in the Veda.

#### REFUTATION OF THE CONCEPT JĀTI OR SĀMĀNYA OF TĀRKIKAS

S.Dasagupta writes "Samanya is the fourth category. It means the genus or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things. Thus, in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have such a sameness that we call them cows. In spite of all diversity in all objects around us, they are all perceived as Sat or existing. The Sat or existence is thus a sameness, which is found to exist in all the three things, Dravya, Guna and Karma. The sameness is called Sāmānya or Jati, and it is regarded as a separate thing which rests on Dravya, Guna and Karma."<sup>277</sup>

The Jati<sup>278</sup> according to the Tarkikas, is the property

which is peculiar to a class and distinguishes it from all others. It is an essential characteristic of species as Gotva of cows, Aśvatva of horses and the like.<sup>279</sup> It is a common and equally applicable property of the entities. And it is being referred to by similar terms. According to them Jāti is that which helps to recognise the entities as similar.<sup>280</sup>

In connection with the exact meaning of the Jāti, Vādirāja poses following questions: Is it a single means of dealing? Or is it endowed with one property? Or is it of single formed and is it an object of expression with synonymous words?<sup>281</sup> He opines that the first option is not acceptable to both since, it is well experienced fact that even the entities of similar type are dealt with and referred to separately as "It is a pot, this is a pot, that is a pot" and the like. So, on the basis of dealings, the Jāti cannot be proved. And the second view is not sound since the expressive dealing in terms will not lead to any identity. As it does not prove the identity, even the third view stands baseless. Because the different and variegated dealings ascertain the fact that there are different and variegated properties. Thus, this discards the claim that the common property of similar kind and of the same magnitude must be there in all the entities of that class. So oneness of common property as Jāti cannot be entertained. The difference is distinct

in all respects; e.g. the offering of Bali for devils and others differs from one to another of the same class. Since it depends upon the individual capability, it is not governed by a common property of any kind.<sup>282</sup>

If it is argued that the Jāti of one class is single and the parts of it are manifested individually in each entity of that class, then it appears that the each entity is the part of that and this proves the absence of an entity of complete Jāti. Then all the pots become only potsherds (Ghata-āṁśas) and there cannot be a complete pot.<sup>283</sup> This also causes impropriety so far as the usage and dealing are concerned.

So the view that the Jāti is one in the entities of the same class, is not tenable. The Ghatatva of one Ghata is peculiar and is related with that Ghata only. Hence, Jatis are to be admitted as innumerable even in one single class of entities. Each entity is governed by its own Jāti. And if it is referred to with one word for the sake of usage and dealing, there is nothing wrong. Because, this does not prove the common property of the entities of one class. The usage with single word is for the convenience of easy dealing and it does not help to prove any Jāti. The property, (Dharma) though appears as if present in all the entities

of that same class, is distinct on account of the difference in entities as shown above.

It may also be held that the similar objects, subject to the similar and common usages and dealings, would be the Vyanjakas and that common and innate property, lying there and which is suggested by the objects, is Vyangya and that is termed Jati. In the expressions, 'This is Ghata (pot)', 'That is Ghata' Ghatas (pots) are similar and they are Vyañjakas and these Vyanjakas denote the common and innate property - Chatatva which is Vyangya.

But, Vadirāja says that this view is not correct. He advocates counter argument questioning that if on account of similar, common dealings and usages, a common innate property (Jati) is traced and admitted then, what is unsound if distinct and manifold properties are traced and admitted for similar and common dealings.<sup>284</sup> Moreover, according to the Tarkikas, expressions are not Nitya and they differ from time to time and place to place even with respect to similar objects. And hence these distinct expressions cannot prove a single common innate property related to all entities of that class.

According to the Tarkikas, even the entities of same

class are different each other. And these entities cannot be held as causes for the apprehension of single, common innate property. Because, as entities (here, marked with the fact of being cause), that are held causes, are manifold and distinct each other; the differentiating characteristic attribute (Kāranatāvacchedakadharma) is also manifold and distinct. If Ghatas, as Kārana, are manifold and distinct, then the fact of their being causes, Kāranatā is also manifold. When Kāranatā is manifold, it is evident that the differentiating characteristic attribute (innate property Kāranatāvacchedakadharma - Ghatatva) is also manifold and distinct.

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Further, if the Jāti is taken to be one, then what happens to that Jāti, when an entity of that class gets affected. When a Ghata is broken, then what happens to that Ghatatva? Either the part manifested, or the complete Jāti, should get affected. But it never happens. Thus, the acceptance of the Jāti in this sense, leads to such manifold absurdities.

#### ABSENCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LORD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES

There is no difference between the attributed (Dharmin) and eternal attributes (Dharmas). Brahman is Dharmin and His attributes are Dharmas. The attributes of Brahman are eternal

and real. So there is no difference between Brahman and His attributes.<sup>286</sup>

It may be mentioned that in the Advaita there is difference between the Lord and His attributes.<sup>287</sup> The Advaitin may be questioned as to what is the reason or ground for him to behold difference between the Lord and His attributes, since he is the rigid and close follower of unreality of difference everywhere. It is wonder to know that he denies difference everywhere but claims difference between the Lord and His attributes. Thus it looks partial and contradictory in the case of the Adyaitins. So all the attributes of Brahman are Brahman-natured (attributed-natured).<sup>288</sup> Even 'difference-cum-identity' (Bhedābheda)<sup>289</sup> cannot be referred to Brahman and His attributes, since neither the few attributes (Dharmas) are destroyed nor the attributed Lord Himself. So the Bhedābheda view is also not tenable. Thus neither Bheda nor Bhedābheda is found reasonable in case of the Lord and His attributes.

#### GUNAMITHYĀTVA<sup>289A</sup> IS NOT POSSIBLE EVEN WITH AIKYA ŚRUTIS

Advaita holds that Brahman is qualityless. The reference of qualities in the Upanisads is not absolutely real. It is not tentative. The Advaitins, in this regard, claim the authority of Aikyaśrutis.

Even the Aikyaśrūtis like Tattvamasi as such cannot prove the unreality of the attributes of the Lord. Because, identity is established if all the qualities are given up. And the attributes are given up when the identity is established. Thus, there would result the defect of mutual dependence.<sup>290</sup> It means when the identity is proved then the absence of attributes is proved. When the absence of attributes is proved then the identity is proved. The eternal and intrinsic attributes cannot be given up on account of the supposed identity-texts. Because, the statement Tattvamasi is Sāvakāśa and can be understood as not complete identity but as similarity. On the basis of Caitanya lying in the Jīva and Paramātman similarity can be traced and not identity in essence. (Svarūpaikya). Whereas there are passages (Niravakāśa śrutis) such as Satyam Jnānamanantaṁ Brahma which cannot be interpreted and understood in different way.<sup>291</sup> If the Aikyaśrūtis are understood as is done by the Advaitins (if the expressive meaning is taken as invalid) then one has to give up the very concept of Brahman.<sup>292</sup> Because, in respect of attributes, if Sattā is Vyāvahārika,<sup>293</sup> and Nityatva means remaining for a longer period, then let it be so even in the case of the very existence of Brahman which is not acceptable even to the Advaitins. Nowhere in the Śrutiś the attributes of the Lord are described as Vyāvahārika but they are stated to be eternal, intrinsic

and real. If the attributes are sublated, then Vyāvahārikatva may be attributed to them. If they are not sublated, they are eternally real. When stand sublated, then the statements, denoting the auspicious attributes, would become invalid. So with a view to safeguard the validity of the statements such as Kevalo nirgunasca and the like they are to be interpreted as absence of material attributes. In case of the passages like Tattvamasi etc., identity is to be understood as similarity with regard to Caitanya element.<sup>294</sup>

#### REALITY AND ETERNITY OF ATTRIBUTES OF THE LORD

The attributes of the Lord are never affected and never get changed. When the nature of Brahman does not get affected, how can the attributes get affected? - asks Vādirāja. So the attributes are real and eternal. And the Śruti also substantiates the view that knowledge, strength and action of the Lord are natural to Him for ever.<sup>295</sup>

The attributes of the Lord are neither of the nature of destruction nor of the nature of change as is the case in Pīlupāka and Pītharapāka of the Vaiśeṣikas.<sup>296</sup> In the Pīlupāka atoms get changed. It means when wet pot is heated then all its atoms are destroyed and they produce a new pot. So in the Pīlupāka, Dharmin or the object gets completely affected. In the Pītharapāka, the object does not get

destroyed or changed, but only its attributes like colour, form and the like get changed. The object remains the same; so in one case, the object is changed and in another attributes are changed.<sup>297</sup>

The attributes of Brahman are not of the nature of getting in either of the manners said above. The Lord does not undergo any type of Paka i.e., He does not get affected by the fire. So the Form, Beauty, Valour, Adventure, Supreme independence and Omnipotence and other attributes of the Lord, are all real and eternally present in Him.<sup>298</sup> And these characteristics of the Lord are not conditional and are not procured by others' favour. So when the Lord is not subjected to destruction, the intrinsic attributes are also not subjected to destruction. The attributes of the Lord such as knowledge and the like, are not created like the knowledge of an ordinary being. They are uncreated and Aprakṛta. When the object is present, absence of its intrinsic attributes, is nowhere found.<sup>299</sup> The attributes of the Lord are Śrutisiddha and are not sublated. Everywhere in general, it is known that, existence of the attributes is regulated by the existence of the object. E.g., as long as there exists the pot (object) so long potness (Ghatatva-attribute) also exists. So undoubtedly, all the attributes of Brahman are eternally real.<sup>300</sup> The natural attributes may

come to an end only when the concerned created entity perishes.<sup>301</sup> As Brahman is eternally Undestroyable, Imperishable, His attributes will never come to an end or never be destroyed. The attributes of the Lord are described in the Śrutis and the Smṛtis as natural, real and eternal and hence are not the nature of Maya.<sup>302</sup> as understood by the Advaitins.<sup>303</sup>

The Vidya and the Avidya are mutually opposite and produce different effects. By the Avidya<sup>304</sup> one cannot gain the Vidya, strength, lusture etc. Because all these are not the products of the Maya. In the same way, like Brahman, His attributes are also not the products of and not related to the Maya. Corroborating with this, one can state logically that all the Dharmas of Brahman are Amayika because they are real, natural and eternal like Brahman.<sup>305</sup> The Maya cannot be said to be an Upādhi (extraneous limiting factor) to Brahman. Because, the Maya is Jada and it cannot have the Lord's qualities like Vyāpyatva, Nityaśuddhatva, Muktatva etc. So the Maya cannot superimpose all these on Brahman. Therefore, the attributes of Brahman cannot be considered as Mayika or products of Maya.<sup>306</sup> Moreover, as this Maya of the Advaita cannot trace and exert its influence on the Jīva directly, how can then it superimpose the extra-ordinary features such as Omnipotence, Omnipresence on Brahman who is the Lord and is Omnipotent. In the Bhāgavata, fifth canto,<sup>307</sup> it is clearly

stated that the knowledge of Brahman never gets related with Maya. So as Brahman is Real, Natural and Eternal likewise His attributes are also real, natural and eternal. The absence of them (non-existence) cannot be thought of. <sup>308</sup>

So far it is proved that Maya as Upādhi or Limiting adjunct cannot be related with the Lord and His attributes. Further it is said that in Bimba and Pratibimba, Bimba or reflection is Upādhi or Pratibimba or reflected. The qualities of the Bimba are seen in the Pratibimba. As the redness of the flower is seen in the nearby crystal. Here, the flower is Upādhi or Bimba and crystal is Pratibimba. Hence, the quality of redness is seen in the Pratibimba crystal. But the relation of Bimba and Pratibimba cannot be referred to Maya since the Lord is Amayika. The Maya cannot be an Upādhi in case of Brahman as is the flower in case of crystal but, it is only an apparent cause or a pretext, a secondary cause.

Now Brahman is the Bimba and the Jīva is the Pratibimba. Brahman is Upādhi and hence on account of that, the attributes such as knowledge and the like of Brahman are seen in the Pratibimba Jīva. To all these attributes, the Lord Brahman, who is Bimba and of the Upādhi state, is the primary cause. So all the attributes, seen the Jīva, are under the control of the Upādhi, i.e. Brahman, whereas the attributes of Brahman

are natural. We cannot ascribe the Aupādikatva to the attributes of the Lord since they are like red colour of a flower. So the qualities of Brahman are seen in the Jīva as reflections.<sup>309</sup> Therefore, the attributes of Brahman are all natural and eternal. This proves that the attributes of Pratibimba that are knowledge and bliss (Jīvasvarūpa) are natural, Brahman is Bimba to all starting from Goddess Lakṣmī to minute beings such as ants and others. Hence, Brahman is real, eternal and is never Nirguna<sup>310</sup> as the Advaitins contend. The relation of Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva between the Lord and the Jīva, is not taken in respect of nature and content but with regard to the control and regulation of the Lord over the Jīva in all respects. The Śruti referred to above, describes the natural qualities of Brahman as Jnāna, Bala, Kriyā and the like. Vādirāja says that Lord Viṣṇu, Saguṇa, Brahman is none other than the Suddha Brahman. We cannot classify Brahman as Suddha and Sabala. Śruti does not permit for this classification. So one has to give up the very concept of Nirguṇatva (attributelessness) and should accept Guṇapūrnatva (perfection).

Now even if Māya is taken for granted as Upādhi, Vādirāja says that Māyikatva cannot be attributed to the qualities of Brahman. In general, a Mayin (magician) creates wonderful things out of Māya. But the very next moment, everything

stands disappeared from our sight. So the created wonderful things may be treated as non-permanent (non-natural) and Maya-generated. But the existence of the magician, his power, efforts, desire and the like do not disappear and hence they are permanent (natural) and real. In the same way, Brahman, His Knowledge, Desire, Action and the like are real and natural. But the world, created by Him though real unlike the created things of a magician, may change now and then.<sup>311</sup> Thus, the Knowledge, Richness etc. of the Lord are natural and they are ever imperishable also, since Brahman is Imperishable. As the attributes of Brahman such as Omniscience and Omnipresence are eternal and natural it cannot be imagined that they would disappear, since the Lord never disappears. Thus, the attributes of the Lord do not get sublated by any means whereas the concept of identity of Brahman and the Jīva stands sublated. Because, so as to have the identity of that kind, according to the Advaita, Brahman should be proved as attributeless (Nirdharmika), which is impossible. Therefore, identity cannot be proved. Hence Brahman cannot be described as Nirguna or attributeless. There are innumerable Śruti passages that extol the majestic glory of Lord Brahman.<sup>312</sup> The glory of the Lord is real. He is the sole supporter of the whole universe. He is the supreme Brahman. And there is no Brahman as Nirguna.<sup>313</sup> The Nirguna Brahman fabricated by the Advaitins

is of no use. Because, It cannot bestow the liberation. And moreover, Vādirāja says that, both the Śrutis and the Smṛtis do not claim the Moksadatr̄tvā to the Nirguna Brahman. It is only Lord Viṣṇu, who bestows liberation (Mokṣa). Thus, in all respects the Nirguna Brahman should be rejected. Even if two Brahmans are imagined and accepted, identity cannot be proved. And this imagination is contrary to the Śruti passage Ekamevādvitīyam.<sup>314</sup> So Brahman is alone and He is all-pervasive and is called Viṣṇu.<sup>315</sup> Due to the reasons cited above, it is highly impossible to ascribe the Nirgunatvā to Brahman. If, with strong attachment or persistence, Nirguna Brahman is accepted then there will be two Brahmans which would go against the Advaita.<sup>316</sup> Thus, the acceptance of Nirguna Brahman, serves no purpose. It cannot be proved by any valid evidence. Further, it leads to rejection of the concept of Advaita. So there is no supreme Brahman other than Viṣṇu-declares Vādirāja.<sup>317</sup>

#### LORD VIṢNU IS THE SUPREME BRAHMAN

Vādirāja promises that Lord Viṣṇu is Supreme. To substantiate this he quotes the statements of the Mahābhārata and the Bhāgavata.

The statements ascribe Parabrahmatvā to Nārāyaṇa and at the same time negate the existence of another Brahman.<sup>318</sup>

All the statements of the Mahābhārata, clearly glorify the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. With reference to the conventional marks of the purport of proposition (Tatparyaliṅgas) such as Upakrama, Upasamhāra, in these verses, the supremacy of the Lord is referred to and is praised at the beginning, in the middle and at the end. So the aim of the statements of the Mahābhārata is to establish the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu.<sup>319</sup>

In the Bhāgavata also it is declared that Lord Viṣṇu is the sole creator, sustainer and destroyer of this universe. It is the Brahmā, appointed by Lord Viṣṇu who creates this world. That means the Lord, gracing his Brahmā-form in Brahmā, creates this world. And in God Śiva, retaining His Śiva-form destroys the world. Thus, Lord Viṣṇu alone possesses all the three powers of creation, protection and destruction. Under His control, both Brahmā and Rudra fulfil their functions.<sup>320</sup>

The attributes of the Lord are innumerable and each one of them is complete in itself, the scope of each is limitless. Even the forms or incarnations of the Lord are also limitless. They cannot be counted. Thus the concept Nirguna-Brahman has no place at all and it is excommunicated in respect of all spaces and times.<sup>321</sup>

REFUTATION OF NIRGUNA<sup>322</sup> BRAHMAN BY INFERENCE

So far it has been shown that the attributelessness (Nirgunatva) is not the import of Śruti and other works. Vādirāja contends that even inference is also not competent to prove attributelessness. Because if it is accepted that there is a Brahman who is devoid of all characteristics, then an aspirant who realises It, would have to become devoid of characteristics. If, with the help of inference etc., Nirguna Brahman is accepted for the attainment of Mokṣa then, Brahman would be possessed of many Gunas or attributes such as Mānā-meyata (the fact of being an object of Pramāṇa) and Jñāna-drśyata (the fact of being an object of knowledge or realisation). And by this, there comes the Vacyata (the fact of being an object of expression) and with this Padārthatā (the fact of being an object) is also attributed.<sup>323</sup> So, this Vastutva wards off the Nirgunatva-view of the Advaitins and proves the Sagunatva-view which the very word Brahman conveys that It being an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities. So the phrase Nirguna Brahman is self-contradictory. The terms Nirguna and Brahman give entirely different and opposite senses.<sup>324</sup>

Now, the Vyavahārikasatyatva<sup>325</sup> cannot be attributed to Nirguna-Brahman, since it is worse than Pratibhāsikasatyatva which is there in the Śuktirajata. In Pratibhāsika level,

at the end (when the superimposed knowledge of Rajata vanishes) there remains Sukti, in time and space. But when the Vyāvahārikasatyatva of Brahman is sublated, there remains nothing. So the Vyāvahārikasatyatva of Nirguna Brahman is more harmful than the Prātibhāsikasatyatva. Because, in the Advaita by the knowledge of Brahman everything stands sublated (becomes unreal). So there is no use of the knowledge Brahman of Vyāvahārikasatya because it gets sublated (proved unreal) at realisation and it does not exist at all the times. So it is not proper to treat an unreal entity (Nirguna-Brahman) as Vyāvahārikasatya. If the Bādhyatva is there in the Bādha (unreality in sublation), then the Abādhyatva, reality is thus proved, (the attributes of Brahman become real). If the Abādhyatva is attributed to the Bādha, then also the very statement proves reality. Thus there would be two real entities that lead to the loss of Advaita once again. And if that Bādha is a Brahman-form then it becomes an attribute of Brahman. The Bādha is the knowledge of non-existence (Abhāva). And if this Abhāva is the form of Brahman, It becomes Jada and then It also, like Bhāva, becomes an object of knowledge. Jadatva, Vastutva and the like then, become the features of Brahman. Thus, by this also, no Nirguna-Brahman can be proved. And if it is held that these attributes are not there in Brahman then there could be no Abhāva also. Thus, there is no Abhāva of negation, which

means absence of Bādhyatva in attributes. Thus they become real. If Nirgunatva is to be known through the Pramāṇas, then Nirgunatva is given up. If it is not to be known through the Pramāṇas, then also it is given up.<sup>326</sup>

So, Hari, an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities, is the Lord (controller-regulator) of all and there is none, who is equal and superior to Him.

#### MADHVA'S APPROACH IS THE RIGHT APPROACH

That path alone is declared as right wherein Lord Hari is worshipped as Gunapūrṇa. And that is not the right path wherein the Lord is not given the state of Supremacy and is not worshipped with supreme devotion. The statement of the Mahābhārata,<sup>326A</sup> clearly states that, that path does not help us to attain the upliftment where Lord Nārāyaṇa is not declared as Gunapūrṇa.<sup>327</sup> So the doctrines that do not declare Nārāyaṇa as Gunapūrṇa, the Purāṇas that do not proclaim the Gunapūrnata of Lord Nārāyaṇa and the Śruti passages that do not state Nārāyaṇa as Gunapūrṇa are all lead to treated as unworthy and/a wrong path.<sup>328</sup> So the approach of Madhva, based on such statements of the Mahābhārata and the like, and wherein the Lord is declared as entirely distinct from this world, as Supreme Being to be worshipped by all and as sole Controller and Regulator, is right.<sup>329</sup>

The Mahābhārata verse in this way gives a clear exposition of the doctrines of Madhva school of philosophy in a nut-shell.

NIRGUNATVA CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THE EVIDENCES OF PURĀNAS AND THE LIKE

There are eighteen Purānas<sup>330</sup> which are classified and called Śaiva, Brahma and Vaiṣṇava<sup>331</sup> (extolling respectively Śiva, Brahme and Viṣṇu). In none of these Purānas there is any reference to Nirguna-Brahman of the Advaitins. So just as their Nirguna-Brahman is placed out of the Śruti texts, he is also excluded from the Purānas. And it is but proper as both the Śrutis and the Purānas have the same purport.<sup>332</sup> Ultimately, all these Purānas do not refer to any attribute-less Brahman besides describing Śiva, Brahme and Viṣṇu.

The purport of the Śrutis can be understood with the help of Itihāsa<sup>333</sup> and Purāna. Accordingly, one has to try his best in understanding the Śruti passages with the help of one's study of the Itihāsa and the Purāna. So the understanding of the Śruti should be in accordance with the purport of the Sātvikapurānas and the Mahābhārata.<sup>334</sup> In this way when the Śruti passages are understood evidently, Viṣṇu will be proved as the Lord Brahman. Vādirāja quotes profusely from the accepted texts to prove the Supremacy of Viṣṇu.

The Advaitins contend that the primary sense of the Śruti passages should be given up and then it is to be said that the Śruti aims at attributeless Brahman. The words Satyam, Jnānam and Ānandam<sup>335</sup> are the terms denoting the attributes of Brahman. So to avoid this, the Advaitins suggest to give up the primary sense of these terms. If this would be the case, then Vādirāja asks that according to the same principle why can't the sense of the term Nirguna (sense of attributelessness) be given up and be understood as devoid of materials attributes? If this is not accepted then neither Nirgunatva nor identity could be proved.<sup>336</sup>

Vādirāja opines that the Advaitin's way of understanding the Śtutis is like starving it to death. That is depriving the Śruti of its proper meaning. So Vādirāja pleads that the Śruti be protected by offering at least limited food (instead of giving up totally the primary purport on implication, it is to be understood in different way, that means not killing but protecting by offering the food). Therefore, instead of giving up completely the primary sense, it is better to have a limited or restricted sense. So, the restricted meaning of the term Nirguna, then, is absence of material qualities.<sup>337</sup>

BRAHMAN IS SAGUNA

So far Sagunatva of Brahman is established by means of scriptural authority and now Vādirāja shows that Sagunatva can be proved by means of reason also. Brahman is endowed with innumerable Bhāvadharmas, since He is eternally liberated. This statement proves the Sagunatva of Lord Viṣṇu and denies the Nirguna concept of the Advaita.<sup>338</sup> Here Muktatva or state of liberation means the state of absence of Bandha or bondage (Samsāra). And this bondage is not there in Acetana or non-sentient. This is also not there in liberated souls.<sup>339</sup> So this bondage is in sentient beings who are not liberated. As there are Bhāvadharmas in objects like pots, likewise, there are also Bhāvadharmas in Brahman. Even if the presence of the Abhāvadharmas in Brahman, is taken into account (the Advaitins claim the presence of the Abhāvadharmas<sup>339A</sup> in Brahman and mode of cognition of those is as Brahman is not an object of Jnāna, Brahman is not Creator and so on), the absence of Samsāra, as one of the Abhāvadharmas, is to be accepted. If Muktatva is not accepted in Mukta Brahman then Baddhatva as in the Jīva, is to be accepted. Even then Bhāvadharmas cannot be negated in Brahman. Here there are two self-contradictions (Vyāhatis). One is, accepting Brahman as Mukta and then attributing Muktatvabhāva to Him and secondly accepting Baddhatva in Him. Because a liberated one can have neither Muktatvabhāva nor Baddhatva.<sup>340</sup> In this

context it must be noted that Vādirāja is not of the view of agreeing Baddhatva to Brahman but states the said view only to refute the views of others. (The Advaitins claim Brahman as Mayabaddha).<sup>340A</sup> According to Vādirāja Baddhatva of Brahman means not the Advaitins' Mayabaddhatva but Baddhatva means bound in the hearts of devotees.

Now both Baddhatva and Muktatva are not at all found in Nirguna Brahman. Therefore, He is to be Saguna. Here Muktatva means absence of Bandha. But this type of Muktatva is not there in Brahman, since He is Nityamukta. Muktatva, in the form of destruction of Bandha, may be seen in the liberated souls, who, for sometime, have been Baddha (in Samsara) and then by the grace of the Lord, have attained the liberation. So, Brahman being Nityamukta, there is no question of Baddhatva and Muktatva. If this Muktatva is admitted in Brahman then once again, it is a self-contradiction.<sup>341</sup>

Now Vādirāja proves Sagunatva with some other arguments. The Advaitins contend that Brahman is Nirguna, being an object of negative cognition.<sup>342</sup> It means He is Abhavaśraya. Vādirāja says that even this Hetu, viz., Abhavaśrayatva does not come in the way of proving Sagunatva of the Lord. Brahman is Saguna on account of being the Abhavaśraya like a Kapala.

or potsherd. In the potsherd, which is Abhāvāśraya of jar, there may not be the characteristics of Ghatatva and others but there are other characteristics such as form, colour and the like. Thus, the Kapāla (an absence of jar) helps us to understand some other characteristics. In the same way Nirguna Brahman may be Abhāvāśraya or object of negative cognition but as a real entity, which is a Pratiyogin or counterpart of Abhāva, or negation becomes Saguṇa. Even if all the characteristics are negated, the characteristic namely Abhāvāśrayatva or the fact of being an object of negative cognition is there and it proves Brahman to be Saguṇa. So making use of Abhāvāśrayatva characteristic (Hetu) in proving Saguṇatva is not a defect. Thus, this Hetu, Abhāvāśrayatva is not seen where there is no Saguṇatva.<sup>343</sup> Otherwise, doubt or question may arise as to the Abhāva of what? So wherever, this Abhāvāśrayatva is seen, there is an entity with some Gūpas. So Saguṇatva is inevitable. There may be Abhāvāśrayatva or not, but there is no harm to Saguṇatva. Muktatva is a Bhāvadharma and thus Brahman is Bhāvadharmin.<sup>344</sup> Here Bhāvadharma means an experience of eternal nature of eternal intrinsic bliss. The Bhavadharmas of Brahman, that are characteristics, are unlimited.

Now, if Vyāvahārika-satyatva<sup>345</sup> or empirical reality is stated for Muktas and to their Muktatva, then also the statement

is self-contradictory in two ways. If Vyāvahārikatva is attributed to liberation, then it is as good as opposing the very Muktatva. Accepting Mukti and rejecting its Dharma viz., Muktatva, is one defect; secondly let one be Mukta but not have Muktatva. It is as good as saying that Brahman is eternal but there is not eternity in Him. So Vyāvahārika-satyatva cannot be attributed to the Lord to prove Him as Nirguna, because He is eternally liberated and hence the question of Vyāvahārikatva does not arise.<sup>346</sup> So rejecting Muktatva in the Mukta, is as good as saying, let there be a Vipra having no Vipratva, "Let one be rich without possessing any money."<sup>347</sup>

Vādirāja asserts that the text Kevalo nirgunasca should be understood as Brahman is Nirguna or devoid of material qualities. The Sruti also declares that Brahman is Blissful as He possesses eternal and unlimited bliss. The Sruti does not discard the blissful nature of Brahman. Because of His Blissful nature, He is called Blissful. When the sense of the term Sukharūpa is evident and not incompatible, there is no reason to give it up and to understand a different sense. Because, Lakṣaṇa functions only when there is a primary sense and the same becomes incompatible.<sup>347A</sup> When the Sruti passages convey compatible sense, there is no need to give up the primary (expressive) sense and understand some other sense.

by implication. The Śruti states Brahman as Sukharūpa, since His very nature is really and absolutely Sukhamaya.<sup>348</sup> If Brahman were not to be a Sukharūpi then the Śruti would not have praised Him, like that. In the same way, if Mukti is not understood as Sukharūpa, then it becomes the Mukti of logicians.<sup>349</sup> Sukhasvarūpa and Sukharūpatva go together always. If Bhavarūpadharmas are denied in the Muktas, then Sukharūpatvadharma will also cease to be there. Then the Hetu Muktatva would become removed and absent and this would lead to the absence of Muktasvarūpa in Brahman. So the state of Mukti<sup>350</sup> intended by the Advaitins, cannot be found on account of the absence of the Hetu-Muktatva. And if Brahman is stated as Nirguna (attributeless) then, that Nirguna-Brahman will not become the topic of the Śruti.<sup>351</sup>

In the Śrutis, both in the beginning and at the end Brahman is glorified as an embodiment of unlimited auspicious qualities; so how can the term Nirguna, coming in the middle, establish the attributelessness of Brahman? Therefore, it should mean that the term Nirguna denies the possibility of the Prakṛta-gunas (Sattva, Rajas and Tamas).<sup>352</sup>

#### APPARENT MEANING OF NIRGUNA ŚRUTI IS NOT CORRECT

The Nirgunatva indicates the absence of Prakṛta-gunas. If one more negative particle is added as Nairgunyam na, then

it gives the sense of affirmation. It affirms that the Lord is Saguna (He is not Nirguna).<sup>353</sup>

According to the Advaita, it cannot be said that Nirguna-  
śruti negates the Bhāvadharmas. Because the Śruti: Neha  
nānāsti kincana<sup>353A</sup> denies all the Bhāvadharmas in Brahman  
according to the Advaita. If this is so then Nirgunatva-  
dharma is also to be denied on the same ground. If Nirgunatva-  
dharma alone is regarded or accepted then 'Neha nānā...' Śruti becomes invalid. Therefore, it is better to accept  
the meaning of the Nirgunaśruti as absence of three Prakrt-  
gunas, or material qualities, by which validity of all the  
Śruti-passages remains unharmed.<sup>354</sup>

Now, if it is stated that the Lord is Nirguna, then on  
account of Nirgunatva-rūpadharma and Vacyatvarūpadharma (guna),  
He becomes Saguna. If He is known by Laksyārtha, then on  
account of Laksyatvarūpadharma, He becomes Saguna. If both  
these Vacyatva and Laksyatva are given up, then He becomes  
Abodhya and this Abodhyatva-dharma is attributed to by which  
He becomes Saguna.<sup>355</sup>

If Nirgunatva is Mithyā, then Sagunatva is thus proved  
easily. The Nirgunaśruti cannot affect or cause any sublation  
to Saguna-śruti, because Nirgunaśruti is Mithyā. If Bhāva-

rūpadharmas are alone negated or denied, then Abhāvadharma<sup>s</sup> could be traced and mentioned as real without any difficulty. So the Anyonyābhāva, one of the Abhāvadharma<sup>s</sup>, becomes real and it proves and establishes the absolute difference (Bheda) between the Lord and the Jīva and the Jada. Here Anyonyābhāva may be known in respect of Sarvajñatva of the Lord and Alpajñatva of the Jīva. The two are distinct to each other. This difference is not the Prthaktva of the logicians<sup>355A</sup> which disregards any relation. Vādirāja states that though the Lord and the Jīva are absolutely different, they have the relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva. Pratibimba cannot have the existence without Bimba. So Prthaktva of the logicians is not the Bheda of Tattvavāda.<sup>356</sup>

So, Nirguna<sup>t</sup>atva may be real or unreal, or it may convey the sense of Abhāvadharma<sup>s</sup>; Saguṇatva is unharmed. Hence, Bhāvadharma<sup>s</sup> are to be admitted inevitably by Nirgunaśruti as admitting Abhāvadharma<sup>s</sup>. Bhāvadharma<sup>s</sup>, such as Jnātattva, Visayatva, Abhāvadharmaśrayatva and others are to be accepted.

Vādirāja promises that the text Tattvamasi also indicates the Bheda of Anyonyābhāvarūpa. Bheda or difference between Tat and Tvam is Bhāvarūpaviśesa. The Advaita cannot deny this difference for having not admitted Bhāvarūpaviśesas.<sup>357</sup>

REFUTATION OF VYĀVAHĀRIKAPARATVA TO ŚRUTIS AND GUNAS

The Nirguna Śruti cannot attribute Vyāvahārikatva to other Śrutis or to Gunas. This Śruti with its primary power may deny the presence of Gunas in Brahman. But on implication, it cannot give up the Bhāvagunas such as Śabdatva and the like that are Āśraya to its Svarūpa at the same time. But really speaking, like Bhāvagunas such as Śabdatva and others, it cannot deny Bhāvagunas of Brahman such as Sarvajñatva and others. Therefore, here the primary Vrtti or power is more important since it conveys the acceptable sense. <sup>358</sup>

The Nirgunatva of Brahman, proclaimed in the Nirguna Śruti will not cause any harm to its Upajīvyas <sup>358A</sup> that are Śabdatva and the like which are real. On the same ground, the unlimited Bhāvadharmas such as Sarvajnatva, Sarveśvaratva and so on, cannot be denied by this Nirguna-Śruti. But this Nirguna-Śruti definitely denies Durgunas or demerits, and also material Gunas such as Satva, Rajas and Tamas. <sup>359</sup>

The Sarvajnatva and the like which are the Bhāvadharmas are also Upajīvyas like the Śabdatva of the Nirguna-Śruti. So this Śruti should be meant that it affords protection to similar Upajīvyadharmas. And the Bhāvadharmas such as Sarvajñatvā<sup>and</sup> others, are self-Upajīvyas and are absolutely found in the Lord. Thus, having resorted to Bhāvadharmas such as Śabdatva and others, how can the Nirguna-Śruti deny

or discard other Bhāvadharmas. It is not possible. Like, where there is a pot it is not proper to deny its presence.<sup>360</sup> Thus, all other Śruti-passages that declare the Bhāvadharmas of the Lord such as Sarvajñatva and others become Upajīvya to Nirguna-śruti. Therefore, this Nirguna-śruti cannot deny them. The Prākṛtagunas are those, that are with changes, seen in the Jīvas and not in Brahman. So this Śruti proclaims that Prākṛtagunas are not there in Brahman. It does not deny Bhāvadharmas of Brahman such as Sarvajñatva and others, that are Aprākṛta. So as other Śrutis would become Upajīvyas<sup>361</sup> real, they also declare the auspicious attributes of Brahman. And hence, Vyāvahārikatva cannot be attributed to both Śrutis and Gunas of Brahman.

#### BHĀVA OR POSITIVITY IS PREFERRED TO ABHĀVA OR NEGITIVITY

The Nirgunaśruti is supposed to be a Śruti that gives the sense of Abhāva or negation, absence and hence it is called Abhāvaśruti. And the other Śrutis that convey the sense of Bhāva, existence, presence are known to be Bhāva-śrutis.

The Nirgunaśruti is a denoter of Abhāvadharmas and others are of Bhāvadharmas. Among these two types of Dharmas, it is better to get retained Bhāvadharmas of the Lord. Moreover, scholars say that there is difficulty in respect of

Abhāva. It means, it is a difficult task to prove the Abhāvadharmas in Brahman, whereas it is easy to prove the Bhāvadharmas in Brahman.<sup>362</sup>

In the text Neha nānāsti kincana, the term Kincana conveys the sense of Bhāva, Vācyatva and Bodhyatva of some kind. So really speaking, there is no scope and possibility to accept only Abhāvadharmas in Brahman. So admitting Abhāvatva to that Śruti, becomes self-contradictory. As Bodyārtha is real, the Bodhakaśruti is also real (unsublated). As the Śruti is beginningless and eternal, its meaning is also eternal and beginningless. So Bhāvaquna is to be admitted as real.<sup>363</sup> The Śruti Neha nānāsti kincana denies only difference in Brahman and not the presence of Bhāvadharmas in Brahman.

The Bodhaka sentence would not exist if there had not been the Bhāvadharma viz., Vaktrtvā in Lord Hari, who, disclosing the Vedas, taught them to others. Then the Śrutis such as 'Neha nānā...' and others, being absent, would not have conveyed any meaning. Further, the absence of that would be a severe defect in the form of Svarūpahāni (self-destruction)<sup>364</sup> Therefore, Dharmin must be taken for granted, otherwise Brahman would cease to be there. The term Iha, in that Śruti establishes Satyatva of Brahman.

If the Bodhaka sentence is regarded as Vyāvahārika-satya or empirically real, then Bodhya-Brahman will have to become Vyāvahārika-satya. According to the Advaita, Vyāvahārika-satya means, ultimately total negation (absence). Thus, Brahman Himself becomes totally negated.<sup>365</sup>

And if the Śruti does not impart real knowledge, it becomes Atattvavedaka. Then how can it be the destroyer of Avidyā? Therefore, if Brahman is accepted and declared as real, then, the Śruti, which gives the knowledge of Brahman, should also be taken as real.<sup>366</sup> A Śruti of superimposed reality cannot convey or describe real Brahman just as a barren woman (a woman of superimposed womanness) cannot beget any children. So, it is to be admitted that Nirguna-Śruti denies only Prakṛta-gunas in Brahman. Therefore, Vādirāja asserts that Nirguna-Śruti, being attracted by the auspicious, supreme and extra-ordinary personality of the Lord, does not deny the Bhāvarūpadharmas, whereas by discarding the Prakṛta-gunas, it glorifies the Lord.<sup>367</sup> In this way Bhāva is preferred to Abhāva.

#### EXPOSITION OF THE NIRGUNA-ŚRUTI<sup>368</sup>

On accepting the Advaita view, there appears contradiction among the Śruti texts. E.g., the Śrutis Ekamevādvitīyam Tattvamasi<sup>368A</sup> and the like, and the Nirguna Śruti, since

conveying the sense of Bhāva and Abhāva respectively become contradictory to each other. The text Ekamevādvitīyam indicates Ekatva-dharma, whereas the Nirguna-śruti debars all the Dharmas in Brahman. If the Nirguna-śruti is regarded as Pramāṇa or valid then the Ekamevādvitīyam Śruti becomes Apramāṇa or invalid. Then the intended oneness or identity would not result.<sup>369</sup> If the Ekamevādvitīyam Śruti is regarded as valid, then the Nirguna-śruti becomes invalid. And that will prove supremacy, Guṇapūrnatva and the like of Brahman. And again the intended oneness or identity would not be there. So on account of mutual contradiction, the Śruti passages of both the types seem to be invalid (sublated).

The connotation of the words depends upon the usage of the learned. Therefore, the usage of the learned is to be taken into account. If it is not taken as authority, then the literal meaning of the words may differ and become incorrect. The word Pāṅkaja is not taken to mean a frog, but the usage of the learned reveals that the term denotes 'lotus'. In the same way, the word Suvarna cannot mean 'fire' on account of Yaugikārtha-possessing dazzling brilliance.' So ignoring the understanding of the usage of the learned it is not proper to accept the Yaugikārtha viz., devoid of Guṇas to the term Nirguna. According to the Advaita, there can be no usage that aims at Brahman

since Brahman is not Vācyā by any words.<sup>370</sup> The term Nirguna is primarily used in Brahman. And for this, there is support of the usages in Śrutis and Smṛtis.<sup>371</sup>

Therefore, the meaning of the words when employed to convey a certain object, is to be taken without prejudice or harm to the basic characteristics of the object, like the word Guru. The term Guru could be used in a teacher on account of teaching quality etc., in case of a weighty object (stone etc.) and also in respect of variegated. So the basic features are to be taken into account when a word is to be employed to convey certain objects. In the same way, the term Nirguna, when employed to Brahman, with restriction, denies the three Prākṛta-guṇas and not the other innumerable auspicious Guṇas as in Kanyakanūdara. Here, Anūdara does not mean that the girl has no waist but it conveys that she has a very slender waist.<sup>372</sup>

So depending on the context, the meaning of the term differs. The term Nirguna when employed to describe an ordinary man, it may give the sense of absence of Sadguna in that man, and if the same word, when applied to Lord Brahman - an embodiment of auspicious qualities it gives the sense of the absence of Prākṛta-gunas and not Aprākṛta-gunas.<sup>373</sup>

NIRGUNA MEANS DEVOID OF THREE GUNAS ACCORDING TO THE BHĀGAVATA

Lord Hari is totally disassociated from Prakrti and Prakrtatattva. Hence, He alone can be called Nirguna. He, who worships the Lord Nirguna, will also become Nirguna, that means by Lord's grace, he, being released of the Prakrti-bandha, will attain Mukti. Thus, Lord Hari is glorified as Nirguna in the Bhāgavata. Hence, on account of the absence of three material qualities and being embodied with all the auspicious Gunas, He (denoted by the Nirguna-Śruti) is Brahman; who is absolutely Suddha.<sup>374</sup> When the devotee with His grace gets released from the bondage (Prakrti constituting three Gunas- Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) and attains Mukti, (state of the absence of the effect of three Gunas) how can then the Lord be a Sabala (impure due to the association of three Gunas)? When River Gaṅgā, since touching the holy feet of the Lord, has become holy and pure to all, how then the Lord be impure?<sup>375</sup> - asks Vādirāja.

And moreover, the description of Mukti is Nirguna has to mean beyond trinity (free from three Gunas). If it is interpreted as devoid of any Guna, then no body would long for and try for such Mukti.<sup>376</sup>

The Bhāgavata, undoubtedly states that Lord Hari is Nirguna on account of the absence of three Gunas. And the

same term is also applied to Muktas secondarily, since they too, for attaining Mukti, are freed from three Gunas.<sup>377</sup>

Further, Vādirāja discusses the topic in most appealing and different manner. Śiva has Prākṛta form and his worship will become the cause material wealth (progress). Lord Hari has Aprākṛta or extra-ordinary form and His worship would become the cause Aprākṛta fortune (Mokṣa). This also proves that the Lord Hari is Aprākṛta means Triguna-sunya. The Aprākṛta form of the Lord is of the nature of Cit only. And this form is Satya and Nitya. Hence, Aprākṛta qualities such as Sarvajñatva (Omniscience), Sarvaśaktitva (Omnipotence) of the Lord are eternal. They will never get sublated.<sup>378</sup> So the Nirguna should be understood as devoid of three Prākṛta Gunas.

#### THE SENSE OF ABSENCE OF QUALITIES' LEADS TO MUTUAL CONTRADICTION

In the same context,<sup>379</sup> (6th Chapter Sve.Up.) the term Sarvavid denotes Omniscience.<sup>380</sup> Likewise Ekah, Devah, and Sakṣi etc. are the words found in the same passage, that declare Lord Brahman as Saguna (having Sadgunas or auspicious qualities). When all the words give the sense of Sagunatva, it is improper to deny the Gunas in Brahman by a single word Nirguna of the same sentence. Otherwise, there arises mutual

contradiction among the words of the same sentence.<sup>381</sup> If Eko devah of that sentence is to be supposed as Anuvāda<sup>381A</sup> (secondary) then on the same ground, the Nirguna-word should also be considered as Anuvāda. Therefore, in the same sentence, this is not correct to have such discrimination. Moreover, a single word of a sentence cannot deny the purport of other words of the same sentence.

So, if the term Nirguna is taken to mean as devoid of all qualities, then, Ekatva, too, being a quality, is to be denied. Thus, Nirguna, if understood as absence of qualities, leads to mutual contradiction. Ekatva, Devatva etc., are the qualities denoted by that verse. Among all these qualities, preferring the only one quality, that is Ekatva; if other qualities are denied account of the term Nirguna therein; then it becomes as good as saying that there is difference in the homogeneous delicious food of the same vessel. So, if other Gunas are to be denied, then the Ekatva should also be denied. All the qualities conveyed by the terms, from Eka to Kevala, are to be taken into account. As the term Nirguna cannot deny the Ekatva, it also cannot deny other Gunas conveyed by the intervening terms of that sentence.

The Lord incarnated Vedavyāsa does not admit the

negation of even a single Guna. In the Brahmasūtra, He states- "Sarvadharma-paṭṭeśca," which clearly declares that the Lord is an embodiment of unlimited qualities and is devoid of all demerits. The Śruti-s are to be interpreted in accordance with the Sūtras. And these Sūtras, composed by Vedavyāsa, admit auspicious qualities of the Lord and never deny them.<sup>382</sup>

THE ŚRUTI WORDS, SINCE CONVEY DHARMA-VIDHĀYAKA SENSE, ARE MORE POWERFUL

All the words of this Sruti state one or the other meritorious qualities of Brahman. Therefore, they are more powerful. If the ni prefix, conveying the sense of negation in the term Nirguna, is separated and added to all the words of that Śruti-text independently then Ekatva would be no more. And if it is not dissolved and not added to others, then there is no (meaning) sense in saying that it protects the Ekatvadharma and denies all other Dharmas.<sup>383</sup>

THE ŚRUTIS ARE NOT ANUVĀDAKAS<sup>384</sup>

The Advaitins hold that certain passages of the Śruti are Anuvadākas, mere repetitions and hence fit to be rejected. If this is so, then there must be some indicative terms such as 'Yat', 'Tat' and the like. But such indicative terms are not there in this Nirguna Śruti. So the words of this

Śruti or the whole passage cannot be considered as Anuvādaka.

The presence of indicative terms may be found where there are both Anuvāda and Nisedha in only one sentence or passage. Otherwise Na is used separately in difference sentence.<sup>385</sup>

To declare certain data as Anuvādita, it must have been already conveyed by some other Pramāṇas. There, the question of negation does not arise. If Nisedhakatva is understood by the word Nirguna, then all the Dharmas of that sentence, including Ekatva become invalid. When the Dharmas are Anuvādita (invalid) then those need not be negated by the Nirguna word. Thus, on either grounds, the Nisedhakatva is not the intended and suitable meaning of the Nirguna word in this context. In this way, there arises the defect of mutual dependence.<sup>386</sup> And even if the term Nirguna is understood as rejecting the Guna, it cannot deny the Dharmas such as Ekatva and others. It is to be questioned whether the Anuvādita Dharmas (Sagunatva etc., according to the Advaita) are conveyed by the Pramāṇas other than the Vedas or by the Advaita or by Veda-Pramāṇas? Let the Dharmas be conveyed by any means, the Anuvādakatva cannot be conveyed and attributed to that. Because, the qualities of the Lord such as Sarvajñatva and the like, are eternally conveyed by the Vedas.<sup>386A</sup> So they need not be conveyed by any other Pramāṇas. Therefore they cannot be called the Anuvādita Dharmas. If these Dharmas stand conveyed by the Śruti, then also these cannot be rejected by the Nirguna Śruti. Whatever

is conveyed by one section of the Śruti, cannot be rejected by another section of the same Śruti. Otherwise, the very validity of the Śruti gets affected. So the Anuvādakatva cannot be established in respect of the Saguna passages.<sup>387</sup>

Further, the Ekatva and the like, are unaffected even when they are accrued with Anuvādakatva. In such case, they convey the object of knowledge as it is. Hence, it will not become invalid. Agnirhimasya bhesajam conveys that fire destroys snow. This fact becomes well-known and firm by this statement. So the Anuvādakatva will not cause any harm to the purport.<sup>388</sup> Because, it has conveyed what is confirmed by direct observation. So the Anuvādakatva has nothing to do with negation. Thus, the Nirguna Śruti will not deny or reject the Bhāvaguṇas such as Sarvajñatva and the like of Brahman conveyed by other Śrutis.<sup>389</sup> So the Śruti opines that all the Gunas of the Lord are Svabhāvika and hence the question of denying them does not arise.<sup>390</sup> The Gunas of the Lord cannot be considered as Vyāvahārika, since, even before creation, all these Gunas were there as they are even today. The eternal Veda proclaims them as eternal.<sup>390A</sup> So Vyāvahārikatva cannot be ascribed to these Gunas that are unsublated for ever. The Śruti Yāvad Brahmatīstitam tāvati vāk,<sup>390B</sup> clarifies that both Brahman and Śruti are beginning-less and eternal. The Śrutis are Nitya, that means they get

manifested from the Lord at the time of creation. So the creation is manifestation in respect of the Vedas. Therefore, all the Śrutis are Satya and Nitya. The Nirguna Śruti, hence, denies the Prākṛta-dharmas that are different from the Nitya-dharmas of the Lord such as Kartrtva, Bhoktrtva and Phaladātrtva etc. Hence, it is to be admitted that the term Nirguna does not belittle or reject other Śruti passages.

Here Vādirāja quotes some Śrutis and the statements of the Bhāgavata in defence of Guna-declaration. These statements clearly state that Lord Brahman is Sarvagunaparipūrṇa, possessing all the good qualities. There is no limit so far as His ocean of qualities is concerned. Even thousand faced Śeṣa cannot count His auspicious qualities. Thus, all these statements establish the Anantatva (infinity) of the auspicious qualities of the Lord.<sup>391</sup>

Further, if the Śruti words are dissolved as Kevalah and Anirgunaśca then the purpose will serve very easily. The expressive meaning will remain unharmed. It conveys uncontradictory and unsublated sense as Brahman is not devoid of qualities. This explanation also removes the mutual contradiction and proves the Ekavākyata.<sup>392</sup>

THE ADVAITA INTERPRETATION<sup>393</sup> IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY

Now, if it is argued that the passage Kevalo nirgunaśca (Śve. Up.) denies all the Gunas, then it will lead to the rejection of Jñāna, Ānanda and the like of Brahman. If Brahman is understood as of the nature of Jñāna, Ānanda and the like the Nirguna Śruti, if understood according to the Advaita, will also reject these Dharmas when interpreted as above.<sup>394</sup> If the Dharmas - Jñāna, Ānanda and the like are said to be identical with Brahman, then on the same ground Gunas (Dharmas) such as Sarvajñatva and the like, are also to be understood as identical with Brahman. The Śruti Neha nānāsti kiñcana<sup>394A</sup> denies the difference between Brahman and His qualities. So let there be Abheda between the Lord and His qualities.<sup>395</sup> There is no impropriety in this. The Nirguna Śruti rejects the qualities that are not identical with Brahman. So the Gunatva and Ekatva can be present in Brahman.<sup>396</sup> As the above Śruti - Neha nānā... directly rejects the Bheda, there is no possibility to think of the Bhedabheda in Brahman. The Gunatva and Ekatva may be present in Brahman at the same time and it is possible with the help of the Viśesa.<sup>396A</sup>

Further, if something is not possible to a person, the very possibility cannot be ruled out completely. Because it may be possible to another man. In the same way, everything

is possible in Brahman. In the Bhāgavata, the Lord declares Himself as Ananta. He clarifies that each Guna is complete in itself and unlimited and it is cognized as Ananta by Him. Thus, the Gunānāntya of the Lord refers to each quality.<sup>397</sup> All this is possible with the help of the Viśesa, which is also called Bhedapratinidhi since it assists for Bheda-vyavahāra where, really speaking, there is no Bheda at all.<sup>398</sup> The Brahmasūtra- Ātmani caivam vicitraśca hi (II-i-29) states that the Brahman is endowed with this Viśesa-power that ascertains the Gunānāntya of Brahman without any contradiction.<sup>398A</sup>

#### THE SARVAJNATVA AND THE LIKE ARE ALSO BRAHMASVARŪPA

The Advaitins contend that Sarvajñatva of Brahman is Sopādhika (conditional). And whatever is Sopādhika is not absolutely real.<sup>398A</sup> Because, to gain Sarvajñatva, the knowledge of the whole world is necessary. When the world is caused by Mithyopādhi, the knowledge of that should also be caused by Mithopādhi. So the Sarvajñatva (an attribute of having the knowledge of Mithyā-world) being Sopādhika and limited, it cannot become identical with the nature of Brahman which is Nirupādhika (unconditional - unlimited).

But Vādirāja argues that the world cannot be Mithyā, or Sopādhika. It is not caused by any Upādhi. The world is

real, Its reality is conveyed by the Śrutis.<sup>399</sup> So the Sarvajñatva is not Sopādhika. And both, the Sarvajñatva and the nature of Brahman could be stated as one and the same.<sup>400</sup> The Mithyātva of the Advaitins is self-imagined and superimposed. If there is any doubt regarding the reality of the world, then why not the same case regarding the unreality of the world. Thus, this view of mutual contradiction about the reality of the world (personal views of different sects) will not affect and harm the Sarvajñatva of Brahman, which is conveyed and proved by the Śrutis.<sup>401</sup>

Further, the identity of the world with Brahman cannot be stated on the basis of the identity of Brahman and Sopādhika Sarvajñatva, since both Sarvajñatva and the world are Sopādhika.

Moreover, their view is also unsound. Because, the knowledge of a pot is of Manorūpa, but the pot itself is not of Manorūpa. The pot is outside and mind is inside.<sup>401A</sup> In the same way, the knowledge of the whole world (Sarvajñatva) is of the nature of Brahman and not of the world. Further, the knowledge of the world (may be Mithyā according to the Advaita) is real as the knowledge of the silver in the conch-shell and of the serpent in the rope is real, since it is cognized by the Sāksin. In the same way, though the

world is held to be Mithyā, the knowledge of that need not be so. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in considering Sarvajñatva as identical with the Brahmasvarūpa.<sup>402</sup> If it is argued that on account of the Mithyātva of the world, the knowledge of that also is to be taken to mean Mithyā, then why can't the object of real knowledge be considered as real. As the knowledge of Brahman is real, the objects (world etc.) of His knowledge, should also be treated as real.<sup>403</sup> The knowledge of Brahman is real and Vathartha, so the objects related to that knowledge are also real.<sup>404</sup>

Further, Vādirāja questions regarding the Sopādhika-Sarvajñatva itself. Is it mixed with the world caused by the Upādhi or is it only termed or indicated by the Upādhi? If it is admitted that the Sarvajñatva is mixed with the world caused by the Upādhi, then it is as good as saying that there is no Sarvajñatva, since the very Upādhi in the Advaita, is Mithyā.

Secondly, the Sarvajñatva cannot be termed as it is indicated by the Upādhi. As light of the sun, which is identical with the sun, in the same way, the knowledge present or abiding inside though having connected with the outside world, is identical with that person. So the Sarvajñatva of Brahman is identical with Brahman. Further,

if the knowledge related to the Mithyā object is taken to mean Mithyā, then the knowledge of Brahman too, is to be regarded as Mithyā since having as its object, the Mithyā world. Then it amounts to saying that Brahman too is Mithyā. According to the Advaita, the knowledge of Brahman has delusion. But in the Siddhānta, this defect is not there. Because, Lord Brahman has the knowledge of the real world. So He is of the nature of real Jñāna.<sup>405</sup> Thus, the Sarvajñatva of Brahman becomes unsublated and this in turn suggests that all the Dharmas of the Lord are of His very nature. With the help of the Vिशेषगुणगुणित्वा, Ekatva-anekatva etc., are possible in the Brahman.<sup>406</sup> Therefore, like Sukha, all the qualities are identical with Him.<sup>407</sup>

The Advaitins declare that the Brahman is of the nature of Jñānānanda. They do not contend that the Brahman alone is there and not the Jñāna and Ananda. So also there is nothing wrong in declaring that the Brahman is of the nature of unlimited qualities. And all these qualities are identical with the Brahman. There is no charm and reason to lessen and limit the number of qualities in the Brahman. So Gunata, Gunita, Sukhitā and Sukhatā are all possible in the Brahman. They are not contradictory. The Śruti-Vijñānamānandam Brahma<sup>407A</sup> states that the Lord is of the nature of Jñāna and Ananda. And the Śruti- Ānandam brahma

vidvān<sup>407B</sup> specifies that the Brahman is possessing Ānanda. Thus, the first statement proves Sukhitā in the Brahman and the second the Sukhata in Him. On the same ground, Gunata and Gunitā are also established.<sup>408</sup> Thus, Vijñāna, Ānanda etc., convey the presence of innumerable qualities in the Brahman and not merely the Svarūpa of Brahman. Though they are identical with the Brahman, with the help of the concept of Viśesa, they are liable also for Bhedavyavahara.<sup>409</sup> In this way, the Nirguna-Śruti will also not cause any harm to other Saguṇa-Śrutis, but negates only the vicious qualities- Prākṛta qualities in Brahman.

#### THE REFUTATION OF AKHANDĀRTHAVĀDA<sup>409A</sup>

The Advaitins opine that the Śruti passage- Satyam jñānam...<sup>409B</sup> is Svarūpamātrapara. It may be an answer to the question- Kim Brahma. Therefore the above Śruti passage gives the Akhandārtha. But this is not correct. Because in an example- Kaścandraḥ (who is moon?), the question is asked to know the special features of the moon. One may be knowing already the moon as an illuminating object of the galaxy. But to know more about the moon i.e., its special features, he asks that question. Therefore, it is not an ordinary question but it is a particular question (Dharmavacaka) i.e., the question is- 'What are the special features of the moon? Who is possessing the Candravatva? and so on.'<sup>410</sup> If the

question is meant to refer to Svarūpa only, it may be taken to mean as Candra only by nature, but that is not wanted. It is something more that is enquired into, i.e., the special features of the moon.

In the same way Kīrti Brahma is not an ordinary question related to Svarūpamātra. Here also, to know the special features of the Brahman, the question is asked. So the Śruti- Satyam jñanam... is a reply which is the relevant Lakṣaṇavākyā. And this Lakṣaṇavākyā states the special features of the Brahman such as Satyatva, Jñānatva that are not found elsewhere. It declares that all these Dharmas are complete.<sup>411</sup> If it is taken to mean Svarūpamātrapara, then there would have been only one term and not more terms. In that case, other terms would become useless.<sup>412</sup> By way of Lakṣaṇā it is not befitting to say that Satya is 'other than Asatya', Jñāna stands for 'other than Ajñāna' and Ananda stands for 'other than Duhkha'. In such case, in the oft-quoted passage 'Gangayām ghosah', the term Gangā will have to mean 'not Agaṅgā' instead of the bank (Tīra) as understood by one and all. Then both Gangā and Lakṣya-bank appear to be conveyed by Lakṣaṇā which is absurd. In fact, the terms Satya and the like convey the Dharmas of Satyatva and the like of the Brahman. The term Satya itself negates the possibility of Asatya. These terms directly convey the Dharmas of

Satyatva and the like which is the primary meaning of those terms. The Lakṣyārtha (secondary meaning) is taken into account only when Mukhyārtha (primary meaning) gets sublated.<sup>413</sup> The basic fact is, without Mukhyārtha, there cannot be Lakṣyārtha.<sup>414</sup> The Advaitins may say that the Brahman, though not having Satyatva, is not Mithyā being of Sadrūpa. But this is not correct because, without Satyatva there cannot be Sadrūpatva.<sup>414A</sup> Otherwise horns of the rabbit, though not having Satyatva, should also be taken to mean Sadrūpa. The Satyatva and the Sadrūpatva go together always. And wherever there is no Satyatva, there is no Sadrūpatva. Therefore, to admit Sadrūpatva in the Brahman, the Satyatva must be accepted. Otherwise, the Brahman cannot be of the Sadrūpa as a head, when shaved, is deprived of hair.<sup>415</sup>

If it is said that the term Satya conveys the Brahman by Laksana, then there must be something else to be Vacya and real (by which the Brahman is implied and suggested). And that real could be the world. So if the Brahman becomes Laksya - secondary meaning, then the world becomes Vacya (primary meaning). Thus, the Laksana of the Advaitins promises to guarantee two real things - world and Brahman. And this Laksita Brahman, becoming real, will not give up the Satyatva of its own. So conveying of Satyatva and the like is inevitable.

Likewise, if the Śruti-Tattvamasi<sup>416</sup> is treated as Svarūpamātrapara, then the Aikya cannot be termed in Brahman since according to the Advaita as the Brahman is devoid of all the Dharmas, this Aikyadharma too, cannot be traced there. When the Aikyadharma is not there, identity of Brahman and Jīva is not possible. Thus, this Śruti conveys the primary sense Bheda.<sup>417</sup>

So here the Lakṣaṇa is not meant as conveying the secondary meaning, but the term Lakṣaṇa refers to special or extra-ordinary features of Brahman. That means it conveys the Dharma such as Satyatā, Jñānatā and Anantatā.

Even if the Advaitins deny the Dharmas such as Satyatva, Jñānatva etc., their intended Akhandartha is not proved and established and Sakhandatva is not dropped. Because, the Advaitins may negate the Dharmas viz., Satyatva and the like, but cannot deny Laksyatva, Amukhyārthavisayatva and the like. These Dharmas are unaffected even at the negation of Satyatva etc.<sup>418</sup> In fact, Akhandatva is also a Dharma. If this too is negated, with a view to declare Brahman as Nirdharmika, then Sakhandatva occurs automatically. Because, Abhāva (negation) of Akhandatva means Sakhandatva.<sup>419</sup>

### EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT VIŚESA

"The relation between substance and attributes is one of the intriguing problems of philosophy. It has well-high taxed the ingenuity and resources of philosophers in the East and in the West. Madhva's contribution to the solution of this problem is both original and significant. He has actually contributed a new idea, the concept of Viśesas - to the treatment of this philosophical problem. It is an outstanding discovery of his. Madhva accepts a relation of 'colourful identity (Saviśeṣabhedā) in respect of coessential attributes and difference-cum-identity (Bhedābheda) in the case of transient attributes.

Khandite bheda aikyam ca; syādvastu na bhedavat(TV)  
He has thus made a striking efforts to rise above the 'dualism' of substance and attributes and combine them into a homogeneous whole that admits, however, of logical conceptual and linguistic distinction, wherever necessary, thro' the self-differentiating capacity of substances themselves, to be known as "Viśesas."<sup>420</sup>

It is peculiar characteristic of things which makes the talk of difference possible where, really speaking, there exists only identity.<sup>420A</sup>

The concept Viśesa is an unlimited power of Lord Brahman

which is His very nature, that plays the role of conveying the identity of the attributes of Brahman that appear mutually distinct for common understanding and also that helps for Bhedavyavahāra. This Viśesa conjoins and distinguishes the attributes for Bhedavyavahāra and it does not spoil the <sup>420B</sup> very nature and identity of the attributes of the Brahman. And it does not refer to and conjoin the attributes that are of opposite nature such as Baddhatva, Muktatva since they spoil the very nature and greatness of Brahman. This Viśesa, though it is one of the Gunas (or is included in Gunas), its function goes on without any obstacle.<sup>421</sup> With the help of this Viśesa, presence of the attributes of mutual contradiction is possible in the Brahman such as Anutva (atomic form), Mahattva (universal form) and the like.<sup>422</sup> Such wonderful attributes such as Anima-mahima, Garima-laghima are present in the Brahman as a mark of His unlimited treasure of auspicious qualities. This Viśesa also establishes the identity of the Brahman with His each unlimited Guna. This conveys the Nityatva to the Lord's Bala, Jñāna, Kriya and the like. The concept Viśesa may be defined as- "that extra-ordinary power of Brahman as His nature that fulfills the need of Bheda-vyavahāra where there is no Bheda at all; and also infinity of the attributes individually." Here the function of Bheda by Viśesa is restricted to that which is conveyed by the Śruti. Therefore, it is to be understood that it

does not serve the purpose of identifying Duhkha, Jīva and the like in the Brahman.<sup>423</sup> To prove Abheda of this Vīśesa with the Brahman, we do not require any other Vīśesa, lest that may lead to endless regression, it proves of its identity with the Brahman itself and not with the help of another Vīśesa. So it is Svanirvāhaka like a lamp, that reveals other objects and does not require another lamp to get itself revealed.<sup>424</sup> It is Svanirvāhaka, means self-competent, self-explicable and self-related for dealing. It is nothing but an intrinsic power, peculiar, and particular of respective objects.<sup>424A</sup> The qualities of Brahman are not different from Him. But these are referred to as distinguished through this Vīśesa. This is the real purpose of Vīśesa.

The Gunas are the very nature of Gupin. So the Vīśesa, being a Guna, is the very nature of the Brahman and hence establishes the identity of them and distinguishes the same for the sake of usage. For the sake of usage as Guna of the Brahman, the Vīśesa is accepted that playing the role of the representative of Bheda, assists for usage on one hand and establishes the identity of Brahman and His Gunas on the other.<sup>424B</sup> The incarnations of the Lord such as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and the like are not different from Him. All are identical in nature.<sup>424C</sup> In the same way, the unlimited auspicious qualities of the Lord Nārāyaṇa such as Sarvajñatva etc., are identical with

each other and are present even in incarnations. The unlimited forms and innumerable qualities are identical. There is no mutual Bheda among the forms and qualities of the Lord.<sup>425</sup>

It can be stated that, the Viśesa too is conveyed by the Śruti. Because, the Śruti states that the Brahman is Gunapūrṇa, Gunavisista and there is no difference between Guna and Gunin. Explicitly it appears contradictory and illogical. But for conveying the real import of the Veda, all these three are grouped together in sense (Viśesa, Guna and Gunin). And for that, the Viśesa is to be admitted which successfully accomplishes this function. With the help of this Viśesa, difference-in-identity and identity-in-difference could be conveyed. Identity can be established with reference to Gunatva and Gunitva in the Lord like Sukha and the like. It means Sukha, Jnāna etc., are the very nature of Brahman. The Vācyatvarūpa guna of these is conveyed and Gunagunibhāva is thus possible with the strength of Viśesa.<sup>426</sup> The Śruti-Yathodakam...<sup>426A</sup> stating the Brahman as possessing unlimited attributes, negates the difference thereof. So this very Śruti conveys the Viśesa, described above in detail.<sup>427</sup> So to prove the validity of this Śruti, the Viśesa should be admitted in the Brahman as His Svarūpaśakti that indeed dispels the contradiction being seen in the explicit appearance of Gunagunibhāva, identity of the Gunas and the like.


Thus, it is not possible to state the relation of attributed and attribute without the help of such concept which is termed Bhedapratinidhi (playing the role of the representative of difference). This is also required to relate the plurality with regard to the attributes of same object.<sup>428</sup> Jayatīrtha says that these Viśesas are innumerable subject to manifold and innumerable dealings and usages.<sup>429</sup>

## II. ŚUDDHISAURABHA

### NIRDOSATVA OF THE LORD IN HIS MŪLARŪPA AND IN AVATĀRARŪPAS

In the Gunasaurabha the Gunapūrnatva of the Lord Nārāyaṇa was established. In this Śuddhisaurabha, the Nirdosatva of the Lord is established. The theme of this Saurabha is "Lord Nārāyaṇa is absolutely free from all demerits and drawbacks."

Vādirāja asserts that even the act of searching for a demerit in great persons, is wrong. So, it becomes an unworthy act to refer to blemishes or flaws of Lord Hari, who is Ever-free from all demerits. He is Nirdoṣa being endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities.<sup>430</sup> And whatever seems to be a defect in ordinary persons need not be a defect in the great. The Lord destroying the whole created universe at its end, stands unaffected. E.g. giving up of daily religious duties is sinful in respect of those, who are in

Samprajñatāsamādhi but it seems not sinful in case of those who are in deep meditation or Asamprajñatāsamādhi. So the Lord is defectless even when He gets engaged in some destructive deed and such a destruction appears sinful from the point of view of only ordinary persons. Thus even killing Rāvana is not a sinful act. The Lord is Acyuta having no demerits.<sup>431</sup> It is said, Lord Nārāyana, during Pralaya, sleeps on a leaf. But that leaf exists without any tree. When there is such greatness   in the case of the leaf at Pralaya then what to say about the greatness of the Lord who sleeps on that.<sup>432</sup> The Lord has no birth and death. He is eternal. Because, birth and death are also a type of Dosas as they exist in the bound souls. But Lord Hari is an Eternally Liberated Supreme Soul. The absence of pre-existence may be the cause of effect in case of others. But the Lord is an exception to this as He is Eternally Exist. Even during Pralaya He is not destroyed. So there is no absence of pre-existence in the Lord. Thus, He is not born like others.<sup>433</sup> There is no cause as such for Lord's birth, since He is not born. The four-faced Brahmā is born out of Lord's navel and god Śiva is born of His wrath, but the Lord is not at all born from any source. It means, there is nothing that could be thought of as the cause of His birth.<sup>434</sup> When there is no cause, no effect (birth) as such can result. The presence of the

Lord, during the Pralaya, justifies that even when everything in the universe is destroyed, He is not destroyed and He is present even before everything is created. So this fact proves that He has no birth and death.

Now one may say that the Lord is Apūrṇa since He, in the beginning, tends towards the creation of this universe. But this argument is not tenable since this inclination towards creation is for the sake of others and not for His sake like the overflowing of the water from a tank is to irrigate the adjacent lands, and not for its own benefit. In the same way, the Lord engages in the creation etc., with a view to give different states to different souls.<sup>435</sup> (Mokṣa, Svarga and Naraka). Lord Nārāyaṇa has no displeasure and delusion. He is an embodiment of bliss and knowledge. Therefore, neither is He sorrowful nor deluded.<sup>436</sup> The displeasure and the like happen as a result of the misdeeds and the like in one's past life.<sup>437</sup> But as the Lord is never born, there is no question of His past life and performance of misdeeds and the like. He neither gets prospered nor degraded by any action, since His engagement in activity, is not for His own sake,<sup>438</sup> but with a view to bless the devotees, He gets engaged in multifarious activities. We learn that the Lord, in His incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, has eaten butter, drunk milk and so on. But by this, we cannot conclude

that He also has the feeling of hunger, thirst and the like. Because, generally, the feeling of hunger, thirst and the others, are not seen even in the liberated souls. Those feelings are there only upto liberation. The Lord, being eternally liberated, cannot have either hunger or thirst. And likewise the Lord is independent. Although He sits on Garuda and moves, He is not dependent. Because, when the whole earth was drowning into water, the Lord lifted it up and at that time, there was neither Garuda nor others to support Him. So His sitting on Garuda etc., is only to favour them by receiving devotional service from them. In His several incarnations, some activities of the Lord may appear as if defective. And, one may ascribe Him pain, sorrow and the like as it happened in the case of Rāma who lamented for Sītā. But there, it does not mean that Rāma was incapable of regaining Sītā and hence suffered a lot. Because, the same Rāma, in His Kṛṣṇa form went to Anantāsana to bring back the child of a brahmin. For Him, getting back Sītā was not a great and impossible task. The fact is, as the Lord is all-pervasive, He was there all the time with Sītā, even in Lākṣā. Even then Lord's variegated deeds are to impart instruction regarding the behaviour to the human beings as it is remarked in the Bhāgavata.<sup>439</sup> Although, He killed Rāvaṇa who was a brahmin, He did not gain any sin by that. Because, at the end of the Yuga or age, He even

swallows the creator Brahma, but He was not stained with any sin. Therefore, there is no Brahmahatyādosa as such. And His installing the Sivalinga at Rameśvara, is to offer a chance to god Śiva to look at Setu and to get rid of the sin of Brahmahatyā,<sup>440</sup> caused by the cutting the fifth head of God Brahma. So at the request of Śiva, Lord Rāma installed the Sivalinga there. And keeping friendship with Sugrīva is also not defectful. King although capable, goes as if led by the servant; Lord Rāma, who is capable to take with Him the creatures to the Brahmaloka,<sup>441</sup> has no need to depend upon others.

Then Vādirāja deals with the Kṛṣṇavatāra and its Nir-dosatva. Lord Kṛṣṇa is also free from birth and death. Because, in His belly, all the worlds exist and they were seen by His mother Yaśodā as such. His showing the Brahmānda in His mouth proves that He is beyond birth and death.<sup>442</sup> The holy mark of Śrīvatsa, which is there on the chest of Lord Nārāyaṇa, was seen on the body of Kṛṣṇa.<sup>443</sup> So Kṛṣṇa is none other than Lord Viṣṇu.<sup>444</sup>

The Lord is not subject to Cheda, Bheda and the like.<sup>445</sup> When Kṛṣṇa showed His Viśvarūpa to Arjuna, the latter saw all the warriors of his enemy side, being clutched between the teeth of Kṛṣṇa. So how can such a Lord be killed and

cut off by the same warriors on the ground.<sup>446</sup> Therefore, He is Acchhedya and Abheda. When Kṛṣṇa came to Duryodhana for the talks of compromise, Duryodhana intended to bind him, but could not. So, Lord Hari is beyond and not subject to destruction like Cheda, Bheda, Bandhana etc. Thus, Lord Hari, in His incarnations, appears to be weak and defectful. But He is not so in reality. So, his appearance is like a male actor, who takes a female role on the stage; but by this very acting, he cannot be said to be a woman.<sup>447</sup>

Here after, Vādirāja quotes from the scriptures to substantiate what is proved above.

By this, it is clear that the Lord is free from all demerits. He, who credits demerits to the Lord, will become sinful. The Lord, therefore, in his original form or in the incarnated forms, is defectless. He is Blissful and Guna-pūrṇa. It means, He always enshrines with His intrinsic pure and blissful nature.<sup>448</sup>

#### REFUTATION OF ADVAITA CONCEPT OF AJÑĀNA

After clearing out the doubts regarding the Nirdosatva of the Lord, Vādirāja takes up for criticism the Advaita concept of Ajñāna.<sup>449</sup> The Advaitins attribute Ajñāna or nescience to Brahman. They say that Brahman is the Āśraya

(locus) and Viṣaya (object) of Ajñāna.<sup>450</sup> And it is said that He, because of this, undergoes Samsāra (transmigration). If all this is admitted, then Nirdoṣatva or defectlessness of the Lord would become baseless.

Vādirāja states that Brahman can be neither the Āśraya nor the Viṣaya of nescience. By superimposition of Ajñāna, only erroneous experience will result and that will lead to attaining states like Jīvabhāva. But the superimposition of nescience on Brahman is impossible. Because, according to the Advaita, superimposition is of two types: (1) Tadātmyārōpa - mistaking one entity for another and (2) Dharmāropa - mistaking the attributes of one entity as the attributes of another entity, mistaking the attributes of body such as Sthūlatva, etc., as the attributes of the self.<sup>451</sup> But Brahman has no such erroneous experience of two kinds. It cannot be said "Ajñānam Brahma" - which means Ajñāna cannot be attributed to or transferred to Brahman saying "Brahma Ajñānam." Thus Ajñānaropa is not possible in Brahman.<sup>452</sup> And the experience as Ajñoham - "I am ignorant" involves no superimposition. It is only the experience of Siddhājñāna.<sup>453</sup> It may be superimposition only when association of nescience in that, is regarded as superimposed. For this, presence of nescience must be there somewhere before and same is to be wrongly associated with Brahman by superimposing

the attributes of that. But in the Advaita, there is no another entity<sup>454</sup> other than Brahman, which can be the locus and object. Presence of nescience cannot be regarded as superimposed. And in the Advaita, nescience is not a different and independent entity. According to them, it is Brahmaśrita or associated with Brahman and not Anyaśrita.<sup>455</sup> To have erroneous experience in Brahman, there should be nescience before, then it is to be superimposed. The expression "I am ignorant" may be erroneous in him, who has no nescience. And it is not erroneous in him, who has nescience. So, in the Advaita, Ajñanasamsargāropa is not possible since, nescience is already associated with Brahman. So, there is no question of superimposition as such. And this association cannot be treated as superimposition. So, the expression "I am ignorant" is not erroneous one. The superimposition of nescience might be possible, if Brahman is considered an Ādhara or substratum of nescience and the attributes of Ādhāratva (state of being substratum) of Ajnāna are seen. But, the Advaita Brahman feels Itself as 'It is ignorant.' So the experience of ignorance is not all erroneous. Moreover, unless the superimposition of nescience is proved, the superimposition of its association cannot be proved and vice versa. The superimposition of nescience in Brahman is not possible since, nescience is not an independent and different entity. So, in the form of cognition "I am ignorant," there is no

Āropa of Tādātmya, and Samsarqa as shown above.<sup>456</sup> In the statement "I am ignorant," if Ajñānāropa is accepted, then there would be Apasiddhānta i.e., the very concept of their Siddhānta will collapse. For, according to the Advaita, nescience is associated with the very nature of Brahman and it is the root cause of the experienced such as "I am ignorant" etc., So how can either the nescience or its association be superimposed? The association of pot and earth is not at all superimposed (not imagined). It is real. So nescience being present with Brahman, is not erroneous, but it is to be accepted as real and non-erroneous.<sup>457</sup> And Brahman is declared as Nirdosa or defectless in the Advaita.<sup>458</sup> If association of nescience is referred to Brahman then the very Nirdosatva will be no more. And nescience cannot become erroneous to itself. It may cause erroneous experience such as pride etc., which are seen in the embodied soul. So it is evident that Ajnāna is Jīvāśrita and not Brahmāśrita. Thus, superimposition of nescience in Brahman is not tenable. The nescience is eternal and hence there is no first and second nescience as such. Even if it is taken for granted, the latter does not become the cause of the defect of erroneous experience to the former. But, it may become the cause of the ascertainment of nescience as in darkness.<sup>459</sup> Bhrāma is possible, only when something is understood in its absence. In the same way, erroneous

experience (Bhramā) may get originated, only when superimposition of nescience or its association is possible. As shown above, the superimposition of Ajñāna is impossible. All this has been said and thus proved that the Advaita concept of Ajñāna remains unproved. Really speaking, in the eternity of Ajñāna, it cannot become the cause of superimposition of latter Ajñāna.<sup>460</sup> Moreover, at the time of the ascertainment or apprehension (in the case of experience as "I am ignorant"), nescience cannot become the cause of Bhramā (its superimposition). Because, cause should precede the effect. Ajñāna being a Dosa or defect, should give rise to Bhramā (erroneous experience).<sup>461</sup> But here, both nescience and erroneous experience become mutually cause and effect.<sup>462</sup> It means whenever there is nescience, there is apprehension of erroneous experience and whenever there is erroneous experience, there is nescience (defect). Thus, the view is affected by Anyonyāśraya-dosa or the fallacy of mutual dependence.<sup>463</sup> Now the erroneousness cannot be said as born of nescience because according to the Advaita, even this erroneous experience of nescience is cognized by Sāksin.<sup>464</sup> And this Sāksin is eternal and unborn. So in "I am ignorant," the knowledge of it, is cognized by eternal Sāksin. And this experience is unborn and not erroneous. Whatever is not born of defect (nescience) is not erroneous experience.<sup>465</sup> So, the expression "I am ignorant" does not accept Ajñāna as

Brahmāśrita, since there is no any valid proof. But it is clear that it is Jīvāśrita or associated with soul, where its effects such as pride, arrogance etc., are clearly perceptible. So, the association of nescience in Brahman is just imagined and baseless. Thus, in Brahman, as there is no nescience, there is no erroneous experience. In the Advaita, the self is Nirviśesa<sup>466</sup> (devoid of all characteristics). So, how can there be defect of nescience and the erroneous experience from that in It? The Nirviśesatva view of the self (Brahman) does not permit nescience to be the cause of erroneous experience. So nescience concept of the Advaita is not tenable.

Now, if nescience is not superimposed, then it must be real. When it is real there is the loss of the Advaita. Not only this, the world created by this should also be declared as real. Because, when the cause is regarded as real then the effect must also be real. The real cause does not give rise to an unreal effect. By this, the Bheda or difference is also established and because of real nescience it remains unsublated so far as cognition is concerned. And according to the Advaita, whatever is real, like Brahman, never disappears.<sup>467</sup> So, the real nescience remains as it is and because of this there is no Mokṣa or liberation. Mokṣa is cessation of nescience. When nescience

is real like Brahman there is no cessation and hence there is no liberation.<sup>468</sup> Thus, the doctrines in the form of branches of the tree of the Advaita, such as identity, liberation fall one by one, since the very root Ajñana of the Advaita-tree is not firm.

According to the Advaita, Pratikarmavyavasthiti means when the nescience which is Bandhaka or binder and the veil of an object, is removed by the preception of direct cognition (Aparokṣajñāna), then that entity becomes an object of knowledge Cetana. This is Pratikarmavyavasthitih. As shown above, when the cessation of real nescience is impossible, then Pratikarmavyavasthitih is baseless. Thus, nescience as contended by the Advaitins, is nowhere found as proved so far. So, Brahman does not get associated or affected by this nescience and for It there is no necessity to attain state of soul and see the world. Thus, there is no nescience as such; even if it is real (in the Jīva) its products such as world etc., are also real. So, acceptance of the concept of nescience by the Advaita leads to baseless and impossible conclusions. Thus, the whole tree of the Advaita with nescience as its root, when uprooted, collapses completely.<sup>469</sup> And there remains nothing as a topic for the Advaita Śāstra.<sup>470</sup> Now "I am ignorant" and other statements give the sense that nescience is present in soul since he

has such experience. How can it be then Brahmaśrita? For Pramāna (valid means) is somewhere and Prameya or an object of knowledge is elsewhere. Pramāna is the experience of soul and how can Brahman be an object of knowledge of this? And even by the fact of Aikya (identity) in Brahman and Jīva, nescience cannot be attributed to Brahman. If attributed, then there will be the defect of Anyonyāśraya (mutual dependence). When identity is proved, nescience as Brahmaśrita is proved and when nescience as Brahmaśrita is proved then the identity is proved. Thus, there is Anyonyāśraya-dosa.<sup>471</sup> So nescience is impossible in Brahman. The Bhaqavadgīta<sup>472</sup> clearly shows that the Lord is Sarvajña or Omniscient and Arjuna is Alpajña or knowing little. And these two qualities are mutually contradictory. And by this statement, it is evident that the Lord has the perception of His Sarvajnatva omniscience for ever. So, nescience seen in the soul cannot be associated with Brahman. Thus, nescience is also not approved of by Śruti, Smṛti etc.

Now, even the Jīva does not become the locus of nescience. If it is to be the locus of nescience, then it would be earlier to nescience. And if nescience is proved, then the Jīva is proved, and if Jīva is proved then only it can be a locus of nescience. If it is contended that Brahman, owing to Ajnāna, attains Jīvabhāva, then the Jīva has to be admitted as distinct

since beginningless<sup>472A</sup> and by this Bheda-difference becomes evident. So to avoid this, the Advaitins have to declare that Jīva is Ajñānakalpita. So, when it is Ajñānakalpita, then also there is the defect of mutual dependence.<sup>473</sup> And, this defect of mutual dependence is more severe, than the defect of endless regression (Anavasthā). Because, in Anavasthā (as in seed and sprout), the relation of mutual cause cannot be decided and it is not deformed and moreover, it does not create any Ayathārthajñāna (the tree is not born of the seed of the same tree). Whereas in mutual dependence, the state of cause and effect is defective. So nescience is not a Viṣaya or object at all. Brahman is not Āśraya or locus of this nescience (of superimposed nature). If it is admitted that nescience present in soul is also there in Brahman, then Brahman Itself owing to Ajnāna should attain Jīvabhāva. By this knowledge of identity, experience of a Jīva should also be seen in all, i.e., nescience of one soul should be in all and experience of one soul must be there in all. To avoid this crisis, if Vyāvahārikabhedā (empirical difference) is allowed to flourish, then the experience as "I am ignorant" does not prove nescience in Brahman.

So Jīva is ignorant, he is not the Lord and creator of the world. He, who is the Lord and creator, has no ignorance. The association of Brahma (illusion) of nescience is impossible

in Brahman.<sup>474</sup> In Śrutis also, it is clearly stated that, soul is associated with Ajñāna since eternity and this Ajñāna is of Abhāvarūpa (negative) and Bhāvarūpa<sup>475 (positive)</sup> as it veils the understanding of the nature of knowledge, bliss etc. There is no Ajñāna in the sense of 'self,' but only in respect of the content of knowledge, bliss etc., of 'self.' So in "I am ignorant" Ajñāna is of Abhāvarūpa. Otherwise, the Samsāra (with Bhāvarūpajñāna) would have to be declared as Mokṣa. If there is realisation of the pleasure of self, then that state is called Mukti.<sup>476</sup> And there is no rule as such, that without the knowledge of the Svarūpasukha (Bhāva), there cannot be knowledge of its Abhāva as there is no knowledge of the objects without the light. Because as, for the cognition (perception) of darkness, light is not required. So also for knowledge of Abhāva, knowledge of Svarūpasukha (Bhāva) is not necessarily required. So just giving up of the rigidity of the rule as knowledge is ever dependent on an object, it is to be accepted that Svarūpa knowledge is common and general and knowledge of its qualities such as bliss etc., are particular and peculiar. So "I am ignorant" means, the sense of I (self) is general and common and ignorant means Abhāvarūpajñāna of the qualities of self (Avacchedaka).<sup>477</sup> Thus, in this context, the problem is whether an object of which Ajñāna is talked of, is known or not. For this the Advaitins have no solution. But in the Dvaita, the solution

is shown as above (with the help of the Sāmanya and Viśesa).

Without the distinction of Sāmanya and Viśesa if Jñānabhāva (absence of knowledge) is meant as Atyantabhāva (total non-existence) then the Atyantabhāva is Śūnya and its knowledge would become absolutely real as Brahman. (It is as good as saying the Śūnya is also real). Because knowledge of Pratiyogin of Atyantabhāva is real as Brahman. So, the Śūnya (a Pratiyogin of Atyantabhāva) should also be real.<sup>478</sup>

Then, if Jñāna of Jñānabhāva is not accepted, it is as good as negating the Jñāna itself, which is impossible as a blind by birth cannot negate the presence of variegated and colourful earth. There is nothing which is absolutely unknown since there is no evidence. (It means, everything including Jñānabhāva, is cognized in the form of knowledge). So, Jñāna of Jñānabhāva is to be accepted.<sup>479</sup> As nescience is accepted, likewise let absence of knowledge also be accepted in the form of knowledge. Thus, there are two aspects (Ajñāna and Jñānabhāva) to be put on. May be Bhāvarūpajñāna or Abhāvarūpajñāna, there is no so much distinction since Ajñatata is common to both. If Bhāvarūpajñāna is accepted, as it is a partial view that causes the loss of the Advaita. According to the Dvaita view, there is no

Abhāva of Jñānasamānya<sup>480</sup> since Sakṣijñāna is eternal one. And so far as Abhāva is concerned, it is there in the Viśeṣajñāna of the Jīvas. But it is not there in Brahman, since He is Sarvajña. So in the experience of Jīva as "I am ignorant" the Ajñāna is of Abhāvarūpa of Viśeṣajñāna. So as to say it does not mean that Jīva has no Sāmānyajñāna of Brahman, but he lacks Viśeṣajñāna which is Abhāvarūpa.

If some one says that he does not understand Brahman, it means he has no direct cognition of Brahman through eye; (He lacks Viśeṣajñāna of Brahman or lacks Sāstrajñāna pertaining to Brahman) but he may be having Sāmānyajñāna.<sup>480A</sup> The Ajñāna does not mean total negation of Jñāna but only absence of Viśeṣajñāna. So the statement "I am ignorant" does not negate Parokṣajñāna gained by the study of Śāstras, but it negates only the Aparokṣajñāna (direct cognition) of Brahman. Here the same is applied to the Advaitins, because the Bhāvarūpājñāna although conceals the nature of Brahman (Brahmāparokṣa) it does not negate the Jñāna gained by the Śāstras. The Advaitins contend that they do not understand It (Brahman) even after gaining Its knowledge by the Śāstras.<sup>480B</sup>

In the Dvaita, there is no impossibility of cognition (Jñāna) of Ajñāna (Jñānabhāva).<sup>481</sup> According to the Advaita, Brahmajñāna is not competent to remove Ajñāna but it is the

Manovṛttijnāna, that removes the Ajnāna. But this view is not tenable since it is as good as saying that a king, impossible to be killed by the sharp weapons of his enemies, is slain by the sword of his own at home. The Vṛttijnāna is originated from Avidyā (Ajnāna). How can this Vṛttijnāna remove the Ajnāna which cannot be removed by Brahmajnāna? (knowledge of Brahman or absolute knowledge)? So the view of the Advaitins is contradictory to the Śruti and reason as well. And Brahmajnāna is Ajada (sentient) and Vṛttijnāna is Jada (insentient). So how can this Vṛttijnāna which is insentient, remove the nescience? One Jada cannot kill another Jada as it is originated from that. It is impossible.<sup>482</sup> Really speaking, the very contention as Vṛttijnāna originates from insentient Ajnāna (nescience) is unsound. The mind (Vṛttijnāna) only when having association of the Svarūpajnāna, becomes capable to cognize the objects. So how then does the mind (Vṛttijnāna) become competent to remove nescience without Svarūpajnāna? For the removal of nescience, connection of Svarūpajnāna is necessary. Otherwise, neither can it (Manovṛttijnāna) cognize the objects nor can it remove the nescience since it is insentient. Only with the help of Cetanaśakti of Svarūpajnāna, the two above mentioned capacities are seen in Vṛttijnāna.<sup>483</sup> So the nescience stands undestroyed.

Thus, having disregarded the nescience, Vadirāja takes up

the Bhrama (illusion) of the Advaitins for refutation. This illusion is also a product of nescience. If it is said that Brahman cognizes the Siddhajagat, then it is not the Bhrama. And if at all it (Jagat) becomes the product (Kalpita) of illusion to which nescience is the cause, then it (Jagat) would be eternal (Sarvakalikanitya) being Brahmakalpita. As long as the world is there, nescience is also there and eternal Brahman is also there. And as Brahman and nescience are eternal, Brahman would have the cognition of the world for ever. Because as long as nescience is there, illusion is also there, and Jagat a product (Kalpita) of that nescience is cognized without destruction (Pralaya) since the power of cognition of Brahman is eternal and indestructible. Thus, illusion is also Nitya. The Adrsta, Kala etc., cannot be treated as the cause of Pralaya, since they are also products of Bhrama.<sup>484</sup> The Advaitins quoting the Śruti passage- "Māyinantu māheśvaram" contend that Māyā is in Brahman. But here the term Māyā means Prakṛti (primal matter). So Māyin does not give the sense of Brahman having Māyā. The term Māyin does not attribute Māyā to Brahman. Brahman does not get bound by Māyā like the term Cakrin, referring to a potter, does not make him get bound by the wheel. As a potter makes use of the wheel in manufacturing the pots and the like, Brahman also makes use of Māyā in creating this world. As the wheel is under the control of the potter, the

Māyā is also under the control of Brahman. So Mayin means He, with Māyā under His control.<sup>485</sup> Brahman, although Mayin is Māyadūra like a king, although in forest is called Dhanin. How can Brahman get affected by Māyā (Ajñāna) when He is declared as Sarvajña? He, who is Omniscient has no Ajñāna. Brahman is Sarvajña in the sense, He is an embodiment of eternal power of cognition and cognizes Himself and the whole world. So attributing nescience to Omniscient is as good as saying that a mother is a barren woman, which is self-contradictory.<sup>486</sup> The Śruti proclaims that Brahman is Asaṅga (having no association of Ajñāna as such).<sup>486A</sup> And it cannot be argued that, it is only by means of Ajñāna, that Brahman gains the knowledge of the world (contact of the world) and without Ajñāna His Sarvajnatva is no more. Because, Ajñāna need not play the role of conductor since Brahmānetana is all pervasive and need not be helped by any means. And very naturally Brahman has the contact with all the objects. The Advaitins explain the term Asaṅga as Brahman, in Its nature, is devoid of any contact.<sup>486B</sup> In the Dvaita view, Asaṅga means Brahman, not affected by the association of the world. Really speaking, the Advaitins cannot explain the term since, in their view, Brahman is associated with nescience always. But in the Dvaita, Brahman is Asaṅga in the sense that He is all pervasive which means although having associated with the world, He is disassociated in the sense He does not get affected by that association.<sup>487</sup> So the very

Śruti passage Asaṅga wards off even the association of Ajñāna in Brahman. But it does not rule out the association or the contact of other things other than the Ajñāna. Because, Asaṅga-Śruti not merely discard the defect of Ajñāna but discards other defects (demerits) also. Otherwise, this Śruti would oppose other Śruti passages such as Niranisto niravadhyah.<sup>487A</sup> So the Asaṅga-śruti negates the association of defective things such as Ajñāna and the like, and it does not negate the association of meritorious and auspicious qualities. The Asaṅga-śruti, admitting meritorious and auspicious qualities in Brahman such as Sarveśvaratva, Sarvavāpitva, Sarvakartrtvā etc., does not admit creation of defective world. It means, because, Lord Brahman is Sarvakartā. He does not create any illusory world, but creates a real world. And by this very creation, He is not affected by any Dosa. Thus, the term Asaṅga gives the sense of the absence of the contact of demerits or defects. The creation of the world does not make Him to be defective, whereas it proves His Sarvajnatva, Sarvakartrtvā, Sarvavyāpitva etc. So, this Śruti describes that Brahman has the association of the Prakṛti (primal-matter) and at the same time it negates the association of the defects such as Karman, Ajñana, Duhkha etc. And the Śruti-Niranisto niravadhyah does not negate the association of meritorious qualities, but negates the association of demerits. The Asaṅgaśruti also suggests that Brahman

nescience are two different, separate, distinct, opposite and contradictory aspects. Therefore, Madhva has stated in his Upādhikhandana, that Ajñāna can never be attributed to Brahman who is Omniscient (Akhilasamvetr).<sup>491</sup> Now it cannot be said that let there be Ajñāna in the presence of Jñāna. Because, then the prefix a (giving the sense of negation) becomes futile, or else, Ajñāna should mean the knowledge of Brahman since a denotes Lord Visnu. So His knowledge is Ajñāna.<sup>491A</sup> And Brahman has no Vrttijñāna (since He has no mind which is Prākṛta). So there is no question of getting affected His Svarūpa�nāna as shown above and also Mānasikajñāna since there is no material mind. Thus there is no nescience in Brahman.<sup>492</sup> The world, including mind is the product of nescience. Before creation there was no nescience since there was no world as such. How can then the forming or fashioning of these be possible? So there is neither nescience nor illusion in Brahman. When it is proved that Brahman has no Mānasikajñāna (Vrttijñāna) how then its nescience (if taken for granted) be removed? Because, in the Advaita, Ajñāna is to be removed by Vrttijñāna. And it is foolish to say that nescience of Brahman would be removed by Vrttijñāna of the Jīvas forming in future. Because, nescience of one cannot be removed by the Vrttijñāna of another. And if the Advaitins say that this is possible because of the identity of Brahman and embodied soul, then as shown earlier, there would be

Anyonyāśraya (if there is nescience in Brahman there is identity and if there is identity there can be nescience in Brahman). It also cannot be said that it is possible as Brahman attains the Jīvabhāva through Its nescience because it amounts to saying that nescience is there along with Jñāna (true knowledge) which is a self-contradiction. Now it is proved that Vṛttijñāna of soul cannot remove the nescience of Brahman. As Brahman is veiled (or concealed) by nescience, there is no chance for soul to gain true knowledge since he is identical with Brahman in the Advaita.<sup>493</sup> Let the Vṛttijñāna, a product of nescience, destroy not only the nescience (even if taken for granted) but also true knowledge since it is understood that it is present always with Ajñāna in Brahman and both of them are not contradictory, as Ajñāna is not going to be destroyed by Jñāna. This view becomes opposed to the Śruti passage- Drṣṭyaiva tam mucyate<sup>493A</sup> (Realising It one gets liberated), because, according to this view neither Samsāra nor Ajñāna can be destroyed. Further, it is to be accepted that nescience has only resisting power towards the origin of true knowledge. Otherwise, the Śruti-passages relating to the destruction of Ajñāna by Jñāna become futile.

Now this nescience cannot be destroyed by Mānasajñāna. Because, Mānasajñāna related to Brahman, is insentient according

to the Advaita. The Acit element of this Jñāna is not capable to destroy the Ajñāna. And if the Cit element is regarded as competent as it is the very nature of Brahman, then there is no scope for Ajñāna to be there in Brahman. So the Bhāvarūpā-jñāna which is Nitya as contended by the Advaitins, is not at all there in the Lord.

#### AJÑĀNA IS NOT VIŚAYĀŚRITA

Some of the Advaitins contend that Ajñāna is Viśayaśrita.<sup>494</sup> According to this view, Viśaya becomes the locus of Ajñāna. It is because of the concealment by the Ajñāna, the Śukti cannot be comprehended as it is. It is because of Ajñāna only, the Śukti is mistaken for Rajata. Therefore, it is said that the Ajñāna is Viśayaśrita. But this view does not stand any test; since, when the Ajñāna of that object (Śukti) is removed by the Vṛttijñāna of one beholder, then the object, as it is, should become exposed to one and all. Because the Vṛttijñāna has already removed the Ajñāna covering that object. But practically, it never happens.<sup>495</sup> When some light is taken into a room, it removes the darkness therein and makes all the objects therein visible to one and all. But in the case of Ajñāna, which is believed to be Viśayaśrita, it does not happen. Even by the Vṛttijñāna of one, when the Ajñāna, which is the Āvaraṇa of the object is removed, it does not become visible as it is to one and all. So it is clear that the Ajñāna

is not Viṣayaśrita. If another concealment is to be accepted (Ajñānāntarāvaraṇa), then that object becomes invisible to one and all including him, who, at first attempt, had seen the object.<sup>496</sup> If separate Ajñānas, concealing the same object, according to a number of Jīvas, are to be regarded, then that leads to the concept of infinite number of different Ajñānas. So the view, that the Ajñāna is Viṣayaśrita, is not tenable.<sup>497</sup>

Thus, it is clear from this, that neither Brahman nor individual soul and nor even Viṣaya can be the Āśraya of Ajñāna.

#### AJÑĀNA<sup>497A</sup> IS JĪVĀŚRITA

According to the Dvaita view, the embodied soul is the locus of Ajñāna. The Ajñāna (wrong knowledge), coming in the way of true knowledge is found in the soul. And the souls alone, and not insentient things, are called Tāmasas (possessing Ajñāna).<sup>498</sup> He, whose Ajñāna (wrong knowledge) gets removed, is capable to have the knowledge of objects. And like the variegated defects of sight in different persons, the veil of Ajñāna (wrong knowledge) is also distinctly different from man to man. Generally, the light and darkness appear to be resorted to objects. Really speaking, objects resort to light and darkness. One becomes the Naśaka (destroyer) and another Naśya (destroyed) as light enters in the place

of darkness and removes it; in the same way, Jñāna and Ajñāna are Naśaka and Naśya (relation of Nāśyāśaka). By this very fact, it can be known that both Jñānājñāna are there in the soul. As true knowledge is there in Purusa, in the same way, the nescience to be destroyed by that true knowledge, must also be there in the same Purusa. Then only the destruction of his nescience (wrong knowledge) is possible. But in Brahman, there cannot be any nescience (wrong knowledge). Since He is an embodiment of unlimited pure knowledge.<sup>499</sup> Thus, Jñānājñāna being present in the Jīva the Jñāna becomes the cause of Vastujñāna and wrong knowledge of that like an eye-disease, causing veil to objects, becomes the cause of wrong knowledge. The role of wrong knowledge in Purusa is also the same. As the Jñāna is there in the knowing Jīva, the Ajñāna is also there in the Jīva.<sup>500</sup>

The Advaitins' stand is that to gain the knowledge of objects, our mind moves out of the body through eyes (senses) towards objects (Āśraya of Ajñāna).<sup>500A</sup> But this view is wrong. Because the experience of the knowledge of objects etc., is like the experience of pleasure and displeasure. As the experience takes inside,<sup>501</sup> knowledge of objects cannot take place outside. Otherwise, there cannot be experience of that. The sense-organs such as the eye, ear, although tracing outward, originate knowledge inside; whereas mind, not tracing

outward, need not move out of the body towards objects. The moving of the mind from the body is seen when the soul departs from the body. The mind is called Antahkarana - inner sense - organ. So, it should always be there inside and accomplish its work.<sup>502</sup> As Jñāna is Antahkarana-gata, Ajñāna is also Antahkarana-gata. So the destroyer and destroyed should be at the same place. And moreover the true knowledge of one man does not destroy the wrong knowledge of another. By this very fact also, it is clear that Jñāna and Ajñāna are of Ekaśraya (having one and the same as substratum). The experience of Sakṣin is also the same. The experience as - 'I know' and the experience - 'I know not' are also cognized by the Sakṣin.<sup>503</sup> The Jñāna as 'I am ignorant' proves the Ajñāna of the Jīva. The Vedic statement corroborates the same point as Māya (Avidyā-Ajñāna) is there in the Jīva since eternity.<sup>504</sup> But, it cannot be said that by the fact of identity (Aikya) of Jīva and Brahman, Ajñāna can get transferred to Brahman. Because, Pramātrtvā (knowability) is there in the Jīva and Pramātā (Jñātr) (knower) is soul only. So the Pramātrtvā of Jīva cannot be attributed to Brahman as there is difference in Kartr, Karma and Bhava according to the Advaita.<sup>504A</sup> When Aikya itself is untenable and illogical as shown earlier, it is foolish to attribute Pramātrtvā of Jīva to Brahman.<sup>505</sup> The inference also favours the view that wrong knowledge is in the soul since the Āśraya

(locus) of this is same as that of Jñāna (true knowledge) like the pleasure and displeasure found in the same person.<sup>506</sup>

The Advaitins hold that Ajñāna is the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) for the creation of this world.<sup>506A</sup> So Ajñāna is there in Brahman. But this view is wrong. The primal matter (Mūlaprakṛti) at creation and the mud and the like in subsequent creations is the material cause (Upādānakāraṇa). So the nescience is not required for creation of this world. Even if it is taken for granted that nescience is there in Brahman, Brahman is the Lord, the controller of that like a cowherd who is called the lord of cows (Gomān). It means, He being the Lord of that, never gets affected.<sup>507</sup> The Jīva, since sleeping with Māyā (Ajñāna-affected), cannot have the experience of his own bliss. When this Māyā (Ajñāna-wrong knowledge) is removed, he will experience his own bliss. Hence Ajñāna is Jīvāśrita.<sup>508</sup> This Māyā, which is real, conceals only the blissful nature of soul and not the element of the cognition 'I'. The wrong knowledge does not affect the 'I' element. The Māyā (Ajñāna) of this kind is real, an element of Prakṛti, and seen in Jīvas.<sup>509</sup> The wrong knowledge which is Anādi in souls is of two kinds. One Jīvacchadaka that veils the very nature of the soul like the cataract of an eye and another is Paramācchadaka, like a curtain, that makes the very nature of Brahman unknown

to the soul. Thus two-folded Ajñāna (Māya) is there in the Jīva. The Lord, not having any of these, removes away the same. (He is the destroyer of these two).<sup>510</sup> If He is not away from or free from two types of wrong knowledge, how can He then dispel the wrong knowledge of others like a king being himself confined or arrested cannot help others to get released.<sup>511</sup> Those, who attribute Māya to the Lord, should bequestioned as to whether Māya causes delusion to the Lord or not? If it does not create delusion then let it be in the Lord as a special power. Then it proves that the Lord, being unaffected and undeluded, makes the Jīvas deluded. The Bhāgavata<sup>512</sup> passage discards the possibility of the presence of Ajñāna in Brahman. It is only a fool or ignorant, who, with a view to hide his demerits, attributes the same to the others. In the same way, he attributes Ajñāna, possibly present in the Jīva, to the Lord with a view to ward off the inferiority complex.<sup>513</sup> Thus, Ajñāna, may be in any form, can never be attributed to the Lord; whereas it can be attributed to the Jīva since the Jīva is the locus of the Ajñāna.

#### ONE AND THE SAME CAN BE THE SUBJECT AND THE OBJECT

The Advaitins contend that one and the same cannot be the subject and the object for one and the same action, viz., knowing. Regarding this, they say that Lord cannot realise

himself or know Himself. But the statements such as "I know not myself", "I know myself" clearly show that one and the same can be the subject and the object for the same action of knowing. This cannot be rejected since it is universally accepted.<sup>514</sup> The contention of the Advaitins seems to be based upon the definition of Karma Mīmāṃsakas.<sup>514A</sup> According to them, Karma or the object is that where the fruit of the action such as movement (knowing) is seen. According to this, one and the same cannot be the subject and the object for the same action. But, this definition has no universal applicability. It may not be true in the case of experiences. So some other definition has to be stated.<sup>515</sup>

By quoting the definition of Karma of Mīmāṃsakas the Advaitins slip into self-contradiction.<sup>515A</sup> Because, disregarding the same definition, the Advaita superimposes the world on Brahman - with the view that the subject-object relation (Jñāna-Jñeyarūpa-relation) cannot be applied and attributed to Brahman. If it is attributed, like Brahman, the world will also become real. Hence, the Advaita does not admit this relation in the case of Brahman. But here, to reject the identity (sameness) in the subject, the object and the action, the Advaita has relied upon the same definition of Karma given by the Bhāṭṭas. Thus, there is self-

contradiction in this approach. Moreover, the definition itself of the Bhāṭṭas is defective. Because, the fruit or aim or result of action can never be the object whereas it is something pertaining to the subject only, E.g. he, who wants to go to a village, walks a certain distance. The mere stepping into that village is not the fruit or the aim, but it is something more that pertains to the subject who walks. Otherwise Karmatva is to be attributed to the entire portion of the land touched by his feet on the way. But, this is not the case. Just Karmatva cannot be attributed to the entire portion of the land, in the same way, Karmatva cannot be attributed to the last portion or last stepped or touched land. Thus the application of definition is affected, with two demerits, too wide and too narrow (two logical defects).<sup>516</sup> Therefore, the relation of the subject and the object must be subjective - a type of subjective or intrinsic relation. Since it is evident that when one knows an object (pot), the fruit of that knowledge is to describe it in terms or words. And this is seen in the knower and not in the known (pot). Hence, the fruit of the action is related to the subject and not to the object. So the definition of the Bhāṭṭas is defective. According to this definition, one and the same cannot be the subject and the object. Whereas self-objectivity of knowledge (Svarūpa) is thus evident. So there is identity in the subject, the object and the action.<sup>517</sup>

The characteristic of the object of the knowledge is not found in the object (pot) but seen in the knower, since the fruit of the knowing action is a peculiar subjective relation which is in the form of usage or articulation. The Jñātrtvā is not there in the object but in the knowledge of the knower. If it is in the object, then Jñātrtvā cannot be seen pertaining to the realisation of past and future things. So Jñātrtvā is there in the knowledge<sup>518</sup> of the knower. Therefore, there is sameness in these.

The Svarūpa-jñāna of the Lord realises the nature of the Lord. The Bhagavadgītā corroborates this view. The Gīta<sup>-518A</sup> declares, the Kartṛtvā, Karmatvā and Kriyātva to the Lord. The difference is seen between Jñāna (which is intrinsic) and Jñeyā (the object of knowledge - extrinsic) in respect of the knowledge of the Jada. But when Jñānatvā and Jñeyatvā are attributed to the same Jñānarūpa Ātman there is no difference and there the same becomes the subject, the means and also the object. Hence, there is no universal rule that there is difference between Jñāna and Jñeyā. So there is no any invalidity in saying that Ātman realises himself.<sup>519</sup> Jñānatvā and Jñeyatvā are possible to be seen in respect of an object of Jñānarūpa such as Ātman.

Explicitly, there appears difference among Brahman, His knowledge and His action so far as usage is concerned. But, they are not different. Identity among them is possible with the help of the concept Vishesa.<sup>519A</sup> The Vishesa is the philosophical concept expounded by Madhva that proves ultimate identity between the Lord, His knowledge, His action and the like and at the same time plays the role of representative of difference so as to help the usage such as 'Lord's knowledge,' 'Lord's action' and so on. So, there is no impropriety in saying that one and the same can be the subject and the object for the same action of knowing. To the same Atman (the Lord) Kartrtva is attributed in the process of knowing and Karmatva too as He being the object of knowing.<sup>520</sup> The statements 'Mamaham na vijanami', 'Mamaham janami' etc., clearly show the sameness in the subject, the object and the action of knowing.

Now, Vadiraja point out the demerits of the definition of Svaprakasatva of the Advaitins.<sup>520A</sup> First of all, the sense, conveyed by the definition, is contradictory to common understanding. Because, the Advaitins simply say that Brahman is Svaprakasa but declare that It has no Svarupajnana and attribute Asarvajnatva to It. So Svaprakasatva becomes meaningless. According to the Advaita, Brahman is not merely Asarvajna. But it also attributes Jadatva, a defect also.

The state of Brahman of the Advaitins, is worse than that of a blind man. Because, a blind man, though not knowing others, knows at least himself. Whereas, the Advaita-Brahman knows not even Itself.<sup>521</sup> If Svarūpasukha is not experienced, then it is useless. According to the above definition, Brahman has no experience of bliss, although having Sukhasvarūpa. If, like Svarūpasukha, it is contended that Svarūpajñāna is also not an object of Itself then what is the use of the Jñāna that cannot be made use of. The knowledge, that cognises an object, is useful for Vyavahāra. But the knowledge of Brahman, as it does not cognise Itself, is useless. When this is the state of Brahman, then nobody will aspire to attain and realise such Brahman.<sup>522</sup> If it is said that Brahman is Sukharūpa, but It has no experience of that Sukha then how can It be declared as eternally liberated one, since in the state of liberation, one has to experience the bliss bereft of sorrow of any kind. So a liberated one, although having Jñānarūpa and Sukharūpa cannot gain any fruit experience of Jñāna and Sukha. If bliss is not experienced in the liberated state, the liberation will cease to be a Purusārtha. The liberation is nothing but a state of realization of intrinsic bliss and knowledge.<sup>522A</sup> If there is no experience of bliss and knowledge in liberation, then it will not be coveted by any one and also it cannot be called as the final goal to be

achieved by an embodied soul.<sup>523</sup> Therefore, to prove Puruṣārthatva to liberation, Brahman should be described as Svaprakāśa as one who realizes Svarūpajñāna and Svarūpasukha of Himself. That means that these are the subjective objects of His realization. The derivative meaning of that term also corroborates this view, as Svaprakāśa is one who knows his nature (himself).<sup>524</sup> The Gītā statement also states the same that the Lord knows Himself through His knowledge.<sup>524A</sup>

Therefore, even if one and the same becomes the subject and the object or even if Kartrtvā, Karmatva and Kriyātva are seen in one, there is no harm. But, the Advaitins' idea of Svaprakāśa as one that does not know himself (itself) is untenable.

#### REFUTATION OF SABALATVA ATTRIBUTED TO VIŚNU BY OTHERS

The Advaitins attribute Sabalatva to Brahman.<sup>524B</sup> The Brahman when affected or qualified by Avidyā becomes Sabala and thus is called Īśvara. And this Sabala-Brahman plays the role of the world-creator and the like. But this view is wrong. There cannot be such classification as 'Para-Brahman' and 'Apara Brahman'. Therefore, Vādirāja says that He, who is eternally Śuddha cannot become Sabala. Since the Lord is eternally liberated one, He cannot be confined

to any bondage or He cannot get affected by any Dosa such as Avidya and the like, Brahman is the Supreme Lord. He is eternally Suddha and Mukta. Nityamuktatva and Nitya-Suddhatva are not present in Saṁsāra. Nityaśuddhatva means absence of any Dosa such as Ajñāna, Bhrama for ever. In the state of liberation, one is free from such Dosas.

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According to the Advaita, Brahman gets affected with Avidyadosa and since beginningless it has been assuming the Jīva-state or form.<sup>525A</sup> If this is the position, how can there be Suddhatva in Brahman who is stained with the dirt of transmigration. In the Advaita, there is no possibility of a Suddha-Brahman. Further, it cannot be argued that part of it gets stained with Ajñanadosa. It is to be stated that the whole gets affected like an injury in the part of the body that causes pain to that man as a whole.<sup>526</sup> Now it can also not be argued that Bandha is not real and hence let Brahman be both Baddha and Suddha. Because, the Śruti-passage does not admit this.<sup>527</sup> In the Śruti, both the Jīva and the Lord are described as two birds. They are present in the same tree in the form of body always.<sup>528</sup> The Lord, although present with the Jīva, does not undergo any changes or does not get affected like the Jīva. The terms 'Anaśnan' and 'Abhicākāśiti' do not admit any Dosas in Brahman. So He is eternally Suddha. So it cannot be

stated that let Brahman be both Buddha and Mukta as Bandha is unreal. And moreover, unreal Bandha cannot attribute Baddhatva to Brahman. So it is inevitable on the part of the Advaitins either to give up Suddhatva (Muktatva) or Baddhatva (Sabalatva) of Brahman. The Śruti-passage, cited above, does not permit both together in Brahman. Both are contradictory to each other. So it is evident that Brahman, being eternally Suddha and Mukta, never gets affected by Avidyā and the like and never becomes Sabala as the Advaitins contend.<sup>529</sup>

Now it may be argued that let the Bandha, though unreal but on account of it being Vyāvahārika, be attributed to Brahman. But this view is untenable because whatever is Vyāvahārika, is not there in reality. As Sukti remains as it is (unchangeable), Brahman also is of same type (unchangeable) for ever. And moreover, the Baddhatva and the Muktatva cannot be present jointly in one. The Buddha is different and the Mukta (Nityamukta) is different.<sup>530</sup> The Sūtra-Sthityadanābhyaṁ ca, accepted by both also states difference between the Jīva and Brahman. The term Sthiti in the Sūtra suggests the presence of Brahman with the Jīva. The Jīva enjoys or eats the fruit of his deeds. The term Adana suggests the presence of the Jīva enjoying the Karmaphala. Thus, neither Sabalatva can be proved in Brahman nor identity of Jīva with Brahman is possible.

CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF THE BHĀGAVATA VERSE -"BADDHO MUKTA ITI HYĀKHYĀ GUNATO ME NA VASTUTAH"<sup>530B</sup>

The Bhāgavata verse, Baddho mukta iti hyākhyā gunato me na vastutah at first reading appears to convey the sense that "I (God) am called bound and released through Gunas but really speaking I am neither bound nor released." But this is not the intended meaning. Because in the previous verse Lord Kṛṣṇa has said that there are Gunas, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. These Gunas bind the Jīva and not the Lord. By this it is promised that the God is free from these three Gunas. Bandha is to the Jīva on account of the Gunas that are under God's control. When the Gunas are under the control of the Lord, how can they bind Him?<sup>531</sup> And moreover, latter part of the verse<sup>531A</sup> also suggests that since Gunas arise out of Māyā or Prakṛti, God has no Bandha nor Mokṣa. Because, Māyā or Prakṛti is also under the control of the Lord. Therefore, the real meaning of the verse is "The Jīva has Bandha and Mokṣa through the Gunas - Sattva, Rajas and Tamas that are under My control but not as a part of his very nature; since, Gunas arise out of Māyā or Prakṛti. I have neither Bandha nor Mokṣa." Because, The very Māyā is under God's control, as in the statement- 'he lives with my amount.' Here 'my amount' means amount under my control. And for livelihood, it is taken by some one else. In the same way, 'Me gunataḥ' means through Gunas

that are under my (God's) control. So the Jīva, thus gets bound through these Guṇas and hence is called Baddha. When the same Jīva gets released of these, he is called Mukta.<sup>532</sup>

The Advaitins interpret this verse that on account of the association of the Guṇas, Sattva and the like, the God is called Baddha, Mukta and the like and not in reality.<sup>532A</sup> But this interpretation is not correct since there arises contradiction when compared with previous and latter verses. And moreover, according to the Advaita, Bandha may be supposed to be Mithyā but Mokṣa can never be said to be Mithyā. Therefore, Vādirāja's interpretation wherein both these Baddhatva and Muktatva are attributed to the Jīva, is correct and appropriate. Further, as long as there is Bandha, there is no Mokṣa, when once Mokṣa is attained there cannot be any Bandha.<sup>533</sup>

In the latter part of the verse, Lord Kṛṣṇa negates the Bandha to Himself since He is devoid of or is not influenced by the Guṇas such as Sattva, Rajas and Tamas that originate from Māya. The God is Aprakṛta and hence, there is no possibility of the effect of Prākṛtaguṇas that cause Bandha. Māya cannot be there in the Lord because He is the destroyer of that. Therefore, the Guṇas, arising from Māya, cannot affect the Lord. So, when the Guṇas are not there, there is

no Bandha. When there is no Bandha, the question of attainment of the Mokṣa does not arise. Hence, the Lord is Nitya-mukta whereas the Jīva is Baddha and also subsequently Mukta.<sup>534</sup>

The Jīva is of different nature from that of the God. Therefore, he is called Bhinnamāsa. In the statement Sayujau sakhayau,<sup>534A</sup> among the two birds of the Jīva and the God, Gunabandha is there to the Jīva and release of the Bandha is also there to the Jīva. The beginningless Ajñāna is the cause of Gunabandha. When the Ajñāna is destroyed, the Gunabandha is released. Then the Jīva attains the state of liberation. Thus, the Bandha and the Mokṣa pertain to the Jīva and not to the God.<sup>535</sup>

#### ANOTHER INTERPRETATION OF THE VERSE 'BADDHO MUKTA...'

Vādirāja interprets the same verse Baddho mukta... in a different manner.

Baddhatva, Muktatva and the like are attributed by the scholars to the God since He controls them. Really speaking, He is completely free from Bandha and Mokṣa. The Brahmasūtra<sup>535A</sup> also justifies the same; that, which is regulated or controlled by a person, is normally attributed to him as in the slogan- 'King is victorious.' Actually, it is the soldiers who are responsible for the victory, but since they and their efforts

are under the control of that sovereign, victory is applied to him.<sup>536</sup> The term Baddha is real in the case of the Jīva who is dependent. He is Baddha due to having real Bandha. This clearly states the difference between Baddhajīva, Muktajīva and Nityamukta God.<sup>537</sup> As the Lord controls the Māyā, how can there be either Gunabandha originated from Māyā or destruction of that, in Him.

If the Bandha is imagined as delusion, then the cause to that effect should also be stated. But the Guna cannot be treated as its cause. Because, it is the real Guna that causes Bandha and not the delusion. Moreover, cognition of Guna is not unreal. Therefore, Mithyatva cannot be attributed to Bandha. The Śruti also proves the same.

Moreover, the knowledge originated from the Sattva-guna, is taken for granted as real. The gods, sages, full of Sattvaguna, admit that Samsāra-bandha is real. It is an object of their direct cognition. So the Bandha cannot be called as unreal.<sup>538</sup> In His preaching to Uddhava, God Kṛṣṇa has said that Bandha is due to Avidyā, but it cannot be called Mithya.<sup>539</sup>

Vadirāja refers to other verses of the Bhāgavata<sup>540</sup> and states that even the four-faced Brahma, who heads the

Jivas, gets bound by Guna. And he cannot know the Lord completely who is totally free from Gunabandha, who is Supreme and is the Lord of all. All the Jivas - from the four-faced Brahma to Sthāvara Jāṅgama (ordinary beings) all are bound by these Gunas with gradation in content. Being caught hold by the wrong knowledge, (except Rjus)<sup>540A</sup> they are always engaged in the performance of various Karmas and as a result of that they undergo or attain different births. At the end, even after the attainment of liberation, all the Jivas remain in the state of dependence. There also, they are bound by Asvātantrya, Apūrnata and the like.<sup>540B</sup> And hence they are called Buddhas both in Samsāra state and also in Mukti state.

#### PURPORT OF DIFFERENT ŚRUTIS AND SMRTIS SHOWN IN THE PADYĀRTHA

Here Vādirāja establishes Lord's Nitya-muktatva asserted by some Śruti passages and Smṛti statements. In the Bhagavad-gītā, it is stated that Karmas do not affect the God since He is completely beyond that. Three Gunas, namely, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas originate from Prakṛti and they bind the embodied souls in different bodies. So it is clear that the Gunabaddhatva is to the embodied souls and not to the Lord.<sup>541</sup> Likewise, the Śruti-passages Utamṛtasya<sup>541A</sup> and the like declare the Nityamuktatva of the Lord. It is also suggested that the Muktas<sup>(—)</sup> are not Nityamuktas because these Jivas attain the liberation by the grace of the Lord

and hence even in the Mukti state, they remain dependents on and devotees of the Lord. So the Nityamukta God is the Lord of Muktas. As the Lord is the controller of the embodied souls, He is also the Lord of liberated souls.<sup>542</sup>

It is accepted that when a Jīva attains the liberation, his Gunabandha is removed. But there is bondage in the form of Asvatantrya. So the Jīva has either Gunabandha or Bhakti bandha.<sup>543</sup> There is a class of Jīvas who are called Nitya-samsārins, since they have the mixed experience of pleasure and pain according to their inner nature. There is difficulty to treat them as Nityabaddhas.<sup>544</sup> Thus Baddhatva and Muktatva are eternal and real. So, Mithyatva cannot be attributed to these. The two are eternal like Brahman and Mukti.<sup>545</sup> The bondage of the Jīvas is on account of Gunas and not as a part of nature. This bondage, although beginningless, is not eternal.

Attributing bondage to the Lord is contradictory to the common understanding also. A fool, if unhappy, attributes unhappiness to others. In the same way, an embodied being attributes his bondage to the Lord.

It cannot be said that the Lord is also bound. If He too becomes subject to bondage, then who would be there to

release the souls from bondage like a man, fallen in the ditch, cannot protect others. Therefore, the God should be declared as Nityamukta; then only He can remove the bondage of bound-souls.<sup>546</sup> When the Bandha of the soul is removed, the soul will not become similar to the Lord. The identity cannot be established between the God and the Jīva. Because, the God is eternally released and pure where as the soul is then released and purified like a dirty cloth made clean. A released soul may not have birth and death but on this ground he cannot be identified with the God. The Sāyujyanukti, a kind of release<sup>546A</sup> does not indicate any identity, but it states that the soul without any pain lives with God.

The Advaitins classify Brahman as Parabrahman and Śabalabrahman and attribute Śabalatva to the Brahman. Vādirāja asks: "What is this Śabalatva? Is it Māya Śabalatva in the form of a Dosa? Or is it Māya Śabalatva in the form of Adosa? Or is it Śabalatva in the form of meritorious qualities such as Jñāna, Ananda?" In these options, Vādirāja, discarding the first one, accepts the second and third ones since the two do not superimpose or attribute any demerits (Doṣas) to the Lord.<sup>547</sup> And it is ascertained that Ajñāna (Māya) is Jīvāśrita and not Brahmāśrita. Because, Ajñāna is experienced by the Jīva as Aham ajñah. So Ajñāna is

found in the Jīva and not in Brahman.<sup>548</sup>

#### ESTABLISHING MĀYĀDŪRATVA BY THE BHĀGAVATA STATEMENT

In this context, Vādirāja gathering the data from the Bhāgavata,<sup>549</sup> states that the praise of the Lord (God Kṛṣṇa) recited by the four-faced Brahmā. The praise declares that the Ajñāna, that causes delusion to the embodied souls, is not found in the Lord. He is the Supreme Ātman. He is a treasure of qualities and is the Adipurusa. He keeps aside the Māya by the power of His knowledge. He is the Lord of Prakrti. He is the controller of the entire world. He is Anaśrita (not having resorted to any one). He is glorified as bestower of Dharma, Kāma and Mokṣa to the Jīvas who are deluded by Māya. Thus the praise establishes Māyādūratva of the Lord.

Vādirāja adduces one more argument that the Vaikuntha-loka is Aprakṛta. It means Māya (either Prakrti or Ajñāna) is not there in the abode of the Lord viz., Vaikuntha. When the abode of the Lord is Amāyika, then how can its Lord be Māya-formed? Thus, it is evident that the Lord is Amāyika (absence of Prakrti, or Māya).<sup>550</sup>

ESTABLISHING MAYĀDŪRATVA BY A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF  
THE TERM MĀYĀ

The term Māyā occurs in the Śruti and Smṛti passages in the following meanings: (1) God's Desire, (2) God's Power, (3) Goddess Laxmī, (4) Jadaprakṛti and (5) Ignorance of the souls.<sup>550A</sup> The Māyā, referred to in these meanings, is not Mithyā. So Māyā is inexplicable according to the Advaitins, is nowhere found. The Māyā, although being declared as Anirvacanīya- inexplicable by the Advaitins, it is not Anirvacanīya. It is Anirvacanīya only in terms and not in sense. It is not totally Asat. The Advaitins' interpretation and explanation of Māyā and its product Sabalatva look baseless and are totally disregarded by scholars. If the Lord, an embodiment of infinite auspicious qualities is declared as Sabala, Aśuddha and so on, it is a defect or bad remark as in the case of pure cloth when stained with dirt. When He is declared as Suddha Brahman, an embodiment of unlimited power, beauty, knowledge and the like, then that shows that demerits such as ignorance etc., are not there in the Brahman.<sup>551</sup> Thus, He becomes Pure and not associated with any defects.

Now in attributing Sabalatva to the Lord, Ajñana or nescience is the main cause. This nescience is an aspect whose presence is known temporarily at the time of appearance and not prior to that. And this nescience, it is stated,

becomes the cause of delusion. It is also said that this nescience is removed by the Vrttijñāna born of the nescience and not by Svarūpajñāna. If Svarūpajñāna is not the destroyer of Ajñāna then the Ajñāna, although destroyed by the Vrttijñāna, may reappear and cause the delusion as in the case of delusion of the silveryness in the conch shell. So it is to be stated that the nescience cannot be destroyed totally since its appearance now and then like the delusion of silveryness in the conch shell which proves the absence of liberation or presence of the nescience even after liberation. Both these views suggest that the nescience cannot be destroyed completely.

So it is right and logically reasonable also to state that Ajnana is destroyed by the everlasting and dazzling Svarūpajñāna. By its association only, one's mind gains the cognitive power.<sup>552</sup> The Svarūpajñāna of the Lord is eternally pure and illuminous and unlimited. Therefore, there is no possibility of the presence of Ajñāna in Him. When Ajñāna is not there, then Sabalatva connected to Ajñāna cannot be attributed to Him. Mayam vyudasya citsaktya<sup>552A</sup> and other Smṛti passages proclaim the eternal Suddhatva and Muktatva of the Lord. So how can there be any defect in Him?<sup>553</sup>

EXPOSITION OF THE ŚRUTI-PASSAGES 'NISKALAM NISKRIYAM SĀNTAM' ETC.

The Advaitins deny Kartrtva in the Suddha Brahman<sup>553A</sup> on the ground that, if Kartrtva is accepted in Brahman then that would be a defect in the form of a means to possible action of agreeable efforts. It means, Kartrtva is also a cause of Sabalatva. But this view of the Advaitins is untenable. Because, if Kartrtva is said to be the cause of Sabalatva, then why not Jñātrtva? And moreover, as Krtrtva is denied in Suddha Brahman, on the same ground Jñātrtva should also be denied, which is undesirable. If Kartrtva denotes the action of movement etc., Jñātrtva also indicates the action of cognizing the objects. In both, one or other type of action is involved. Further, in general, all the roots give the sense of action one or other. So if Kartrtva is denied then Jñātrtva be denied.<sup>554</sup> Śruti passage has no partiality in denying Kartrtva and in attributing Jñātrtva. Therefore, either both have to be denied or to be admitted.

But really speaking, the Śruti passage, cited above,<sup>554A</sup> never denies Kartrtva and the like in Brahman. The Śruti Parāsyā Saktih<sup>555A</sup> clearly states that Jñāna, Bala and Kriyā of the Lord are all inherent and eternal. If the previous Śruti is understood as denying the Kartrtva then there would be contradiction between the Śruti-passages of one and the same section. Therefore, it should be known that Niskriyam

Śruti negates the merit and demerit of action in the Lord. It means, the Lord, though engages in the action of creating the world and the like is neither graced with merit nor stained with demerit. In the same way, other Śruti passages are also to be understood. The Śruti- Aśabdamaśparśamarūpam<sup>555B</sup> does not deny the Sabda, Sparśa and the like completely, but denies Duṣṭaśabda, Duṣṭaśoarśa etc. If this is not admitted, then the Niṣkalam Śruti is to be understood that it does deny Jñātata in Brahman. Therefore, all these are to be understood as the Lord is free from evil-sound, evil-touch, evil-form and the like. If Aśabda Śruti speaks of Him then also He becomes Sabdavisaya, the object of expression. If the Śruti does not speak of Him, then also His Sabdavisayatva is not disregarded. So, in either case, He is not Aśabda not being an object of Sabda.<sup>556</sup> Similarly, if Asparśa is meant as absence of touch, then Avidyā of the Advaitins cannot touch or affect the Brahman.<sup>557</sup> If the option is given in the case of Avidyā (means Avidyā alone touches Brahman and not the other), then also expressive and primary meaning of the term Asparśam is supposed to be given up. So with implication, agreeable meaning is to be understood. In that case, the term Asparśa could be meant as not having Prākṛtasparśa - effect of influence of Prākṛtasparśa. The Śruti- Aśarīrin suggests that the Lord has no Prākṛta or material body since He has Aprākṛtaśarīta.<sup>557A</sup> Further,

the Śruti describes God as Rukmavarṇa. This shows that He has Rūpa or form. It means He has no Prākṛtarūpa, but Aprākṛta one.<sup>558</sup> Moreover, touch and form go together. Therefore, neither of them can be denied. So the Śrutis 'Aśabdaṁ...' etc., deny evil word, evil touch, evil form and the like, and not the meritorious or auspicious words such as Nārāyaṇa, the graceful touch of Goddess Laxmi.

#### ESTABLISHING THE DIVYĀKARA (DIVINE FORM) TO THE LORD BY ŚRUTI, SMRTI AND YUKTI

The Śruti- Āditya Varnam tamaśah parastat<sup>558A</sup> declares that the Lord is free from nescience and He is brilliant or illuminating with extra-ordinary unlimited prowess.<sup>559</sup> Here is the argument wherever there is colour, there is touch and both these are in form. This rule is not merely applicable to the material world of things, but applies also to the non-material domain. The Śruti-Rukmavarnam tamaśah parastat states that colour, touch, form and the like exist also there in the Aprākṛta place. This can also be proved by the reason Tamaśah parastat which means away from ignorance i.e., Prakṛti.<sup>560</sup> Therefore, on the basis of the Śruti and Yukti stated therein, the Ākāra of the Lord is described as He has unlimited eyes, arms, legs, faces and the like. It means He is Viśvarūpin. So the Lord's presence in the Prākṛta things, does not become

Prākṛta and also does not get affected. He is eternally Aprākṛta bliss-natured. He has the forms of Sukha, Jñāna and the like and not the forms of Pancabhūtas.<sup>561</sup> Though He shows the single world of things in manifold forms at the same time in different places, He is unaffected with Prākṛta contents. As the Māya, the causes of material creation, is not heard as related to Him, His form is of knowledge and bliss and is free from Māya. The form of the Lord is all-pervasive in the same way.<sup>562</sup>

And the term Kāya, when derivatively explained, conveys the following sense: 'Ka' means Sukharūpa and Aya means Jñānarūpa. So Kāya denotes Sukharūpa and Jñānarūpa of the Lord.<sup>562A</sup> In the same way, even when the term Śarīra is referred to the Lord, His Sukharūpa remains unharmed. The term Śarīra, when etymologically explained, conveys the following meaning: 'Śa' means happiness, 'Ra' means enjoyment and 'Ira' means knowledge.<sup>562B</sup> Thus, Śarīra means He who experiences and enjoys His own happiness and knowledge. The form of the Lord abounds in happiness from top to bottom. All the limbs are of bliss-natured and are of extra-ordinary prowess.<sup>563</sup>

Another Śruti ascribes Āśariratva to the Lord. But it does not mean that the very concept of form is negated. It

only denies the presence of the material body, as is in the case of aerial speech, where body is not denied totally but unseen body is accepted and taken into account. Because, without the organ there cannot be the articulation of any speech. In the same way, Aśarīrata with regard to the Lord, stands for Alaukikata.<sup>564</sup> If there is Sarīra, there is no need to accept the presence of Duhkha and the like as a rule. Because, the Sarīra of the Lord is entirely different and not a product of matter. For Duhkha and the like, Sarīra is not responsible but the type of food. The Lord has been declared as Niranna in Dvāsuparna Śruti.<sup>564A</sup> So He has no defects that could originate from the food (of ordinary kind). So whatever may be the objective term, that would never attribute any defects to Brahman. All the terms declare one or the other meritorious and auspicious quality of the Lord.

Now, Vādirāja refutes the view of the Advaitins that there is no Kartrtva to Cetana of Cit-content.<sup>564B</sup> If Cetana is declared as not Kartā, then there arises the difficulty. If Kartrtva is ascribed to the Dehagataacetana, then it appears as if it refers to the both Deha and Cetana. Because, when Kartrtva is referred to the Viśista (Dehin), then Deha and Indriyas are also understood to have Kartrtva. But really speaking, it does not behave proper to attribute Kartrtva to the Jada. The Jada by nature itself, is devoid of any

Kartrtva.<sup>565</sup> And scholars say that Svatantrah karta<sup>565A</sup> that means Cetana alone is Kartā since he does different activities with means that are under his control, like the potter who is acclaimed as Kartā or doer.<sup>566</sup> The potter uses the mud, stick, wheel and the like that are under his control. These are the external instruments for accomplishing the effect viz., pot. The mind, body etc., of the potter are the internal means. So neither the mind nor the body is the Kartā whereas Cetana or soul alone is the Kartā and all others are just related to that. The Maya of the Advaitins also cannot contribute Kartrtva because it is also Jada. Moreover, scholars do not agree with the idea that the Kartrtva is specified or qualified in ordinary case. So Jada is accessory and Cetana alone is Kartā.<sup>567</sup> Vādirāja says that, the Kartrtva of the Lord is noticed as qualified. Viśista. Because the Lord creates this world with accessories time, Prakrti, Karma, that are under his control.<sup>568</sup> And Viśista Kartrtva is possible in the case of the Lord, as this is the very form and not different from Him.

So far as the Lord is concerned, He is Nityamukta. or eternally free. His form (body) is eternally embodied with unlimited auspicious qualities such as power, brilliance of knowledge, bliss beauty etc.<sup>569</sup> The embodied souls becoming favoured by His grace, get released from the bondage.

In release they always look at the blissful form of Lord Nārāyaṇa. The Śruti Yamaivesa...<sup>569A</sup> conveys two things that the Lord removes the obstacle of the Jīvas (Jīvacca-dikā) and setting aside the curtain of Paramāccādikā,<sup>569B</sup> unveils His form (to) souls who fulfilling the prescribed course of Sadhana, become qualified for liberation. The Śruti also states that both eternally free Lord and the released souls have forms. The term Tanu in Śruti signifies this. The adjective Svam suggests that it is the Svarūpa-deha and no else.<sup>570</sup> If the body of the released souls is considered to be material then the grace of the Lord would have to be treated as futile. The terms Svām Tanūm and Vivṛṇute indicate the nature of beginninglessness and eternality of Svarūpadeha respectively. This also proves that body in release state is other than material; it is non-material. Therefore, scholars, knowing the purport of the scriptures admit and proclaim the body of the released and of the Lord as an embodiment of Cit or spirit, Jnāna and Ananda (bliss) and not material. The non-material body as described above<sup>571</sup> will not cause rebirth, oldage, disease and the like. So how can there be dirt of any kind to both Mukta and Nityamukta. All the released are devoid of defects. They are pure nated and enjoy desired enjoyments of various kind. So there is no Sabalatva in them, both in the released souls and in the Lord.<sup>572</sup>

Vādirāja, at this point, emphatically denies the possibility of Sabalatva in the Lord. The inherent nature of the Lord is not Sabala but it is Sambala, that means the Lord is the bestower of extra-ordinary treasures to released souls. The Lord of the Advaitins is Sabala and of the Dvaitins is Sambala. Only an Anusvara is added by which He becomes more powerful and destroys the Sabala Lord. Hence, no Sabalatva can be attributed to Brahman or else. He may also be understood as Sabala since He is bright and lustrous with variegated complexions.<sup>573</sup>

The form of the Lord is Amayika and eternal. In this regard Vādirāja quotes the Bhagavadgītā statements.<sup>574</sup> The Lord is described by Arjuna; He is beginningless. He has no beginning, middle and end. His universal form is so bigger that everything could be visualised. He has unlimited arms, faces, eyes and the like. Arjuna could see this Viśvarūpa, only when he was graced with the divine sight by the Lord. Thus, the form of the Lord is extra-ordinary. Therefore how can it be treated as Mayika<sup>574A</sup> and material. The Lord has His own unlimited power to assume minute form as well as bigger form.<sup>575</sup> The form, directly cognised by Arjuna, is unlimited and all-pervasive. So then how can it be formless and associated with Maya. It cannot be.<sup>576</sup> Moreover, the devotees who seek refuge in the Lord, get released of Maya.

by Lord's grace, how can there be Māyā in Him? He is eternally free from Māyā.<sup>577</sup> Further, when qualified soul realizes the God in the cavity of his heart, Māyā gets burnt to ashes like a cloth. Thus, when the very sight or realization of the Lord destroys the Māyā how could God become Māyāmaya? It can never be. His blissful form is eternally of same nature, and unaffected.<sup>578</sup>

#### CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PURUŚASŪKTA

The exposition of Puruśasūkta, given by Vādirāja, tackles the views of the Advaitins. The Advaitins hold that the Lord described in the Puruśasūkta is Māyāmaya. He is formless. The world is not different from Him. There is identity of the Lord with the embodied soul and the like. But in this hymn, the Lord Brahman is extolled as having wonderful form with unlimited heads, hands and the like. Thus, the whole hymn describes Brahman as possessing a form. The Puruṣa in this hymn is the same Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu and not any ordinary being. It is stated in this hymn that, he, who realizes the God as described in this hymn, attains the liberation.<sup>578A</sup> If this is the fact, then how can He be the being of any ordinary type?<sup>579</sup>

So the Being described in this hymn, is Lord Viṣṇu who is spiritual, non-material, free from nescience and bestower

of the release which is non-material. If this Being would be of ordinary type, then He cannot grant the spiritual release. So there is no doubt that the Lord of this hymn is Aprākṛta or spiritual.

The Advaitins contend<sup>579A</sup> that the statements Purusa eva idam sarvam etc., in the hymn, give the sense of oneness and claim that there is identity between Brahman and the embodied soul. And the Lord is not different from this world. But this view is not correct. Because, the terms in the hymn are adjectives, that qualify and denote the extraordinary nature of the Lord, and hence they cannot be referred to the embodied souls in any manner. Neither explicitly, nor implicitly, the embodied soul is described here. And moreover the Lord cannot be identical with this world, since He is Ajada or non-material<sup>580</sup> and the world is material. And if oneness is traced forcibly then as the world is false in the Advaita Brahman should also have to be declared as false or unreal. The Puruṣasūkta does not convey either the falsity of the world or identity of Brahman and soul. But it establishes the absolute supremacy of the Being (Lord Nārāyaṇa), reality of the world, and distinction of Brahman and soul. It also states that the entire world is under the control of the Lord. And as Lord Puruṣa (Brahman) is eternally real, the world, controlled by Him is also eternally real.

Thus, it can be said that, the Purusasūkta is a critical exposition of the second Brahmasūtra- Janmādyasya yataḥ.

Hence, the Being of this hymn is the Brahman.<sup>581</sup> And the end of the Purusasūkta of the Yajurveda, Śrī and Lakṣmī are described as Lord's wives.<sup>581A</sup> This also indicates that Puruṣa is Lord Nārāyaṇa.<sup>582</sup> He, who knows and realizes the greatness of the Lord Puruṣa, will be favoured by the grace of the Lord, and as a result of that he attains liberation. Hence He is essentially knowable by the seekers of release. Therefore, there is no other Brahman Sabala as such. The term Brahman primarily and absolutely refers to Lord Nārāyaṇa.<sup>583</sup> And devoted service of this Lord Nārāyaṇa, who is an embodiment of innumerable auspicious qualities, who has spiritual form is the only means of attaining final release. The service of other gods will not lead to that release.<sup>584</sup>

### III. BHEDASOURABHA

#### INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM ANANTAM IN THE SRUTI SATYAM-

JÑĀNAMANANTAM BRAHMA <sup>584A</sup>

This Bhedasourabha, after a close examination of all aspects, establishes the five-fold difference. The five-fold difference is distinction between God and the embodied, soul, distinction between God and matter, distinction among souls, distinction among matters and distinction between matter and soul.

"Difference is not merely a component part of reality, but constitutes its very essence. So much so, that to a thing is to know it as distinct from all others, in a general way and from some in a particular way..."

Difference being thus Dharmisvarūpa, the so called perception of the object is nothing but the perception of its difference." <sup>584B</sup>

At the beginning, the expression Anantam in Satyam-jñānamanantam brahma of the Taittirīya Upanisad, is examined. The Advaitins interpret the term Anantam as limitlessness in respect of time, place and entities. They contend that the limitlessness in respect of entities means Brahman is comprised of all entities and hence there is nothing other than Brahman. It means Brahman is Sarvavasturūpa or of the

form of all entities. This view is not correct.<sup>585</sup> Because, the very exposition of the nature of Brahman, according to the Advaita is Brahman is not Jada or insentient matter. He is not unreal. If it is admitted that Brahman is Sarvavastvātmaka or identical with all entities then it would be contrary to their contention. As matter is also one of the entities, accordingly, Brahman would have to be of the form of matter. But the statement acclaims that Brahman is Jñānasvarūpa or of the form of knowledge. So the interpretation as the form of matter is not agreeable. Further, in the Advaita, world is unreal and this passage declares Brahman as real. So how can it be of the form or nature of unreal matter? There lies eternal difference between real and unreal. So the term Ananta conveys that Brahman is limitless in respect of place as It is present everywhere. (all-pervasive). It is also limitless in respect of time since It is present in all the three times, viz., past, present and future. Thus the expression does not convey the sense of Brahman as of the nature of all entities. That which is all-pervasive cannot be an Anurūpa or of the atomic form and that which is eternal, cannot be claimed to be non-eternal like pot, cloth and the like that are also atomic. Because in the first two cases pervasiveness and eternity of Brahman are declared. So how can the word Anantam convey the sense of identity with atomic and non-eternal

entities like pot, cloth and the like.<sup>586</sup> Brahman is described as different due to Its limitlessness nature in respect of time and place. But how is that It is identified in respect of entities. If identity, with entities, is intended, then It must also be identified with time and place since these two also fall under the category of entities. This leads to the absurdity of expressing Brahman as Deśakālasvarūpa,<sup>587</sup> or of the form or nature of time and place. But the attribute of pervasiveness, in respect of place and time, makes it clear that Brahman is distinct from Deśa and Kāla. Because, difference between pervasive and pervaded is ever established. Thus, the expression of identity with entities leads to two defects: identity with insentient matter world and identity with place and time.

As Anantatva or limitlessness in respect of place and time is understood as Brahman is present in all places and times, in respect of entities also it should be known that Brahman is present in all (limitless) entities. The limitlessness is to be understood in all the three cases with the same application.<sup>588</sup> Vādirāja gives one more agreeable meaning.<sup>588A</sup> The term Anantam means being the substratum or support to all entities. As Brahman is the sole substratum of limitless auspicious qualities He is also support of all limitless entities. Here it is to be noted that though

Brahman is the substratum or support to place, time and entities, He is different from them. But in the case of auspicious qualities, He is not Gunabhinna or not different from the qualities. He is very embodiment of those qualities. In this sense, He is Guṇāśraya or the locus of auspicious qualities, Guṇabhinna or identical with them and Guṇavyāpta or pervaded by them. It is also meant that there is no limit of Brahman in being the support of limitless entities and there is no limit of entities having the support of Brahman.<sup>589</sup> 'Ananta' is that which has no limit. Anta means limited association in respect of place and time with some entities; and that which has the association of all the times, places and all entities, is called Ananta. Thus, Guṇānantya means Brahman having the association of all auspicious attributes. In this sense, there is no difference or difficulty in realizing the significance of limitlessness.<sup>590</sup> The relation in respect of place and time is of the Ādhāra-dheya-type or the support and the supported — since Brahman is the Ādhāra and place and time are Adheyas. In the case of the qualities the relation is Ādhārādheya and also Guna-guṇibhāva.<sup>590A</sup> Brahman is Ādhāra and the qualities are Ādheya.

RELEVANCE OF THE GIVEN INTERPRETATION

The expression Anantam is to be understood accordingly, so that it should not lead to any confusion or contradiction. Otherwise, that may show the ignorance of understanding of the reality in respect of entities and also of Brahman being identified with all entities. And moreover, the sense of identity degrades or lessens the greatness of Brahman. Therefore it is not agreeable to regard identity. Further, the sense of identity stands opposed with other scriptural passages like Sa ca Brahnavidāpnotiparam<sup>590B</sup> and the like wherein the term Param glorifies Brahman as distinct and supreme.<sup>591</sup>

In fact, there is no difference of opinion with regard to limitlessness in respect of time and place. The difference of opinion lies only in the third aspect that is whether in respect of entities and in respect of qualities. Therefore, Vyāsa has specifically clarified and explained as Mahadgunatavat yamanantamahuh<sup>591A</sup> stating the Lord is Ananta, being endowed with limitless auspicious qualities. Really speaking, it is because of the attributes of Vyaptatva or pervasion, and Nityatva or eternity, Guṇānanyta is the primary meaning of the expression Anantam.<sup>592</sup> Vadiraja critically examines all the terms of the passage in their fitness with the context.

Brahman is extolled as Satya or real since He affords the very Sattva or existence or sustenance to this entire world. This conveys the sense of creation, sustenance and destruction. As Sattva stands for three functions of the Lord He is called Satya.<sup>593</sup> The Advaitins interpret the term Satya as Abadhya.<sup>593A</sup> According to this It is a subject of sublation. But this is not the meaning intended here. Because, in continuation of that passage, we find other passages that deliberately deal with the sustenance and destruction of the world by the Lord.<sup>593B</sup> Therefore, here 'Satya' means the sole and independent creator, of the world, which is also real and stands distinct from Him.<sup>594</sup>

As it is said that Brahman is the creator of this world, He is also the destroyer. It is clear from the statements - Adyatettica,<sup>594A</sup> Annam Brahmeti vyajanat<sup>594B</sup> and the like. Thus the very fact of destroying the creation is the Annatva. So here Satya means destroyer of the creation.<sup>595</sup> (Annamaya Kośa)<sup>595A</sup>

Now the term Satya means also He, who affords the very life or sustenance to this world. This is denoted by the term Prāna. The Lord is described as Prāṇamaya that means the protector of the world. Both Satya and Prāna give the same sense.<sup>596</sup>

The second term Jñānam in the passage is explained with reference to Manomaya and Vijñānamaya Kośas. Brahman is described as Jñānam or knowledge due to His possessing the knowledge of all the entities in general and particular. The general knowledge of the Lord is complete and limitless in all respects. He knows limitless entities in this created world. Brahman has also specified (particular) knowledge of all entities. This is indicated by the prefix Vi in term Vijñāna of the Vijñānamayakośa. This is the knowledge of limitless entities with regard to special characteristics. Hence He is also called Sarvajña<sup>597</sup> or Omniscient. This Sarvajñatva is explained in two Prakaraṇas - Manomaya or sheath of mind and Vijñānamaya<sup>598</sup> or sheath of intellect.

Now the last term Anantam of the passage is explained in the Ānandamaya Prakarana. Anantam means Pūrṇa, complete in all respects. Brahman is Pūrṇa or perfect with attributes Ānanda or bliss and the like. So the limitlessness is in respect of attributes and not in respect of entities. If Anantatva is meant as identity with the entities, then the very Ānandamaya-prakarana becomes not only irrelevant but also opposed to the other passages. If the world becomes identical with the nature of Brahman, then the passages Tatsṛtvātadevānuprāviśat<sup>598A</sup> and others become meaningless. The intended entrance is possible only when created world

is real and distinct from the creator. So Anantatva is the Pūrnatva or completeness of Anandādigunas of the qualities like bliss and the like and not the identity as contended by the Advaitins.<sup>599</sup> Thus, like Sarvajnatva, or Omnidiscience Anandapūrnatva or perfection in respect of bliss is also a characteristic attribute which is explained in the Anendamaya Prakarana. And it is denoted by the term Anantam. It may be questioned as to why the term Ananda is not used in passage instead of Anantam? The term Anantam serves double purpose. The term not only denotes Ananda as shown above, but also the limitless nature of other attributes such as all-pervasiveness, omnipotence necessary for the creation and the like. The mention of Anantam in the passage is to state that all the attributes are complete also individually.<sup>600</sup>

The attributes are limitless in number. Each attribute is also all-pervasive and of the nature of limitless attributes. So the description of the six Prakaranas is the critical exposition of the Mantra Satyam Jñanamanantam brahma. In this way, the absolute distinction between the Lord and the world of souls and matter is established.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE ABOVE ORDER AND INTERPRETATION

The above order and interpretation is agreeable in all respects. Relevancy in two ways, is noted here. The statement Satyam jñānam anantam brahma suggests the order in terms one by one. By the term Satyam, the sole doership (Sarvakartrtva) of the Lord is explained. And this Sarvakartrtva necessarily requires Sarvajñatva or omniscience. And this is described by the word Jñānam. At last as an essence, Guṇānanya or limitlessness in respect of qualities is explained. This Guṇānanya relates to all attributes of the Lord headed by Ananda and declares that each attribute is limitless also. Secondly, this order is indicated and upheld by the Brahmasūtras also. The second Sūtra mentions the creation etc., of this world.<sup>600A</sup> This creation is placed first and others next in the order. So the order of the inquiry of this passage has thus the support in two ways.<sup>601</sup> These two ways do not clash each other. Moreover we find another passage as Satyam jñānam ānandam brahma.<sup>601A</sup> It is called Samākhya Śruti. Here the word Ānandam is in the place of Anantam. It evidently states that the term Anantam is to be understood in respect of attributes, Ananda and the like. In this way it is substantiated by the Samākhya Śruti.<sup>602</sup> The presence of Ananda in the Samākhya Śruti does not negate the possibility of other qualities. It implies and stands for other qualities also. Thus Ānanya or limitlessness is proved in respect of qualities Ananda and the like.<sup>603</sup>

The passage Nälpe sukham<sup>603A</sup> states that, the Pūrnatva or perfection is the cause of bliss, and this also promises the Pūrhatva or perfection of each attribute of the Lord. The Lord is eternally contended, He is complete in respect of beauty, prowess, knowledge and the like. There is no occasion to have defects of sorrow and the like. Hence, He is eternally blissful. The limitlessness becomes the cause to prove Pūrnatva or perfectness.<sup>604</sup>

Even if the Vastvānantya or limitlessness in respect of entities is taken, it is nothing but the Lord's eternal relation as the primary support of all the limitless entities.<sup>605</sup> The relation of the Lord with the Guna, Kriyā and the like of all the entities is also evident. Here the Vastu is nothing but an attribute of the Lord. Just as one who has abundant wealth, is called Dhanapūrṇa, so also Brahman is called Gunapūrṇa since He is endowed with limitless qualities.<sup>606</sup> In defence of this, Vadirāja quotes some Bhāgavata statements.<sup>606A</sup> As there being no limit in respect of qualities, the Lord is glorified as Anantam.<sup>607</sup>

If the term Pūrnatva in respect of qualities such as Sarvajñatva etc. of the Lord is not admitted then, it would be as good as treating the Lord as Alpajñā, Aīhāni in some places. But nowhere and by no means the Lord is described

as either Alpañña or Aññani. As the Lord is all-pervasive (Dharmin), His auspicious qualities (Dharmas) are also all-pervasive like the form, taste etc. of the objects. The Dharmas, other than Samyoga, are all-pervasive in Dharmin like Dharmin itself.<sup>608</sup> Therefore the state of limitedness cannot be ascribed to the attributes of the Lord. Neither the Lord nor His attributes are the products of Maya. As He is eternally real, His limitless qualities are also eternally real.

Thus, the passage Satyam Jñanamanantam brahma disproves the two contentions of the Advaitins, identity of Brahman and soul and qualitylessness of the Lord. It proves Guna-purnatva or perfectness in respect of qualities of the Lord and also the absolute distinction between the Lord and the souls.<sup>609</sup>

#### ESTABLISHING JĪVEŚVARABHEDA BY SHOWING IRRELEVANCY AND CONTRADICTION IN OTHER BHĀSYAS

Lord Vedavyāsa has composed the Brahmasūtras to determine the support of the scriptural passages. These Sūtras show the way of interpretation and hence are called Sūtras.<sup>610</sup> They are Nirñayakas or determining, <sup>and</sup> the scripture  is Nirneya or the determined. The purport or import of the scriptures should be understood in the light of the Brahma-

sūtras.<sup>611</sup> Therefore, any interpretation, that is not in accordance with the Brahmasūtras, is not correct. Vādirāja declares that the Bhāṣya<sup>611A</sup> or the commentary written by Madhva, alone is relevant since it is written in accordance with the Brahmasūtras.

The Advaitins interpret that the Puccha in the passage of the Taittīriya Śruti viz., Brahma Puccham Pratiṣṭha<sup>611B</sup> is Brahman. They also say that the Ānandamaya is a Kośa. But in the forthcoming passages of that context, Asanneva sa bhavati, Asadbrahmeti veda cet, Asti brahmeti cedveda and <sup>611C</sup> the like the word Brahman is used twice and Ānandamaya is described as Brahman only. The Sūtra Ānandamayo'bhyasat also lays down that Ānandamaya is Brahman.<sup>611D</sup> So treating Ānandamaya as Kośa and describing Puccha as Brahman is irrelevant to the context and also against the Brahmasūtra.<sup>612</sup>

The term Ānandamaya is to be understood as Brahman and not as Puccha. Because, in the four Prakaraṇas of Annamaya and so on, the object of praise is Aṅgin and not the Aṅga (limb). Likewise in the fifth Prakarana of the Ānandamaya, the Aṅgin (Purusa) alone is to be taken to be the object of praise and not any limb such as Puccha. The word Brahman in Brahma Puccham Pratiṣṭha<sup>612A</sup> does not suggest that the Puccha is Brahman but it implies that the Puccha (foot) of

Brahman is also Anandapurna or blissful. So the word Brahman is to be taken to mean Anandamaya (Aṅgin) and not as Puccha (Aṅga).

The Advaita-interpretation states that Anandayama is a Kośa.<sup>612B</sup> But it is irrelevant; because as the Kośa is insentient the Puccha, its part, must also be insentient. So Brahmatva cannot be attributed to that insentient Puccha. In the Dvaita view, as all the limbs are of the blissful form of Brahman, they are also blissful and are of the very nature of Brahman and as such,<sup>there is</sup> no such irrelevancy.<sup>613</sup>

If Brahmatva is attributed to Aṅga (Puccha) alone, then how can there be Brahmatva in the Aṅgin and if Abrahmatva is ascribed to the Aṅgin then how can there be Brahmatva to the part (Puccha) of that Aṅgin. Thus both the arguments show the defects in the Advaita-interpretation. In Brahman, who is Jñānarupa or the very form of knowledge, there are delight, bliss and the like. These are also the very nature of Brahman. When Brahman is Sukharūpa or blissful, Brahmatā is there in that bliss. In the passage Brahman is described as Ānandam brahma kām brahma<sup>613A</sup> and the like. This states that Ānanda or bliss is Brahman, blissful is Brahman. So Brahmatā is there to that Anandamaya in complete and not only in a part viz., Puccha.<sup>614</sup> It is strange to know as to

how the Advaitins, who are very much particular about the identity of soul and Brahman, are not ready to admit the identity of Aṅga and Aṅgin that constitutes or comprises of one and the same object.<sup>615</sup> When Puccha can be Brahman then why can't the middle portion of that body? If an Ox is made of clay, the tail should also necessarily be of clay.<sup>616</sup>

Moreover, Brahmatva is evident in both Āṁśin and Āṁśas and it is complete in all respects. The passage Pādam brahma karau brahma<sup>616A</sup> clearly mentions that Brahmata is seen in all the parts. It glorifies the limbs of Brahman as having Brahmata being complete in all respects.<sup>617</sup> The Pūrnatva or perfection described in passage of Brahman, has been realized by the knowers like Brahmā and others. Yaśodā is the witness in this regard who saw the entire world in the graceful mouth of Lord Kṛṣṇa.<sup>617A</sup> So all the limbs of Brahman are all-pervasive and hence are of the nature of Brahman.

In the Bṛhgavalli of Taittirīyopanisad, while delineating the definition of Brahman, it is described that creation and the like of this world take place from Ananda and the same Ananda as Brahman is praised at the Anandamaya-prakarana of the Brahmavalli.<sup>617B</sup> So the Anandamaya is Brahman.<sup>618</sup> By the passage Brahma Puccham pratistha,<sup>618A</sup> if Brahmatva is restricted to Puccha only then, according to the passage

Ananda ātma,<sup>618B</sup> Anandatva is to be restricted to the soul of Brahman. Then it implies that there is no Ananda in Brahman denoted by Puccham. So if Brahmatva is negated in the Ānandamaya, then the Anandatva is to be negated in Brahman. Thus, the entire exposition of the Advaitins becomes absurd and contradictory.<sup>619</sup>

If the Ānandamaya is the material sheath, then how can there be Brahmatva in its Puccha? And by referring to Puccha, form is to be admitted. But in the Advaita, Brahman is formless (Nirākāra).<sup>619A</sup> By admitting Brahmatva in the Puccha of material sheath which is deprived of Brahmatva it appears as if the organ is cut off from the Ānandamaya. It is as good as saying that the passage is Atatvāvedaka or not imparting the right knowledge.<sup>620</sup> And if for attributing Brahmatva, Puccha is taken to be Adhisthāna or substratum, then Brahmatva becomes Aropita or superimposed. And whatever is superimposed is unreal. So Brahmatva would become unreal. And how is that this Brahmatva is attributed to Puccha alone which is a limb and why not to other limbs of that Ānandamaya.

Therefore, Brahmatva should not be restricted to the Puccha. It should also be referred to the Ānandamaya as a whole. Then only there would be concordance among scriptural passages Ānandam brahmeti vyajanāt, Brahma puccham pratisthā and the like.<sup>620A</sup>

If the Advaitins have high regard to scripture, let them admit Brahmátvā to Puccha but they cannot have the privilege of discarding Brahmatva to Anandamaya (sheath). Abrahmatva of Anandamaya is nowhere heard in scriptures.<sup>621</sup> The reason given by the Advaitins as Brahmatva, since specified in terms with Puccha, is not there in Anandamaya; gives chance to fabricate counter reason as Brahmatva, since not referred to Anandamaya cannot be there in Puccha as it being the part of Anandamaya or sheath. Thus mere reason leads to misinterpretation. Sometimes it also spoils the contextual purport. Therefore, that reason alone which has the support of either perception or right scriptures is valid. The reason, given by the Dvaitins, /the support of both scriptures and Brahmasútras. Hence, Anandamaya is not a sheath. Brahmatva is to be referred to both Anandamaya and Puccha.<sup>622</sup> However, the reason advanced by the Advaitins may be appealing, if it is against the Sútra, then it will be futile.

The Advaitins contend that the Kartrtva, in respect of creation etc., of the world though a characteristic is a contingent in pure Brahman.<sup>622A</sup> It is a contingent characteristic and not a constituent characteristic. The above definition may be seen in the Sabala Brahman who is Avidyásrita. And it is this Sabala Brahman who is the Kartā of the creation etc., of the world.

While interpreting the second Sūtra Janmādyasya yataḥ, the Advaitins hold that this Lakṣaṇa or definition is a contingent characteristic of Brahman. They say that Śabala Brahman, a product of Māya, is the creator etc., of this world.<sup>622B</sup> Hence, the above definition of the Sūtra applies to this Śabala Brahman. It is as good as attributing Jagatkāranatva or world-creatorship to Māya. But the contention of the Sūtrakāra is different. The second Sūtra expresses the fact of Brahman being the efficient cause (Nimittakāraṇa) like a potter in making a pot. And this Sūtra does not state the Tatastha laksana as the Advaitins believe. Because, after mentioning Brahman in the first Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra is giving the definition of Brahman in the second Sūtra. There is no necessity to define Avidyā or Śabalabrahman in the second Sūtra which is out of context.<sup>623</sup>

According to innumerable usages and also other aphorisms, a word having the suffix 'Tasi' conveys the sense of all cases.<sup>623A</sup> In view of this Yataḥ in the Sūtra is to be meant as 'Yena' (instrumental case). Then the Śruti conveys that the Lord is the creator of this world. He is the efficient cause. He need not get modified Himself and need not appear in the form of the world as the Advaitins contend.

If the definition of Kartrītvā is attributed to Māya,

then the entire creation and the like of the world, would become without a Kartā.<sup>624</sup> It is not sound and tenable to hold that without a Kartā, effects get originated. And if, along with Māyā, Brahman is taken to be a cause of creation, then the purpose of ascribing Tatsasthya to Brahmalakṣaṇa stands unserved. And further, neither the Śruti nor the Sūtra promises two types of origination of an effect with Kartā and without Kartā.

In the first Sūtra, Brahman is described as an object of inquiry and in the second Sūtra as a reason to have inquiry. His constituent characteristic of creation etc., is explained. In the same way, the Śruti passages Tadvijijñānasva tadbrahmeti<sup>624A</sup> and the like, state Brahman as an object of inquiry. And other passages Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante<sup>624B</sup> and so on, deal with constituent characteristics of Brahman, as the cause of inquiry. If the definition of Kartṛtva is not referred to aim at Brahman then why the mention of Brahman, as an object of inquiry in the first Sūtra, is made? And if it is held that the definition aims at Māyā, then one has to pursue the inquiry of Māyā to attain the same. By this, the very concept of Brahman and the inquiry of Him stand dismissed.<sup>625</sup> Hence, taking into account Brahman as the primary object of inquiry, definitions are to be explained.

The Advaitins' contention of attributing Tatasthatva to the definition of Brahman does serve the purpose of overcoming the contradiction with other passages like Nis-kriyām niskalam sāntam, is baseless. Really speaking there is no contradiction. The passage Niskriyām niskalam sāntam<sup>625A</sup> does not negate the Kartrtva of Brahman but negates secular effects such as birth, death and the like. So there is no contradiction among scriptural passages and hence there is no scope to attribute Tatasthatva to the definition of Brahman. Like Time, Brahman is also an efficient cause. But He is the primary efficient cause unlike Time and the like. So there is no possibility to describe Brahman as the material cause by any means.<sup>626</sup>

The Dharma or the characteristic feature that is present only in all the defined objects and not in others, is called Laksana or definition. That is the Asādhāraṇadharma or the unique feature of that entity. When this is what is meant by Laksana, then how can the Laksana of Jagatkaranatva, aiming at Māya, the Upādānakāraṇa of the world, be the Laksana of Brahman? And if its application or presence is admitted in both Brahman and the Māya, then Laksana becomes Ativyāpta (too-wide).<sup>626A</sup> Further, Laksana of Jagatkaranatva, aiming at Māya as said above, cannot be the Laksana of Brahman. Thus, the attributing Tatasthya to the definition of

Jagatkāranatva makes the very definition as the definition of Māyā and not of Brahman. Thus, Tatasthalaksana spoils the very proposition of the context-inquiry of Brahman.<sup>626B</sup>

By disregarding the Tatasthalaksana, it is proved that Brahman cannot get associated with Māyā and hence Upādāna-kāranatva or the fact being the material cause cannot be attributed to Brahman. Further, Tatasthalaksana can also not be understood as Brahman is the substratum (Adhisthana) for the superimposition (Āropa) of Māyā, the Upādāna according to the Advaitins of Jagat. Because, neither in the Brahmasūtra nor in the Śruti, Āropa is described as an object of inquiry. Otherwise, the Sūtrakāra could have composed the second Sūtra as Āropasya Yataḥ instead of Janmadyasya yataḥ and the Śruti would also have explained the Āropa deliberately. Therefore the term Yataḥ in the Sūtra and the Śruti, is to be meant as Brahman and to be construed with Tad that literally denotes Brahman. Thus, there is no reference to Māyā by any means.<sup>627</sup>

The contention of the Advaita that Laksana is Tatastha, since Brahman is Nirguna<sup>627A</sup> is also untenable.<sup>627B</sup> The Laksana conveys the attributes of Brahman one or another. And if on the basis of Nirguna-Śruti, Tatasthatva is attributed to the Laksana, then that leads to the defect of mutual

dependence. If Nirgunatva or attributelessness would be the primary import of the Śruti then Lakṣaṇa can be proved as Tatastha and if the Tatasthatva of Laksana is proved, Nirgunatva can be proved. Thus there is Anyonyāśraya or defect of mutual dependence. So the Lakṣaṇa cannot become Tatastha with regard to Brahman.<sup>628</sup>

Now Brahman cannot be the Upādānakāraṇa or material cause of the world. Because, He is Nirvikāri (not subject to modification). Hence He is described as the creator and so on in the Sūtra as well as in the Śruti. Brahman not being subject to modification, is acclaimed as Niskriyāḥ in the Śruti. It also means that though He gets engaged in the creation and the like, He is not affected by the results and such as Punya, or merit, /Papa or demerit. In this sense, He is called Akārtā or non-doer.

There is no proper direction in the approach of the Advaitins since they, sometimes neglecting the Śruti, resort to the Sūtra and sometimes disregarding the Sūtra, resort to the Śruti. E.g. while explaining the Śruti Asya Lokasya...<sup>629A</sup> the term Akāśa is understood as Brahman with the help of the Sūtra Akāśastallihāt;<sup>629B</sup> but while explaining Anandamaya, the determining Sūtra Ānandamayobhyāsāt is given up, and it is explained as Kośa.<sup>629C</sup> Thus there is irrelevancy in the Advaita-interpretation.

The Śruti Sa idam sarvamsrjata<sup>629D</sup> clearly states that Brahman is the creator of this world and not the material cause.<sup>630</sup> If Kartrtva is absolutely unseen in Brahman then this passage would have to aim at something else. But nowhere in the Śruti and the Sūtra, Kartrtva of Brahman is negated. In the first Sūtra instruction is given to engage in an inquiry of Brahman. Thus, having instructed in the first Sūtra, there is no need and occasion to define Māya (Ajñāna) in the second Sūtra. So there is no scope to attribute/an attribute of Māya, to Brahman.<sup>631</sup>

The Upādāna or the material cause cannot itself modify into an effect.  
 /So the Prakrti being Upādāna cannot modify itself as the world. It requires a Kartā or a creator to modify as the world.<sup>632</sup> So the creator is needed for any creation. Otherwise, the very argument goes in favour of Nirīśvarasāṅkhyās, who admit Prakrti as an independent cause<sup>632A</sup> for the creation. Hence the Kartrtva, willingly or unwillingly is to be accepted without any alternative.<sup>633</sup> Further the Kartrtva is not seen in insentient matter. So Brahman, the supreme being, must be admitted as the Kartā. Referring to the Niskriyatva passage if Kartrtva is negated then owing to Nirguna passage, Ajñāna must be negated. As the soul is described a dependent Kartā in the scriptures,<sup>633A</sup> there is no room for doubt whether Brahman is the sole Kartā. Brahman is the independent Kartā.<sup>634</sup>

The passage stating Niskriyatva, denies the Vikriyā or modification in Brahman and not the Kriyā or action. If Laksana of Kartrtva, owing to Niskriya passage is Tatastha in Brahman, then Ajnāna must also be taken to mean Tatastha in Brahman owing to the Śruti Ekamevadvitīyam brahma.<sup>635</sup> Vādirāja interprets this passage in the most appealing manner.

In the Advaita, Brahman and Ajñāna are since beginningless. So Ajñāna is to be admitted as second, other than Brahman. The world, then, would be the third one. If the Advitiya Śruti is taken for granted to refute the second one, then, by that, Ajñāna, being second, stands negated and not the world which is the third.<sup>635A</sup>

Thus, the Advaita-interpretation of the Sūtra and the Śruti gives scope to the defects Ativyāpti<sup>635B</sup> (attributing Brahma Laksana to Avidyā), Asambhava<sup>635C</sup> (negating Katrīva as Laksana) and the like. And hence it is not in accordance either with the Sūtra or with the Śruti.

By the Sūtra, Janmādyasya yataḥ the Brahmalakṣaṇa is given. It is acclaimed that Brahman is Pūrṇa in respect of power, knowledge and the like. For the creation of this wonderful world unlimited knowledge, will, effort, power,

kindness and the like are essential. The Lakṣana of Sṛṣṭyā-dikartṛtva, referred to in the Sūtra, is also a Guna. Thus by the Laksanasūtra, Gunapūrṇatva or perfectness in respect of the qualities of Brahman is proved.<sup>636</sup> By this Laksana-sūtra itself, His absolute distinction from the world of souls and matter is also proved. As Brahman is described the creator, the sustainer, the destroyer, the bestower of knowledge and the like, His Supreme Superiority is also proved. The same Sūtra, delineating the Laksana of Jagatkartṛtva or creatorship of the world of Brahman (who is absolutely real) establishes reality of the world too.

The Abheda or identity of Brahman with these qualities as explained in the passage Neha nānāsti kincana<sup>636A</sup> is also suggested by the Sūtra. The fact of Abheda in His qualities is also a merit and is the very nature of Brahman. It means Brahmatva is the very nature of the qualities.<sup>637</sup> Brahman is the possessor of all qualities. There is identity between quality and their possessor. There is also the Guṇāguṇibhāva or the relation of the quality and the qualified. To effect these two, the Viśeṣa is to be admitted. These Viśeṣas are infinite in Brahman and help for Bhedavyavahāra as 'knowledge of Brahman' and the like. These Viśeṣas are also the very attributes of Brahman and are of the very nature of Brahman. Otherwise the very usage or expression would be meaningless. All this has the sanction of the Sūtras.<sup>638</sup> When Brahman is

declared as the creator, He must have the defectless form. A formless one cannot act and create something. The blissful form of Brahman is glorified in both the Sūtras and Śrutis.<sup>638A</sup> If the graceful and blissful form is not admitted, then Brahman would cease to get engaged in creation like a potter, lacking hands, cannot create a pot.<sup>639</sup>

Thus has been shown with relevant examples, irrelevancy of the Advaita-interpretation and relevancy of the Dvaita view.

#### BHEDA ESTABLISHING THROUGH BRAHMASŪTRAS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF AIKYA ŚRUTI

Really speaking, all the Brahmasūtras declare Bheda or absolute distinction of Brahman from the soul. But some Sūtras do not state the distinction openly. But it is beyond doubt that distinction is nowhere denied. In some Sūtras, apparently it appears as if distinction is denied and identity is accepted. But taking into account the contextual reference of the scriptural passage, Adhikarana and the like, it is evident that distinction is the primary import of all the Brahmasūtras. Vādirāja deals with those Sūtras that ultimately aims at the absolute distinction of Brahman from the soul.

As already said, there are a good number of Sūtras that

establishe distinction, but the Sūtra Sthityadanābhyaṁ ca<sup>639A</sup> (I.iii.7) is taken first as it involves Yukti or reasoning and as the work is named Yuktimallikā.<sup>640</sup> In this Sūtra soul and Brahman are described as abiding in the physic. The soul reaps or eats the fruits of his deeds whereas Brahman, without eating, dwells there with His blissful nature. Thus the two reasons as eating the fruits of the deeds and absence of eating, prove the distinction between soul and Brahman.

The Sūtra Sarīrāscobhayepi hi bhedenainamadhiyate<sup>640A</sup> (I.ii.20) explains that Sarīra jīva is not an Antaryāmin or indweller. It is the Paramātman who is Antaryāmin. So Paramātman is the supporter and soul is the supported. So there is difference between the two.<sup>641</sup> This Sūtra is to determine the purport of the Śruti Ya ātmani tisthan...<sup>641A</sup>

There are some Sūtras quoted here wherein the term Bheda is present and that states distinction clearly. Bhedavyapadeśacca (I.i.17), this Sūtra is in the Anandamaya-dhikarana. This states that the Anandamaya is Viṣṇu and not others, since distinction lies even in the Mukti state. And it is repeatedly stressed in Taittirīya Śruti.<sup>641B</sup> As the Bheda is there even in the Mukti, it is evident that the Bheda is eternal. Bheavyapadeśat (I.iii.5) this Sūtra

deals with the Ātharvānaśruti-Justam yada...<sup>641C</sup> It promises that a devotee should think of and realize Viṣṇu as distinct from him. Bhedavyapadesācchānyah (I.i.21), this Sūtra specifies that the Antaryāmin is distinct from souls like Indra and others. The Sūtra- Viśesanabhedavyapadesābhyaṁ ca netarau, (I.ii.22) deals with the passage, Yah sarvajnah...<sup>641D</sup> and states that Viṣṇu is distinct from Kṣarakṣarajīvas<sup>641E</sup> as He is Omniscient and self-contended.<sup>642</sup>

Further, two Sūtras Anupapatteṣṭu na Śārlrah (I.ii.3) and Netaronupapatteḥ (I.i.16) justify the distinction of soul and Brahman with proper reasons. At first, it is stated that the attributes of soul are distinct from the attributes of Lord Viṣṇu. Hence there is Bheda. The second states that Viṣṇudharma of bestowing the release is unseen and unreasonable in the soul. So He is Bhinna.<sup>643</sup>

The Sūtra Muktopasṛpya vyapadeśat (I.iii.2) states that Brahman is an object of attainment even by liberated souls. This Sūtra explains and determines the import of Ātharvāna Śruti Amṛtasyesa setuh.<sup>643A</sup> It proves that Viṣṇu and not others is the supporter of the entire world. The Sūtra Asminnasya ca tadyogam śāsti (I.i.19) explains that the aspirant will have the Yoga (contact or association) of Ānandabrahman as a fruit in release. The Sūtra Prthagupadeśat

(II.iii.27) dispels the apparently appearing contradiction of the Śrutis Tattvamasi,<sup>643B</sup> Aham brahmāsmi,<sup>643C</sup> Nityo-nityanam,<sup>643D</sup> Dvā suparna<sup>643E</sup> and the like. It is stated that the soul is absolutely distinct from Brahman since the import of the Śrutis specifies the distinction.

Then the Sūtra coming in the fourth viz., Phalādyāya sampadyavihāya svena śabdāt (IV.iv.1) states that the soul of the realized nature, attaining Brahman in release and being distinct from Him, experiences the desired blissful enjoyments. Brahman is Jagajjanmādikarana (efficient cause of the creation etc., of the world) but the souls, though liberated, do not have the creatorship of the creation of the world and the like. This is stated by the Sūtra Jagadvyāpāra varjam (IV.iv.17) which negates Sṛstyādīvyāpāra (the power of creation etc.) in the released souls.

In this way, Bheda is acclaimed in all the Sūtras composed by Vedavyāsa. This is the primary import.<sup>644</sup>

The Surottamatīrtha, in his commentary Bhāvavilāshī gives a brief account of all the four Adhyāyas of the Brahma-sūtras and mentions that Bheda is the primary aspect enumerated in and determined by all the Sūtras. In the first Samanvayādhyāya, Brahman is described as the primier object

and import (sense) of all the words that generally refer to and convey other things. Other things are not the primier object of expression of words. So there is distinction between the two i.e. Brahman and other objects. In the second Avireadhadyāya, Brahman is declared as defectless (Dosadūra). So He must be distinct from those who are defective. Thus, distinction is evident. In the Sadhanādhyāya, Brahman is described as an object of realization. So, he, who will secure realization, must be different from Him the object of realization. In the last Phalādhyāya, Brahman is stated as the bestower of release and is described as an object of attainment. So, He must be distinct from those, on whom He bestows the release.

The Śrutis that appear as if conveying the Abhedartha, are to be understood in favour of distinction only since the Sūtras have determined that Abhedartha is not the primary import. In the Śruti Prāṇo Vāhamasmirse,<sup>644A</sup> it appears that Indra is Prāṇa. But he is not. The Sūtra Na Vaktur-ātmopadesāditi cedadvyātmasambandhabhūma hyasmin (I.i.29) determines that, at the time of Indra's declaration of this Śruti, there was special presence of Viṣṇu by name Prāṇa. This statement is like the usage 'this is fire' when an iron ball, excessively heated, is seen. In fact that is iron ball only but because of reddish colour, ball is termed as fire.

In the same way, he is Indra only. But owing to the special presence of Viṣṇu by name Prāṇa, he declares 'I am Prāṇa.' So there is no scope for conveying identity. It ultimately conveys distinction. Indra cannot be identical with Prāṇa-nāmaka Viṣṇu. In this way, with the help of the Sūtras, apparent contradiction of the Śrutis must be dispelled.<sup>645</sup>

Thus Vādirāja, showing accordingly the distinction as the primary import of all the Sūtras, promises that the Sūtras not only determine the Bheda but also the reality of the world. E.g. the Sūtra Sattvāccāvarasya (II.i.17) declares the real existence of the things other than Brahman.

The passage Pare'vyaye sarva ekibhavanti<sup>645A</sup> seems to declare the Advaitic identity. To determine the import of this passage, the Sūtra Bhoktrāpatteravibhāgaścet syāllokavat (II.i.16) is taken into account. Here, Abheda or identity is treated as Pūrvapakṣa, and it is denied. The Sūtra states that all the liberated souls get together in release like the cows getting together in the cow-pen. This shows that the liberated souls are distinct from each other and also distinct from Brahman. In release the liberated souls are under the control of Brahman. There is only Sthānaikya or the unity of place. Thus the concept Bheda is referred to in all the Sūtras.<sup>646</sup>

This Bheda is Paramārthika and not Vyāvahārika or Mithyā, as understood by the Advaitins. It is essential for attaining the Mokṣa. The Sūtrakāra, proposing an inquiry of Brahman in the first Sūtra as an essential requirement for the attainment of release, has determined distinction in all the Sūtras since Brahman, an object of an inquiry must be distinct from those who pursue the Jijñāsa<sup>647</sup> an inquiry.

**'SAMANYAYĀDHYĀYA' ESTABLISHES GUNAPŪRNATVA THROUGH SARVĀŚABDAVĀCYATVA**

The Advaitins' view is that Brahman is Avācya or beyond all expressions. Because It is inexpressible, It is Nirguna or qualityless or unqualified. So, there is no question of Gunapūrnatva or full qualified as understood by the Dvaitins. Avācya means unable to express by any word. No word expresses Brahman by Mukhyavṛtti (primary power). Sometimes, it is on the basis of implication (Lakṣaṇā), Brahman is conveyed by some words. Words always convey one or other attribute of entities. As no word expresses Brahman and thus It being Avācya, It has no attributes. Attributes, conveyed by Lakṣaṇavṛtti or implication are not at all taken into account. This view of argument of Advaitins,<sup>648</sup> is not correct.

In Samanyayādhya of the Brahmasūtras, not only the

words, describing and expressing Brahman are taken into account but also other words that express generally other entities, are also explained. It is determined that all the words primarily express Brahman only. As an example different types of words- Nāmātmaka, Līṅgātmaka and others are explained and it is shown that every word describes one or the other auspicious quality of Brahman. The word Brahman in the first Sūtra gives the sense of Gunapūrnatva or perfectness in respect of qualities. It is because of Brahman is Sarvaśabda-vācyā, (expressible by all words). Etymologically, Brahman means Pūrṇa<sup>649</sup> or full of perfect. The same fact is determined in all the Sūtras of the first Adhyāya.<sup>650</sup> The Līṅga is a peculiar Dharma or characteristic denoted by a concerned word. It is in the form of an attribute. So it is as good as saying that even Līṅgātmaka words ultimately convey Brahman by describing His attributes.

The Sūtra Antastadharma-padeśat (I.i.20), Antaryāmyadhi-daiवादिशु taddharma-vyapadeśat (I.ii.18), Adṛśyatvādigunako dharmokteḥ (I.ii.20), Sarva-dharma-patteśca (I.i.38) etc., clearly point out that Brahman is expressed by infinite words as He possesses infinite attributes. So He is Gunapūrṇa, perfect in respect of qualities. He is also Sarvaśabda-vācyā or an object of all expressions. If words do not express distinct nature of Brahman, then what is the use of describing

Him by so many words? As Brahman is absolutely real, His attributes are also real.<sup>651</sup>

All the words in the Vedas declare Brahman primarily. The Sūtras Śabdaēva pramitah (I.iii.24), Gounāscennatma śabdāt (I.i.6) etc., make it clear that Brahman is expressed by all the words. In Him there is Samanvaya or harmonious interpretation of different words. And this Samanvaya stands useless if attributes denoted by the words are denied in Brahman. Because, that ultimately negates the Gunapūrnatva of Brahman. Then the very usage Brahman in the first Sūtra would become meaningless and purposeless.<sup>652</sup>

The Advaita Bhāṣya or Brahmasūtra, mentions that the first quarter of first chapter makes an inquiry of Brahman dealing with some indicatory marks that are clear and explicit whereas the second and the third quarters of the same chapter refers to the indicatory marks that are not clear.<sup>653</sup>

But, Vādirāja opines that the indicatory marks enumerated in the Br.Sū. are all clear and explicit as they proclaim one or other characteristic or attribute of Brahman. Here, it looks that Vādirāja understands and takes the clear indicatory marks in the sense of characteristics or attributes. As a matter of fact, he refers to the first Sūtra of the third

quarter and defends that the Sūtra declares the positive indicatory mark clearly as an attribute of the Lord, and He also promises that all the Sūtras aim at and glorify the attributes of the Lord clearly.<sup>653A</sup>

The Sūtras in the third quarter, Dyubhvādyāyatanaṁ svaśabdāt (I.iii.1) and Muktopasṛpya vyapadeśāt (I.iii.2) clearly state that Brahman is the support to heaven, earth and the like. He is an object of attainment by the released souls. Thus, here also the qualities of Brahman are described. So there is no scope for Nirviśeṣatva or attributelessness and the like. And moreover, the very expression, as Jihñāsa, inquiry of Nirviśeṣa attributeless Brahman is defective, because an inquiry needs the discussion of the Dharmas or characteristics or attributes of entities here of Brahman.

So the opinion of the Sūtrakāra is that ~~पूर्ण वाचोऽपि~~ that Brahman is Pūrṇa or perfect with infinite auspicious attributes since He is expressed and conveyed by all the words.<sup>654</sup>

#### ADVAITA VIEW IS CONTRADICTORY TO THE SŪTRA

Owing to the apparent contradiction, seen in the scriptural passages the Advaitins classify the Vedas as Tatvāvedaka or imparting true knowledge and Atatvāvedaka or imparting

wrong knowledge and they consider only Nirgunaśrutis as Tatvāvedaka.<sup>655</sup> Avedaka means communicating or aiming at reality. They state that the passages that aim at reality, (since according to the Advaita, Brahman alone is reality) are Tatvāvedaka and others are Atatvāvedaka. But this classification is not at all upheld by the Sūtrakāra.<sup>656</sup> Owing to apparent contradiction, it is not agreeable to group the scriptures as above. The third and fourth quarters of the second Adhyāya (Avirodhādhyāya) are meant to remove the apparent conflict or contradiction among the scriptural passages. There, it is proved that all scriptures are Tatvāvedakas only.

On the basis of personal experience as 'I am ignorant,' it is not befitting to attribute Ajñāna or ignorance in Brahman and it is not the contention of the Sūtrakāra also. As already stated, all the Sūtras aim at the absolute distinction between Brahman and the soul. Both are of distinct nature. So personal experience as 'I am ignorant' proves that ignorance is a quality abiding in the souls. This experience does not prove ignorance in Brahman and cannot harm the Sarvajñatva or omniscience of Brahman. The very experience indicates that the soul's experience is an outcome of ignorance.<sup>657</sup> So the absolute distinction of the soul from Brahman remains unharmed.

BRAHMAN IS NOT NIRĀKĀRA BUT IS OF PŪRNĀNANDADEHA

In defending the Nirgunanatva of Brahman the Advaitins hold that Brahman is Nirākāra. If It were Akāravān having a form, then their contention of Nirgunanatva holds no good. Therefore, they state that Brahman is Nirākāra or formless. But this view is not tenable, because when Puccha (according to the Advaita) is taken to mean Brahman, the view of Nirākāratva is gone. This is closely examined and discussed in the Anandamayādhikarana.<sup>658</sup>

The passage Tasya priyameva śirah<sup>659</sup> states that His form is blissful. Here, śirah stands for not only head but also other limbs. So all organs are blissful. The two arms of Brahman are described as Moda and Pramoda, aspects of bliss. The related passages are Modo daksinah paksah, Pramoda uttarah paksah.<sup>660</sup> Here Moda and Pramoda are not different in nature and essence; they are the two aspects of the same bliss. The right arm called/also is blissful like the left one called Pramoda. So difference lies in terms and not in essence.

The passage Ananda ātma conveys the blissful nature of the middle portion. And the passage Brahma puccham pratistha<sup>-661</sup> refers to all the limbs of Brahman. As support of the entire body possessing all limbs, the foot is extolled particularly

and specifically. But it does not negate the blissful nature of other limbs of the body.

The word Brahman, used at the end of that Prakarana, is to be construed with all the statements accordingly. Brahman stands for Purnasukha or perfect bliss. The terms Priya, Moda, Pramoda and so on referred <sup>to</sup> at first, declare that the form of Brahman is blissful including Puccha-foot. The 'Mayat' suffix in Anandamaya stands for completeness or for abundance. Mayat is also Purnatvavācaka or expressive of perfectness and Brahman also Purnatvavācaka.<sup>662</sup> So there need not be any difference in purport or import of several scriptural passages.

In another passage, it is stated that the souls, liberated by the grace of Brahman, will have the blissful enjoyment at their own accord.<sup>663</sup> This proves that Brahman, who is eternally liberated, must also be of blissful nature. Thus, the scripture as well as reasoning describe the Puccha is also of perfect bliss. So the term Brahman is Sukhavācaka.<sup>664</sup> Brahman is Bimba or original and souls are Pratibimbas or reflections. Owing to the Bimba-pratibimba-bhāva also Sukhārūpatva blissful nature is evident. Because, it is explained that the liberated souls, who are reflections will have blissful enjoyments for having got manifested their blissful nature.

Thus the scriptures clearly state the blissful nature of Brahman.<sup>665</sup> In view of this, the Sūtrakāra also specifies as Ānandamaya'bhyasāt.<sup>666</sup>

In these Śruti passages, the primary import is the blissful Brahman is not irrelevant. The Laksāna is resorted to only when the expressed sense is incompatible.<sup>667</sup> If it is argued that 'Sirah' is to be understood as like Sirah then, on the same ground in Puccham Brahma, the primary sense of the term Brahman is to be given up which is not desirable even to the Advaitins.<sup>668</sup> Moreover, in the same line, the Śruti directs as Sa vā esa puruṣavidha eva<sup>669</sup> where there is no scope for Laksāna. The particle 'Eva' determines that Brahman is Puruṣakāra and that is blissful. It does not get modified and hence it is absolutely and eternally real.<sup>670</sup> So Brahman is of the nature of Pūrnānanda or perfect blissful. He is blissful with Sukharūpa and He is the Lord Nārāyaṇa. He is eternally deprived of material elements. He, being eternally blissful, becomes an object of blissful experience. Thus the Śruti promises that Ānandamaya is Sakāra with limbs that are also blissful.<sup>671</sup>

INTERPRETATION OF APPARENTLY CONFLICTING STATEMENTS OF  
PŪRNAS SUCH AS TRAYĀNĀM... ETC., OF BHĀGAVATA<sup>672</sup>

(Pūrnas also declare Bheda).

The Nirneya works are those that convey the determined sense and the Nirṇayakas are those that give the clues to determine the purport of the Nirneya works. The Śruti, Smṛti and Purāṇas are Nirneya works and ~~the~~ the Brahmasūtras since determine the import of them, are called Nirṇayakas. In the Sūtra, as already mentioned, Bheda is pointed out clearly. But in the Purāṇas, in some places, there are some statements that appear as if denying the distinction of the soul from Brahman. And this portion contradicts with other, declaring distinction. At this juncture, one has to seek the help of the Nirṇayaka works. The Nirneya works are original and Nirṇayakas are the commentaries of them. So Nirneyas are to be understood in the light of the Nirṇayakas.<sup>673</sup>

To give the correct import of the term Bhida of the Bhāgavata verse Trayānam... Vādirāja gives the seven usenses (meanings) of the term Bhida.

- (1) Anyonyabhāva - difference of one object from another;
- (2) Bhrama - misunderstanding
- (3) Virodha - opposition
- (4) Buddhibheda - differentiating the opinion or splitting the mind;
- (5) Nāśa - destruction
- (6) Misraṇa - mixing up and
- (7) Asamyoγa - separate existence.<sup>674</sup>

Vādirāja also states the stock examples of these. Difference between pot and cloth is Anyonyābhāva. Mistaking rope as snake involves Bhrama. Mitrabheda is taken to mean Virodha, Buddhibheda as one of the four devices, Nāśa, destruction of a pot and the like. Mixing up of water and milk is an example of Vimśrana. Bifurcating or standing apart of the two armies is an example of Asamyoqa. In this way, the same term conveys the seven meanings.

The Bhāgavata verse Trayānām... does not convey the sense of identity. This verse is spoken by Maitreya or Vidura. The same sage elsewhere in the Bhāgavata itself has made it clear that Lord Viṣṇu is supreme.<sup>675</sup> And even the episode of Bhṛgu's meeting all the three deities proves that Lord Viṣṇu is supreme. Vādirāja, critically examines the verse in the light of the meanings given above. He states that the term Bhida, in the verse, does not deny the Bheda of the variety of Anyonyābhāva. And hence, it does not prove the identity of three deities. He proves the fact that there is no difference of opinion so far as the three deities are concerned. The term Bhida denies the difference of opinion. It conveys that though there is gradation and difference among Lord Viṣṇu, Brahmā and Rudra in respect of nature, there is no Buddhibheda (difference of opinion) among them. Vādirāja interprets the verse skilfully and establishes that this verse does not prove any identity among the three deities.<sup>676</sup>

To know the purport of the Purāṇas and to understand their importance, it is necessary to know their types. Here Vādirāja gives the list of all the Purāṇas with classification and stresses that the purport of the Sātvika Purāṇas stands unquestioned, significant and evident. So contradiction, appearing in others, is to be warded off in the light of the Sātvika Purāṇas. The author also says that the three-fold nature of the works, means and fruits, proves it evidently that three deities are neither equal nor identical. So the above verse does not convey either equality or identity, but it does convey the sense of absence of difference of opinion among them.

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#### INTERPRETATION OF THE BHĀGAVATA VERSE BHAYAM DVITIYĀBHINIVESATAH..

The Advaitins contend that the Bhāgavata verse Bhayam dvitiyābhiniveśatah syāt...<sup>678</sup> affirms their identity and establishes the unreality of the world. But this contention is not correct. The Dvitiya word indicates world constituting body, family, property and the like. The word Abhiniveśa means attachment. So, the import of the verse is that one has to worship the Lord devotedly, setting aside or giving up close attachment towards worldly objects. The Dvitiya that involves world is not at all denied. So the expression does not agree with the view that 'the belief in the existence of other than Brahman' causes fear. If the word Dvitiya is

meant that there is nothing other than Brahman, then the statements- Bhajettam bhaktyā... and the like serve no purpose.<sup>679</sup> Because, here duality of Sevyā-sevaka or master and servant variety is clearly stated. Brahman is the first who is Sevyā or the Master and the devotee, who is servant is the second. So the second, other than Brahman, is not denied, and it is also not unreal. The word Gurudevatatma in the above verse, which is an adjective of Budha, directs that his mind should get fixed on Guru and Devata. But it does not convey the sense of identity. Therefore, with close observation and examination, one has to understand the import of the expression as it is done in the Sūtra Ākāśastalingat (I.1.22) where the popular and general sense of the word Ākāśa is given up and the word is aimed at conveying the sense befitting to the context as Brahman.<sup>680</sup>

It is hinted that more attachment towards this world causes fear. To be free from the fear, one has to worship the Lord with his mind fixed on preceptor and deity, with true devotion. So the world, second and other than Brahman is not unreal. We find a good number of statements in the Bhāgavata and in other Purāṇas that instruct the devotees to give up the attachment towards body, family property and the like on account of their being defective in so many respects and to worship the lotus feet of the Lord.<sup>681</sup>

In all these, it is hinted that close and more attachment towards worldly objects causes fear. But nowhere either Ātmāikya or Mithyātva of the world is stated. In the above verse, Abhiniveśa or attachment of the Dvitiya or the world is said to be given up and not the Dvitiya itself.<sup>682</sup> If the attachment to the world is given up, the world will not become unreal like a house will not disappear or will not become unreal when the house-holder renounces it and resorts to asceticism.

Really, all these things, including Kala, Karman and the like are under the control of the Lord.<sup>683</sup> But it is because of the close attachment, they appear as if under the control of the souls and thus cause fear. But they are not at all unreal and their very existence is not at all negated.

#### INTERPRETATION OF THE BHĀGAVATA VERSE AHAM BHAVAN NA CA...<sup>684</sup>

In the Śāstras and the Purāṇas, we find a good number of statements, that appear as if conveying the sense of identity. But they are to be understood in accordance with other statements in the same context.

People, who are more affectionate to each other say 'I am thou,' 'Thou are I' and the like. Here both of them cannot be identical. These are the statements spoken out of intimacy, affection, faith and the like.<sup>685</sup> Vādirāja opines

that on such occasions if the primary sense seems to be irrelevant, then it is to be understood accordingly on implication.<sup>686</sup>

In the Bhāgavata, Hamsarūpi-paramātman preaches Prācetus as 'I am thou, not distinct, thou are I, wise will not see any distinction between us two.'<sup>687</sup> Here Hamsarūpi-paramātman is the preceptor and Pracetus is the pupil. Paramātman, appearing in the guise of a brahmin, teaches Puranjana, who is now born as the daughter of Vidharbha king. Puranjana is Jīvahamsa. Paramatmahamsa is teaching to Jīvahamsa. The apparent identity stated here, should not be taken literally. The preceptor, to ensue devotion in the devotee and to show his deep affection, has spoken thus. Here Paramātma-hamsa is Bodhaka-teacher and Jīvahamsa is Bodhya-taught. The Lord wants the soul to get uplifted who is eligible for realizing the philosophical truth but who is now deeply engaged in worldly enjoyments. One is Sarvajña or Omniscient and another is Ajña or ignorant. So how can there be identity between the two? To realize the philosophical truth, complete harmony of the mind is essential. And this expression is uttered to gain the complete harmony of the mind.

Or, it may be Bimba-pratibimbabhava or relation of

reflective and reflection that is hinted here. Paramātmahamsa is Bimba and Jīvahamsa is Pratibimba. This relation denotes the togetherness of the two and not the identity. Jīva must always live together with Paramātman. So it is also an expression of the relation of Avinabhava or togetherness of the two.<sup>688</sup>

Vādirāja gives a wonderful order of interpreting and argues that the above verse states the difference and not the identity. If the first pause is given at Aham bhāvan na ca then that conveys 'I am not thou,' the second sentence is as Tvam anyah that means 'Thou are distinct.' Here the distinction of Paramātmahamsa from Jīvahamsa is stressed. Third sentence is as Tvayi eva aham instead Tyamevāham. Then it conveys that the Paramātman is the Antaryāmin or the Indweller in all the souls. Thus, the distinction of the soul from the Paramātman is the primary import of the verse.<sup>689</sup>

Further, it may be asked as to why the Indweller God is not seen? The reply is that He is seen by great seers who are graced with divine sight as it happened in the case of Arjuna.<sup>690</sup> And they, although knowing the joint presence of God and the soul, do not hold their identity. They have the knowledge of distinction<sup>of</sup> these two as a swan has in respect of milk and water.

The advice of sage Nārada and also concluding verse of that Puruṣjanopakhyāna affirm that Jīvahamsa, being thus initiated and enlightened by Paramātmahamsa gained real knowledge and by His favour became contented.<sup>691</sup> This result also determines that the soul is distinct from Brahman.

#### KAPILĀKHYĀNA ALSO PROMISES BHEDA

The Kapilākhyāna occurring in the Bhāgavata (third chapter) wherein Lord Kapila preaches to His mother Devahuti, also establishes the Bheda.

The Lord Brahman is distinct from Pancabhūtas or five great elements, Indriyas or senses, Manas or mind and also from the Prakṛti, the primary cause of all these. Though He is the primier-source of very existence and the action of all these, He is totally distinct from them like the fire, though the cause of the origin of flames, sparks, smoke and the like, it is distinct from them.<sup>692</sup>

As the terms Indriyas or senses, Manas or mind and the like also stand for conveying their respective presiding deities, not only Jadājada-bheda or distinction among matters and Jadeśvara-bheda or distinction between matter and God are hinted at but other types of Bhedas are also suggested.

The sentences quoted here are the explanation of the Śruti passage- Ekamevādvitīyam Brahma.<sup>693</sup> These declare that Brahman is distinct from both Jīva and Jada. The Śruti- Neti netītyātmā grhyah<sup>694</sup> states that the Lord is neither Jada or matter nor Jīva or soul. He is distinct from both. This is the import of the Śruti- Ekamevādvitīyam. The term Advitiya does not convey the sense of identity as the Advaitins contend.<sup>695</sup>

The Advaitins hold that Brahman is Akhanda or partless, Nirākāra or formless, Nirguna or attributeless and Avācya or inexpressible.<sup>696</sup> All these views have been refuted in this Bhāgavata verse. The terms 'Bhagavān' and 'Brahman' prove that Brahman is not Akhanda as the Advaitins contend.<sup>697</sup> He is not Nirākāra since He has blissful form. He, being Brahman, is not Nirguna as the term Brahman means an embodiment of infinite auspicious attributes.<sup>698</sup> He is not Avācya as He is the primier object of the import of all the Śrutis. And because of this, Brahman is distinct from souls and matter.<sup>699</sup> This distinction will also continue to exist even in release.

BHEDAŚRUTIS ARE NIRAVAKĀSAS AND ABHEDAŚRUTIS ARE SĀVAKĀSAS<sup>700</sup>

Vādirāja argues that, it cannot be said that the Bheda-Śrutis convey the sense of distinction due to the Matibheda

or the difference of thinking. Matibheda is possible when there is Svarūpabhedā or difference in nature. It is due to the Svarūpabhedā, sense of distinction originates. And in the case of the Abhedaśrutis, they can be understood as conveying Matyaikya or unity of opinion, Sthānaikya or unity of place and the like.<sup>701</sup> Therefore, the Bhedaśrutis are Niravakaśas, having or affording no scope for different explanation. The Abhedaśrutis are Sāvakaśas, since there is scope to understand the import through different explanation or implication.

In the Śruti- Dvāsupana sayujā sakhyau..<sup>702</sup> the term Sakhyau conveys that the two have harmonious mind and the term Sayujau states that both of them are abiding in the same place or body. Here Paramatman and soul are the two birds dwelling in one place with harmonious mind. Here there is no scope to convey Matibheda or difference in intellect and Sthānabheda or difference in place. Bheda is distinct due to Svarūpabhedā or difference in nature. The dual number specifies that one is distinct from another. And it does not harm the beauty of the sense of Matyaikya and sthānaikya.<sup>703</sup> Not only this, the passage also states the mutually contradictory and opposing attributes of the soul and Brahma. In the soul, there are Baddhatva (boundness), Apūrnata (imperfection) and Karmaphalabhoktitva (the state

of experiencing the fruits of his deeds) whereas in Para-mātman, there are Nityamuktatva, Pūrnatva (perfectness), and Anatrtva (the state of non-eating the fruits of deeds). Because of this, the distinction between the soul and Brahman is real and eternal.<sup>704</sup>

And in the case of Aikyaśruti, resorting to Laksāna and setting aside the expressed sense of identity, one has to understand Matyaikya or unity in thought, Sthānaikya or unity in place and the like as in the statements like: They two got together. Here there is no scope for sense of identity.<sup>705</sup>

As there is scope and chance to Matyaikya, Sthānaikya and the like, with regard to Aikyaśrutis there is no scope to realize Matibheda, Sthānabheda and the like with regard to Bheda-śrutis as shown above but the Svarūpabheda. Hence the Bhedaśrutis are Niravakāśas and the Abhedaśrutis are Sāvakaśas.

#### INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI NITYONITYĀNĀM...<sup>706</sup>

Vādirāja, gives an elaborate interpretation of the passage Nityo nityānām... and shows that this Sruti states the Pancabhedas (five varieties of distinction) clearly.

The passage conveys that the Lord is Paramanitya or supreme eternal among eternal entities. He is Paramacetana or supreme being among all sentients. He brings qualified souls in Samsara and affords them chances for pursuing their respective Sadhana. He blesses with eternal bliss to those who are eligible. He, being Indweller of all, is the Lord, who is Independent in all respects. Wise always realize the distinction and not the identity with the Lord. Others do not realize this truth and hence they cannot have the realization of the Lord. It is the very nature of wise that helps them to realize the Lord. Those, who have the realization of the Lord, will attain blissful release. And others have no release due to having no realization.<sup>707</sup>

The passage also affirms that the Lord alone is the independent Doer and none else. The Kartrtva cannot be ascribed to nescience since it is insentient. This also proves that Brahman is not the material cause of the creation, but He is the efficient and independent cause (Nimitta and Svatantra karana). So there is no question of superimposition of Kartrtva and the like on Brahman. Here, it is also explained that the Lord is Omnipotent, Supreme and Omnicient as He, having the knowledge of all entities (including primeval matter), creates the world sportively. So He is Independent and others are dependents.<sup>708</sup> Neither He is

initiated by others nor He seeks the help of others in creating the world. The souls are dependent, since the very survival of them is under His control and Bhogabhaktvā the state of experiencing the enjoyments is also blessed by Him.<sup>709</sup>

The repeated description of the attributes such as eternity, sentiency, being alone, doership promises that this Śruti is an interpretation of so many other Śrutis. Ekatva referred to above establishes Abheda between the original form and incarnations of Brahman.

This passage also proves the concept of Viśesa, a Samarthyaviśesa (or distinct power) of the Lord and that helps for Bhedavyavahāra.<sup>710</sup> There is no difference ~~(भेदव्यावहार)~~ between the Lord and His incarnations, His limbs and His qualities. All are of the same nature. The attributes are absolutely real and not ephemeral.

The Lord, with Indwelling-forms dwells in all. His realization is essential for attaining the release. The liberated ones are identical neither with Brahman and nor with each other. They are distinct from Brahman and also from each other. Brahman is the Lord of the released souls and they have the direct vision of the Lord always. This will never get affected.<sup>711</sup>

In this passage, the five-fold difference is clearly stated. It is also described that the liberation is of the nature of bliss. And this liberation can be attained through the knowledge of five-fold difference. The sentence Anupaśyanti dhīrah indicates that there is gradation with distinction with regard to the nature of the souls in respect of their Aparoksajñāna or realization. The graded souls are of three kinds and there is mutual distinction among them. The sentence Kāmān yo vidadhāti indicates the plurality of the means of enjoyments and also mutual distinction among them. Yo vidadhāti states that the Lord is the creator of them, and it proves the distinction of matter from Paramātman. This also proves the Jīvajadabheda or the difference of the souls from the insentient matter.

As Brahman is the Creator of all means of worldly enjoyments, like Brahman, reality of the world is also proved. It is also stated that the world is eternal in the form of a current. Hence, the process of creation is beginning-less. 712

Vādirāja opines that, this passage not only established Pancabheda, Tāratamya and the like, but at the same time denies the scope for Advaita-views such as identity between the Lord and the Jīva, identity of Jīva and Jīva, non-reality

of the world, attainment of the Mokṣa through Nisprakāraka-jñāna, nature of Jīvas, Akartrtvā to Cit and the like.<sup>712A</sup>

#### THE IDEA OF JĪVABRAHMAIKYA IS CONTRARY TO REASON

Those, who opine that there being no soul other than Brahman, may say for argument's sake that just as Ākāśa is one and by limiting adjuncts like Ghata, Matha and the like it is referred to as Ghatākāśa, Mathākāśa and so on. Similarly, Brahman also with the limiting adjuncts, assumes the role of Jīva. Or else, it may be also be contended that the Jīvas are the Aṁśas or parts of the all-pervasive Brahman like the water in pots fetched from a lake.

In the Advaita, Brahman is partless (Akhanda). The Advaita does not accept the view of Aṁśa and Aṁśin in ultimate sense. What all reference about the Aṁśa and Aṁśin, seen in the Advaita works, relates with empirical level (Vyāvahārika),<sup>712B</sup> Vādirāja, disregarding the view, opines that even this idea of Aṁśa and Aṁśin of the Advaita does not help to prove the identity between Brahman and soul.

If it is argued that the Brahmāṁśa in a body is Jīva, then it is as good as saying that Brahmāṁśa outside the body is not Jīva. Then the very proposition as Brahman is all-pervasive becomes unsound. Further, there cannot be

movements in limiting adjuncts such as body since according to the Advaita, Brahman is Niskriya or passive. And Upādhi or limiting adjunct being insentient cannot have activity of its own. Thus the movements of living bodies become impossible.<sup>713</sup> As there is no movements or shaking in Brahman, it cannot be said that the body gets activated by Brahman. Thus, the body should become stable or movementless. So the Brahmāṁśa, abiding in a body, since having no movement cannot hope to go to heaven and the like. One may raise the question that movements are seen in grass and the like that are insentient when they are shaken by wind. But the reply is that it is not the mere wind that moves and causes movements in other things, but it is the presiding deity of the wind, being sentient, that moves and causes the movements in others. This is possible provided Kriyāśakti is admitted in presiding deities unlike the Brahman of the Advaitins.<sup>714</sup>

As their Brahman is Niskriya, Brahmāṁśa must also be likewise Niskriya. Further it cannot be argued that it is because of the association of Upādhi, viz., body Brahman becomes active since Upādhi is Jada. It is by its nature always inactive.<sup>715</sup> And it is also not reasonable to hold that the body at every step, gets associated with the facing Brahmāṁśa, leaving the one behind. Because, in that case, at every step, there are to be deaths and births.

The above given exposition may seem to be unconnected to the topic of the content. But by close observation and deep reflection, relevancy of the exposition may be known. The main aim of the exposition is to tackle the concepts Upādhi or limiting adjunct, Abheda or identity and also Niskriyatva or actionlessness of Brahman. On the basis of Upādhi, neither Abheda of Jīva from Brahman nor the Niskriyatva of them be established. By admitting Upādhi, Deha etc., if Kriyāsakti is taken to be attributed to the Jīvas or Brahmanas then the above shown absurdity and irrelevancy are inevitable. In this way, the given exposition is connected with the context.

If the souls are taken to mean Brahmanas in the limiting bodies, then there cannot be movement in the souls. Because, when Brahman is motionless, how can there be motion in Brahmanasabhūtajīvas, souls being parts of Brahman. Without the movement of the mud or clay, the pot made of that cannot move. Further, the body being limiting adjunct, product of nescience cannot generate action since the very nescience is insentient.<sup>716</sup>

So it is not proper to state that the souls are Brahmanas and thereby there is identity between them. Because, if that would be the case then as in Brahman according to

the Advaita, there should not be any activity in the souls which are Brahma parts. And it is evident that activity is seen in souls. So even according to the Advaita, the fact that souls are parts of Brahman, cannot be proved. And if, with regard to the limiting adjuncts parts of Brahman are explained, then they differ from body to body, as it is to be bigger in an elephant and very small in ants and the like. This optional view seems to be similar to that of Jainism.<sup>717</sup>

It is specified in the Brahmasūtra- Utkrāntigatyāg-  
tinam<sup>718</sup> (II.iii.19) that the soul of atomic nature is having dependent powers. Hence, the soul cannot be identical with Brahman. Nor is it Brahmāṇḍa.

In the Advaita, Brahman is motionless by nature. And this Brahman becomes active or will have the motion when getting associated with adjunct by name Māya.<sup>719</sup> But it is impossible. Because, the nature does not change. He cannot be active even when there is the association of thousands of limiting adjuncts. Because adjunct being insentient is itself inactive. How can then it cause action in others like the space in pot cannot cause movement since by nature it is actionless. In the same way, when Advaita holds that Brahman is actionless by nature, there cannot be action by

any means. Advaita cannot explain the soul of Brahmāṁśa either Sthirāṁśa or immovable part or Caladāṁśa or movable part because the soul, by nature, is inactive. The soul can neither be immovable part of Brahman nor movable part of Brahman. If immovable part is taken then that would be against the experience. If it is taken as movable part, then It should have the movement. But according to them, Brahman has no movement.<sup>720</sup>

Thus, in the Advaita neither immovable part nor movable part proves identity. According to the Sūtra and the Śruti, soul is Anu.<sup>721</sup> The souls attain different bodies as they are associated with fruits of actions of each body. Being dependent they are distinct from each other. This is the state of soul. On the contrary, Brahmachaitanya or supreme soul is altogether distinct. It exists always and everywhere. It is pure by nature. It is also indestructible, partless, unchangeable, eternal and firm.<sup>722</sup> When Brahman is indestructible, partless etc., there is no chance to have pieces of It as souls. So souls are not at all parts of Brahman.<sup>723</sup> Since Brahman is alone and partless in the Advaita, the very contention that the souls are parts of Brahman is untenable. Nānatva in respect of parts cannot be proved also.

Brahman is endowed with Vicitrāśakti or supreme power. He is Omniscience Lord of all and sole doer. He is of the minute as well as of the biggest form. Though, Brahman is capable of doing anything, He never thinks to misuse His power and thereby to assume the form of a soul.<sup>724</sup>

Now it cannot be argued that the Avidyā or nescience responsible for Brahman assuming the form of the embodied soul, contributes power. Because it is insentient. As nescience is insentient, it has no power of discrimination. So it cannot assist Brahman in assuming the state of soul. Thus, it is evident that neither Brahman can Itself assume the form nor can nescience make It to assume the soul form. Brahman of the Advaitins being Nirviśesa or qualityless, cannot have the power which is also a quality. If It would have the power of that kind, It could have driven out the nescience making It to assume soul form. And nescience, being insentient cannot have this power. If that is admitted then the Advaita would be similar to that of Nirīśvara-sāṃkhyas.<sup>725</sup> Further, it cannot be said that power can be attributed to the qualified Brahman (Ajñāna-Avidyā-viśista Brahman). Because originally this power is neither in Brahman nor in nescience. Further, Brahman, knowing the nescience to be the cause of undesirable and unworthy things and of sorrowful transmigration does not want to get associated

with that. Or Brahman will be inactive until It is moved by nescience and It is inactive again when nescience dis-associates from Brahman. Thus, really speaking, the idea of a qualified Brahman is baseless and unreasonable. In this way, Brahman assuming soul form is totally impossible.<sup>726</sup> Therefore, souls are not parts of Brahman. They are distinct beings. In some Purāṇas they are described as parts of Brahman, but it is to be understood in the sense of dependence. They are under the control of the Lord. The incarnations, Matsya, Kūrma and the like are His Svarūpamāśas or nature forms. Hence, there is no distinction among them. Whereas there is distinction from the souls as they are not Bhinnamāśas!<sup>727</sup> Therefore, the contention that Brahman assumes the state of soul is not correct. As Brahman is all-pervasive and soul is Anu, the distinction is evident. And this distinction is existing since beginningless time and it will continue to exist even in release. Hence, identity is by no means possible here and hereafter.<sup>728</sup> Though the body as adjunct gets destroyed, it is not possible for soul to become identical with Brahman since as already proved, both of them possess opposing aspects like the water in the jar and in the lake. When jar is destroyed the water will not become identical with the water of the lake.

Now, if Brahman is regarded as actionless then Brahma-

formed soul must also be actionless. Because, the inexpressible Māyā or Avidyā of the Advaita, dividing Brahman in parts, cannot contribute power of action to the parts.

In the Dvaita view, there is no difficulty, since it is the Śaktiviśesa or His unique form, the very nature of Brahman, which helps Him to assume Anu as well as Mahat forms. So He is of infinite forms. The same Śaktiviśesa proves the movement in Him. But the souls possess only Anu form and dependent Kriyaśakti. Hence, both of them are absolutely distinct from each other.<sup>729</sup> And Brahman, abiding in all the souls, is one and the same and is perfect and Supreme. He is one with Mahat and all-pervasive form and is infinite with indwelling forms. All these forms are perfect in respect of qualities and are identical with original form. The Śruti- Antarbahiśca tatsarvamvyāpya nārāyanasthitah<sup>729A</sup> specifies that all-pervasive Brahman is the Nārāyana.

If the Advaitins hasten to admit the possibility of two all-pervasive sentients, then the very concept of the Advaita stands uprooted.<sup>730</sup> So they cannot accept two all-pervasive sentients. Therefore, the illustration of Ghatākāśa, Mathākāśa given at the beginning to prove their identity, is irrelevant. The souls do not conform with the size of the bodies in the form of adjuncts. They are Anus. The

above analogy may be taken with reference to the incarnations of the Lord as His all forms are all-pervasive. Souls are like dust particles flying in the space. So they were not, are not, and shall not be identical with Brahman.<sup>731</sup>

When Brahman is beginningless and souls are beginningless, distinction among them must also be beginningless as explained above. So identity cannot be thought of between soul and Brahman. It cannot be stated that though difference is beginningless, it gets destroyed at the attainment of the release because difference is not the product of nescience. Though, nescience is destroyed by knowledge, difference remains as it is.

The Ekajīvavādins hold that it is due to Avidyā, that Brahman attains the soul form. Soul is one only and it is its nescience by which the entire world is fabricated.<sup>732</sup> When its nescience is removed, there originates Aikya Jñāna as 'I am Brahman' and by this, the fabricated world ceases to exist. The Bahujīvavādins<sup>733</sup> hold that it is due to the manifold Upādhis, that Jīvas or Brahmanas are many. By knowledge of identity when once adjuncts get destroyed, they getting liberated, attain Brahmasvarūpa. For them the world becomes unreal.

Vādirāja attacks the view of the Ekajīvavādins. He

argues that if the settlement in the world is unreal and sentiency abiding is so many bodies, is unreal, then how can the movements etc., causing effects be possible? The unreality cannot move.<sup>734</sup> If it is a real serpent, then only it can move. In the same way, sentiency as well as their living world must be real, then only movements and the like are possible. And it is not the delusion that causes movements. The whole world cannot be taken to mean to be ephemeral. If souls are superimposed on one Cetana, then they are unreal. Since being superimposed, they cannot be the parts of real Brahman and there is no question of identity.<sup>735</sup>

Further, the view of the Advaitins that all the souls are parts of Brahman is also not tenable. The distinction between soul and Brahman is evident since beginningless time. This is because of their inherent distinct nature and distinct constituent characteristics. Souls, living in different bodies, are of Anu size. Brahman is all-pervasive and of Mahatparimāṇa. Brahman is Niskriya (not affected by the effects of actions). He is perfect. Souls are active and are affected by actions. And as a result of that they move from one body to another and from one place to another. Brahman is defectless. Souls are defective, and as a result of that they suffer. So such souls cannot be parts of Brahman or forms of Brahman.

The Advaitins hold that like the difference of ether in the pot, souls or parts of Brahman possess unreal difference caused by adjuncts. But it is wrong. Because, if difference is unreal, then the very attributes and effects of that also become unreal. If difference is real, then only all those will be real. Ghatākāśa does not move wherever pot moves. And ether in the pot does not get stained with the water or dirt in the pot. It is unaffected like the ether all-pervasive. So if soul would be a part of all-pervasive Brahman he should be actionless and unaffected like the ether in the pot. But the soul is not like that. He is active and hence associated with the fruits of actions. So the distinction between him and Brahman is real.<sup>736</sup> As dust particles, distinct from ether and each other, fly in the ether that is motionless and unchangeable, the souls too, distinct from each other and from Brahman and being active abide in all-pervasive Brahman. If they were to be parts of Niskriyabrahma, they must not be Sakriyas as said above. If dust particles are parts of ether, then they must be actionless. But they are active. Since, they are not the parts of ether. In the same way, souls, being active, are not the parts of Brahman.<sup>737</sup> If the difference is regarded as empirical, then the very concept difference would be meaningless since it will be no more after the knowledge of sublation. If the knowledge of

sublation is negated then the very idea of empirical difference is useless.

So the five-fold distinction is evident to the experience of all. The state of distinction safeguards the very code or law of worldly behaviour. Let all entities be distinct, soul as a soul, matter as matter and the Lord as the Lord. There is no need to change their states. The soul need not become matter or Brahman and vice-versa.

As the scriptural passage- Dhataḥ yathā pūrvamakalpayat<sup>737A</sup> states, the creation and the like which are subject to the five-fold distinction, have been continuing since beginning-less time and they will continue till eternity.<sup>738</sup> The release is not attaining the identity with Brahman but attaining the experience of inherent bliss always.

The passage Sarvam khalvidam Brahma<sup>739</sup> refers to the entire world of sentients and the insentient matter. So there is no scope to drop matter from the meaning of the term 'Sarvam.' If at all Aikya or identity is to be understood, let it also be understood with matter and not only with sentient souls. Because, 'Sarvam' stands for all including souls and matter. So the passage is to be understood as everything is under the control of the Lord or everything gets or comes into existence from the Lord. Otherwise,

the contention of proving identity of souls and Brahman leads to undesirable identity of matter with Brahman.<sup>740</sup> So identity of souls is untenable. If identity between Brahman and soul is voluntarily forced, then all the above mentioned auspicious attributes stand untenable or they are to be abandoned.

Vādirāja taunts at the Advaitins saying that it is good on their part to prefer identity with matter to identify with souls since that does not make their Brahman to assume soul form and to undergo the hardships of transmigration. Whereas, it cannot be applied in the Dvaita view, since matter is not capable of doing anything. It is inactive by its very nature.

According to the Advaita, Brahman is Svaprakāśa, that means Svāvedyatva is there is Brahman (absence of self-knowledge or realization).<sup>740A</sup> It can also be found in matter. So identity with matter is preferable. Vādirāja taunts that the passage- Sarvam khalvidam Brahma becomes fruitful and relevant only when the Advaitins hasten to relate entire identity comprising the identity with souls and identity with matter that lead to unreality of the world and also unreality of souls (beings). Let Brahman be also unreal as being. When everything is unreal, then like bondage,

release will also be-come Mithyā.<sup>741</sup> This leads to the absence of Bandha and Mokṣa. Both Mokṣasādhana and Sukhaboktrtvā also become Mithyā. Then the state of Mukti would be nominal and for only name sake.

Thus, if Jīvaikya is related then it appears attributing Baddhatva and Muktatva to Brahman and entire Jagat becomes Mithyā. But the Śruti conveys that the entire world of Jīva and Jada is under the control of Lord.<sup>742</sup>

In this way the Advaita-interpretation of this Śruti is irrelevant and contradictory to valid perception. It is also against the Brahmasūtras. Bādarāyaṇa has shown the way of interpreting the scriptural statements wherein there appears contradiction as in Mṛdabratit, Apo'bruvan and the like.<sup>742A</sup> Here neither the clay nor the water can speak but it is the presiding deities of clay and water that speak. Thus, relevant to the context and to the valid perception, the Śrutis are to be interpreted.

The expression of Atmaikya is against the <sup>to</sup> very code and conduct. It is neither pleasing nor a real one. Paundrak Vāsudeva was severely punished since he declared that he was the Lord. It was neither pleasing nor a real one.<sup>743</sup> The entities that are ever distinct like the cloth and the soap cannot be identical. So the expressive meaning of the Śruti since sublated, should not be accepted as the real meaning.

Even the liberated souls are not identical with each other nor with Brahman. Because, Brahman is ever-released and they are the gainers of release. So there cannot be identity. And their distinct living is also evident. There may be little bit similarity in some aspects like the explicit form. (Sārūpya).<sup>744</sup> Further,<sup>they</sup> although gain the required knowledge may not attain release. The gained knowledge has no impact on them. It is only those who are eligible in nature. Knowledge is the only instrumental. In release, similarity may be termed only in respect of the state of liberation. That means one is liberated like others.<sup>745</sup> Identity cannot be referred to even in case of Sāyujyamuktas. They are also distinct from Brahman. It is true that in the cavity of the heart of the soul, there abide both the soul and Paramātman. Paramātman is ever-released and Omnipotence whereas Jīva is Niyamya, Alpajīha and the like. Jīva experiences the Karmaphala, whereas Paramātman does not. So both of them are distinct<sup>746</sup> like milk and water. Thus on account of possessing contradictory qualities and distinct nature since beginningless time cannot be stated and proved.<sup>747</sup>

The Advaitins Īśvara cannot be identical with the world of Jīva and Jada. If Īśvara is incapable of the creation of the world then the world cannot come into existence, since

without Karta there cannot be any Karya. If He is taken to be capable, even then He cannot be identical. Because, creator and created must be distinct each other.<sup>748</sup>

If the import of the Śruti is taken as real, then the Advaitins admitting the identity of soul and Brahman, would become unreal and not a reality. And if the import of the passage is taken to be unreal, then also the Advalta becomes not a Tattva that means, it cannot be proved. Since Nirguna passage declares Brahman as attributeless identity cannot be talked of.<sup>749</sup> In spite of knowledge, if nescience is attributed to Brahman there cannot be this Samsāra since that nescience cannot influence and affect the inherent knowledge. If nescience is negated in Omniscient Lord, then also there is no Samsāra (effect of nescience).<sup>750</sup> Nescience cannot be referred to in Brahman. If nescience is possible, then only soul form, and the like become possible. As it is said that knowledge of Brahman is real, He cannot have the nescience (ignorance) (knowledge of comprehending limited objects). If He has no knowledge, then also there can be no nescience since, absence of knowledge does not lead to or result into any apprehension of nescience.<sup>751</sup>

Thus, there is not even a single argument, relevant in all respects, that can help the Advaltins to prove and to assert identity. The very idea or concept identity is against the valid experience and contradictory to the import of the Śrutis.

#### ADVAITA IS CONTRARY TO NITI OR MORAL CONDUCT

The Very idea of contending the state of Brahman in

soul by the Advaitins, is mere superimposition which means false. It is not a real one as poor people sometimes behave as if they are rich ones. As richness appears superimposed and hence false, in the same way, attributing the state of Brahman to soul is false. The very idea appears as an ignorant hopes to get popularity and for that sake he boasts of himself to be too great. But as by mere boasting he will not become great. The soul too, who is very mean and ordinary cannot attain the state of Brahman though boasts of himself.<sup>752</sup> Hoping to be identical with Brahman is as good as hoping to become the Lord of Laxmi, mother of the entire world, which is most unworthy and sinful.

Vadiraja, attacks directly the practical behaviour of the Advaitins saying that the Advaitins, during pleasure, plenty and prosperity declare that they are gods; but when in distress and difficulties, they fall at the feet of gods and worship them. If they themselves are gods then they need not prostrate and worship others.<sup>753</sup> The Advaitin treats himself as Brahman but for getting rid of the sin resorts to sacred rivers to take the holy bath and also rushes to the temples. Thus there is no harmony and propriety in his declaration and actual behaviour.

EXPOSITION OF TRIVIDHĀMŚA

Even when Aṁśāṁśi form of relation is taken into account, it is not possible to prove and establish the identity of Jīva and Brahman. This Aṁśāṁśi form is three-fold - Bhinnāṁśa (different part), Bhinnābhinnāṁśa (different-cum-identical part) and Abhinnāṁśa (identical part).

Vadiraja states that as souls are considered Bhinnāṁśas, that does not help for or convey the identity. The same word, when referred to different objects, does not lead to either equality or identity. But it conveys the sense of distinction. E.g. the word Hari stands for both frog and Viṣṇu. The mere reference of articulation does not create any greatness in frog the greatness that is found in Viṣṇu. It clearly shows the distinctive features of both. With regard to distinctive features souls are distinct parts unlike Matsya, Kūrma etc., that are recognised as identical forms or forms of nature. Thus the usage of the same word does not convey the same sense with regard to all objects denoted by it.<sup>754</sup>

In the Bhāgavata-Ete Svāṁśakalāḥ puṁsaḥ kr̥ṣṇastu bhaqavān svayam<sup>755</sup> and Jīvāḥ sarve kalāḥ kila, it is clearly stated that identical forms are the incarnations of the Lord Nārāyaṇa such as Matsya, Kūrma. These are the forms of

nature of the Lord. Hence they are identical. Here, they are explained as Svāṁśakalāḥ of the Lord. Whereas souls are explained as only Kalāḥ.<sup>755A</sup> Thus, it is evident that forms (parts) are of two types: Identical form and distinct part.<sup>756</sup>

Distinct part is the part which is under the control of the Lord. This constitutes the entire world of soul and matter. Different-cum-identical part relates to half-similarity as in the thread and the cloth. Identical form is total similarity and identity that is seen in the incarnations of the Lord.<sup>757</sup> Souls are distinct parts as they do not possess the auspicious and great qualities of the Lord. Since the incarnations of Matysa, Kurma and the like are endowed with those great qualities, they are Identical forms.

So far as different-cum-identical part is concerned, it refers to matter entities. Because, in these, the cause of distinction is both perceived and unperceived. There is half-similarity between cloth and thread. Even at the destruction of the entity, half-similarity exists, hence there is both difference and identity. Though cloth is destroyed it is not other than the thread, hence both difference and identity are seen. In this way there are three types in

Aṁśas.<sup>758</sup> So far as the view of different-cum-identical part is concerned, there is no difference of opinion. There is such a difference only in respect of different part and identical forms.

The Śruti Pūrnamadah pūrnamidam purnātpūrnamudacyate...<sup>758A</sup> states that like Mūlarūpa or Original form, the incarnations of the Lord are complete in all respects. The Pūrnatva or perfection is the very constituent characteristic of the nature of the Lord. Hence, they are Identical forms. The above adjective specifies that there is one more Aṁśa which is not perfect and that is the soul. And it is distinct part. Apūrṇāṁśa is never identical with perfect form. Difference is evident between two entities possessing distinct nature. So soul is distinct part.<sup>759</sup> In this regard, Vādirāja refers to the Bhāgavata verses<sup>759A</sup> that declare soul as distinct part. The Brahmasūtra- Aṁśo nānāvyapadeśat (II.iii.43)<sup>760</sup> makes it clear that soul is Brahmāṁśa in the sense he is distinct part as soul seeks the help or support of the Lord in many ways. Since having relation with Brahman he is stated to be of Brahmāṁśa.

The Advaitins admit the view of Atyantābheda (absolute identity). In that case, the very concept or usage of Aṁśāṁśa-bhāva becomes meaningless. In their view there is

no possibility of Aṁśa and Aṁśih. Both must be Aṁśins, then there can be no identity which means Advaita. In the Dvaita view, Aṁśāṁśibhāva, with regard to the forms of nature, wherein absolute identity is evident can be referred to, with the help of Viśeṣa. The Aṁśāṁśibhāva, in case of the forms of the nature, necessitates difference with identity. That means in Aṁśāṁśibhāva of the forms of nature, difference and identity (with Viśeṣa) go together. They do not stand separated.

This relation of part and whole, together with difference is there in release. Both relation of part and whole and absolute identity cannot be there in one place (except in the case of Svarūpāṁśa). The two are contradictory to each other.

#### BAHUJĪVAVĀDA

"Śaṅkara does not support the view that the Jīva, limited by Avidyā, is one, as Avidyā is one. For if all souls are one Jīva, then when the first case of liberation occurred, mundane existence should have come to an end, which is not the case. Brahman, limited by the different inner organs born of Avidyā, becomes divided, as it were, into many individual souls, but the difficulties of the relation of Māyā and Avidyā to Brahman led to the formulation of

several theories in the later Advaita, of which the two chief are ekajīvavāda, single soul theory, and aneka jīva-vāda, or the theory of a plurality of souls.<sup>761</sup>

The Advaitins' identity is not possible even when souls are held to be many. According to them, souls with distinct Karmaphala are born in different births.<sup>762</sup> The fruits of their actions and the change in the time of their liberation and the like negate the mutual identity. The identity, not prevailing in Samsāra, cannot be attained due to the above mentioned causes. The distinct nature of the souls in Samsāra does not get changed. In release though they attain Brahman, do not become identical with Brahman, like the threads though conjoined together in cloth do not become identical with each other. Their distinct nature remains unharmed and unchanged. It is simply the change of state from Samsāra to release. So the contention of mutual identity of souls, held by the Bahujīvavādins, is also untenable.<sup>763</sup> Further, soul attaining identity with Brahman will lose his soul form and hence how can he be identical with other souls since all souls do not attain liberation at the same time.<sup>764</sup> Therefore, souls are not identical each other in Samsāra as well as in release. Neither reason nor Sruti supports the view of the Bahujīva-vāda.<sup>765</sup>

Mutual identity of Jīvas would be contrary to reason. Because in that case, experiences of pleasure and pain should be uniform and simultaneous to one and all. If parts of Brahman were to be in many bodies, then there must be uniform experience. But experience changes from one to another.<sup>766</sup> The idea of mutual identity leads to so many irrelevant and unworthy trends in society.

If identity in nature of souls is going to be admitted then that causes Karmasamkara. That means, sinful acts or may be meritorious deeds of one, should accrue to others. But it does not happen. On the other hand, difference in actions seen everywhere, cannot support and overcome the defects of identity whereas it proves ultimate distinction. So if identity in nature is going to be admitted then that causes so many problems as stated above. And explicit elements such as body, action, since being unreal and superimposed, cannot contribute to different dealing. Only that which is not superimposed can be taken as the means of different dealing. And that is the very nature. And if it is taken to be identical then it cannot survive the different dealing but leads to manifold problems. So this nature must also be taken to be distinct to each other and infinite in number. They are not at all parts of Brahman. There is no identity in nature among them. The facts such as difference

in the experience of pleasure and pain, difference in the source of birth and the like affirm that sentiency, seen in each body, is distinct. And that is the difference in nature.<sup>767</sup>

All the sentient souls are distinct and they are the very Saksins of their experiences of pleasure and pain. The Saksin is the sentient. Thus distinct sentient souls abide in different bodies.<sup>768</sup>

The idea of mutual identity is also contrary to worldly experience. When one is in distress, nobody will identify with him. But only in the state of prosperity, every one prefers to become one with him. This shows that identical dealing is nominal and is not real. It is the difference which is ultimately real.

#### REFUTATION OF EKAJĪVAVĀDA<sup>769</sup>

"As opposed to anekajīvavāda, there is ekajīvavāda, according to which there is only one self who being bound by one avidyā is deluded and the same Jīva is released when that avidyā is destroyed. Thus, according to this theory there exists only one self (jīva) and all other Jivas and phenomena are but the figments of imagination of that single jīva. The existence of other jīvas and the phenomena, according to this theory, may be compared to the dream of that single jīva."<sup>770</sup>

The Advaitins, who hold the view of Ekajīvavāda, state that soul is one and one only. Owing to the impact of nescience, he sees the entire world of soul and matter as a dream. For him, like a dreamer, the entire world is unreal. The others and matter entities are all superimposed by that soul, product of ignorance.

Vādirāja attacks this view severely and says that the Ekajīvavādin has no discrimination. Because, there would not be distinction in day and night for him. Further, his view suggests that all others are as good as dead in this world, though in reality they get engaged in various activities, assume different bodies one after another. Vādirāja opines that the Ekajīvavādin is not any different from Cārvāka or materialist. Because, the latter declares body as the soul and the former attributes the lone sentiency to himself. For him others are neither souls nor Brahmans. The very existence of all others is like a dream. It also appears that he alone attains the liberation after the destruction of nescience. This view looks that even the great Yogins Śuka, Vāmadeva and others, are deprived of attaining release. According to this view of Ekajīvavāda, all kinds of worships, gifts, sacred baths and even sacred studies and hearings are also to be futile since they happen to be the occurrences in a dream.

The view is absurd to the extent as it states that it is the single soul, sleeping since beginningless time due to nescience has created everything.<sup>771</sup>

In the Ekajīvavāda the preceptor must be fabrication of nescience. And this preceptor should teach the knowledge of identity to his disciple for the destruction of nescience. If he has the knowledge of identity, he himself should get destroyed first since knowledge of identity removes the nescience. Then, who else is to teach the disciple. Or, at the time of preaching, preceptor will be destroyed and the disciple gaining knowledge of identity attains the release. Thus, the self-destruction to the preceptor and release to his disciple. Thus, it is absurd. If knowledge of identity of preceptor who is product of nescience of single soul, is taken to be real, then the Advaita view as dream is illusion, will be no more.<sup>772</sup>

The world, if compared with the dream, affirms plurality of souls and not single soul.<sup>773</sup> When the entire world is the dream of one soul, then to justify it, there is no other dream as an illustration. Thus, inference also does not support in this regard.<sup>774</sup> So, illustration of dream is not tenable to the world in establishing the view of single soul. The Brahmasūtra-Sandhye srstirahahī (III.ii.1)

states that the aspect of dream determines the plurality of souls. It also mentions that the dream is fabricated by the Lord according to the mental impressions of the souls and hence it is real. In the waking state the things, created last for longer time whereas the dream-creations exist for a limited time as they are the products of Vāsanā (Manosāṃskāra)<sup>775</sup> or past impressions.

If all dreams are witnessed by that single soul (that means if the entire world appears to him alone as a dream always) then to whom could there be waking state? Because both these states cannot be there at the same time.<sup>776</sup> If both the states are taken together, that leads to the defect of Ātmāśraya or sitting on one's own shoulder. Therefore, waking and dream states must be mentioned distinctly.<sup>777</sup> And in dream, if the plurality of the souls is admitted then also there cannot be the Eka�īvavāda. Further, if presence of the souls, in different bodies, is admitted, then also the Eka�īvavāda would stand no more. If their presence is negated, the view of Ekaজīva would be false, since the functions of all the bodies become unreal.<sup>778</sup> If there is no any Višesa (special difference) between different body and jar, then jar, though matter, must have cognition and sensation. If bodies are distinct from matter (Jīvasahita), there cannot be single soul.

Now, other bodies cannot be the sources of experience to that Ekajīva as his body; because to enter into other bodies for experience he has give up his body and then has to enter other bodies. This causes undergoing the deaths and the births repeatedly for experience. So all the bodies cannot be held as the sources of experience of that Ekajīva.<sup>779</sup> The singular usage — as soul in Śruti, Smṛti and in other works does not restrict the number of the souls but that stands for and represents the entire group of that class.

Vādirāja says that dream state of the single soul cannot be <sup>the</sup> state of wakefullness. Because, in the state of wakefullness, it is evident that there are opposing and variegated functions of different souls with different bodies. If souls are not in those bodies, then functioning must not be seen. So the state of wakefulness does not support the view of single soul.

Further, if the Ekajīva is the creation of Māyā or nescience, then creation of others would also be of nescience. This Māyika cannot see others, products of nescience. And as there are no other souls, no one is there to see the illusory creation. If existence of other souls, is admitted then the view of the Ekajīva would be no more.<sup>780</sup>

Now, it cannot be contended that the Ekajīva is the part of Brahman himself and others sentients acting in different bodies are his Aṁśas, because, he being present in one body, ~~He~~ cannot enter into other bodies with his parts. He is not a Yогin to possess and to enjoy that power. Thus, the Ekajīvavāda is not agreeable.<sup>781</sup> So it is to be accepted that, since beginningless time,~~He~~ there have been infinite number of souls, dwelling in infinite number of bodies.

Vādirāja questions as to how the body of the Ekajīva is created. It must be created by some one else. And he, himself, cannot be the creator of the body before its coming into existence. So it must be accepted that, the body is created by someone i.e., Brahman. In this case, why only the body of this soul is created by Brahman? And if not created then, let all the bodies, including the body of the Ekajīva be Nirjīvas. This argument also opposes the view of the Ekajīvavāda.

Now, Vādirāja says that creatorship of the world cannot be attributed to this Ekajīva as it leads to contradictions in view of the Advaita also. Because, in the commentary of benedictory verse of an Advaita work, by name Tattvadīpana, the creatorship of the world is discarded

in the case of Brahman and Rudra, stating that they do not have the ability of creating the world as they are the products of nescience. Tayoḥ kāryatvena nikhilajagatsar-  
jana saṁharana saṁarthya-abhāvāt.<sup>781A</sup> So how can there be the creatorship of the world to this Ekajīva, who is also a product of nescience and is plunged in the mundane world full of sorrow. Further, the Brahmasūtra has also not only denied the creatorship of the world to the soul, but has clearly attributed it to Brahman.<sup>782</sup>

Vadirāja raises the doubt as to whether the Ekajīva sees the world fabricated by him? As Advaita denies the creatorship to the cit element, he cannot fabricate the world. It is the mind and other organs that have created this world. So the Ekajīva cannot see the world. Thus, the very idea of Ekajīva and his fabrication of the world is contrary to reason and experience. Really the soul, who is in atomic form cannot create this wonderful creation. It is possible to All-pervasive One and He is the Brahman.<sup>783</sup>

#### BHEDA OR DIFFERENCE IS REAL

The Advaitins to defend their concept of identity advance an inference as follows: Bhedo mithyā bhedatvāt  
candra bhedavat. Difference is unreal since being the fact of difference like the difference appearing in two moons.

This inference, no doubt, favours the Dvaita also with the change of the Drṣṭānta (illustration) Bhedo na mithyā bheda-tvat brahmamoksavat. Difference is not unreal since being the fact of difference like Brahma and Mokṣa.<sup>784</sup>

The Advaitins refer to the illustration of moons. In the Advaita, Brahman is Sat and the world is neither Sat, nor Asat and nor even Sadasat. It is inexpressible and other than these three.<sup>784A</sup>

Really speaking, in the Advaita, release cannot be identified with Brahman.

Bheda between Brahman and Mokṣa is not Mithyā. Even when removal of nescience is taken to be release, it will not be unreal. Because, Avidyāñāśa is the fifth in the enumeration of Vastusattā. As already mentioned world is the fourth one (Sadasadvilakṣana) and removal of nescience being distinct or other than the world becomes the fifth one. Prior to the removal of nescience, there is unreality (illusoriness). But release being the counter positive of an ~~absence~~ of that removal of nescience must be other than illusory means real. And this release is distinct from Brahman. Because, like release, Brahman is not the Prati-yogin of Avidyāñāśa (removal of nescience). Like this

difference among souls is real. Further, to substantiate this inference, the Śruti declares that Satyam bhidā satyam-  
bhidā satyambidā.<sup>784B</sup> That means, difference is the ultimate reality. If difference in the illustration is regarded as illusory then the Advaita Brahman also becomes illusory (unreal).<sup>785</sup>

The inference that is framed by the Advaitins is not relevant. That means it will not prove Bhedamithyātva. If difference is real in the illustration (difference between moon and its reflection) then, that leads to Sādhyavaikalya-causing deficiency with regard to probandum (Mithyātva). If difference is illusory (unreal) in illustration due to absence of difference, that leads to Sādhanavaikalya- causing deficiency with regard to reason - Bhedatva. Thus the inference does not prove unreality of the world. When the reason-difference is not there, how can it prove the Mithyātva. Like an unreal serpent cannot cause any fear. So difference remains unaffected and vindicated.<sup>786</sup> Thus, illustration does not help to prove unreality of difference. And moreover difference, cited in the illustration will not be an illustration to prove unreality of difference. Because, difference between superimposed moon and unsuperimposed moon is quite real. And this real difference cannot help to prove Sādhyā viz., unreality of difference. Difference of

real moon from the unreal one is the very characteristic of that.<sup>787</sup> A real entity is competent to be existent with its nature. Neither the objects caused by the illusion of a particular entity, and nor the others are identical with this. The distinction of it from other entities is evident and unsublated. In the illustration, the moon unsuperimposed, is distinct from the moon superimposed and also other real entities like the pot and the like owing to their respective individual nature. Therefore, difference is real. When difference is real in Sapakṣa (similar instance) or illustration, then unreality of difference cannot be proved in the subject of a syllogism.<sup>788</sup> In instance, if difference of unreal moons is taken into account, then difference could not be a reason, since there cannot be difference in unreal entities. Hence, the reason cannot prove the unreality. The Dvaita view does not relate Bheda of Anyonyābhāva in respect of unreal entities.<sup>789</sup> If an entity is non-existent, then its non-existence is not at all related or is not referred to in respect of negating Tādātmya with other entities. There is no question of relating Anyonyābhāva in this respect. When it is stated that a hare's horn is non-existent then, there is no need to relate its Tādātmyābhāva (identity) with any other entities. So in these cases, the question of difference does not arise. Thus, if both the

moons are unreal like a hare's horn then the question of difference does not arise. And this leads to Sādhana-  
vaikalya.<sup>790</sup> Therefore, there cannot be difference of mutual non-existence with regard to unreal entities. One may say that this is a jar and not a cloth. Here, there is mutual non-existence (difference) between jar and cloth. If mutual non-existence (difference) is admitted in respect of non-real entities also, then it amounts to attributing reality to them. So difference of Anyonyābhāva type cannot be related with unreal entities - two unreal moons like hare's horns.<sup>791</sup>

At this point Vādirāja examines in detail the four types of Abhāvas, or non-existences- Pratiyogin, Anuyogin and the like. The discussion is so deep and observation is so close. He defends that in the presence of Bheda of Anyonyābhāva, there cannot be any other Abhāvas (negation). The three Abhāvas can be mentioned with reference to their respective counter-co-relates.

So there is no distinction among non-existent. Hence, superimposed in illustration, the difference of/moon is unreal. This leads to Sādhanavaikalya in Pakṣa. Difference is possible if there were to be two unsuperimposed moons. The reason-Bhedatvāt is not evident or Prāmāṇika in illustration and

hence causing Sādhanavaikalya (causing deficiency with regard to reason or means or proban) cannot prove unreality of difference (Sādhya) (probandum).<sup>792</sup>

Therefore, difference that is superimposed is not a difference at all as silverness in superimposed silver. Hence, difference that is not superimposed between two real entities is real one. In the illustration of the above inference, as moons are unreal or superimposed, difference cannot be thought of and related to. And if that difference is taken to be real, then that causes Sādhyavaikalya and as unreal leads to Sādhanavaikalya. Thus, inference itself, is defective.<sup>793</sup>

Now, Vādirāja deals with another inference of the Advaitins. The Advaitins may frame the inference as: Vimata ātmānah paramātmanah na bhidyante ātmatvāt paramātma-vat. The souls are not different from supreme self since having the nature of self like supreme self. This inference is most irrelevant. It is not an inference at all. If it is taken to prove Paramātmatva to soul, then mother can be proved as having wife-hood as there is the common property of femininity (Strītvā) in both of them. Therefore, the mere fact that the presence of a single common property cannot be taken to be a means to prove identity between

any two entities.<sup>794</sup> This type of inference may pose irrelevancy in arguing and treating a cow as a dog owing to the common property of Pasutva, pot as cloth since having the common property of Dravyatva and so on. So the reasons related here, are fallacious. The defect of fallacious experience is same with regard to the Hetu-Ātmavat in inference. So, that cannot prove the nature of Paramātman that is identity in the Jīva.<sup>795</sup>

In fact, the inference always seeks the support either of perception or of testimony. Independently, it cannot give rise to any conclusion. Hence, it is called Anumāna i.e. following other.<sup>796</sup> The inference, cited above by the Advaitins is not agreeable to both perception and testimony. It is contrary to the perception of personal experience: "I am not Omniscient" and also to the scriptural passages- Dvāsuparna<sup>-797</sup> and the like that are Niravakāśas.<sup>798</sup> The concept of the Advaitins' identity is not at all evident. As the Advaita admits Sarvamithyatva including of scriptures, all scriptural statements conveying identity are unreal, hence identity is also unreal. In the Dvaita view, these statements are taken as not conveying identity. So there is no identity.

Vādirāja advances perception, inference and other

evidences in favour of difference between soul and Paramātman. Inference is, Vimatau jīvaparamāù na abhinnaù viruddha-  
gunavatvāt tuhinadahanau iva. Embodied soul and Supreme Soul are not identical owing to the possession of opposing and contradictory properties as possessed by snow and fire. This inference is agreeable in all respects. The personal experience as 'I am not Omniscient' constitutes perception. And in the Vedas difference is stated repeatedly through Niravakaśa passages.<sup>799</sup> In this way, the knowledge of difference is evident and rests on defectless authorities.

The liberated souls cannot be identical with the Lord. The Bhāgavata verse- Na yatra māya<sup>799A</sup> states that there is no Māya in Vaikuntha. This statement negates the material relation and at the same time affirms the difference in release. When nescience is not there, there cannot be the impact of its effects.<sup>800</sup> The released are distinct from the Lord and from each other. Thus, the abode of the Lord is away from nescience. It consists of plurality of released souls. It is absolutely real. Difference therein, is also absolutely real.<sup>801</sup>

Vādirāja holds that not only the difference is evident but reality of difference is also evident (reality of difference). As difference is proved by the authorities, so also

is reality of difference proved. In this respect, Vādirāja gives the inference. Vimato jīvaparayoh bhedah paramārtha san avidyāstamaye satvāt yathā ātmā. Bheda of Jīva and Paramātman is absolutely real since being present even after the removal of Avidyā like Paramātman. This inference proves the reality of difference. The reason, as being present even after the removal of nescience has the support of Āgama.<sup>802</sup> The statements Na vai sa ātmatmavatāmadhiśvarah bhagavān vāsudevah...<sup>803</sup> etc., state that the Lord never gets affected by getting incarnated and the like. The Brahmacaitanya is not the same as Jīvacaitanya since not having the experience of sufferings. He cannot also be identified with matter on the ground that it too has no experience of sufferings. In the insentient, the very question of enjoyment or experience does not arise. Because, He is sentient whereas matter is insentient. The Lord, being Parama Cetana and having no experience of sufferings is distinct from soul and matter.

Vādirāja, referring to the inference of the Advaitins, advances the Anumāna to prove difference. Vimato jīvesa- bhedah paramārthasat anāditvāt brahmavat. Difference of soul and Paramātman is real since being beginningless like Paramātman. Here Anādi-Hetu is accepted by the Advaitins in enlisting the beginningless entities. So as Brahman is

Anādi and Satya, Bheda is Satya since being Anādi. Anādi means not only as that which is beginningless but its presence must be since time immemorial. Otherwise, a hare's horn which is total non-existent, would also become beginningless.<sup>804</sup> The inference cited above is defectless, since the Hetu-Anāditva is present in similar instance and subject and not in contrary instance. Thus the absolute reality of difference is evident.

#### THE SCRIPTURAL PASSAGES DECLARE THE DVAITA VIEW

The scriptural passages- Anādimāyaya <sup>804A</sup> supto yadā jīvah prabudhyate and others declare inherent and ultimate difference. It is stated that soul being caught hold by wrong knowledge has been sleeping. When he gets the Māyā destroyed that means when Māyābandha is removed by the grace of the Lord, he will attain release. Thus, identity is not at all traced. Distinction between the Lord and soul is clear.<sup>805</sup> Here Jīva is the knower and the Lord is the known. So there cannot be any identity between the knower and the known.<sup>806</sup>

In the passage Advaitam paramārthatataḥ,<sup>806A</sup> the term 'Advaitam' negates the inner distinction within Brahman. It also promises that there is no any other entity which is either superior or equal to Brahman.<sup>807</sup> Thus these

scriptural passages will not help the Advaitin to prove the doctrine of identity between soul and Brahman. So without any alternative he has to accept difference as real.

In some places,<sup>808</sup> the Lord is glorified as Nityamukta (eternally liberated), Jīva is described as bound. As Nityamuktatva and Baddhatva are opposite to each other, there cannot be any identity between eternally liberated Brahman and bound soul. The state of release in the case of soul, indicates the Sārūpya (similar form) in release. The liberated soul will have the similar explicit form as that of the God.<sup>809</sup>

Vādirāja asks- "Is this identity true or false?" If this identity is not true, then difference is true. If identity is true then second question follows: "Is this attribute distinct or not?" If the very attribute identity is distinct, then the Advaita is given up. If it is not distinct then, it cannot be an attribute of Brahman, since Brahman, in the Advaita, is attributeless.<sup>810</sup> The Advaita cannot talk of identity between attribute and attributed because, the fact of being attributelessness is the only aspect in the Advaita. Therefore, neither identity can be treated as attribute nor can it be identified with Brahman.

Even in the Advaita, Brahman and souls, due to

possessing opposite attributes cannot be declared as identical. And with Laksana, setting aside opposite attributes if identity is going to be traced then, that is not at all the identity of soul and Brahman.<sup>811</sup>

But in the Dvaita view, there is no difficulty. Because, the identity between attribute and attributed is accepted. Attributes such as Omniscience, Omnipotence and attributed Brahman are not distinct. They are identical. The concept of Viśesa helps for different dealing. It is the power and also the very nature of Brahman with the help of which distinction is hinted at for dealing without difference in reality or essence. The expressions such as bliss of Brahman, knowledge of Brahman and others do not convey the sense of difference, since they are the very nature of Brahman.<sup>812</sup>

#### AIKYA ŚRUTIS ALSO DO NOT SUPPORT THE ADVAITA

The scriptural passages, that are considered as Aikya srutis or 'identity-passages' by the Advaitins, and which are regarded as Tatvavedaka or truth-imparting by them, also do not convey their identity and unreality. The passage Ekamevādvitiyam,<sup>813</sup> Neha nānāsti<sup>814</sup> and others are interpreted by the Advaitins to prove the illusory nature of the world. But really speaking, all these passages neither

prove the illusory nature of the world nor negate the difference between Brahman and the world consisting of sentient souls and insentient matter. The Advaitins hold that these passages declare Brahman as Abādhyā or unsublated and world Bādhyā or sublated. This interpretation does not prove the identity but on the other hand proves the difference between Brahman and the world, since difference is evident between sublated, and unsublated.<sup>815</sup> Even if the world is taken to mean sublated, its reality cannot be eliminated, because, as nature of attributed (of Brahman) its difference is real. If the world is taken as identical with Brahman, then also the world would be real. Thus, neither identity nor unreality can be proved with the help of these statements. The above interpretation of the Advaita ultimately insists on either to accept both Brahman and the world as real or both as unreal. In the same way the passage Tat tvam=asi<sup>815A</sup> does not state the identity between Brahman and the soul. The term Advitiyam in Ekamevādvitiyam does not negate the second other than the Brahman. But it certainly proves that Brahman is different from the second, that is world. Here, neither the non-reality of the second viz., the world is stated nor the identity is stressed. It is like the expression Anaśva. Anaśva, though something other than Aśva, or horse, does not negate the existence of others. In the same way the term 'Advitiya' also does not

deny the presence of the second viz., the world.<sup>816</sup>

And moreover, the term 'Advitiya' is stated in the context of Pralaya world-dissolution. So it also means the Pragabhāva and Pradhvamsābhāva or the prior and posterior non-existence of the world. And that entity to which the prior and posterior non-existence are connected, cannot be subject to Atyantābhāva, total non-existence. And further this 'Advitiya' term does not refer to or indicate the illusory nature of the world.<sup>817</sup> Though the concept unreality of the Advaita, conveys the sense of absence in the past, present and future, the expression Advitiya in the context of Pralaya cannot be understood in that sense. The term 'Advitiya', with reference to the annihilation, suggests that the created world would be absent only during annihilation. It is evident that it was present before annihilation and will be present after annihilation. In addition to Brahman, Time is also present during annihilation. And it is indicated by the term 'Agre'.<sup>818</sup> So with reference to the annihilation, presence of Brahman alone cannot be asserted but also of the world. That means, the world, in the term of primaval matter (Mūlaprakṛti) is present even during dissolution.<sup>818A</sup>

The passage Neha nānāsti kincana does not prove either

identity of the soul and Brahman or does not negate the presence of something other than Brahman. It denies the difference in Brahman and His attributes, between original form and incarnations and so on.<sup>819</sup> The same view is being asserted by the passage Yadeveha tadamutra.<sup>820</sup> The passages Neha nānāsti kincana<sup>821</sup> and Īśāno bhūtabhavyasya<sup>822</sup> are beginning and concluding statements respectively. In both neither identity nor unreality is declared,<sup>823</sup> but identity of Brahman and His attributes, supremacy of Brahman and reality of the world are promised. Vādirāja interprets the passage Neha nānāsti... and says that the Lord is the Ādhara (supporter) for all.<sup>824</sup> The relation of supported and supporter is evident.

#### THE PASSAGES BRAHMĀHAMSMI AND OTHERS ALSO SUPPORT BHEDA

Vādirāja quoted not only statements that openly declare Bheda, but also those that have been misinterpreted by the Advaitins.

The Advaitins' contend that the passage Brahmā ahamasmi  
<sup>825</sup> states the identity. But it does not. The term 'Brahma' which is in the nominative case, can also be understood in locative sense. Then the expression becomes as Brahmāni ahamasmi that means "I am solely dependent upon Brahman." Vādirāja states that it can also be interpreted

as 'I am controlled by Brahman.'<sup>826</sup> Thus, there is no scope for identity. And moreover, to explain such statements one has to take into consideration the context also. The above passage occurs in the Aghamarsana hymn. Here a qualified soul is offering prayer to God Varuna. The relation of the worshipped and the worshipper is clearly visible. Hence, the soul cannot be declared as identical with God. Vādirāja asks the Advaitin as to whether he intends to declare himself as identical with Jyoti or flame since in the same context there is the statement as Paramjyotih. The Advaitin cannot get himself identified with the Jyoti. So the context is more important. Further, Brahma aham asmi cannot be interpreted as soul is identical with Brahman. Because in the Advaita 'Aham' does not stand for Jīva Caitanya as it is Avācya.<sup>827</sup> So 'Aham' stands for Antahkarana which is insentient. Now the identity can be traced provided this insentient Antahkarana is real. But it is not real as it is a product of nescience. Therefore, Brahman cannot be identified with this insentient matter.<sup>828</sup> Thus, the above statement does not help to identify Brahman with soul. The above passage Brahma aham asmi is nothing but a repetition of the Brhadāraṇyaka passage viz., Aham Brahma asmi.<sup>829</sup> since all the scriptural passages (including this) are the declarations of Brahman Himself at the time of world-creation. He cannot intend Himself to get identified with

someone else. So here also, the sense of identity cannot be understood.

The passage Sarvam khalvidam brahma<sup>830</sup> does not state the identity between Brahman and matter. Because, Brahman is sentient. He cannot be identified with matter which is insentient. Further, it does not state the identity between Brahman and Soul, since both possess opposite attributes. Brahman is Omniscient whereas soul is knowing little. Therefore, there cannot be identity between the two.

Vādirāja promises that the term Sarvam in the passage above conveys the all-pervasiveness of Brahman. His all-pervasiveness is declared here. He, who is all-pervasive and sentient, cannot be identical either with soul of Ekadeśavyāpi or with matter which is insentient. If the sense of identity is understood then, that would become contradictory to the beginning statement of that context Tajjalān iti santassan upasita.<sup>832</sup> In the beginning statement, the relation of worshipped and worshipper is clearly mentioned. And always it is fact that worshipped is distinct from worshipper. The worshipped is not only distinct but also superior to worshipper. Then only the relation of Upasya-Upasaka has some meaning. This not only promises the distinction but also the gradation. Therefore, the passage Sarvam khalu cannot be interpreted as against this beginning statement.

So the sense of identity should not be understood here as the Advaitins unfortunately do. The passage is to be understood as 'Brahman is all-pervasive', 'Everything is dependent upon Brahman' and so on. It also means that the entire world is controlled by Brahman. So there is no question of the identity and unreality. And further it does not hold good if Sarvam is meant as Sarva brahmadiśṭhāna, since it is not the intended meaning in this context.<sup>833</sup>

#### INTERPRETATION OF EKAVIṄNĀNENA SARVA VIṄNĀNA

The Śruti- Uta tamadeśam...<sup>834</sup> does not help the Advaitin to prove his conception of identity.<sup>835</sup> The meaning of the statement seems to be that by gaining the knowledge of one, everything becomes known. According to the Advaita, Brahmajñāna is Nisprakāraka (absolute-without distinction). That means it is Cinmātrajñāna or knowledge of sentiency. It is the knowledge of Brahman devoid of all attributes and it is only an element of consciousness. But this knowledge which conveys nothing, cannot help to know the knowledge of all other entities. The knowledge of other entities is possible only when there is some relation with that. But Vadiraja argues that as Brahman is attributeless, the knowledge of It is also not concrete and definite. So it does not help to gain the knowledge of all other entities.<sup>836</sup>

And moreover, in the Advaita, Brahman is Adhisthana or substratum and the world is Aropita or superimposed. The superimposed one cannot be known by the knowledge of the substratum. The substratum Brahman is real and it cannot give the knowledge of the superimposed world. In fact the knowledge of Brahman sublates the knowledge of the superimposed snake. In the Advaita, the superimposed one is non-real. And if it is held that the knowledge of Brahman helps to gain the knowledge of the non-reality of all other entities, then it amounts to saying that the gained knowledge is the knowledge of the absence of all other entities. This type of knowledge cannot be considered as knowledge. Such negative knowledge may be termed as Abhāvajñāna of all other entities and not the knowledge of all other entities. So the interpretation of the Advaitins of the passage Eka vijñānena sarva vijñāna stands baseless.

The correct interpretation of the passage is that as there is similarity in respect of reality and the like, between Brahman and the world of souls and matter, the knowledge of Brahman helps to gain the correct knowledge of the world.<sup>837</sup> Here this interpretation of similarity neither proves the identity with Brahman nor the unreality of the world. As the Lord is Supreme, All-pervasive and so on, His knowledge is enough to realize the entire reality.

The knowledge of Brahman gives rise to the correct knowledge of the world as the world is created by Him. This is also explained in all Itihāsas, Purāṇas and other authoritative texts.

The Viśvarūpa darśana episode of the Gītā and the universe being shown to Yaśodā by Lord Kṛṣṇa substantiate the above view. Akūra also makes it clear in the Bhāgavata, that all the wonders of the world are the wonders of the Lord.<sup>838</sup> Therefore, to know Brahman, is to know the entire world. Further, he, who knows Brahman well, is blessed by Brahman. It is the grace of the Lord that makes us have the knowledge of the whole world. So it is all-knowledge. As Brahman is Omniscient, Supreme doer, Supreme being and so on, and as entire world is created by Him, His knowledge indeed promises the knowledge of entire world.<sup>839</sup>

So the passage does not mean that as there is nothing other than Brahman, the knowledge of it leads to the knowledge of non-reality of all others. The correct import of the passage is given by Vādirāja as above. Vādirāja ensures that as the knowledge of Brahman is vast and the knowledge of the world is limited, the knowledge of Brahman makes easy to have the knowledge of all other entities.

INTERPRETATION OF TAT TVAM ASI AND REFERENCE OF ŚRUTI-  
GĪTĀ AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS  
IN SUPPORT OF THAT

The scriptural passage which is widely quoted as the most stable evidence for stating the identity as understood by Advaitins is the passage- Tattvamasi.<sup>840</sup> Vādirāja opines that it does not help the Advaitins to prove the identity between the embodied soul and Brahman. The real import of the passage is that soul is similar to Brahman in some respects in a limited way.<sup>841</sup> That does not promise complete identity between the two as made much of by the Advaitins.

Vādirāja asserts that this type of expressions are common but nowhere the sense of identity as understood by the Advaitins is conveyed. The expressions like 'He is a tiger' and 'The boy is fire' do not convey the sense of identity. But, it is the similarity with regard to some common properties that is intended here to be conveyed. Similarly, in the case of Tat tvam asi also, the sense of similarity in some respects is to be taken into account. The context in which the statement is taught clearly indicates the difference and not the identity.<sup>842</sup> The preceding statement also does not talk of identity. The Śruti- Sata somya tada sampanno bhavati<sup>843</sup> states that there is no identity between the soul and Brahman but it is the soul who has close proximity with Brahman at heart

during deep-sleep state. During waking state and dream state the soul abides in the eye and the neck respectively.<sup>843A</sup> So the passage Tat tvam asi that falls in the same context, cannot be understood in favour of identity of the Advaitins.

Another passage of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad viz., Prajñenātmanā samparisvaktah<sup>844</sup> also corroborates the view of the above Śruti that the soul has close proximity with Brahman during deep sleep. Here also the identity is not expressed.<sup>845</sup> The Sūtra- Susuptyutkṛantyorbhedena (I.iii.42) also proves that there is difference during deep sleep and Utkṛanti.<sup>846</sup> If difference is not accepted then there should not be any difference between deep sleep and release.

The expressions or terms 'Manas' and 'Prāna',<sup>847</sup> that are used in this context, denote soul and Brahman respectively.<sup>848</sup> And it is also explained that one is regulated by the other. That means soul is regulated by Brahman. The relation of regulated and regulator shows that there is difference between the two. He, who is regulated seeks the shelter of the other.

In the passage of 'Tattvamasi' itself, nine illustrations are given to substantiate the reality and the relation between 'Tat' and 'Tvam'. And all these nine

illustrations clearly state that in this context difference of soul and Brahman is intended. The illustration of salt and water ascertains the difference. When salt is put in the water, no doubt it melts and becomes invisible, but it does not become identical with water. Likewise when rivers flow and join the sea it does not become identical with them. The river-waters do retain their separateness and individuality. The human capacity is limited and as such not enough to distinguish the river-waters from the sea. But that does not rule out the fact of their existing separately. It is only the confluence and not the identity. In the same way when bees collect the flower juice from different flowers and when they form into honey that does not mean that juices of different flowers have attained identity. Their separateness remains unharmed. The close examination makes it clear that they have the variegated tastes. Thus all the nine illustrations of that context prove difference and not the identity.<sup>849</sup>

Vādirāja critically views the context wherein the passage occurs. When Śvetaketu, son of Uddalaka, developed arrogance thinking himself to be highly learned, then this was realized by his father and the father wanted to remove the arrogance of the son. And with that intention he taught this truth. The father wanted to convince the son

that the knowledge is vast and mere recitation of the Vedic hymns would serve no purpose and hence one had to understand the real import of the Vedas. So, his intention was not to convey the identity but the difference. Then only he could make his son give up his arrogance. If the sense of identity was intended then there was no scope to reduce the arrogance, of Śvetaketu. Thus, the context also affirms that the passage declares the difference and not the identity.<sup>850</sup> The Advaita prefers to have implied meaning with regard to two terms Tat and Tvam. That means the primary meaning of the terms should be given up. As these two terms indicate the opposite attributes, the Advaita prefers secondary meaning to primary meaning. Because, unless and until the sense of opposite attributes is given up, it is not possible to talk of identity. But Vādirāja says that resorting of Laksanā or indication could be enough for one word- Tat as it shows an element of Laghutva or easiness in interpretation. There is no need to adopt implication for two words- Tat and Tvam. Now the word Tat can be understood as Tatsadrśa or (similar to that) Tatsambandhi (or related to that). This would be the most befitting meaning to the context. So implication may be applied to only one word and not to both the words.<sup>851</sup>

Further, the term 'Tat' may also be understood as

Tasmāt. In that case, the meaning of the expression would be 'Thine very existence is from Him!' The sense of Akhandarthatva also is not tenable and agreeable to the context. Because, it makes the entire discussion and exposition baseless and futile. Vādirāja refers to the statements of the Bhāgavata such as Śrutiśitā<sup>852</sup> and others and proves that even the Bhāgavata does not declare identity between Brahman and the world. He asserts that even Viṣṇusahasra-nāma indicates difference.

Bhedo mithyā bheda tvat̄ candraḥedavat. The inference advanced by the Advaitins has no support of either perception or of testimony. Hence, the very inference is likely to be disproved by counter inferences. Jīveśvarabhedah pāramārthika san mahāpralayepi urvaya tatvāt brahmavat. The very attempt of resorting to indication is unnecessary. Because, in that case, Brahman, giving away all His auspicious virtues, would have to be declared as only consisting of sentiency. Even this also does not help to prove the supposed identity. And moreover, perception also openly proclaims the difference.<sup>853</sup> Thus, identity cannot be established.

Vādirāja, by the by, attacks the epistemology of the Advaita and remarks that according to them the Pramāṇas are

not real as they are the product of nescience. As nescience is unreal, its effects must also be unreal. Therefore, these Pramanas or means cannot establish the identity. While resorting to Lakṣaṇā in Tat-tvamasi the Advaitins cite the example So'yam devadattah. But actually, neither the meaning of Sah nor of Ayam is given up.<sup>854</sup> So this example does not confirm their arguments. Because, in the example cited above, Sah stands for and denotes time and the place of the past and Ayam stands for and denotes the time and place of the present.

Further, Vādirāja opines that Viśistaikya cannot be traced here. And that will not indicate Viśesanaikya necessarily. Because, in the example Dandī devadattah and Kundalī devadattah, Devadatta is one and the same but not Danda and Kundala. So Viśesanaikya cannot be held.<sup>855</sup>

Now if the aspect of sentiency alone is to be meant with regard to the terms 'Tat' and 'Tvam', then the very usage of expression would be meaningless. Not only that, the expressions, then by no means convey the sense of identity. And if sentiency alone would be there, then also, the question viz., as to the identity of what remains unsolved.<sup>856</sup> Therefore, as already mentioned the sense of similarity in certain respects between Brahman and the soul

is intended here. This passage also relates the relation of reflective and reflection. Brahman is reflective and soul is reflection. This relation promises certain similarity and also the control of reflective over reflection.<sup>856A</sup> Thus, the passage Tat tvam asi does not ascertain the identity.

In defence of this, Vādirāja mentions the episodes of Paundraka Vāsudeva and of Mūcukunda and shows how the knowledge of identity brought about self-destruction and the sense of difference led to upliftment<sup>857</sup> respectively. He also discusses the Gītā statement Iśvarohamhambhogi...<sup>858</sup> and defends that knowledge of identity will not help to attain the liberation.

#### THE ŚRUTI DVĀSUPARNA... SUPPORTS BHEDA

The passage Dvāsuparna sayujā sakhyau...<sup>859</sup> does not mention identity whereas it clearly states the difference. Here both soul and Brahman are described as two birds abiding in the same tree in the form of physical body. Jīva is described as one who eats the karmaphala whereas Brahman does not. The very fact of eating and non-eating clearly shows the distinction.<sup>860</sup> There even the Advaita interpretation mentions the two birds as soul and Brahman. Vādirāja opines that the mention of two birds as soul and

Brahman in the Advaita commentary, ascertains the difference and not the identity.<sup>861</sup>

The Advaitins interpret the passage with the help of the Adhyāhāra of two words as Pāramārthika and Vyāvahārika. They explain that, in the empirical state, one and the same Brahman eats the fruits of his deeds and in the real state, one and the same Brahman does not eat the fruits of deeds. Thus, the two states as eating and non-eating are taken into account. The opposite nature of these two is discarded by resorting to Adhyāhāra of above words. Hence, both enjoying and non-enjoying of fruit of deeds seem to be possible with regard to one and the same Brahman. In this way, apparent difference as two is simply empirical and hence is not absolutely real. Whereas, the sense as one and the same, which is Pāramārthika is real. The Advaitins hold that difference implied here is only empirical.

This interpretation as well as the contention of the Advaitins is not correct. Because, here Adhyāhāra is not necessary. Generally, Adhyāhāra is resorted to when the particular passage cannot be interpreted in a cogent manner.<sup>863</sup> Further, there is no ground or any reason to state eating of fruit of deeds is only empirical. Because, the passage Sośnute sarvān kāmān saha...<sup>864</sup> declares that

the enjoyment is also there in liberation. And this enjoyment or eating cannot be considered as empirical. It must be Paramārthika.<sup>865</sup> So the enjoyment and the non-enjoyment are both absolutely real. And this proves the real difference between the two. When there is difference between liberated soul and Brahman, there is no need to stress difference in respect of the unliberated or bound souls.

Further, if there was no real difference, then, there would not have been in the passage the mention of 'two' by using the dual number as Dvā suparna. Because two attributes of one and the same thing do not make it to be consisting of two. A jar, possessing colour and form, cannot be considered as two jars. And also a wife, having courage and beauty, cannot be mentioned as two.<sup>866</sup> In the same way, enjoyment and its absence do not make one and the same as two but convey only two distinct entities. Because of the two attributes one and the same object is not mentioned in dual number. The Bhagavata verse Vidyāmaya nitya mukto... clearly establishes the distinction between soul and Brahman.<sup>867</sup>

Vādirāja holds that, the inference as Vimataḥ bhedah paramārthasat... proves the difference. It states that difference is evident as reference is made of the souls,

liberated afterwards. And moreover, the illustration also corroborates the proposition that difference is absolutely real like the bliss of liberation.<sup>868</sup> In the passage Dvā suparnā difference is hinted at on so many grounds. The use of dual number, reference of enjoyment and non-enjoyment and also the usage Anya promise only the distinction beyond doubt.<sup>869</sup> The expressions sakhayau and Sayujau assert that the distinction, hinted at here in the passage, is in respect of nature and not in respect of place and thought that is unity of place and unity of thought. As the passage also deals with the enjoyment of liberation of the liberated souls, it is sure that the difference in nature is taken into account.<sup>870</sup> Brahman is described here as brilliant. It shows that He is superior and master, another soul is inferior and servant.

The term 'Sayujau' in the passage implies the Sāyujya type of liberation and not the identity. The Sāyujya type of liberation indicates soul's presence in close proximity with Brahman always and not the identity between the two. So there is nothing in this passage that could suggest that the difference between soul and Brahman is simply empirical. The view of the Advaita that Vyāvahārika Bheda referred to elsewhere, is quoted here is also not tenable since according to the Advaita absolute difference is nowhere declared in the entire scripture.<sup>871</sup>

Brahman, being Omniscient, Omnipresent, Omnipotent and so on, need not undergo any hardships for his enjoyment. The question of gaining of fresh enjoyment does not arise in His case. He is eternally contented. His activity is for others' sake who are under his control and supervision.<sup>872</sup> Vādirāja cites the example of how God distributed the nectar and poison obtained in the churning of milky ocean. Neither he tasted the nectar nor he rejected the poison. This shows that he has nothing to gain or lose with efforts. He dwells in all as the inner controller and without experiencing any fruit of actions. Since, He controls, He is the Impeller and as the soul is the controlled, he is impelled.<sup>873</sup> Thus, this passage also indicates the relation of impelled and impellor. The very fact is being discussed and narrated with illustrations in the Bhāgavata, in Gītā and in other works.<sup>874</sup> It is explained there that soul eats the fruit of deeds according to his own deeds. Whereas God being unaffected, simply witnesses and controls the soul. The sufferings and others, seen in soul, are not seen in God. Therefore, soul and Brahman are distinct to each other.<sup>875</sup> Thus the very expression of the passage denotes one or other unique attributes of both of them and establishes difference as its primary import.

BHEDA IS NOT VYĀVĀHĀRIKA OR EMPIRICAL<sup>876</sup>

The Advaitins hold that difference is empirical and not fail to absolutely real. But at the same time they/explain this empirical difference convincingly. They cannot say that it is sublated by the cognition of Brahman. And it is evident that it is not sublated by any other knowledge. It shows that the very usage emperical is baseless. Further, difference is not sublated by this cognition of Brahman. But, it is the Brahmaikya that gets sublated. The experience or knowledge as 'I am not Omniscient,' 'I am not the overlord of all' is evident. This experience is the perception. And the knowledge of this perception controverts the idea of the identity fancied by the Advaitins.

According to the Advaita, the experience or knowledge that is sublated by the empirical experience, is called real in appearance. If that is true their Brahmaikya since being sublated as explained above by the experience of empirical perception would become real in appearance.<sup>877</sup> E.g. the experience of the snake gets sublated by the experience of the rope. Here the experience of the snake is illusory whereas the experience of rope is empirical according to the Advaitins. According to this, in the Advaita, perception of difference is empirical. And as knowledge of identity gets sublated by this perception of

empirical difference that would become Prātibhāsika. So the Advaitins cannot treat difference between soul and Brahman as empirical. Vādirāja says that the efforts of the Advaitins is like a person running out of fear of the scorpion but rushing into the hole of venomous snakes.<sup>878</sup>

The contention of the Advaitins is that the passages like Dvā suparna... and others that declare Jīveśvarabheda which is only Vyāvahārika, become Atatvāvedaka or conveying false information. But Vādirāja opines that a true follower of the scriptures will not accept this view. Because, really speaking, it is as good as disregarding the scripture as the Buddhists do. A true and rigid follower of the scriptures will rather try his best to prove both difference and identity conveying passages, as Tatvāvedaka. That means all scriptural passages convey valid information when interpreted properly.<sup>879</sup>

In the Advaita, as cognition of Brahman is Nirvikalpaka (without distinction), it can neither establish something nor can it sublate anything.<sup>880</sup> It can also not sublate the difference. Hence, difference is real.<sup>881</sup> Vādirāja asks: "What is this sublation of difference?" If it is taken to mean Bhedanāśa, then it is not a sualation at all. Because, when something is destroyed nobody says that it is

the sublation of that. Destruction of a jar is not the sublation of that jar. So the sublation of difference is not Bhedānāśa. The Advaitins also hold that the ignorance that causes illusion is going to be removed by the sublating knowledge. The ignorance that causes the illusory experience of the snake, will be removed by subsequent sublating knowledge of the rope. But in the case of difference it is not at all caused by any ignorance. As difference is beginningless in time, it will never get sublated.<sup>882</sup>

The Advaitins contend that the empiricability is nothing but Arthakriyākāritva (effectiveness causing some activity). But it is not correct. Because, as already pointed out that the Vyāvahārikatva is not a reality according to them. Hence its Arthakriyākāritva does not arise. Otherwise the hare's horn will have to be treated as Pāramārthika (absolutely real) as it is not Arthakriyākāri, a view that is absurd.<sup>883</sup> Vādirāja taunts at Advaitins that their Brahman should be treated as Vyāvahārika since being Arthakriyākāri in the form of being Upādāna, Nimitta and Bhramādiṣṭhāna. And It would not become Pāramārthika. So Vyāvahārikatva cannot be defined as Arthakriyākāritva. Vādirāja also opines that whatever is Prātibhāsika in the Advaita will become Vyāvahārika if the above definition of Vyāvahārikatva

is taken into account. The illusory knowledge, related to the substratum (Adhisthāna), is Prātibhāsika. And this Prātibhāsika, since being Arthakriyākāri, as shown above, can also be considered as Vyāvahārika. As the experience of the snake superimposed on the rope causes fear and the like, it should be treated as Vyāvahārika because it is Arthakriyākāri. But in reality, no one admits this view. Generally when an experience leads to fulfilment of some purpose then it is treated as valid experience and if it does not lead to any fulfilment then that experience is considered to be invalid. In the above case, defining Vyāvahārikatva as Arthakriyākāritva and considering Vyāvahārikatva, that will not real or invalid, has made the very discussion invalid. Even if Vyāvahārikatva is defined as Avidyākāryatva, that will not fulfil the intention of the Advaitins in establishing identity.<sup>884</sup> Further, this difference of soul and God is considered as one of the six Anādis by the Advaitins.<sup>885</sup> When it is Anādi or beginning-less it cannot be Avidyākārya or the effect of nescience. And as it is not the product of nescience it cannot be empirical. Thus, the very definition of the Advaitins proves that the difference is not empirical. When it is not empirical, it must be absolutely real.<sup>886</sup>

Vādirāja quotes some other passages that support and

declare difference. The passages Brahmañā saha..., Param-  
 887 jyotih... clearly state the distinction of the soul from  
 Brahman. The former passage states that there is distinc-  
 tion between the soul and Brahman in the liberated state.  
 The term saha indicates this. And the second mentions  
 that soul attains only proximity with Brahman and not  
 identity with Him.<sup>888</sup> Thus, difference of soul from  
 Brahman is absolutely real. The Brahmasūtras, cited already<sup>889</sup>  
 also declare difference and not the identity.

#### ANUVĀDYATVA AFFECTS AIKYA AND NOT BHEDA

The Advaitins hold that Bheda śruti-s are 'lower' and  
Abheda śruti-s are 'higher.' Here 'Apara' means they occur  
first and para means 'they occur later.' The view of the  
Advaita is as follows:- Bheda śruti-s may be useful at the  
beginning and lower stage whereas Abheda śruti-s are useful  
at the ultimate and higher stage. So Abheda śruti-s are  
preferred to Bheda śruti-s. But, this view is not correct.<sup>890</sup>  
The very classification of passages as higher and lower  
is not correct because all of them are impersonal. When  
one admits scriptures as impersonal, this classification  
does not hold good.

If it is held that Para śruti-s invalidate the Apara  
ones because Para śruti-s occur later, then on this ground

as Smṛtis occur later than even these Para śruti passages, will invalidate the 'higher' scriptures.<sup>891</sup> The world that emerges later may also invalidate Brahman. The contention that Nisedha or negation is superior to Vidhi or injunction is also not correct. Because, in sacrifice, negation of violence is set aside and violated. In sacrifices Paśuhimsā is preferred by the Mīmāṃsakas. Therefore, such classification of scriptural passages will not help the Advaita in any manner. On the basis of conveying the import, the scripture may be grouped as Sāvakaśa and Niravakaśa.<sup>892</sup> The close observation and study proves that Bheda Śrutis are Niravakaśas and Abheda Śrutis are Sāvakaśas.<sup>893</sup> So this makes it clear that Sāvakaśa Śrutis (Abheda Śrutis) are to be explained in accordance with Niravakaśa Śrutis (Bheda Śrutis).

The Advaitins also opine that Bheda Śrutis are only Anuvādakas (repetitions) because, they convey the sense which is already Pratyaksasiddha (established by perception). As they are Anuvādakas,<sup>894</sup> there is left nothing to prove. Whereas Abheda Śrutis are not Anuvādakas as they declare the Advaita for the first time. This view is also not correct. Vādirāja asserts that this type of argument may also be advanced against the Advaitins. Brahman is Svaprakāśa or self-luminous and a known entity in the Advaita.

And this Brahman is mentioned in the scriptural passages. Hence, the Advaita Śrutis are Anuvādakas.<sup>895</sup> Thus, the argument proves Śrutis as Anuvādakas. If Bheda Śrutis are alone considered as Anuvādakas, then is it grouped and mentioned without any purpose or is it for refutation?<sup>896</sup> In the first case, there is purpose and this purpose is to adduce the Bheda Śrutis as stock Pramanas. Because Bheda Śrutis have the support of Pratyakṣa and Śruti. What is evident by perception is upheld by scriptures. Thus the support of the two creates more confidence in the proposition.<sup>897</sup> In the second alternative, difference cannot be shown as stained with defect and hence cannot be refuted. The mere fact that difference being opposite of identity, cannot be a defect. If the mere opposition of identity is held as defect, then that will lead to Anyonyāśraya dosa. Till the validity of Abheda Śrutis is proved, Abheda Śrutis will not be able to invalidate the Bheda Śrutis. And until the invalidity of the Bheda Śrutis is established, the validity of Abheda Śrutis is not final.<sup>898</sup> As both are scriptures, it is not possible to attribute invalidity to any group. If at all there is a need to attribute, it must be to all the scriptures. Otherwise, the very view becomes opposite of perception and may lead to either the defect of mutual dependence or some other.<sup>899</sup>

As already mentioned that if a fact is supported by two Pramanas, then it becomes more stronger. In Bheda Śrutis, as difference is Pratyaksasiddha, its Anuvāda in the Śruti will strengthen it (difference), then Abheda Śrutis, since lacking such strong support will have to be explained in accordance with Bheda Śrutis. Generally testimony will not come in the way of perception. If at all there is sublation in perception, then only implication is preferred to. But nowhere perception is given up for the sake of testimony. Intuitive perception supports the difference and this difference is rightly upheld by the Bheda Śrutis.<sup>900</sup> So the Advaitins resorting to implication with regard to Bheda Śrutis, is unnecessary. To support Advaita, there is no fun in resorting to implication. Perception is valid in the case of those that are liable for perception and testimony (Āgama) is valid in respect of those that are beyond senses. That does not mean that perception is invalid.<sup>901</sup>

The distinction of soul and Brahman is evident as it is established by perception. And the same is explained in the scriptures. Even if it is considered as repetition, that definitely strengthens the difference doctrine. Anuvāda Sometimes/in the form of mere duplication and repetition becomes invalid and weak but here it is a plus point that

strengthens the very difference. Thus, Anuvāda necessarily does not affect the validity in any way. The significance of validity could be realized by Yāthārthya. Whatever is not Yāthārtha, validity of that knowledge cannot be gained. Otherwise, on the basis of Anuvāda as explained by the Advaitins, Smṛtis are to be considered as Anuvādas since they convey the fact which is already stated in scriptures.<sup>902</sup> Vādirāja refers to the Bhagavata<sup>903</sup> verse and says that Anuvāda is praised there.<sup>904</sup> Anuvāda is of two kinds. Sometimes it is for affirmation of something already established, and sometimes it is for refutation. In respect of difference, Anuvāda is for affirmation of difference already established by perception. If all Anuvādakas are held invalid, then all the Advaita Śrutiś that are Anuvādakas to each other, cut the validity of each other like the two demons Sunda and Upasunda.<sup>905</sup> And in Anuvādas that are meant for refutation, there must be Dūṣya and Dūṣaka in one sentence or in one context. On the basis of Anuvāda, passages of one context cannot refute the Śruti passage of another context.<sup>906</sup> Therefore, the passages as they do not contradict with others, are defectless.<sup>907</sup> And there is also not a single Śruti in the form of Anuvāda.<sup>908</sup>

The view of the Advaitins that Bheda is stated and prescribed for the sake of worship, is not correct.

Because for worship or adoration, object must be real and its worship-worthiness must be known. Otherwise there may be confusion, because, it is not correct to meditate on three-eyed god Siva as thousand-eyed Indra. Each God is distinct in nature and position. So two gods as objects of meditation, cannot be put together.<sup>909</sup> Sṛuti clarifies this and never misleads the worshipper.

#### OBJECT OF MEDITATION IS NOT MITHYĀ

The object of meditation cannot be a unreal. Because in that case, meditation would be meaningless. The scriptural passage Nedam yadidam upāsate<sup>910</sup> does not negate the real object of meditation. But it stresses on the real object and also on the difference between soul and Brahman.<sup>911</sup> It is common to see that people meditate upon god Garuda for the removal of the poison and god Vighneśvara for the removal of obstacles.<sup>912</sup> The scripture never misleads with regard to meditation. And this meditation would be fruitful provided there is real difference between the object of meditation and the person meditating. The Brahmasūtra-Na pratīke na hi sah<sup>913</sup> (IV.i.4) makes it clear that Pratīka itself is not God. From this it is evident that the true position of the object is taken into account for meditation.<sup>914</sup> Certainly, an unreal cannot help to realize the real.

Further, the difference between worshipped and worshipper is seen not only in Samsāra but continues even after liberation. The four types of liberation<sup>915</sup> do not rule out the relation of worshipped and worshipper and do not result in any identity.<sup>916</sup>

As already pointed out above, the passage, Nedam yadidam upasate does not convey the sense of identity. It informs that the mental image of God fabricated for meditation before direct vision or knowledge is not God Himself.<sup>917</sup> This meditation on that mental image, helps us to have the vision of the God in the long run at the Aparokṣa state. The mental image is the mental image. Though it is distinct from God, it is not unreal.<sup>918</sup> Because, it is this through which one will have the direct vision of the God.<sup>919</sup> Vādirāja gives another interpretation of this passage as soul, who is known by Sākṣin is not Brahman. Here Idam stands for soul. Thus, both the interpretations establish the difference.<sup>920</sup> As scripture informs about relation of worshipped and worshipper, it can never establish identity. And moreover, it also proves the reality of the object of meditation. If the object of meditation is not real, then the process of Śravana, Manana and Dhyāna would be futile. Hence, the object of meditation must be real and distinct from meditator.<sup>920A</sup>

The passage Yada paśyah paśyate rukmavarnam<sup>921</sup> promises the distinction of worshipped and worshipper. The distinct attributes of worshipped God such as Rukmavarnam, Kartāram, Īśam and others affirm that worshipped God is not merely distinct but is superior to the meditating soul. He is the Supreme Lord, Independent Creator and so on. Samyam upaiti does not convey identity but asserts that the liberated soul lives in close proximity with the God.<sup>922</sup>

#### BHEDA IS TENABLE IN ALL RESPECTS

The Advaitins question as to whether the difference is distinct, identical or distinct-cum-identical from the entity. Vādirāja replies that this approach or criticism can be set aside very easily. He opines that the reply, given in the case Vyāvahārika Bheda,<sup>923</sup> can be given here also even if difference is taken as absolutely real.<sup>924</sup>

The passage Neti neti...<sup>925</sup> declares that Brahman is different from both the soul and matter. The use of two negative particles ensures the difference from both soul and matter. In the Advaita, as there is nothing to be negated, the interpretation of 'Na' would be baseless. That means, the Advaitins cannot interpret the use of 'Na' twice in the passage.<sup>926</sup> The passage Anyam īśai...<sup>927</sup> makes it clear that Brahman is not only different from this

world of the souls and matter but He is also the Overlord of all. It also states that the soul will be relieved of his sufferings of Samsāra, when he realizes the difference between himself and Brahman, the supremacy of the Lord and great auspicious nature of God.<sup>927A</sup> The ideas of Abheda, Sāmya and Nirgunatva do not help the soul to get relieved of his grief.<sup>928</sup> The passages Eśa sarveśvarah<sup>929</sup> and others establish God's overlordship and bring out the difference between the soul and God. The passages also mention that the relation with regard to the difference is Swāmibhṛtya or Master and servant type. At this juncture, Vādirāja quotes the statements of the Gīta<sup>930</sup> and the Bhāgavata that openly declare difference and supremacy of the God.<sup>931</sup> The Bhāgavata verses Vidyātmā bhida bodhaḥ...<sup>932</sup> and Bhedadrstyā abhimānenā...<sup>933</sup> and others state that knowledge of difference, Abhimāna or devotion and Nissaṅgakarma or performance of deeds without the feeling of attachment, as the means for liberation. Here Abhimāna is not attachment towards worldly pleasures but it is the Bhakti or devotion to the Lord. And Nissaṅgakarma is the Virakti.<sup>934</sup> Thus, all the passages signify the importance of Bheda as the primary means for realization and liberation.

BIMBAPRATIBIMBABHAVA BETWEEN GOD AND THE EMBODIED SOUL

The passage Yathaisā puruse chāyā...<sup>935</sup> states that there is Bimbapratibimbabhava between Jīva and Brahman.<sup>936</sup> The illustration cited in the passage, as man and his shadow, signifies and points at three important points. That are: similarity between Bimba and Pratibimba, dependance of Pratibimba on the Bimba and also difference between the two. No doubt that the soul is similar to God in respect of Sat, Cit and Ananda. The soul is different from the God and also dependent upon Him.<sup>937</sup> The same passage also makes it clear that this Bimbapratibimbabhava ascertains the Sakāratva or Ādhāratva and Swāmitva of God.<sup>937A</sup> The similarity between the soul and the God is also hinted at in the passage Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bhabuva.<sup>938</sup> God becomes Bimba to infinite souls, assuming infinite Bimba-forms. And all the souls are Pratibimbas. And these are different from God.<sup>939</sup>

This relation of Bimbapratibimbabhava establishes the difference between the two. The reflection shadow is not only distinct but it is real. Similarly reflection soul is not only distinct but also real. Though it is said that there is

similarity between reflective and reflection, this similarity is not in all respects, but with regard to only some respects. The mention with dual number ascertains the difference between the two.<sup>940</sup> The similarity is also not in all respects completely. It is only in some respects with limitations. Souls are declared as reflections (reflected) since they too are real and unsublated like Brahman. Similarity with limitations does not lead to any identity.<sup>940A</sup>

Sometimes, the reflection of face is described as face. But that does not mean that both are identical, but they are only similar in some respects. Vādirāja justifies this fact by citing an example that it is as good as referring to the lion in the picture as lion. The lion in the picture, exposes its similarity but not identity. The two are distinct to each other.<sup>941</sup> Vādirāja argues that if Bimba and Pratibimba were taken to be identical, then reflection of face in hot water should cause burning pain to the real or reflecting face. Similarly, the entities bigger in size should not get reflected in a small mirror. Hence, identity cannot be traced. If at all there might be similarity in all the respects, then only identity could be attributed.

The dependence of Pratibimba is evident since Pratibimba

lasts as long as reflective is present near Upādhi or adjunct. When reflective goes away from the adjunct, then reflection disappears. Thus, a reflection is wholly dependent upon reflective.<sup>941A</sup> It does not make the reflection unreal.

Pratibimba is Bimbakarya. It is tenable completely in other examples. But in the case of the soul, whose very nature is not created, its solely dependent state is taken into account. In Jīva, the presence of Bimba God is Nimitta. He is the Kartā. Upādhi in the form of Jīvasvarūpa is Upādāna.<sup>942</sup> This is agreeable only in respect of Bimba-pratibimbabhava of Brahman and the embodied soul. In the example also, the mirror would become Upādāna for reflection. Thus Pratibimba Jīva is Karya of Bimba God. It is the Upādāna that is modified as reflection. There is no difficulty for the Advaitins to accept this modification as they regard modification of mind into a jar.<sup>943</sup> Thus reflection, though modification, is not unreal. If the reflection is regarded as unreal, then there would be difference from real reflective. And if reflection is taken to be real, then owing to two real entities, difference is evident.<sup>943A</sup> It is as real as Bimba. Because, the cognition of it as Pratibimba does not get sublated.<sup>944</sup> So reflection is real and it is real and it is distinct from reflective. The very difference in the usage as reflective and reflection, also signifies

the distinction here. Therefore, the God, who is reflective is distinct from Pratibimba reflection soul and reflection soul is as real as God Brahman.<sup>945</sup>

#### IV. VIŚVASAURABHA

##### INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI' PRAPANCO YADI VIDYETA' AND VIKALPO

##### VINIVARTETA<sup>946</sup>

As in the Bhedasaurabha, difference between God, embodied soul and the world is proved to be five-fold, in this Viśvasaurabha, reality of the world is considered to be established. Because the doctrine of difference would be meaningful provided the related entities are real. The Śruti- Prapañco yadi vidyeta asserts the reality and eternity of the world of five-fold difference. The world comprising of sentient beings and insentient matter is real since beginningless. In this sense, the Śruti appears to be connected with both the Saurabhas, viz., the Bheda-saurabha and the Viśvasaurabha.<sup>947</sup>

The Śruti-passage mentioned above is interpreted by the Advaitins that it indeed supports the Advaita doctrines viz., the Jaganmīthyātva (falsity of the world) and the Advaita (absolute identity). But, Vādirāja opines and promises that this passage does not inform anything about the Jaganmīthyātva nor about the Advaita. It ultimately

proves the reality of the world with five-fold difference<sup>948</sup> and also the Supremacy of the Lord. Vādirāja says that this could be understood and realized, only when the passage is interpreted in the light of and in accordance with the context.

The Advaita interpretation of this passage is 'If the world were to be existed, then only it would have been withdrawn. But as it is an illusion, Advaita is the only reality.' This interpretation controverts the very Advaita view. Because according to the Advaita the world is not real. So when the Advaita negates the real existence of the world, how can there be the withdrawal of the same world. The logic of something having existed and then withdrawn is not helpful to the Advaita. There is no Vyāpti or invariable concomitance between existence and withdrawal in the Advaita. If this Vyāpti is taken for granted then Brahman being existent, would have to be withdrawn.<sup>949</sup> And according to the Advaita, that which is an object of withdrawal (sublation) is an illusion. In that case, Brahman would have to be an illusion.<sup>950</sup>

Therefore Vādirāja insists that the context is to be taken into account while interpreting such passages. The passage previous to this, runs Anādimayaya supto yada

jīvah prabudhyate<sup>951</sup> and so on and it has the reference of ignorance, knowledge and also of difference between one matter and the other one soul and the other. So in the above passage- Prapanco... etc., contrary to the previous one, neither non-reality of the world nor the identity could be traced. So it is five-fold difference that is hinted at by the word 'Prapanca.' The etymological explanation of the term 'Prapanca' is 'higher knowledge of five-fold difference'. 'Pra' means Prakṛṣṭa - 'detail, higher knowledge' and 'Panca' means 'five-fold.' Thus, Prapanca' means 'five-fold difference' and not simply the world.<sup>952</sup> The expression 'Yadi vidyeta' poses the problem as to whether Prapanca were to be created (if it were not beginning-less) then that would have perished. But really speaking, this five-fold difference is not created and hence, the question of its perishing does not arise. As it is beginning-less, it will not perish.<sup>953</sup> This view establishes the eternity of five-fold difference. The term Māyāmātra in the passage denotes that this five-fold difference is known the God and also is guarded by Him. Here 'Māyā' is the Prajñā or knowledge<sup>954</sup> of the God. It also means that it is the knowledge of the God that makes us to know this five-fold difference well. Here Māyā does not convey the sense believed by the Advaitins. The term 'Advaita' indicates the Sarvottamatva or the supreme nature of the God.

The Advaitins consider the term 'Advaita' as there is nothing real other than Brahman. But this meaning is not intended here. It conveys that there is nothing that is equal or superior to the God. So there is no scope to understand that the things other than the God are illusion. Thus, the term 'Advaita' means 'The God is Supreme.'<sup>955</sup>

The correct import of the passage is that 'If the five-fold difference had been caused then one day it will get perished. But as it does not perish, it is not caused or created. It is known to the God and is guarded by Him. He is the only Supreme Being. There is nothing either equal or superior to Him. This interpretation does not contradict with other passages and does not give scope for counter-arguments. This is the only meaning that suits the context. So the context does not suggest either the Jaganmityatva or the Ātmaikya. Vādirāja splits the compounded words wonderfully as 'Māyāmātram' etc., and explains that Dvaitam māyāmātram means 'five fold difference is not at illusory.'<sup>956</sup> Such interpretation also suits the context and avoids the contradiction.

The Advaitins interpret the passage- Vikalpo vinivarteta etc., as follows: The difference as teacher, taught and teaching is only an illusory difference. This order is

meant for only teaching. When the truth is understood then there remains nothing. That means, then distinction will not remain. This interpretation of the Advaitins criticises the view of distinction by treating it as illusion. Hence, the Advaitins contend that this illusory distinction is not a reality. But this interpretation is not correct. Because then, there will be contradiction with the previous one. So the correct import of the passage is that the distinction would have been withdrawn if it were created out of illusion. But it is not illusory. And this fact could be known through a competent teacher (Upadeśaka).

Vādirāja argues that if the Advaitins question as to whether Bheda is Bhinna, Abhinna or Bhinnabhinna, and so on, then what would be the reply of the Advaitins when the same question is asked with regard to Vyāvahārika bheda.<sup>957</sup> So the difference should be accepted as real.

Thus, these two passages establish both Bheda or difference and Jagatsatyatva or reality of the world, topics of the Bhedasaurabha and the Viśvasaurabha respectively. Vādirāja hence considers these passages as Dehalīlīpa - lamp kept on the threshold that illuminates both the rooms.<sup>958</sup>

Gītā, MAHĀBHĀRATA AND PURĀNAS ALSO SUPPORT VIŚVASATYATVA

The Bhagavadgītā verse that runs as Asatyamapratisthante jagadāhuraniśvaram. Aparasparasambhūtaṁ kimanyat kāmahai-  
tukam, supports the view of the reality of the world.<sup>959</sup> It severely attacks those who consider the world as Asat or Mithyā or unreal. It is stated that this view is not only untenable but it spoils all those who teach and are taught.<sup>960</sup> Vādirāja opines that this Gītā-statement is the import of several Śrutis, Purānas etc. It is evident that the Lord is the prime-agent (Karta) and none else. The Prakṛti or the primal matter is the only Upādānakāraṇa or material cause and others time, place, etc., are Nimittakāraṇas or instrumental causes. The Lord is also considered as Nimittakāraṇa but He is foremost and prime among all instrumental causes. And the world is created by the operation of all these causes.<sup>961</sup> The Prakṛti, stated above, is nothing but the constitution of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.<sup>962</sup> In the scriptures as well as in other works, this Prakṛti is called sometimes as Māyā. It is not the Māyā of the Advaitins, because in that case, it would be only an illusion. It is the Prakṛti that is termed Māyā.<sup>963</sup> Therefore, the world-effect of this Māyā-prakṛti, is called Māyamaya.<sup>964</sup> And thus, the usage will not make this world as the product of Māyā or illusion of the Advaitins. In that case, the world would be unreal.

Now it cannot be held that this Prakṛti gets modified itself into the world. It, being Jada or insentient cannot modify itself into the world. It is the Lord who creates the world out of this Prakṛti. The Gītā statement- Maya adhyakṣena prakṛtih...<sup>965</sup> makes this point clear. As Prakṛti is the material cause of this creation, Ajñāna of the Advaitins cannot be taken to be the material cause for creation, since in no works Ajñāna of the Advaitins is declared as Upadānakāraṇa or material cause. So creation is not the out-come of Ajñāna or nescience. And hence, it is not sublated by Brahmajñāna, as the Advaitins make others believe.

The created world, since being not a product of Ajñāna, cannot totally be non-existent. Neither Brahman nor this world will be destroyed completely. Both are eternal.<sup>966</sup> It is Anādi or beginningless and Ananta or endless in the sense of Pravāhato nitya or eternal like a current. Brahman is also Nitya or eternal. But the difference is that the world is Pravāhato Nitya whereas Brahman is Svarūpataḥ nitya or inherently eternal. The Mahābhārata verse 'Evam tada-nādyantam...'<sup>967</sup> brings out the nature of the world as mentioned above.<sup>968</sup>

THE ŚRUTI SVAPNAMĀYĀ SĀRŪPĀ ... ESTABLISHES VIŚVASATYATVA

The verses in the Māndūkyopaniṣad that run Vibhūtim  
prasavantvanye...<sup>969</sup> and others state the different views regarding the nature of the world and also of the process of world-creation. The Advaitins hold that these verses hint at Brahma Parināmavāda or the Vikāravāda. That means Brahman modifies Itself into various forms of the world. They say that the passage also indicates the illusory nature of the world.<sup>970</sup> But this is not correct. Modification is not admissible in the case of the God.<sup>971</sup> Because, He is glorified as Nirvikāri or changeless. And moreover, He is not of the nature of modification. Further, the world also cannot be treated as illusory. Because, it is the desire of the Lord who creates the world. So it cannot be illusory. Even the Prakṛti or material cause undergoes the changes and functions according to the desire of the Lord.<sup>972</sup> The God creates this world by His desire and not by any Māyā as understood by the Advaitins. If the desire of the Lord itself is named Māyā then there is no objection to it. Vādirāja opines that the term Prabhu indicates that the Lord is Sarvottama or Overlord, Sarvaśakta or Omnipotent and the like. He never seeks the help of others (in creation maintenance and the like connected with this world.

Now the question is 'What is the Lord's purpose of

creating this world?' Some misinterpret the verse Bhogartham srstirityanye...<sup>972A</sup> etc., and say that the God creates the world for his own enjoyment. But it is not correct. Because, He is Aptakāma or ever-contented. He has nothing to get fulfilled.<sup>973</sup> There are some who hold the view that the God creates the world out of Himself for play.<sup>974</sup> They think that during Pralaya the God's life would be charmless as there might be nothing and hence He, then, engages in the process of creation. This view is also not correct. Because, Vādirāja says, that if this view is admitted then it would contradict with His Aptakāmatva or self-contentment. So it is neither for enjoyment nor for play that the God creates the world, but it is His very nature that He creates the world. Because, He has no desires including to play, to get fulfilled.<sup>975</sup> It is clear from the passage 'Ichhamātram prabhoh srstih' and 'Devasya esa svabhavah...'<sup>975A</sup> The expression 'Ichhamātram' indicates that He has the desire only for creation and not for any benefit out of that. It also conveys that the God's manifestation as Matsya, Kūrma and so on, is because of His Ichha or desire.<sup>976</sup> The Upadāna is not required for the manifestation of God's incarnations. Because, something in the form of Upadāna is required for creation and not for manifestation. All the incarnations of the God are eternal but it is the desire of the God that makes them manifest.

So far as Kala or Time is considered, it is accepted as only instrumental cause and not as Independent efficient cause. The statement Dravyam karma ca kalaśca...<sup>977</sup> makes it clear that all these are under the control of the Lord. These become useful and favourable in creation etc., provided the God desires, otherwise not. So it is evident that the God is the Creator, Prakrti is the material cause, time and the like are instruments.

The term Prabhu in the passage also signifies that the God has no Ajnāna or nescience and the creation of the world is not due to nescience. Since Brahman is Omnipotent, Omniscient and so on, He does not require Ajnāna and such others for creation. And moreover, such a wonderful world cannot be the outcome of nescience. It is the Prakrti (prime-matter) which is the material course.<sup>978</sup> Creation is Nitya (Pravahato) or eternal because, the act of creation of the world is the very nature of the God. The world is present with minute form in the God during Pralaya and the same gets manifested and created by the Lord at the time of creation. This proves that the world, either with minute form or with gross form, is present eternally. Hence, the total non-existence of the world cannot be thought of. It also ascertains the fact that this world is eternally distinct from the God. As it is under the control of the Lord, who is supreme.<sup>979</sup>

The Brahmasūtra-Vaidharmyācca na svapnādīvat (II.ii.29)<sup>980</sup> rejects the view that the world is illusory like a dream. If the creation of the world is compared with the dream or magic then, that would lead to many defects. In the dream, there is a dreamer, his body, bed, and the like who are real. And in magic also, the magician is real, observers are real. So the Advaitins have to specify the real things in the world-creation first and then they can talk of illusory aspect of creation. Therefore, it is not proper to compare the creation of the world either with a dream or with magical creation. Further, the Advaita view that the illusion of the world, after sublation leads to liberation and bliss is also not agreeable and tenable because, an illusory cause can never lead to real effects. Otherwise, the effects liberation, bliss and the like must also be held as unreal.<sup>981</sup> So the world is real: And the reality of the world can be ascertained and also realized as mentioned above. Thus, the passages quoted above establish the reality of the world.<sup>982</sup>

#### ŚRUTIS 'VIŚVAM SATYAM' AND OTHERS ESTABLISH REALITY OF THE WORLD

The Īśavāsyā passage Yathātathatorthān vyadadhāt...<sup>983</sup> declares the reality of the world undoubtedly. The Omnipotent Lord creates wonderful things in this world. And all of them are real.<sup>984</sup> The scriptural statement 'Viśvam

satyam<sup>985</sup> promises the reality of the world. It makes clear that the detailed information mentioned or delineated here, is true to fact. And it has the support of the Pramanas. This is evident by the expression 'Praminanti'.<sup>986</sup> It declares "O God! this world of yours is real. And it is the presiding deities of water who know it well." The God is glorified as 'Maghavan' that means 'He,' who possesses all prosperity.' The dual usage of the word affirms the fact that the God creates the world and also regulates it. This indicates the difference between the two. It is also said that it is the presiding deities who know the truth. Here the truth is the 'Niyamya-niyamakabhabha,' or the relation of the controlled and the controller. Vādi-rāja opines that this statement, not only asserts the reality of the world but also adduces the arguments in favour of this. Thus, the fact that the world is real rules out the view of the Vyavahārikasatta or the ephemeral reality held by the Advaitins, since the view ultimately aims at non-reality of the world.<sup>987</sup> The present statement argues: "How can the Lord being Maghavan or possessing all prosperity, create a non-real world?" It is not correct. Because, then the very possession of all prosperity would be meaningless. The dual and plural forms in 'Yuvoh' and 'Apah' prove that more sentient beings observe the world. It also ascertains the mutual difference among sentients

and also their difference from the world observed. The presiding deities of water and the reference to their knowledge is true. That means the created world is not empirically real but absolutely real like Brahman.<sup>988</sup> The difference is that, Brahman is eternally real whereas world is real or eternal like a current. Vādirāja opines that this not only establishes the reality of the world but also the Sarvottamatva, Gunapurnatva and Nirdosatva of the God. By the by it also brings out the difference between the God and the world.<sup>989</sup>

The scriptural statement- Yacciketa satyamiti<sup>990</sup> also promises the reality of the world. The correct import of the Śruti is: 'The world that is present for ever, is created by the God. It is real and also serves real purpose. It is covetable one. The God has conquered this world and gifted.' All the expressions of the statement clearly bring out the reality of the world.<sup>991</sup> Like the previous one, it also, by the by proves the difference between the God and the world. All the scriptures thus, shining with the lustre of arguments prove the reality of the world and also glorify the greatness of the Lord. Therefore, Vādirāja opines and appeals that the idea of the unreality of the world is an obstacle for liberation and spiritual delight, and it is the realization of

reality of the world that leads to liberation and also helps to attain spiritual delight.<sup>992</sup>

AJÑĀNA CANNOT BE THE UPĀDĀNA AND IT CAN ALSO NOT PROVE THE UNREALITY OF THE WORLD

The God creates this world at the commencement of each Kalpa or universal creation. This proves that the world is never destroyed totally. It remains in minute form during dissolution. That means it would be in the form of Prakṛti or the primeval matter. As the Prakṛti is real its effect the world must also be real.<sup>993</sup> The Advaitins say that Ajñāna or nescience is the Upādāna or the material cause of this world, but it is not correct. Because, out of Ajñāna or nescience this world cannot be created. And moreover, a person, interested in creating something, will go for concerned material cause only. That is reasonable and agreeable in all respects. No one puts his efforts to have anything like Ajñāna as Upādāna.<sup>994</sup>

The contention of the Advaitins that this bondage is also an illusion due to Ajñāna and hence, to remove this Ajñāna one has to pursue an inquiry into Brahman and gain the knowledge,<sup>995</sup> is not correct. Because, this bondage is real and Anādi. It is not an illusion caused by Ajñāna means that which is beginningless, is not a product of

of something.<sup>996</sup> And removal of this bondage is possible, only when it is real; otherwise not. The question of removing does not arise if the said bondage is an illusion and unreal. So when the bondage is real, it cannot be the illusory product of nescience. And it can be removed by right knowledge, which is also real. Here the knowledge means knowledge of Brahman since it is competent to remove the bondage. And this knowledge of Brahman could be gained when one proceeds to make an inquiry about Brahman. Thus there is proper and agreeable relation among Adhikāri or eligible aspirant, Prayojana the purpose, Viśaya the subject-matter and Sambandha the relation provided bondage and the like are taken to be real, otherwise not.<sup>997</sup> In the Advaita, there is no concordance and relevancy since it is treated as an illusory effect of Ajñāna which is unreal.

As the beginningless nescience and its product bondage are seen in the embodied soul, since beginningless, the Advaita view that the Brahman is the locus of nescience, is supportless and gone. Because, the presence of Upādāna or cause (that is nescience) and the Upadeya or effect (bondage) are to be present at one place invariably. The view that the nescience is with Brahman and bondage with soul, is wrong.<sup>998</sup> Further, the nescience, since being beginningless, is of a Bhāvarūpa or positive and hence this nescience

cannot be removed by knowledge.<sup>199</sup> In the Dvaita view, even when the bondage is taken to be beginningless and real, its removal is possible by knowledge as per the declaration of the scriptures.<sup>1000</sup> The contention of nescience as beginningless by the Advaitins, poses the difficulty. Even if the nescience is understood as contact of nescience, then also the removal of contact of nescience is not possible since this contact is also beginningless. In the Advaita, beginningless positive entity cannot be destroyed. Therefore, Vādirāja says that acceptance of the nescience as the material cause of the world, makes the very removal of it impossible. So the nescience is not the material cause whereas it is the Prakṛti that is the material cause.

In the Advaita, the removal of nescience is not possible by knowledge. If this removal is accepted then that will lead to the defect Anyonyāśraya or mutual dependence. According to the Advaita, Svarūpajñāna or knowledge of one's own nature is always present. Therefore, it cannot be concealed by nescience. But it might be the Manovṛtti-jñāna or the knowledge obtained by mental activity that is concealed by nescience. Then, there is the Anyonyāśrayadosa as the Manovṛtti-jñāna is the product of nescience.

If the Manovrttijñāna is concealed then it is this knowledge that has to remove the nescience through its operation and it can operate and remove the nescience only after the concealing nescience is removed. Thus, there is Anyonyāśrayadosa. The same type of Anyonyāśrayadosa would be there, even when Svarūpajñāna is taken to be concealed by the Ajñāna.<sup>1001</sup> Further it cannot be argued that the knowledge functions even when there is the concealing nescience. Otherwise in that case, an object though obstructed by something like a wall, must be seen. But it never happens.

Vādirāja points out that in the Advaita, the removal of the nescience is not possible until the attainment of the final knowledge.<sup>1002</sup> The scriptural statement<sup>1002A</sup> that refers to Akhaṇḍa Brahman, may give rise to Aparokṣajñāna direct realisation and not, to Caramajñāna or the final knowledge. Vādirāja doubts that when the knowledge (direct realization) is not competent to remove the nescience, what guarantee is there that the final knowledge will remove the nescience. This also ascertains the fact that knowledge will not remove the Advaitin's Ajñāna.<sup>1003</sup> So in the Advaita, the procedure of Śravana, Manana etc., and also pursuing the study of the scriptures would become meaningless. And the Gurūpadeśa or preceptor's instruction

and the like is not required for the removal of the nescience that conceals the Adhisthāna Caitanya or sentient being substratum. Because, the experience in the case of a pot, a cloth and the like, is gained without any Gurūpadeśa. Thus, the acceptance of Ajnana leads to such problems. So it is preferred on the basis of the scriptures to accept that bondage is removed by knowledge. There is no necessity to introduce an illusory nescience.<sup>1004</sup> Thus, bondage is real, knowledge is real and removal of bondage by knowledge is also real. Hence, nescience is by no means the material cause of the world and it cannot bring about the bondage.

One may doubt about the removal of bondage by knowledge. But Vādirāja promises that, it is not only the bondage that would be destroyed by knowledge, but also the beginningless action of the soul. The scriptural statement Tadā vidvā punyapāpe viddhuya...<sup>105</sup> etc., makes it clear that Karma or action is removed by knowledge.<sup>1005A</sup> The Brahmasūtra- Tadadhigame Uttarapūrvāghayoh (IV.1.13) states that knowledge removes the previous action and makes the following and next action ineffective.<sup>1006</sup> This proves the very fact as already mentioned that the knowledge is competent to remove the aspects other than nescience. So there is no link between the removal nescience and the

removal of bondage. This ascertains that there is no Vyāpti between Jñāna and Ajñānāśa, as held by the Advaitins. The removal of bondage is nothing but the function of destruction. And Iśvarajñāna is competent to fulfil the creation, sustenance and destruction. So nowhere the removal of nescience is traced possibly. Thus, there is no Vyāpti as knowledge is the destroyer of nescience (Advaita) since, the very concept is untenable.<sup>1007</sup>

It is already mentioned that the knowledge of Brahman removes the bondage. Vādirāja makes it clear that the knowledge does not remove the bondage directly, but Brahmajñāna first generates Bhakti or devotion and then removes the bondage.<sup>1008</sup> The bondage is nothing but the deep attachment towards worldly things and enjoyments. And this attachment should be turned towards the God. It is possible when one gets the Brahmajñāna through proper Jijñāsa or inquiry. When Brahmajñāna is gained then that develops the devotion in the God. Further, the God removes the bondage through His grace. Thus, the bondage, that is real, is removed by knowledge through devotion and His grace.<sup>1009</sup> Here also there is no scope for any nescience of the Advaitins which is according to them illusory.

Further, Vādirāja makes it clear that a real one can

be destroyed. He says that it is not the reality which is the base for non-destruction, but it is the eternity which is the criterion for non-destruction.<sup>1010</sup> The bondage, though real can be destroyed, since it is not eternal as such. Hence, it is destroyed by the grace of God.

The Advaitins hold that the nescience or the unreality of the world is intended in the Brahmasūtras. But this view is wrong. Because, the Sūtrakāra does not imply the unreality of the world in any way. The mention of the Adhikāri and others eligible for Brahmajñāna ascertains that the topic of inquiry can never be an unreal one. The very interpretation of the Śruti passages by the Sūtras has definite aim (Phala).<sup>1011</sup> So the entire scheme of the sūtras cannot be an illusion.<sup>1012</sup> Vādirāja praises that the Sūtrakāra, viz., Vedavyāsa has lit the lamp of Sṛsti-karūptva of the God at the beginning and then poured oil for burning it in the subsequent Sūtras.<sup>1013</sup>

Vādirāja says that even the process of destruction does not admit the view of Ajñāna of the Advaitins. It is the Kārya or the effect which is destroyed first and then its Kāraṇa, or cause upto the Prakrti. And the Prakrti is the main source of creation and is indestructible. This process affirms that the effect is destroyed first

and then the cause. But the view of the Advaitins is against and contrary to this valid experience. Because, in their view the Upādānakārana viz., Ajñāna is said to have been destroyed first and then the effect viz., bondage is destroyed. But it never happens. And it is not intended by the Sūtrakāra also.<sup>1014</sup> Moreover, the Advaita also admits the dissolution, starting from Prthvi to the Mahattatva and then its merging into Maya or Ajñāna. This proves that the effect world is destroyed before its material cause viz., nescience. So the view of Advaita that the world or the bondage is removed by the [redacted] removal of nescience is self-contradictory. To avoid this contradiction, it is to be accepted without hesitation that the Ajñāna is not the Upādānakārana of this world of bondage.<sup>1015</sup>

The Dvaita stand is that there is real Svabhāvajñāna or inherent wrong knowledge that is beginningless. And this is of two aspects: one that conceals and makes the nature of the God unknown to the souls and second that veils the true nature of the souls. It is distinct and individual from one soul to another. And this wrong knowledge is removed by the knowledge through the grace of the God at the time of liberation.<sup>1016</sup> Bondage is real and beginningless. It is not caused by the illusory nescience

as held by the Advaitins. So whatever is referred to be illusory, cannot be a cause of a real effect and vice-versa and also an object of destruction. The removal of or destruction becomes meaningful only when something is held to be real. So the view of the Advaitins regarding the removal of the bondage through the removal of nescience by knowledge has no meaning at all.<sup>1017</sup>

The nescience of the Advaitin is beginningless. In that list, the entities such as Kāla, Ākāśa and others are also counted. So these entities cannot be the effect of nescience since like nescience these two also are beginningless. So it is not proper to hold that all these are unreal (products of Ajñāna). When the above mentioned entities are not the effects of nescience, the question of their destruction by the removal of nescience does not arise.<sup>1018</sup> So it is evident that the removal of world or bondage has nothing to do with the removal nescience. And it is also absurd to say that whatever is not removed by nescience cannot be removed at all by other means.

The above argument proves that the world is real and the bondage also is real. The beginningless and endless nature ~~is~~ proves that the world is not destroyable by the knowledge. It is absolutely real like Brahman.<sup>1019</sup> And

it is not a product of nescience. It is not removed by knowledge.<sup>1020</sup> It is the bondage which is also real is going to be destroyed by knowledge since both possess opposite nature. The darkness, that is real, can be removed by light possessing the real opposite nature and not by the unreal one. So nescience that is real and in the form of bondage could be removed by knowledge. It is the opposite nature that makes the removal possible and not the unreality.<sup>1021</sup>

Vādirāja says that even if the nominal withdrawal of Ajñāna by Vrttijñāna is accepted then, that leads to Anyonyāśraya. Because, unless there is withdrawal of Ajñāna there can be no jñāna and unless there is Jñāna there can be no withdrawal of Ajñāna.<sup>1022</sup> According to the Advaita, the Vrttijñāna originates when it encompasses a particular object. And unless the Ajñāna is withdrawn, encompassing of an object is not possible. Vādirāja opines that the illustration of lamp given by the Advaitins is not supporting their contention. Because, the light of the lamp is possible though there is an object or not. But knowledge cannot arise unless it encompasses the object and objects may be encompassed only when the nescience that conceals the object is withdrawn. And this withdrawal is possible only when there arises the knowledge. Thus, there is

Anyonyāśrayadosa.<sup>1022A</sup> And it cannot be held that inspite of the presence of nescience, let the Vṛttijñāna arise, because in that case knowledge cannot remove the nescience and reveal the objects. Further if opposite nature of nescience and knowledge is not accepted, then it is better and easy to say that the bondage can be removed by knowledge and not through the removal of nescience.<sup>1023</sup>

Another view of the Advaita that Aikyajñāna or identity-knowledge gained from the scriptures removes the nescience and gets destroyed itself for the survival of Ātmakya,<sup>1024</sup> is not correct. Because, knowledge can remove nescience and not itself like fire can burn other things and not itself.<sup>1025</sup>

The opposite nature is the stock base for the destruction of one another. And that which is not of opposite nature, cannot cause any destruction. The nescience of the Advaitins, which is a cause of the effect viz., Vṛtti-jñāna, neither destroys knowledge nor gets destroyed by knowledge. Because, a cause cannot be opposed to effect in nature. So the idea of the Advaitins that identity-knowledge also gets destroyed itself for the survival Ātmakya, is not correct.<sup>1026</sup>

Though the Svarūpajñāna is concealed by nescience, it exist with nescience and its effects. The Ātmaikyajñāna originates through Manovṛtti-jñāna of the Śrutis. As a cause of this Manovṛtti-jñāna, nescience must be there. Thus, if nescience exists along with the Svarūpajñāna and the Vṛtti-jñāna then, it must be accepted that this Ajñāna leads to the Akhandārtha-jñāna for liberation. If this would be the case then, it (Ajñāna) cannot be an Āvaraṇa or a preventing factor.<sup>1027</sup> Then, there is no sense in relating its concealment as bondage and withdrawal of the same as liberation.<sup>1028</sup>

Vādirāja states that the very concept of Bhakti or devotion has no place in the Advaita. He says that even according to the Advaita, knowledge cannot remove nescience. The Advaitins accept a state called Jīvanmukti.<sup>1029</sup> It is between the gain of the Aikyajñāna and the destruction of the Liṅgaśarīra or the subtle body. When the Liṅgadeha is destroyed and Mahā avidyā is withdrawn, then there would be final liberation.<sup>1030</sup> This Liṅgadeha is also beginning-less and is due to nescience. The Advaitins accept the view that both these Liṅgadeha and nescience would be active during Jīvanmukti-state even when there is the Aikyajñāna.<sup>1031</sup> This makes it clear that the Aikyajñāna cannot remove the nescience. So Vādirāja asks: What guarantee

is there in the removal of nescience by ~~the~~ the Aikyajñāna at the time of final liberation as it fails to do so during the Jīvanmukti state? That which is not burnt by wild fire, cannot verily be burnt by house-hold fire.<sup>1032</sup> So the nescience present with knowledge during Jīvanmukti, cannot be removed by knowledge later on. Thus, the very idea of nescience and its removal by knowledge is untenable. It is the Bhakti or devotion an outcome of knowledge that removes the Ajñāna by earning the grace of the God.<sup>1033</sup> So the Bhakti is the means for liberation and not the Aikyajñāna. And moreover the knowledge of identity cannot effect or lead to devotion.

According to the Advaita, the world is treated as Āropita or superimposed or an illusory projection. That means, it is Ajñānaropita or superimposed by nescience. The Ajñāna of the Advaita has two powers namely, Āvaraṇasakti and Viksepasakti. The Āvaraṇasakti is the power that conceals the true nature of Brahman and Viksepasakti is the power that projects the world as it is.<sup>1034</sup> If this is accepted, then Brahman cannot observe the world before as well as after the concealment. After the concealment, Brahman being concealed by nescience, cannot observe anything including the world and before concealment as there is no projection of the world, Brahman cannot observe it.

Before concealment, there is no world to be observed and after concealment, there is no power to observe. So the world cannot be an illusory projection. It is true and ultimately real. The valid experience and also independent existence of objects ascertain the reality of the world.<sup>1035</sup> The relation of the observer and the observed is pertinent in all respects. So the world is real and not Āropita or illusory superimposition.

The Advaitins hold that Brahman, which is associated with Māyā aspect of Ajñāna, is Iśvara. And the Māyā Iśvara creates this world with his Māyā. The souls behold this Māyā-projected world. But this view is not correct. Because, the instance given by the Advaitins in support of this, is not a convincing and corroborating one. In magic, there may be illusory creation but the observers and their senses such as eyes and others are true. But in the case of souls as they are the creation of Avidyā, they are not true. Thus, the very aspect of illusory creation in the Advaita makes the souls also unreal. And moreover, this Iśvara cannot have the body etc., before the creation of them through Māyā. And as he has no body etc., he cannot create them. Thus, there is no Māyā in him.<sup>1036</sup> The acceptance of the effect of Māyā on Iśvara also leads to undesired conclusions. If it is held that

he is not affected then he is not an outcome of Ajñana. If he is taken to be affected then he cannot influence it on others. Certainly, a magician who is affected by his own Maya, cannot operate his Maya on others. So the Īśvara may be affected or may not be affected by Maya, but the reality of the world remains unharmed. Because, if the Īśvara has no illusion then the world is true to him. And if he has illusion then the world is true for others. Thus, in both the cases, the world remains true.<sup>1037</sup> Vādirāja asks: "What is the use of the potter and others when Brahman, with Ajñana creates everything?" But as experience makes the presence of potter and others valid and real through their engagement, the world of wonderful things has to be accepted as real.<sup>1038</sup>

The process of origination of the Vrttijñana in the Advaita is not acceptable. Because, according to the Advaita the objects are revealed to the observer when there is the withdrawal of Ajñana temporarily. When the Ajñana covers the Adhisthanacaitanya, it is not possible to see the objects. They also accept that there is a separate Ajñana that covers each aspect of an object like colour, taste etc. But this view gives rise to the acceptance of many Ajñanas that cover the Adhisthanas.

Further, if there is the withdrawal of nescience (removal of nescience) in case of one, then there may not be any illusion to him. But others may not have the withdrawal of nescience. And for realizing the object they are to be withdrawn one by one. But practically it never happens and hence it is absurd. Vādirāja taunts that the very acceptance of many Ajñānas makes the very small object being heavily loaded.<sup>1039</sup> And as the Adhisthanacaitanya is outside and the observer sentient soul is inside, it is not possible to have the realization of the object. And it cannot be held that owing to the ultimate oneness of them, the experience is possible. Because, in that case, let the two persons have a common experience since they are also ultimately one. But this does never take place. The Advaitins also say that the Jīva (Antahkarana-vacchinnacaitanya) moves out of the body and mingles with Adhisthanacaitanya and it is the union of the two that reveals the object.<sup>1040</sup> This view is also not tenable because, the soul is of atomic size and he has no parts. So his moving outside and reaching the far away objects is impossible. Because, in that case, the body must remain dead till the soul comes back. Hence, the origin of the Vrttijñāna itself is impossible.<sup>1041</sup> Further, if it is admitted that the soul within the body goes out and assumes the form of an object, then the experience or

cognition must be 'I am a jar' and not as 'This is jar.' But in our experience, we never have the cognition as 'I am a jar.'<sup>1042</sup> So the process of origination of Vṛttijñāna, held by the Advaitins, is not acceptable and hence it is not possible to prove that the world is an illusory projection (superimposition).<sup>1043</sup> Further, Vādirāja states that even the empirical reality cannot be referred to. Because if the jar is there prior to illusion, then it is real like Brahman. If the experience as 'I am a Jar' then it is Prātibhāsika type (reality in appearance) as in 'Iam white.' And jar cannot be identified with Cetana being. So Vyāvahārikā cannot be attributed to the world.<sup>1044</sup>

The experiences such as 'This is a jar' and others do not refer to the Adhīsthāna, Brahman. But, the very statement or experience only refers to the place and time. And moreover, it is not the superimposed pot. It is nothing but an expression that denotes an already existing entity.<sup>1045</sup> Otherwise reference must be as 'Aham' and not as 'Ayam.' Further, in the Vṛttijñāna of an object, the concerned object must be true. Otherwise, there cannot be contact between the eye and the object. And contact of Adhīsthāna-caitanya with the senses like eye, is not possible as Adhīsthāna-caitanya is a colourless object. This also makes it clear that the Adhīsthāna Brahman as such is not

there and no expressions and experiences refer to this. So the things in this world are present without any Āropa or superimposition, and hence the world is true.<sup>1046</sup>

A TRUE WORLD MUST BE ACCEPTED AS PRADHĀNA TO PROJECT AN ILLUSORY WORLD

The Advaitins hold that the things such as jar and others are created by nescience on the Adhisthānacaitanya. If this is accepted then created things must exist in all the times, as nescience and Adhisthānacaitanya are beginning-less. Further, the created things must also be everywhere. But it is not the fact. When certain features of a similar object are present in an object, present before the eyes then, there arises an illusion. The conch-shell, as it appears similar to silver in brightness, one mistakes it for silver. But the Advaita Brahman cannot have any features of other objects as there have been no objects before the illusory projection of the world. So there cannot be any illusion of these objects. The objects, present must be true. Further for justifying the illusions, if corresponding similar objects are to be thought of, then it amounts to accepting the world of true objects. And this ultimately rules out the falsity of the world.<sup>1047</sup> Thus, the above explanation proves that there must be both Adhisthāna and Pradhāna (similar object for projecting an

illusion). And projection of an illusion is possible provided both the Adhisthāna and the Pradhāna are real. As shell is real, silver though illusorily projected, is real somewhere. It is because of the appearance of similar features such as brightness, the shell is mistaken for silver in the given context. And reality of both the shell and silver remains unharmed. It shows that both Brahman, the Adhisthāna and the real world to serve as the Pradhāna are necessary to project an illusory world. This proves the presence of the real world.<sup>1048</sup>

Vadirāja also argues that, the projection of the world in the Adhisthāna, is possible only when there<sup>is</sup> another real world (Pradhāna). And if that also is considered as Mithyā then projection is not possible. And if the projection or superimposition is momentary, then it does not disprove the reality of the world.<sup>1049</sup> Moreover, both Adhisthāna and Pradhāna must be real at the same time. If one of these two would be missing then also superimposition or projection is not possible as seen in the superimposition of silver and serpent. When conch-shell and rope are present, at the same time, the presence of silver and serpent are necessary somewhere else.<sup>1050</sup>

The Advaitins state that the nescience is the material

that cause/produces the world-illusion. Vādirāja argues that the material cause cannot be the cause of an illusion. But it is the defect that is responsible to produce an illusion. The defect, during its operation produces the effect, viz., illusion and then it vanishes. As soon as the defect disappears, the illusion also disappears. The defect of distance causes the illusion of a person in a pole. But when the distance is covered the defect vanishes and there is no illusion of a person. In the Advaita the nescience is considered as the material cause. But it is evident that the material cause of an object is not at all a defect and hence it cannot be the cause to produce an illusion of that object. Clay, the material cause of a jar, is not at all considered as a defect to produce the illusion of a jar. In the same way, threads are also not responsible for producing an illusion of a piece of cloth.<sup>1051</sup> So nescience of the Advaita, being the material cause cannot produce the illusory world. It can only prevent the knowledge. Vādirāja, citing examples, defends the above argument. He says that a wall or darkness may prevent the vision or appearance of an object but it cannot produce either knowledge or illusion of it. So the nescience can prevent the knowledge but it cannot produce either knowledge or any illusion.<sup>1052</sup> Therefore, the nescience cannot be taken to be a defect for the projection of the illusory

world. As there is no proper aggregation of Adhisthana, Pradhāna and Dosa in the Advaita, there is no possibility of the projection of an illusory world. Therefore the world is not unreal. It is real.<sup>1053</sup>

Vādirāja also points out that, as there is no substratum, fit and agreeable for superimposition and also as there is no any other world that is real and standard for superimposition, the created and existing world is real like Brahman.<sup>1054</sup> Thus, the world, being unsuperimposed entity, is absolutely real like Brahman. And the statements, the expressive meaning of which stand sublated, are to be understood in a different manner or implication.<sup>1055</sup>

#### THE ADVAITA VIEW IS CONTRARY TO ANUBHAVA

Vādirāja shows that the view of the Advaitins regarding the world is contrary to the Anubhava also. In defence of this, he not only traces the valid perception of ordinary beings, but refers to the authentic authorities such as the Bhāgavata, Gītā and the like.

The Bhāgavata verses- 'Na yatra śrūyate māyā...' <sup>1056</sup> and Māyām vyudasya citsaktya... <sup>1057</sup> make it clear that the Māyā of Advaitins is not there in the God.<sup>1058</sup> It is said that great sages Sanaka and others glorify and meditate upon

a real God who is ever free from delusion. If He too becomes deluded, no one would have praised Him.<sup>1059</sup> The Bhaqavatgītā also clarifies that "the thought that grasps all things as illusory is Tāmasic in nature." This means only those who are of impure nature, behold and understand the world as an illusory creation.<sup>1060</sup> And the reference of Yogic perception, mentioned in the Śrutis and others, affirms that the object of perception must be real. Then only their perception has some meaning. The observance of religious austerities and the like is prescribed to realize the Truth and not the illusory nature of the things. Vādirāja says that the serpent-ornament on god Śiva is not a Rajjusarpa. So the falsity or illusory nature of the world cannot be acceptable as the very idea is baseless.<sup>1061</sup> There is not a single scriptural statement that declares and supports the idea of the falsity of the world.

The Advaitins advance the view that the Mithyatva of the world is contended to overcome the difficulty in the Drg-drśya relation or the relation between the seer and the seen. According to the Advaita, experience or cognition is Mānasa or mental. It is called Drk. And the external object is called Drśya. When there is relation of these two, then only there is the knowledge

of the object. Hence, the object is taken to be mental in this sense. And this realization or knowledge of the relation is possible if it is considered as Superimposed on Brahman. So the experience is termed as the modification of Antahkaranāvacchinnacaitanya and the Drśya or object as the modification of Visayāvacchinnacaitanya. The Caitanya (the sentiency) is the source of these two. The relation of these two is described as Adhyāsa, Adhyastatva relation in the Advaita.<sup>1062</sup> Vādirāja says that this stand is not correct. Because, it is not a novel and distinct relation apart from Jñāna-Jñeya or knowledge-known relation. Only difference is that Jñeya in Adhyāsa is considered as illusory whereas it is real in Jñāna-Jñeya relation. When the Jñeya object is<sup>true,</sup> the relation between the experience and the object can be related without any difficulty. Even if this relation is not possible, the ground as well as the absence of jar cannot be rejected. In support of this, Vādirāja cites an instance most appealing one. If key of the temple door is unfound, it is not agreeable to demolish the temple.<sup>1063</sup> Hence, the difficulty in Drg-Drśya relation does not help to prove Jaganmīthyatva because the very relation stated by the Advaitins is absurd.

In defence of this, Vādirāja, quoting the Bhagavadgītā statements, ridicules the view of the unreality of the

world of the Advaitins and states that even the Bhagavadgītā  
does not support and uphold the unreality view of the world.<sup>1064</sup>

Further, Vādirāja asks: What is the Adhisthāna in Drg-  
Drśya relation of the Advaitins. Where actually is there  
the superimposition? Is it on the Suddhacaitanya or on  
the Ghatāvacchinnacaitanya (qualified Caitanya) or on the  
Ghatopalaksitacaitanya (indicated Caitanya)? Verily, the  
superimposition is not possible in the case of the latter  
two since the Adhisthāna such as Ghata or pot has not come  
into existence. Because, it will come into existence only  
after the superimposition. And as the pot and the like  
become the cause of both the Adhisthāna and the Adhyasta  
it will lead to Ātmāśrayadosa or the defect of sitting on  
one's own shoulder. And as the Suddhacaitanya is Niramśa  
or partless the superimposition on it, will be the super-  
imposition on all things in all places. Then one has to  
see and experience all things at all places.<sup>1065</sup> But  
really speaking, it will not happen. Hence, the very  
Adhyasta in the relation of Drg-Drśya is baseless and un-  
tenable. Therefore, the relation of Jnāna-Jneya is better.  
It constitutes the Visaya-visayi relation and will not  
lead to any absurdities pointed out above.

If the Adhyasta is upheld then, as all experiences

involve Brahmajñāna, it should lead to liberation. Because, in the experience of Adhyāsa, experience of Adhyasta (superimposed) is gained along with the experience of Adhīsthāna. It must be experienced in all Adhyāsa experiences. So Vādirāja ridicules that the Brahmajñāna in these experiences, should lead to liberation.<sup>1066</sup> But it never happens. And moreover, there is no scope for arguing that Savikalpajñāna or distinctive knowledge of pot, cloth and the like will come in the way and prevent liberation; because, if once Brahmajñāna originates its operation cannot be prevented by anything. And if it is not capable to ward off the preventing factors and accomplish liberation here and now, then it can never do so. Burning of fire cannot be obstructed by the spread of grass. Fire burns the entire green with grass to ashes.<sup>1067</sup> In the same way, if at all there is knowledge of Brahman which is the Adhīsthāna in the illusory experience, that Brahmajñāna, being competent by nature should lead to liberation. But it does not happen. So the very concept of superimposition is not agreeable. And it will not serve any purpose to prove the things of the world as unreal.

The Advaitins refer to the Śruti 'Tamevabhartamanubhāti sarvam...',<sup>1068</sup> etc. and say that this statement points at the origin of the Vṛttijñāna. Their interpretation

of this passage is: "The experience of Adhisthana Brahman is the source of all experiences when that is revealed by the temporary withdrawal of Ajñana." Vādirāja says that there is no scope for such interpretation. The import of the statement agreeable to the context is "Sun reveals all objects first and then we know them with our eyes." The sun's revealing the objects is also mentioned in the Gītā- Yadādityaगतमेतो जगद्भासयते अखिलम्...<sup>1069</sup> Vādirāja gives two different and deep meanings of this statement. One is: All the luminous entities such as sun, moon and others derive their brilliance from the God.<sup>1070</sup> Second is: "The God is self-luminant and He does not require anything else to get illuminated Himself whereas others solely depend upon Him to know themselves and also to know other things."<sup>1071</sup> It also means that the knowledge of the God helps to self-realization. Thus, there is no hint or clue regarding the process of the Vṛttijñana in this passage.

Vādirāja also assures that, the above given passage glorifies the self-realizing or luminous nature of God and also His all knowing nature of the world. He is extolled as Omniscient in this passage.<sup>1072</sup>

THE MEANING OF BĀDHA IN THE ADVAITA IS UNTENABLE AND HENCE  
DOES NOT SUPPORT MITHYĀTVA

The Advaita holds that at the gain of Brahmajñāna, all the entities other than Brahman stand sublated. This is what is called Bādha or sublation in the Advaita. But Vādirāja says that the Advaita cannot explain this sublation properly. He poses the question: "Is this Bādha true or not?" If it is held true then, it is nothing but accepting another real entity which in turn makes the very sublation impossible, and also spoils the very idea of Advaita. And if it is not true, then it cannot sublate any entity. Thus in both the cases, the theory of sublation cannot be sustained.<sup>1073</sup> In the Advaita the Brahmajñāna or the sublating knowledge is taken to destroy the nescience and then the world. Thus it is not sublation but destruction like the destruction of a pot. Further, 'sublation' is explained as the realization of the absence of the object relating to all the three times- past, present and future. But this is not correct. There is not a thing that could deny certain thing at all the three times basing on the relating.<sup>1074</sup> The denial is possible provided something is real at sometime.

Vādirāja promises that the 'Ekamevādvītiyam' Śruti does not deal with any kind of sublation. It does not deny

the presence of objects other than Brahman. But, it states that there is not even a single object equal or superior to Brahman. Likewise the Śruti- 'Neha nānāsti...' also does not deny the objects other than Brahman but it denies the internal differences in Brahman in respect of His qualities, incarnations and the like. Thus, these passages do not support the 'sublation' and the Viśvamithyātva. As Vyavahārikasattā means ultimately non-existence, it cannot afford the chance of some type of real existence to any objects. The acceptance of the Vyavahārikasattā does not make the objects real for their sublation.<sup>1075</sup> Vādirāja says that the Śruti 'Bhidyate hrdayagranthih'<sup>1075A</sup> does not refer to either sublation or total destruction. It mentions the destruction of Karma, Punya, Papa and the like. So by the Brahmajñāna neither sublation nor even the destruction of the entire world is possible. The world has been there since beginningless times and so far none has experienced its sublation. Thus, the very fact proves the reality of the world. Vādirāja states also the syllogism: "World is absolutely real since it does not get sublated like Brahman." This argument is defectless in all the respects and hence establishes the reality of the world. The passage, 'Viśvam satyam'<sup>1075B</sup> also substantiates the reality of the world. Thus, there is not even a single evidence, may be of any kind, that could refer to Jaganmityātva.<sup>1076</sup>

The Advaita considers this world as Sadasadvilaksana or inexplicable as either existing or non-existing. That means, it is neither real nor unreal. It is different from both. The Advaitins say that the passage 'Nā-asad-āśit no sad-āśit...'<sup>1076A</sup> supports their Sadasadvilaksana concept. But, really speaking it does not support. Because, if Asad is understood as it stands for Atyantābhāva or absolute non-existence then, there is no point in negating once again by 'Na āśit.' The Atyantābhāva as its very name clarifies, can never be present either in Pralaya or in Sṛsti. Therefore the expression 'Na āśit' regarding it serves no purpose. And as Sat or existence is not expected to be in Pralaya by the Advaitins there is no need to deny it. So this passage does not explain the Sadasadvilaksanatva of the Advaitins. It simply conveys that Asat is always absent and Sat is absent only during Pralaya. And further, as Sat is meant to be Brahman by the Advaitins, their contention is supposed to deny even the existence of Brahman during Pralaya. Hence it leads to Brahmamithyatva<sup>1077</sup> which no Advaitin will ever dare to accept. Thus the passage does not support the Sadasadvilaksanatva and the Jagan-mithyatva of the Advaitins. The reality is the prime-import of all the passages as shown above.

### ŠUKTIRAJATA IS NOT SADASADVILAKSANA AND ASAT-PRATĪTI POSSIBLE

The Advaita-concept of Sadasadvilaksana means neither real or existing nor unreal or non-existing. The world, according to the Advaitins, is Sadasadvilaksana that means it is neither real nor unreal. As an example they refer to the Šuktirajata or the shell-silver and Rajjusarpa or the rope-serpent. The Šuktirajata and Rajjusarpa should be distinguished from a Śaśaviṣāna or hare's horn and or the son of a barren woman. Vandhyāputra/ The Śaśaviṣāna is totally non-existent whereas the Šuktirajata, being real and unreal, is not totally Asat. Hence it is Sadasadvilaksana. The Šuktirajata or Rajjusarpa are real to the extent that they are not real because they are sublated. The Advaita-argument is 'Sat cet na bādhyeta, asat cet na pratiyeta.' Vādirāja says that this argument is defective and fallacious. Because, both the Rajjusarpa and the Šuktirajata are also Asat. He argues that Asat-Pratīti, the knowledge of non-existent is possible, that means there can be the knowledge of Śaśaviṣāna. But it is true that this knowledge of Asat is defective verbal comprehension. In ordinary verbal comprehension, true relation between the word and the corresponding object is necessary. But in the case of Asat it is not possible. Though defective, verbal comprehension is possible in the case of Asat. The defective comprehension or verbal experience of Šuktirajata or Rajjusarpa does not lead to any Sat-Pratīti because the two are

Asat, Vādirāja argues that there is no difference in both the experiences of Śaśavisāna and Śuktirajata or Rajjusarpa. Because the non-existent state of the entity that is experienced, is common in both the cases.<sup>1078</sup> So there is no ground to treat them separately or differently. In the case of the Śaśavisāna, the defective experience is verbal and in the case of the Śuktirajata, defective experience is perceptual. But experience, being defective, is common in both. And moreover, the entities, referred to in both the cases, are Asat. Hence, both the experiences are about the Asat or non-existents.<sup>1079</sup>

But the Advaitins defend and argue that both the Śuktirajata experience and the Śaśavisāna-experience are to be distinguished. Because, illusion of Rajata takes place only in respect of Śukti and illusion of Sarpa in Rajju. And this happens due to previous experience of Rajata or Sarpa. He, who has no previous experience of these, cannot have the illusions. So the contents of previous experience are not totally Asat. But in the case of the Śaśavisāna-comprehension the entity is totally Asat. But this argument is not correct. Because, the Rajata or Sarpa that were experienced earlier cannot be the contents of this experience because they are not physically present in this experience. It is the element of similarity of the objects

already experienced and of the object present before, that leads to illusion. If there is no similarity then there can be no illusion. The contents or objects of previous experience are no doubt, real but the contents of this experience are as much Asat as the Śāśavīśāna. The previous experience, through similarity, leads to illusion but it cannot contribute the reality to the contents of this experience. The defects may be different in respect of the Śuktirajata and the Śāśavīśāna but common fact is that both the experiences are Asat-nature. And as already mentioned, there is every possibility to have the verbal cognition or perceptual cognition of the Asat. And this cognition is due to the defects involved. So the world cannot be Sadasadvilakṣaṇa. And its cognition is possible in either case, real or unreal.

#### REFUTATION OF VIŚIṢṬAJÑĀNA ORIGINATING FROM VIŚEṢĀNAJÑĀNA

The Advaitins explain that the Viśiṣṭajñāna or distinctive knowledge originates from the Viśeṣānajñāna or the knowledge of attributive. In their opinion, the content of the previous experience of true Rajata is the Viśeṣāna. That means the previous experience is Viśeṣānajñāna. And the Śuktirajata experience is the Viśiṣṭajñāna. It is this Viśeṣānajñāna that is responsible for the Viśiṣṭajñāna. But Vādirāja says that in the Śuktirajata-

experience it is not the previous experience of true silver as Visesana that is responsible but it is the similarity of shell and silver that has led to the shell-silver experience.<sup>1080</sup> But this experience involves a non-existing silver as the content of the experience.

Then one may raise the objection: How does the non-existing silver get related with the eye? If not, without the contact of the eye and the object how can there be perceptual experience? Vādirāja replies that it is impossible to trace and to show the relation since the very object silver is not at all real. Even the Advaitins cannot show the contact in this case. Here the contact is not with the unreal silver but it is with the shell itself. And this shell due to defect and similarity, is taken to be responsible to lead to the illusion of a non-existing silver. The shell-silver experience and hare's horn experience are of the same kind. There is no difference at all. To prove this, Vādirāja advances a syllogism: Vimataṁ śuktirajatam na asataḥ vyatiricyate trikālyām niṣedhyatvāt and promises that there is no difference between the shell-silver experience and the hare's horn experience, since the contents of both the experiences are unreal. Hence, it is not possible for the Advaitins to establish Sadasadvilaksanatva or Mithyātva of the world on the basis of the shell-

silver because, as shown the shell-silver itself is not inexplicable.

#### SATTA OR REALITY OF BRAHMAN IS NOT ADHISTHĀNAGATA

According to the Advaita, it is not the jar as an entity that is perceived but it is the Satta or reality of Brahman, underlying the jar that is perceived. It believes that things have no reality of their own in this world. But this view is not correct. Because, Pratyakṣa or perception alone is sufficient to prove the reality of the things of the world.

The direct perceptual experience of the things as 'Ghatah san', 'Patah san' ascertains the reality of the things of the world.<sup>1081</sup> When this experience of reality originates, it will not come in the way of past and future experiences. Because, this experience has the reference with past, present and future. And it is perceived by the eye supported by the Sāksin. The Sāksin is capable to perceive even the time factor, may be past, present and future. So when the defectless eye perceives the reality of the things with reference to the time present, then it is understood that the reality of the things stands perceived with reference to the past and future also. There also the support of the Sāksin is evident.

Here the defectless nature of the senses like eye is most important and also responsible for the perception of the reality. It is the defectless nature of the senses that with the support of the Sāksin, widens the scope of the present perception or comprehension of reality stretching to the past and the future. When the eye perceives a thing having colour, it not only perceives the colour of the object but also the reality of the object. Because, the colour itself is not an object or reality. Neither the colour has any colour nor the reality of the colour has any colour. It is the colour of the object. So the perception of the coloured object means perception of the colour as well as the reality of the object. And the perception of this reality is not restricted to the present time but to the time in general. So it ascertains the fact that objects with their reality are always perceived by defectless senses. If senses are defective then the comprehension of the reality of the object is not possible. Thus, the reality of the things of the world could be established by perceptual experiences.

According to the Advaita, the things of the world such as jar and others have no reality. It is the Sattā or reality of Brahman that is reflected. The experiences like 'Ghatāḥ san' and others are related to this Sattā.

that is underlying (Adhisthāna). But this view is not tenable. Because, Vādirāja doubts as to what happens in the case those experiences such as Nilo ghatah, Nilo patah and the like? To what does this Nilatva belong? Is it only reflected in Ghata? According to the Advaita, this Nilatva should be understood as belonging to Brahman. And in experiences as Asad rajatam, Asattva should also belong to Brahman. As Sattva of Ghata belongs to Brahman, on the same ground Nilatva as well as Asattva should also be taken as belonging to Brahman.<sup>1082</sup> But this is unworthy and also contrary to the Advaita. Because, in that case, in view of the experiences, Brahman would be having attributes (Nilatva) sometimes and it would be Mithyā (Asad) sometimes. Thus it lands into absurdity. Hence, in the experiences San ghatah and others Sattva is the Sattva of Ghata and not of Brahman. Because, as Ghata etc., are Pratyakṣa, Brahman is not Pratyakṣa; when Brahman is not Pratyakṣa how can the Sattā of It be Pratyakṣa in Ghata? Vādirāja says that it is not possible to see the invisible ghost in visible objects. In the same way Sattā of Brahman cannot be seen in Ghata etc. It is the Sattā of respective entity seen there. Further the experiences such as Bhūtale ghataḥ san ākāśe ghataḥ asan ascertain the fact that Sattva and Asattva are referred to Ghata and not to Brahman. The Sattva and Asattva factors of material objects cannot be referred to as belonging to Brahman.

Further, Vadirāja points out the possibility of explaining the experiences of Ghataḥ san, according to the Advaita. The Advaita-contention is that the Sattā of Brahman is reflected in the experiences. And this type of experience may be explained in one of the four ways: 1) The Sattā of Brahman - the Adhisthāna continues to be present in Ghata etc.; 2) The Sattā does not continue, but the Brahmanisthā Sattā is superimposed; 3) The Sattā is in Brahman. The Ghata is experienced as Ghata and not as San ghataḥ. The Sattā that is experienced belongs to Brahman; 4) The Ghata has separate Sattā and the same Sattā is experienced as it is.<sup>1083</sup> In the first case, however, the Sattā is accepted in Ghata. And hence, the purpose of attributing Sattā is served. In the second view the Sattā being superimposed leads to the superimposition of Cittva also since, in the Advaita, Sattva and Cittva are inseparable. If the Sattva alone is superimposed then it indicates the absence of the Cittva in the Ghata etc. Hence the Cittva in the Ghata stands sublated. When the Cittva stands sublated then, on account of invariable concomittance the Sattva also stands sublated. And in the Advaita whatever stands sublated is Prātibhāsika. But the Ghata and others are treated as Vyāvahārika in the Advaita. It is evident that the Ghata and others that are Jada are distinct from Cit. So the Sattva of the Ghata etc., is not same as the Sattva

of the Cit. The Sattva of the Cit cannot be present in the Ghata etc., that are Jada. The Sattva of the Cit and the Sattva of the Jada are distinct to each other.<sup>1084</sup> In the third alternative, the Sattva is stated as belonging to Brahman. If that would be the case, how can then it get reflected in the experiences Ghataḥ san and the like. And the acceptance of transfer of the Sattā of Brahman to the Ghata and the like leads to the acceptance of Anyathākhyati-vāda of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. But both the Dvaita and the Advaita do not accept this. Therefore, the third alternative is untenable. The fourth case that accepts the Sattā for entities like the Ghata, is welcomed. Because, here it is not the Vyāvahārika Sattā or ephemeral reality that is taken into account but the Pāramārthikasattā, the ultimate reality. It is also not the Prātibhāsika sattā or illusory reality. Because, this Sattā (for Ghata) does not get sublated. It stands unsublated since the experience of the Sattā of the Ghata is Pratyakṣa or perceptual experience. The contention of the Advaitins that it is the Śabda-pramāṇa or testimony that supposes the sublation, is not correct. Because, in such cases, the testimony cannot invalidate the experience derived from perception. When there arises the conflict between perception and testimony, the latter is to be reinterpreted and explained in accordance with perception.<sup>1085</sup> To

ascertain as to which Pramāna is stronger and which is weaker, there are certain criteria which are Upajīvya-Upajīvaka, Niravakāśa-Sāvakāśa and the like. And the principles such as Pūrvapara, Vidhi-nisedha and others that are accepted and advocated by the Advaita, do not serve any purpose. Further, this pattern of Pūrvapara tends to prove the Smṛti to be superior to the Śruti. And the Vidhi-nisedha principle may lead to negate sacrificial Himsā. So these principles cannot determine the strength or weakness of the Pramāṇas.

The Pratyakṣa or perception is Upajīvya and hence it is stronger. If at all there is conflict between perception and inference, the inference is to be rejected in favour of perception. And if there is conflict between perception and testimony, then testimony is to be interpreted and explained in accordance with perception.

Therefore, Vādirāja says that experience of Sattā in the expressions San ghaṭaḥ and the like has valid support of perception. And this experience, which is relevant in all respects, cannot be overthrown by any other Pramāṇas. So in the experiences San ghaṭaḥ and the like it is the Sattā or reality of the Ghaṭa that is experienced and not the Sattā of Brahman underlying it.

PRATYAKSA IS PRABALA

In the experiences of the pot and others, Pratyaksa or perception is the superior authority or valid means of knowledge or means of valid knowledge. And this perception cannot be sublated by any other Pramāṇas. If at all there are some defects then the experience of this perception is not valid. A defectless perception is the superior valid means of knowledge to others. In the experiences of pot and the like as there are no defects, perception is unobstructed. Perception in such cases reveals and confirms the reality of those objects. Thus, perception helps to prove the reality of the things of the world. Since the nescience is not related with insentienty, it cannot be a defect in respect of insentient things. 1086 Even according to the Advaita, nescience cannot be there as a defect. Because, at the time Ghatapratyaksa, nescience concealing the Adhisthāna caitanya underlying the pot, is withdrawn. Therefore, in the Ghatapratyaksa there cannot be nescience as a defect.

As already stated perception being Upajīvya or supporting evidence is stronger. Accordingly the perception of the world becomes Upajīvya and testimony cannot invalidate it. Vadirāja says that even the Brahmaparokṣa and the Aikya-śrutis of the Advaita cannot invalidate the perception

of the world because in the Advaita, Brahmaparokṣa is Niṣprakāraka and the Śrutis are Akhandārthabodhaka. If it is held that these two contradict the perception then, the very nature of Nisprakārakatva of Brahmaparokṣa and Akhandārthatva of the Śrutis would be no more. Hence, these do not invalidate the reality of the world which is substantiated by perception. And on the other hand, passages Ekavijñānenā sarvavijñāna and others prove the reality of the world. Because, Sarvavijñāna or the knowledge of all is possible only when there is Sarvasatyatva or the reality of all. And this is none other than Viśvasatyatva.<sup>1087</sup> If inference contradicts perception then, it is sure that concerned inference is fallacious. Hence, inference cannot invalidate the perception since perception is superior to inference. And moreover, inference functions on the basis of the source of information already ascertained by perception. Perception free from defects cannot be invalidated by testimony (Āgama).

Further, superficial meaning of Āgama or scriptural statements is not valid always and every where. The expressed meaning of Ādityoyūpah, Yajamānah prastarah and such other passages serves no purpose. If this literal or superficial meaning is insisted on, then there is no practical utility of these statements. Hence, it becomes

rather clear that whenever there is a conflict between Āgama and perception, Āgama is to be reinterpreted in accordance with perception. Vadiraja points out that even the Advaitins do not interpret the passages- Tattvamasi and the like literally. Because, in that case the literal interpretation conveys the Viśiṣṭaikya which is not at all accepted by the Advaita. In the same way, the literal import of the passage Sarvam khalvidam Brahma appears to convey the identity of the insentient and the sentient. But the Advaita does not accept this identity.<sup>1088</sup> Vādirāja refers to the scope of the grammar and asserts that there is every possibility and also sanction of the grammar to understand the particular case meaning with regard to another in the Veda. He also quotes the reference of usages of the Gītā and the Mahābhārata where the word Sarva is used in connection with different case-meaning. This confirms that there is scope to reinterpret the scriptural passages to avoid their conflict with perception. So as perception of the world is defectless, it cannot be disproved by any other means of knowledge.

#### DREAM-OBJECTS ARE REAL AND ASAT HAS NO ARTHAKRIYĀKĀRITVA

So far the objects experienced during the waking state are proved as real. Not only these objects are true but even the objects seen in the dreams are also true. The

true nature of dream-objects is explained by the Sūtrakāra in the Brahmasūtra-Sandhye srstih aha hi (III.ii.2) and others.<sup>1089</sup> There it is explained that the dream-objects are produced by Vāsanā or past impressions and hence they are subtle. But their true nature is not negated. No doubt that the nature of the dream-objects differs from that of the objects of waking state. It is because of the cause. This difference does not harm their true nature. This is also evident from the fact that they cause certain effects such as pleasure, fear and so on. As the dream-objects are true, their experiences are also true. The objects, seen during a dream, may not be seen in the waking state. And this also does not disprove their true nature. As the objects, seen in the dream have some effects, there must be some causes that produce them. Because, only real causes produce real results. An unreal cause can lead to no results. And there is no condition as such that causes must be of the same nature in all respects.<sup>1090</sup>

Vādirāja refers to the Advaita view that the cause precedes the effect. It is the true Adhisthāna caitanya as a cause that leads to the effect of Āropita. Thus, it proves that without a cause, an effect cannot take place. So the dream-objects, being effects must have causes of

their own. And that is the Vāsanā or previous impressions. And there are some causes that are present everywhere and at all times such as Ākāśa, Kāla and others. Brahman is also the ever-present cause of all creations,<sup>1091</sup>

The Advaita view that in the ultimate analysis, the scriptures are also unreal but they produce the true knowledge of Ātmaikya, is not correct. Because, whatever is unreal or non-existent has no Arthakriyākāritvā or capacity to give rise to desired fruits. That means non-existent cannot produce a real thing. So too false statement cannot give rise to true knowledge. Vādirāja opines that the false knowledge originates from false circumstances. Because of false circumstances it may happen sometimes that the lustre of the gem is mistaken for gem, a Sākhācandra for Candra and the like. Here it is the false circumstances that produce false knowledge. So if scripture is held to be unreal Mithyā then the knowledge, originated from it, must also be unreal. So the Ātmaikya-knowledge, caused from unreal scriptures, will also be unreal. And this unreal identity will not lead to any real liberation. Thus acceptance of passage as unreal lands the Advaitins in unreality in all respects. Because, unreal passage cannot produce true knowledge and then unreal knowledge cannot lead to true liberation. Thus, it results into

everything to be unreal that has no Arthakriyākāritva or effectiveness.

#### DRŚYATVA AND OTHER HETUS DO NOT PROVE MITHYĀTVA BUT SATYATVA

The Advaitins hold that the causes or reasons viz., Drśyatva or being seen, Jadatva or insentienty and Pari-cchinnatva or limitedness establish the unreality of the world. Really speaking, these causes do not prove unreality of the world. Vādirāja critically examines and proves that on the other hand these causes or reasons establish the reality of the world. Drśyatva is the fact of being the object of experience. It cannot prove Mithyātva since it is not Nirupākhyā. The Nirupākhyā is that object which has no form of expression of its own. Therefore, it is nothing but non-existent. Further it cannot be described in anyway. But if an object is Drśya, then it cannot be of formless nature. The Drśyatva ascertains the respective form of the object and it is quite opposite of formlessness. So Drśyatvahetu, since ascertains the form of the object, does not prove unreality of that object, but proves reality of the same. Thus, Drśyatva does not help to prove unreality of the world. Similarly, the second reason, insentienty also proves not the unreality of the world. But it proves that the world is not sentient. It is only the negation of sentiency

and not of the reality of the world. And the third reason Paricchinnatva deals with the proves the nature of limit in respect of space, time and the like but not unreality of the world. Thus, all these reasons do not establish the unreality of the world. As there is no difference ultimately in the Vyāvahārikasatyatva and the Mithyātva according to the Advaitins, the world cannot also be considered as Vyāvahārikasatyatva. And moreover, neither of these reasons prove this Vyāvahārikasatyatva. Therefore, the world is as real as Brahman.<sup>1092</sup>

Vādirāja asserts that the Viśvapratyakṣa or perception of the world cannot be erroneous. Because, there must be some or other defect for an erroneous perception. As there is no any defect in Viśvapratyakṣa, it cannot be erroneous. And Avidyā of the Advaita can also not be a defect in this respect. If this Avidyā is taken to be a defect then what would be the nature of Avidyā, the defect. Vādirāja explains this Avidyā in three ways:

- (1) It is a defect without having any definite role;
- (2) It is a defect that prevents true knowledge;
- (3) And it is a defect that produces erroneous knowledge.

In the first case, the Avidyā is a defect but as there is no any particular role to be played, even merits will become demerits in some cases. In the second alternative,

Avidyā, being a defect, may prevent Brahmajnāna which is true knowledge but not the Viśvapratyakṣa. So Avidyā cannot be a defect for Viśvapratyakṣa and as it is not a defect it cannot hold to its illusion. In the third case, as Avidyā or nescience is untenable, the view that Avidyā produces erroneous knowledge is not correct. Because, the knowledge of pot and the like does not consist of any erroneous element. It is not experienced by perception. So there is no scope for Avidyā, making something erroneous. And further when something is mistaken for something else then, only there arises erroneous knowledge. But in the knowledge of a pot it is not mistaken for something else. So nescience being unreal, cannot be a defect in the knowledge of the things of the world. Hence, there is no change for any erroneous experience due to this.

And further, in the Advaita, the Avidyā belongs to Brahman and not to any other since Brahman alone is Sat. When it is said that the Avidyā belongs to Brahman it may produce erroneous experience in Brahman but not in souls, the matter and means of knowledge like Pramāṇas, perception and others. So Avidyā, since being not connected with the world, cannot prove unreality of the world. In the Advaita, Brahman is declared to be the Adhisthāna for pot and other objects. And for attributes potness and the like, the very

objects become Adhisthana or locus. So the fact that Brahman is the locus is given up. And these potness and the like, cannot be the erroneous projections of Brahman.<sup>1093</sup> If Brahman is taken to be the locus for potness then very idea would be a endless one.

The Advaitins hold that the world is unreal because, the nescience is the material cause for the world. But it is not correct because nescience cannot be the material cause for the world. Because, it is our stock experience that the objects in the world have respective material causes. E.g. a pot has the earth as its material cause therefore, nescience need not be fabricated and taken to be as material cause. According to the Advaita also, nescience is withdrawn at the time of perception of objects pot and others. That means the nescience in the form of material cause is not present at the time of perception. It amounts to saying that mud is not present when a pot is perceived. That means effect remains without a cause, which is absurd. Hence, nescience can never be the material cause for the world. And world is not the illusory projection.<sup>1094</sup>

It is proved that the objects of the world are real. As the objects are real, the attributes of these objects are also real. The Advaitins hold that the attributes

potness and the like, are not real. But this contention is not correct. Vādirāja doubts as what is the ground for this negation of attributes? Is it with reference to Brahman? If the denial of the attributes is with reference to the objects then, the attributes of one object may be observed in some other objects as all of them are illusory projections. And if the denial of the attributes is with reference to Brahman then the very denial will not affect the real presence of objects. Thus, it proves the reality of the attributes of the objects. So potness and the like are as real as the very objects. As there is no any sublation of the experience, these attributes are not at all simply ephemeral. Hence, all the attributes such as Jati, Guna, Karma and other of the things of the world are real.<sup>1095</sup>

In the Advaita, the means of valid knowledge like perception are the products of nescience. And hence, their contention is that they are not true in the ultimate analysis of Truth. But this is wrong. Because, this nescience is not the material cause for this world. As already pointed out earlier, this world stands unsublated to our valid perception, and these means cannot be due to nescience. Otherwise the experience of the world must be sublated. The argument of the Advaita that there is no

real world since there are no means to establish it and there are no means since there is nothing to be established, involves Anyonyāśrayadosa.<sup>1096</sup> Not only that, the very contention and argument of the Advaita would cause the negation of the very existence of Brahman. So means like perception and the like are not due to nescience.

Vādirāja argues that the nescience of the Advaita, since being beginningless, is to be considered as true. As it is beginningless one more nescience need not be envisaged for this nescience. When nescience is true, how then the means of knowledge be false? Though they are taken due to nescience, they are not false. Further, just without taking into consideration the beginninglessness of nescience, if it is argued that nescience is unreal then, it cannot be proved by the valid means perception and others that arise out it. Thus, the very concept nescience stands baseless. And this cannot establish the unreality of the world.

One more contention of the Advaita that whatever is Arthakriyākāri is Mithyā. As there is Arthakriyākāritva in the world, it is not real. This contention of the Advaita verily denies the practical utility of the things of the world. So Arthakriyākāritva must be taken to be

the prime-base of reality. If not then, that amounts to saying that thirst can be quenched by mirage. Thirst is satisfied when one drinks water and not by mirage. Otherwise, there should not be any difference between water and mirage.<sup>1097</sup> And acceptance of different degrees of reality does not help the Advaita to prove unreality of any kind. Difference in the degrees of existence is not the criterion for unreality and reality but it is the sublation and non-sublation that ascertains the unreality and reality.

Therefore, it is evident that reality is responsible for Arthakriyākāritva. The Advaitins, who accept Arthakriyākāritva of the world, have to admit voluntarily the Satyatva of the world.<sup>1098</sup> The idea of Vyāvahārikasatyatva of the Advaita does not contribute Arthakriyākāritva of any kind. Because, the very idea of Vyāvahārikasatyatva is nothing but Asattva or non-existence. And an non-existent cannot be Arthakriyākāri. Thus, it is proved that wherever there is Arthakriyākāritva there is Satyatva. So the world is real as it is Arthakriyākāri.

This real world is created by Brahman. He being sentient, is the creator of this world. That which is insentient and material does have the power of creation. Therefore, nescience of the Advaita since being material,

cannot be the creator. It cannot contribute any Arthakriyākāritva to the world. The Bhagavata and authorities works declare that Brahman is the sole Independent creator of this world. Hence, the Arthakriyākāritva of the world is due to Brahman. So the reality of the world remains unaffected.

Vādirāja promises that not only perception and scriptures establish the reality of the world, even inference also establishes the world-reality. The syllogisms pots and the like are real because there is unobstructed contact in between eye and those things. Pillar, pitcher and other objects are real since those are connected with each other; establish the reality of the world.<sup>1099</sup> When defectless sense organs produce the knowledge, the knowledge must be true. And the objects of this knowledge are also true. The verses Nayatva Māya..., Āpaśca Praminanti and others make it clear that the Lord does not create anything illusorily. When there is no illusory creation, the knowledge, gained, need not be about illusory objects. Thus, neither scriptures nor inference nor even perception supports the unreality view of the Advaitins. All these authorities support the reality of the world.

TEN ARGUMENTS AGAINST ĀROPA

Here Vādirāja summarises the ten arguments that are adduced in the Viśvasaurabha for the refutation of Mithyātva or unreality. The arguments are delineated by the way of exposing defects in the Advaita contention of Mithyātva or unreality.

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi has succinctly enlisted them as follow:-

- "(1) Nowhere in the Śruti the reality of the world is denied;
- (2) Nowhere in the Śruti it is stated that the world does not exist at all the three times (and merely appears);
- (3) The so-called Advaita Śrutis which are supposed to imply Mithyātva are Akhandārthabodhaka. Therefore, they are not capable of conveying anything more than the Akhandārtha of Ātmāikya. Hence, they do not convey Mithyātva of the world;
- (4) The final Brahmapramāṇa which is supposed to imply Mithyātva of other things is also not capable of it since it is Nirvikalpaka and cannot convey anything more than Brahman.
- (5) The attributes Ghatatva etc., are not denied in their respective abodes and therefore, their unreality cannot be established.

(6) The Sabda-pramāna is found suitably reinterpreted whenever it conflicts with Pratyakṣa. Therefore, so-called Mithyātva Śrutis have to be reinterpreted to conform to Pratyakṣa that establishes Viśvasat�atva.

(7) Ekavijñānena sarvavijñāna is possible only if other things are true.

(8) There are Śruti passages that directly state Viśvasat�atva.

(9) Āropa of the world over Brahman cannot be properly explained.

(10) If so called Mithyā Śrutis have to be honoured why not honour the Śrutis like Asadeva idam agre āśit and consider Brahman as Asat? If Asatva Śruti has to be suitably reinterpreted, then the so called Mithyātva Śrutis also have to be reinterpreted to avoid conflict with Viśvasat�atvapratyakṣa.<sup>1100</sup>

Thus, Vādirāja establishes that it is not possible to establish the Viśvamithyātva by any means of knowledge. All the means jointly and ultimately declare the Viśvasat�atva. Vādirāja humbly acknowledges the credit to Madhva and says that it is he who has given these ten arguments to prove the reality of the world refuting the unreality tried to be established by the Advaitins.

V. PHALASAURABHAŚRAVANA, MANANA AND NIDHIDHYĀSANA ETC., ARE THE MEANS OF LIBERATION

Śravana, Manana and Nidhidhyāsana are the three aids of the mind that in course of time, enable the mind to attain the Aparokṣajñāna of the Lord. The contention of the Advaita is that the knowledge alone removes nescience. But it is untenable. Because, if knowledge alone were to remove nescience, then, liberation would have been immediately after knowledge. But this does not happen. And moreover, if it is said that nescience does not become an obstacle to Manovṛttijñāna, then Brahmasaṃkṣātkāra, through the mind would be for ever. But it never happens.<sup>1101</sup> So to get removed the obstacle, sacred hearing etc., are wanted. The contention of the Advaita is defective since it leads to Anyonyāśrayadoṣa (mutual dependence) of two types. If nescience becomes an obstacle to the mind for Brahmadarśana or even if it does not become, the defect of mutual dependence is inevitable. When nescience is removed, there is Brahmadarśana and at Brahmadarśana only nescience can be removed. Secondly, if nescience is not an obstacle then there should be always direct vision and if there is direct vision always then there cannot be obstacle of nescience.<sup>1102</sup> So if nescience is accepted then, there cannot be Saṃkṣātkāra and also the release. So the view of the Advaitins that

knowledge by its very nature removes nescience and no God's grace is required for liberation, is unsound <sup>in fact</sup>. The God's grace is the only ultimate resort to attain the liberation.

To have the Darśana of the Lord through His grace, sacred hearing, repetition and meditation are the three aids, with the help of which, mind gains the power to have the vision of the Lord. Śravana is the study of scriptures in prescribed manner. The study is the understanding of the scriptures as determined by Śāstras. Manana is an inquiry of this purport through appropriate reasons. Dhyāna is the meditation on the auspicious attributes of Lord. These three aids are to be put into practice until each leads to the next. Mind is the main and prime aid in realization. the mind when obstructed with the obstacle ignorance cannot realize the God. The above mentioned three aids become prime-sources or means for removing the obstacle of mind. 1103

The one, who undergoes the course of practice of these three aids accordingly, becomes a qualified one. God, pleased with the meditation of this devotee, will bestow His grace upon him, remove the obstacle of ignorance and grant His direct vision. He will also grant His Darśana. In the Śrutiśāṭa of the Bhāgavata, God is praised as sole

competent to remove the ignorance.<sup>1104</sup> This obstacle, ignorance, has two aspects. One is Jīvācchādikā that conceals the nature of the soul and the other Paramācchādikā that makes the nature of the Lord unknown. God will destroy the first and withdraw the second one. He withdraws the second one, now and then until the final liberation.<sup>1105</sup> That is why God is sometimes seen and sometimes not seen by such seekers. This will continue until the final liberation and this state is called Jīvanmukti state. If it is argued that one can attain the liberation by the very nature and origin of knowledge also then, there must not be any delay in attaining the liberation. By the time ignorance with its effects such as Kāma, Karma is removed by knowledge, immediately one should attain the liberation. But this does not take place. Therefore, God's grace is inevitable. Lord is the sole giver of release. At the time of attaining the release, Lord will remove both the obstacles and disclose His blissful form and make it visible to the liberated then forever according to their inherent ability. Thus, liberation is strictly under the control of and subject to the grace of the Lord.<sup>1106</sup>

Another view of the Advaitins, related to this, is that sacred hearing is also the direct means to attain the direct cognition and hence sacred hearing may also be

sufficient to have direct cognition like repetition and meditation.<sup>1106A</sup> But this is not correct. Because, hearing is not permanent. And moreover, if it is said that direct vision is possible just after hearing then, hearing alone to be considered as Sādhana and not the others. But in the Śruti, all the three aids Śravana, Manana and Nidhi-dhyāsana are prescribed as Sādhanas one after another.<sup>1106B</sup> Meditation is prescribed after repetition. Hence, for direct cognition, meditation is the direct Sadhana and not the hearing. With the help of these three aids, mind gains the direct cognition and then attains the vision of the Lord. Hearing helps to have the indirect cognition and never assists to gain the direct cognition. The statements as 'Pot is in the house' and others cannot be cited as examples in respect of the direct vision. Because, at the listening of the word Brahman, the direct vision of the Lord will not take place. So hearing, though first aid, is not the direct means for direct vision. Meditation is the prime whereas hearing and repetition are auxilliary to that.

The Sabda-pramāṇa or verbal testimony does not lead to direct cognition. The Advaitins hold that testimony leads to direct cognition. The stock example quoted in this regard is Dīśamah tvam asi - 'You are the tenth person.' When some one counts nine persons around him and fails to perceive

himself as tenth; then another person points out and says 'You are the tenth person.' Thus through this statement, he gets the direct cognition - direct knowledge of himself. This is an example wherein testimony leads to direct cognition. On the same ground, the Advaitins argue that the statement or expression 'Tat tvam asi' leads to direct cognition. But this theory is not correct. In the instance given by them, the testimony or the statement does not give the direct knowledge as 'I am the tenth person.' But it only removes the distraction of the mind. Then he realizes that he is the tenth person. This is Mānasajñāna. The testimony only helped him to draw his attention towards himself. And this is not the direct cognition; whereas Mānasajñāna as 'I am the tenth person' is the direct cognition. Thus, testimony conveys only possible sense always and nothing else. So, the undistracted mind, engaged in the meditation of the Lord, will realize Brahman as in the case of the Mānasajñāna, 'I am the tenth person.'<sup>1107</sup> And moreover, a Yogin, who is engaged in deep meditation and whose external organs are actionless, has no use of testimony through which he can have the direct vision. But it is the meditation that helps his mind to have direct cognition and then direct vision. So testimony is of no use in Brahma-darśana.' Mānasajñāna gets originated without the articulation of any Sabda. Therefore the view that testimony leads

to direct cognition is untenable. Mere listening of the word 'pot' does not make the pot visible. Thus, the mind of a Yогin, when deeply immersed in the meditation, will produce the direct cognition and help him to have the vision of Brahman. In the Śruti, hearing is stated first then repetition and lastly meditation. Meditation is the direct and prime aid that leads to direct cognition and direct vision.<sup>1108</sup> Further, the view of the Advaita has no practical application and utility. Because, he, who listens to the word 'food', cannot have the satisfying experience. This experience can be seen in him, who is actually taking the food. Thus, it is evident that mere hearing will not cause Brahma-darśana.<sup>1109</sup> Since the Advaitins subscribe to the view of Anvitābhidhāna, no statement can lead to Nirvikalpaka-jñāna. Therefore, testimony cannot lead to direct cognition directly. It is the meditation that leads to direct vision directly by the grace of the God. This has the support of Bhāgavata and Bhagavad-gīta.

Meditation is the main aid and by this meditation the dirt of the mind will be wiped away. The purified mind will become the cause of Brahma-darśana. Thus meditation is the direct means <sup>1110</sup> whereas hearing is an indirect one.

In this way, Śravana, Manana and Nidhidhyāsana are the three aids of mind for Brahma-darśana. Meditation is the main. Brahma-darśana is possible only when there is no obstacle. In case of obstacle, repeated hearing, repetition etc., are required through which the obstacle could be removed. More than this, it is the grace of God that is ultimately the ground for direct vision.<sup>1111</sup> It is made clear in the Śruti passage Yamevaisa vr̥nute tena labhyah.<sup>1111A</sup> The passage also promises that object of realization is Sakāra. The view of the realization of Nirākāra of the Advaitins is baseless and unsound. The God is Sakāra having Cidānandaśarīra (form of knowledge and bliss). This form of God is realized in the liberation by all the liberated souls. The liberated souls are also having the form of knowledge and bliss.

#### DVEŚA, KĀMA, BHAYA AND OTHERS ARE NOT MEANS OF LIBERATION

So far it is said that direct cognition, originated from hearing and others leads to liberation. Bhakti is the prime-aid to secure the grace of the Lord. This devotion leads to release through the God's grace. Thus, knowledge, devotion and others are the steps for liberation. Haribhakti and others are not demerits (Dosas) but they are the very requisites and praise worthy steps for liberation. This devotion in the Lord originates from instant hearing and the like.<sup>1112</sup>

But, however, in the Bhāgavata, the verse running  
Gopyah kāmat bhayāt kāmso dvesat caidyādayo nṛpah<sup>1112A</sup>  
appears as if stating the Kāma, Bhaya, Dvesa and others  
are the means of liberation. But it is not the real  
import of the verse. Really speaking, it was not the  
Kāma and the like, mentioned above that led to liberation  
but it is the Bhakti that enabled them to gain the grace  
of the Lord and to attain the liberation. E.g. Śīśupāla,  
who was Dvārapālaka in Vaikuntha and who was of pure  
nature, was made to come down to the earth due to curse.  
It was the curse that made him to entertain Dvesa with the  
Lord. When the effect of curse was removed, he with pure  
devotion, secured the grace of the Lord and attained the  
release. In the Brahmasūtra, Vedavyāsa has determined  
that Bhakti graced with Jñāna, is the sole means of libera-  
tion. The Śruti-Nānyah panthāḥ vidyate ayanāya<sup>1112B</sup> also  
states the same.

So Śravana, Manana, Dhyāna, Sāksatkāra, Bhakti and  
Prasāda are the steps for liberation.<sup>1113</sup>

Referring to the import of the Śruti passage, Yada  
paśyah paśyate..., Vādirāja promises that this passage  
declares the realization of Sākāra and Saguṇa Brahman. So  
it is evident that realization of Sākāra and Saguṇa Brahman

is the only means for attaining liberation and not the knowledge of identity of attributeless and formless Brahman.

The term Sāmyam in the Śruti does not mean equality but it means proximity. So it is evident that true devotion is the means of liberation.

#### PROCESS OF LIBERATION

In the last and fourth Adhyāya (chapter) of the Brahmasūtra (Phalādhyāya), Utkrānti, Mārga, Gamyā and Bhogā are described. The qualified aspirant, seeker at the gain of direct knowledge (direct vision of God) in a particular life, goes out of his material body through Brahmanādi. Then he goes to the world of Brahmā through the path of Arcis etc. There he lives until the Brahmā completes his hundred years. This, a period of hundred years of Brahmā, is called Para. The qualified souls after at the gain of direct knowledge come to this place. And living in this place is called the state of Jīvanmukti, for they have not yet attained the final liberation. On the completion of hundredth year of Brahmā, all the souls qualified for liberation and staying in Brahmaloka, will move out with Brahmā. This is called Mahāpralaya or final annihilation. All these souls will attain the liberation along with that Brahma.

The Brahma conducts all the qualified souls with him to the river Virajā. This river is Aprakṛta, non-material (that means it does <sup>not</sup> contain the material element - water). It is free from Sattva, Kajas and Tamas and is only Cid-rūpa. And it is also Lakṣmyātmaka. All the souls led by Brahma are made to take both thereby which they get their Lingaśarīras or subtle bodies destroyed. Then they join the souls already liberated and staying in the three abodes of Lord Viṣṇu, Śvetadvīpa, Anantāsana and Vaikuntha. Then, they together with already liberated ones, move into the belly of Lord Vāsudeva. This state is called Parāntakāla, Paramamokṣa, Brahmalaya and also Mahāpralaya. And at the end of the Kalpas or ages the fire of annihilation, emanated from the mouth of Saṅkarsana burns down the entire creation. Then the Samvartaka clouds, showering heavy rains wash away every thing. The water will be made dried by Tejas which will be in turn extinguished by Vāyu. Vāyu merges into Ākāśa (ether) and that merges into Ahankāra. And Ahankāra merges into Mahat and that in Prakṛti. And so far as Prakṛti is concerned it does not merge into anything else. It being the primal cause and matter, is eternal like God. In this state it remains in minute form. 1115

REFUTATION OF THE 'SARVANĀŚA' VIEW OF THE ADVAITINS

The process of Pralaya or annihilation as stated above clearly indicates that nothing is completely destroyed. The Advaitins hold that this world is the product of Ajñāna or nescience. And it will be destroyed by the knowledge. Thus, they consider the right knowledge as the cause of destruction. But this view is baseless. Nothing is totally destroyed by the right knowledge. The unreality of this world will not take place by knowledge. Even in annihilation, only created things (effects) will be destroyed and not the original or primal cause.

And moreover, a wise will not get the things destroyed by his knowledge. So the view of complete destruction is nowhere found. When things perish, they leave behind their causes. When these causes perish, they again leave their subtle causes.<sup>1116</sup> This process continues and ultimately leads to the survival of Prakṛti or primal matter (primal material cause). There is no such thing that undergoes complete destruction.<sup>1117</sup> And, one cannot say that there is destruction of all destruction, because destruction itself is undestructible. So by all means, total annihilation is impossible. The very expression as Sarvanāśa is wrong. Because, even according to the Advaita, Brahman is real and Avināśi - undestructible.

If it is admitted that, other than Brahman, everything gets destroyed, then, Jīva, different from Brahman, will also have to be destroyed. If difference between Brahman and the soul is taken to be unreal, then the Advaita cannot refer to world as separate from Brahman and liable for destruction. And if the destruction of real things is admitted then, the destruction of Jīva, his characteristics and also of other eternal things, may also take place. Thus, the acceptance of the destruction of real things, definitely and ultimately leads to the destruction of Brahman, as It being real. Therefore, complete destruction is impossible.<sup>1118</sup> That which is eternal, real, subtle and is under Lord's control, is undestructible.

Thus, after having refuted the view of total destruction of the Advaita, Vādirāja diverts his attention to the Sarvānāśa view of Tārkikas. According to them, everything originated with Adṛṣṭa or unseen cause or power, perishes completely and also there is no re-creation. Thus, this is a very strange view. Because, at the end of each age, the created world perishes and again it is going to be created at the beginning of next age. This is happening since time immemorial. Here, only effect (Kārya-world) is going to be perished and not its prime cause which is Adṛṣṭa. If it is held that Adṛṣṭa too perishes, then there

would not be any re-creation. So Adrsta which is prime cause will not perish whereas it becomes the cause of re-creation. So the Sarvanāśa view of the Advaita and of the Tarkika is baseless and untenable. The Śruti declares that, God creates the world as in past. This disproves the very fact of Sarvanāśa or total destruction.

#### LIBERATION IS THE ATTAINMENT OF THE ABODE OF LORD VISNU

In this context, the Advaita view of liberation is refuted. The Advaita holds that liberation is the gain or attainment of identity (Ātmaikya). But Vādirāja says that identity cannot be the liberation. According to him, it is the attainment of highest place. If the view of identity is admitted, then the very concept liberation of attaining highest place, would be futile. The highest place is the abode of Lord Visnu. It is also called Vaikuntha. The liberated souls, attaining this highest abode of Lord Visnu, enjoy their inherent bliss. There, they will have the vision of God always. That place is away from the Tamas, it is ever illuminous. It is the place, after attaining which, one will not come back to transmigration. It is the state of final release,<sup>1119</sup>

This state of liberation is not the state of Jīvanmukti. But it is other and superior to that. In the Bhāgavata,

Lord Kṛṣṇa says that the worlds, upto Brahmaloka, (Satyaloka) are subject to rebirth whereas his abode Vaikuntha, attainment of which will not cause any rebirth. So the liberation is the attainment of close proximity with the Lord, it is the attainment of the lotus-feet of Him, or it may also be explained as dwelling in the abode of the Lord.<sup>1120</sup> Sveta-  
dvīpa, Anantāśāna and Vaikuntha are the three abodes of the Lord, and attainment of these is the liberation.

Then, the question may be raised as to whether, like the created world, the abode of the Lord is subject to the process of creation and destruction. Vādirāja says that in the description of the creation and destruction, Lord's abode is not included. This shows that, Lord's abode is not subjected to creation and destruction,<sup>1121</sup> whereas all other worlds such as Satyaloka and others are subjected to the process of creation and destruction.

The god Mukhyavāyu conducts the qualified souls, who have fulfilled the prescribed course Sādhana, to the Lord and recommends for the attainment of the release. The Chāndogyopaniṣad also states that, the qualified souls, after attaining the release, will not come back. It is the abode of the Lord which is totally free from the defects of Samsāra (transmigration). Hence, the attainment of

release is not possible, with unworthy means. It is similar to the Lord so far as defectless nature is concerned. Like the Lord, it is also free from birth, death and the like. It is Cetanātmaka (sentient) and pervasive. The Lord is the sovereign king of this.

If the release the attainment of another and highest world is not admitted, then the prescription of the course (Sādhana) and the path of Arcis etc., would be useless. In fact, Arcis etc., is the path of attainment of release and release is the gain of the abode of the Lord.

The above explained opinion disregards the views that instant ascending is the release and attainment of the Brahmatva is the release. Because, as Brahman is all-pervasive, there cannot be either the movement of ascending or the process of attainment of Brahmatva. Because, Brahman is supreme and distinct. So there cannot be the gain of Brahmatva.

Here, it is acclaimed that, knowledge (devotion-Bhakti) is the prime means of attaining this final release. Bhakti involves the relation of servant and served between devotee and the Lord. And this proves the difference between the Lord and the soul even in release. As there

lies difference in release, there is also gradation in release among liberated souls.<sup>1122</sup>

The Bhagavadgītā describes the state (place) of release as that, where the sun shines not the moon does not illuminate, and even the fire burns not it. After attaining once, the liberated will not return to transmigration. And that is the highest abode of the Lord.<sup>1123</sup> And this release is not merely the destruction or removal of displeasure as Tārkikas contend, but it is the state of experiencing the bliss and blissful knowledge.

In Parāntakāla, that is at the end of the age, Brahmā, taking the three typed Jīvas, enters into the belly of the Lord. Then along with Sātvikas he takes both in the Virajā river. This river is of the nature of godess Lakṣmī. This river discriminates as to who is liberated and who is not. It is free from material elements and effects. It is Aprākṛta (spiritual). It is the destroyer of transmigration. All those souls, after bath, get their Liṅgaśarīra (subtle body) shattered and then enshrine with their blissful nature. Then Brahmā, getting deeply immersed in the experience of bliss of Dhyāna (contemplation) for hundred years, gets the nature manifested, along with his retinue like past liberated Brahma and experiences the bliss in

swelling. The removal of subtle body and also manifestation of the blissful nature is called Sārūpya release. And others, Sālokya, Sāmīpya and Sāyujya take place according to the eligibility of the liberated souls. In the release, the forms that the liberated souls assume, are not of Prakṛti (matter). So there is no question of rebirth.

The Sādhanas or the means for attaining such release are prescribed in Śāstras and they are the knowledge of difference between the Lord and the soul, performance of deeds without aiming at fruit or result and absence of feeling of Svātantrya (independence) in the souls. Among these, the knowledge of difference and devotion are primary and Niṣkāmakarmanuṣṭhāna or performance of the deeds without the feeling of attachment, is the secondary. All the liberated souls, including Brahmā, have no rebirth.

The qualified souls, though relieved of Prārabha karma cannot attain release independently at their own will. Only with Brahmā, they can attain it. And in some cases they are supposed to undergo and experience the effects of Prārabdhakarma knowingly or unknowingly. And after the bath in Virajā, there will not be any Prārabdhakarma. The eligible souls attain the final release during Parāntakala or at the end of final annihilation.<sup>1124</sup>

ABSENCE OF AIKYA AND SARVAMOKSA; SĀKĀRATVA AND TĀRATAMYA  
TO MUKTAS

As there are three types of souls, all of them will not attain the liberation. As already stated, only Sātvikas attain the liberation. In this context, Vādirāja literally deals with two Śruti passages, Śrnyevīra ugramugram...<sup>1124A</sup> and Parā pūrvesām...<sup>1124B</sup> The import of these passages is that the Lord sends the Asuras to the darkness (tamas) and Sātvikas such as gods and others to Vaikuntha release abode of bliss. He makes the Sātvikas to enjoy the pleasures thereof. So far as Rājasas or middle one are concerned, till they are relieved of the Lingadeha or subtle body, they go to heaven and hell and will have the mixed experience. When that subtle body of them is destroyed, they are given the state of mixed experience of pleasures and displeasures. Thus, without change and without fail, different souls will have different states and different goals to be attained. And the Lord, being supreme surpasses all these. Moreover, He is described as eternally liberated (Nityamukta). So there cannot be any identity between the Lord and souls. Further, as different souls attain different states, there cannot be release of bliss to all.<sup>1125</sup> Even the qualified do not attain the release themselves. They seek the grace of the Lord. So how can there be identity between the Lord and the souls? The Śruti,

Yedha mānadvit...<sup>1125A</sup> states that the Lord never likes and tolerates the identity and equality. When such is the case, the question of attaining the Brahmatva (identity) is gone afar.<sup>1126</sup> In the Bhāgavata, it is made clear that the engagement in Pravṛttikarma in case of Asuras, will not enable them to attain upliftment. Thus, both the Śruti and the Smṛti declare that Asuras will never attain the release (Sarvamokṣa) is impossible one. In the Bhagavadgītā also Lord Kṛṣṇa makes it clear that, those, who hate Him, who do not tolerate His supremacy, who try and hankerfer identity, will roam in unworthy births and at the end, without attaining the Lord; will fall in the deep darkness. In the case of Jaya, Vijaya and others, who hated the Lord due to the curse, this cannot be applied. Their hatred is temporary. As long as there had been the effect of curse, they opposed Lord and did mischiefs. By the time, the curse was dispelled, they assumed their original Sātvika form and were blessed with release by the Lord through His grace.

The liberated souls are infinite in number. Among them there are some, who attained the release early and others later. Some are released together and hence are called Jñātis and others Ajñātis. All the released are affectionate and intimate each other. They are like close

friends. In respect of knowledge and the like, they are not even or equal. There is gradation. The gradation hinted here is always with difference. They are not distinct from their pure and blissful nature. All the organs are of the nature of knowledge and bliss. All are graced with beautiful and charming forms. So in release, the question of formlessness, (Nirakārata) does not arise. The Śruti passage, Te ha nākam mahimānah...<sup>1126A</sup> makes it clear that they flourish and enshine with their own greatness. All of them dwell in and enjoy the pleasures of various kinds. They do not have any displeasure. Approaching the Lord, they get manifested their blissful nature and enjoy in different places.

There is gradation even in the enjoyment of the released. It is because of the difference in their inherent eternal ability and also in respect of spiritual efforts of each released soul. Therefore, the Śruti, enunciates the Ānandataratamya or gradation in the enjoyment of bliss of the liberated.<sup>1127</sup> If this gradation is not admitted, then the doubts related to the difference with regard to the efforts and the like, cannot be cleared off. And it is not logically sound to view that same result will take place with different efforts. Ānanda-mīmāṃsa in the Taittiriya Śruti deals with the Svarūpānanda (natural bliss)

with gradation. Therefore, the gradation, declared in the Śruti, with regard to bliss, is related to release. Thus, even in the release, there is gradation and it cannot be ruled out. The passage Yato vāco nivartante...<sup>1127A</sup> acclaims the infinite bliss of the Lord which is the very nature of Him. In the same context, passages that deal with the enjoyment of bliss of different liberated souls, are also seen. So, it is clear that, entire context of that Śruti refers to Svarūpānanda or natural bliss and not any other type.<sup>1128</sup>

As the Śruti (knowledge of Śruti) ensures the feeling of detachment towards mundane pleasures and initiates the souls for upliftment, it is clear that the Śruti does not talk of anything about mundane pleasures and other things in this context. In the state of Samsāra, the natural bliss is unknown and not experienced. Therefore, the explanation of natural bliss with gradation, seen in the Śruti, is related with liberation and not with transmigration. Mānuśānanda, described in the Śruti, is not of the embodied souls, since they have pleasure for some time and displeasure for some time. They do not enjoy instant bliss. If blissful nature is denied in the case of liberated souls, then that would be the release of Tarkikas, since according to them release is the state of absence of displeasure.

It does not entertain any pleasure. Therefore, gradation in the enjoyment of bliss, is to be accepted. And this gradation never entertains the possibility of Aikya but it proves difference evidently. <sup>1129</sup>

Since, in transmigration, pleasure is not permanent and is mixed with displeasure, gradation cannot be determined ultimately. The degree in the enjoyment of pleasure, in Samsara, varies from time to time, place to place and from situation to situation. Whereas this variation does not occur in the release. In the release, gradation is an ever established entity. Gradation in bliss, exists on account of the graded and different means of enjoyment. Without taking into account the difference in the means of enjoyment, reference of gradation would be meaningless and baseless. <sup>1130</sup> And this gradation asserts the mutual difference among souls and difference with the Lord even in the release. <sup>1131</sup> Thus, gradation is proved through Yukti, Śruti and Smṛti. Yukti (reason) is as there is graded difference in the means, the same must be there in results.

There are some statements such as Mama sadharmyamāgatāḥ...<sup>1131A</sup> and others, that apparently give the sense of equality. But it is to be understood in the sense as free from or absence of displeasure and other mundane defects.

So equality is impossible and gradation is inevitable. Even the Lord cannot undo it or change it.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI PASSAGES YATRATVASYA... AND OTHERS AND THE REFUTATION OF ADVITIYATVAPRĀPTI

The idea of the Advaitins that liberation is attaining the state of being alone (loneliness) is impracticable and untenable. When man is alone, he is not happy. A preceptor, a pupil, a beast, or a crow always long for the company of others, to be happy. The loneliness does not ensure any happiness. Even in the practical life, every one tries to get something other better as he is not at all happy with single possession. When an article is lost, he hankers for another. If living house is burnt away, demands for a new one. So when all this is taken into account, it proves beyond doubt that to be alone or loneliness is nowhere found and preferred to. Thus the liberation is the form of Advitiyatvaprapti or loneliness as the Advaitins contend, is impossible. It is described that the liberated delight with their companions. If they were to be alone then, living in the company of others and also blissful enjoyments, are all impossible. If Ātman is admitted as only one, then there is no possibility of any functions and dealings. Moreover, this Ātmāikya view will be against the Śruti passages such as Tatkena kam paśyet....<sup>1131A</sup>

If the Advitīyatva view is accepted then the liberation cannot be claimed as Puruṣārtha or prime goal to be attained. Therefore, as there is the presence of different souls and manifold objects (duality) in Samsāra in the same way, even in the release, duality is to be accepted inevitably. So there are infinite liberated souls having blissful forms and also there are infinite means of enjoyments.

The passages Yatradvaitamiva bhavati..., Sarvamatmai-vabhūt...<sup>1131B</sup> and others never state any identity but declare the difference. The liberated do have the blissful forms with blissful organs. If this is not accepted then the very fact of their enjoyment is impossible.

The passage, Na pretya sanjñā asti<sup>1131C</sup> does not negate the Svarūpa-jñāna or innate knowledge in case of liberated. It only denies Prākṛta-jñāna or material knowledge. This ascertains that, the liberation is not Prakṛti or matter, but it is Aprākṛta or spiritual. Hence Prākṛta-jñāna or material knowledge cannot be there in the release.

The passage, Yatratvasya sarvamatmaivabhūt<sup>1131D</sup> is interpreted as, in transmigration, the soul, with its mind associated with so many things, concentrates on and deals with them. But in the state of release, this will not happen.

The liberated concentrates as only one, 'That is the Lord. There is no second, in the sense that the Lord is the main object of his concentration. It does not negate the presence of other things. This passage also does not support the attainment of loneliness of the Advaita. Or it may also be meant that the passage describes the state of a Yogin. The Yogin, sitting in a serene and secret place, meditates as God. At that time, except God, nothing is the object of his meditation. In the Samsara, organs of the body are different, whereas in the release, all the organs are the part and parcel of the very nature of liberated. In the release, all the organs are concentrated on God. Why only in the release, such type of deep concentration is seen even in this world on some occasions. A person, engaged in the dice game and a dancer in dancing have no attention towards something other than that. When this is the position of a person in the Samsara, the released, getting deeply engaged in concentration, will never see and know something other than the God.

In the Samsara, there are two entities, one is soul (sentient) and another is matter (insentient). And this soul lives always associated with matter. So the body has the character of Dvittva (possession of both the sentiency and insentiency). In the release, as there is no any

matter (insentient), there lies only spiritual or Aprākṛta body. The whole form is of the very nature of the Cetana. All sorts of enjoyments take place with the help of Svarūpendriyas or blissful organs. Thus, it is to be noted that the passage states the manifestation of the very nature of the liberated.<sup>1132</sup>

The passages, Paramam sāmyamupaiti..., Saha Brahmapāvipaścita..., Paramjyotirupasaṅkramya..., Etamanna mayamātmanamupasaṅkramati...<sup>1132A</sup> and others describe the release as a fruit or result of knowledge. These passages do not refer to any identity. They also not deal with any sheath (Kośa) but mainly aim at Paramātman, since they appear in the part (Prakarana) that explains the state of release.<sup>1133</sup>

The passage Yatra dvaitamiva bhavati... refers to either Aparokṣajñāni or released. It describes the two states such as Jāgṛt and Susupti. Vādirāja opines that whatever may be the reference but it does not talk of any Advitiyatva. The passage, Yatra tvasya sarvamātmaivabhūt describes the state of deep sleep or Susupti. In Jāgṛt or awakening state, Bhedavyavahāra is experienced distinctly. But in the state of deep sleep, on account of deep sleep or concentration, the soul is almost inactive and the God alone is active. Therefore, that wise Yогin or released

is unaware of the external affairs of the world. The present passage as well as the passage, <sup>1133A</sup> Pareavyaaaye sarva ekibhāvanti... promise and state that all the organs of the released deeply concentrate on Lord. In this way no Śruti talks of any identity between Brahman and the soul. <sup>1134</sup> As Śruti appears in and deals with the context of release, it aims at explaining the effect or result of release. In the state of liberation there is no darkness in the form of Ajnāna. There are no merit (Punya) and sin (Papa). There is enjoyment of all pleasures and also manifestation of blissful nature. Vādirāja says that this is not possible in the state of Jīvanmukti. Because, a Jīvanmukta may have no effects of Punya and Papa, but as he is still living in this world with the same body, he has no privilege to enjoy to the desired objects unlike a released one. Otherwise the gods (Jīvanmuktas) would not have churned the milky-ocean for nectar. The above passage refers to final release of four kinds and states that the attainment of this will not cause any rebirth (Samsara).

The passage, Sarvān kāmān samaśnute... <sup>1134A</sup> is interpreted by the Advaitins as, Mukta attaining the identity with Brahman enjoys all the pleasures. So there is no individual pleasure for finally liberated. It is there only during Jīvanmukta state. But this is wrong. Because, the particle 'Saha' in the passage gives the sense of

sameness of time and not the identity. In Samsara as objects of enjoyment vary from being to being, in the state of release also, they differ from one released soul to another. So individual enjoyment of pleasures too prevails in the release. So the interpretation of the passage is as, finally released souls enjoy pleasures with Brahma (four-faced) in the abode of the Lord.

Difference between the soul and supreme soul (Brahman) is pertinent even in the release. Thus all passages aim at and declare the difference and not the identity or Advitiyatva.<sup>1135</sup>

As king is different and does not intend to consider or treat the arrested as equal to him, the God too, who is the Lord of liberated as well as unliberated, does not wish the souls to be equated with him. Although, finally liberated are graced with similar form (Sarūpya), they are not given the Śrivatsa and other ornaments that are Lakṣmyātmaka. So, even the released souls remain as servants of the Lord. The Lord, although graceful and affectionate towards His devotees, does not offer self-identity like a king, though pleased with, will not give his wife to anybody.<sup>1136</sup> Therefore, it is evident that the release is not the attainment of Advitiyatva. The passages do not

refer to Ātmāikya or Advitiyatya but aim at difference in all respects.

#### VAIKUNTHA IS LAKSMYĀTMAKA

Vaikuntha or the abode of the Lord is free from material elements. (Prākṛta elements). It is spiritual. The Bhāgavata verse, Na yatra māyā kimutāpare...<sup>1136A</sup> states that in the abode of the Lord, there is no Māyā and its effects. In fact, it is goddess Lakṣmī who constitutes Lord's abode. Therefore, it is called Lakṣmyātmaka. Goddess Lakṣmī is eternally liberated. Even in final annihilation, she will not get perished. The God, who is eternally liberated, is the Lord of that abode. It does not mean that, only the abode Vaikuntha is spiritual, but, all the three (Vaikuntha, Anantāsana and Svetadvīpa) are spiritual and are of the forms of Lakṣmī. The Śrībhāg (portion) in all the three abodes of the Lord, is imperishable, even during the annihilation. Whereas, other two parts, namely, Bhūbhāga and Durgābhāga are subject to destruction during annihilation.<sup>1137</sup> The abodes of the Lord are crowded with released souls. Not only the abodes are spiritual but, the things available there are also spiritual. Vādirāja mentions that the abodes of Brahmā, Rudra and of other gods are the products of material elements. (No doubt, the abodes of Brahmā and others, unlike the human, consist of

more Sattva element of the matter (Prakrti). Even then they are not of the nature of sentiency and are also not the abodes of released). But the abodes of the Lord, since being spiritual, are superior to them. Vādirāja says that not only the abode but also the Lord. That means, the Lord is superior to all other gods. Not only the Lord, but also His wife, goddess Lakṣmi is superior to those gods. In the abodes of the Lord, only those, who are finally released, live and they are always ardent and devoted to the Lord. Although released are experiencing blissful enjoyments, they are lords of nothing. Although graced with four arms and the like, they are not capable to enjoy the doership or creatorship of anything. They are similar to the God only in respect of explicit form but not in any other respects.<sup>1138</sup>

The released souls are not born during the next world creation and are not perished at the time of world destruction (Pralaya). They do not have any birth, death and the like. They have the form of knowledge and bliss. Since having blissful form, they enjoy only bliss. On this basis, the souls are broadly classified as released and unreleased. And among unreleased, there are three types, Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa. And it is held that only Sāttvikas are entitled to attain the release.<sup>1139</sup>

THE LORD'S ABODE IS NOT EMPTY

As already mentioned, the Lord's abode is not empty, since being crowded with released souls. Vādirāja wants to state that it is not only the released souls that dwell there but the means of their enjoyments are also present there. Even they are also spiritual. Vādirāja argues that when the things, product of matter and present in the heaven and other worlds, are being worshipped and coveted by one all, then what to state about the means of blissful enjoyments of the released in Lord's abode. Further, it is not that only the human beings are liberated and enjoy in release. Even birds, animals and other are also found in the release with innate, original and blissful form.

The Lord's abode, being spiritual, is superior to other abodes of gods. There is no mixed experience of pain and pleasure here. The released souls are not either identical or equal to each other or with the eternally released God. They are different with gradation. This gradation is an account of the difference in the enjoyment of bliss and this absolutely depends on there innate and eternal nature. 1140

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI, RŪPAM RŪPAM PRATIRŪPO BHABHŪVA<sup>1140A</sup>

This Śruti passage proves the possibility of the difference in the nature of the souls. The nature of the souls is not uniform and of same kind. The passage refers to released souls, stating that each and every liberated soul is the Pratibimba or reflection of one or another form of God who is reflective. It does not mean that the embodied soul is not the reflection of God. Vādirāja assures that the relation of reflective and reflection is truly realized at the time of release and not in the state of Samsāra. The Lord is glorified as Pururūpa, that means He is endowed with infinite forms. All the liberated souls are reflections to Him.

In this passage, the Lord is praised as Indra, that means He is endowed with eternal supreme unlimited treasure or wealth. This term does not refer to Indra, who heads the heaven, since his treasure is not eternal and it is limited. All the forms of the Lord get manifested through his special power. They are not the products of any Karma. The term Māyā in the passage is taken to mean an unthinkable, unlimited eternal supreme power of the Lord. But it never gives the sense of Advaita concept of Māyā. The Lord takes a number of forms through this special power of His own. As the forms of the Lord and

also the souls are infinite each and every soul becomes the reflection of one or another Bimba form of God. The realization of respective Bimba-form of the Lord is the prime means of final release. Vadirāja stresses the point that though the forms of the Lord are infinite, they are identical, whereas the souls, although reflections, are neither identical each other nor with God. They are distinct. Thus, the passage proves the variety and difference in the nature of the souls and also the relation of reflective and reflected.<sup>1141</sup>

The qualified souls attain the release only when they realize the respective Bimba form of the Lord.<sup>1142</sup> The passage Tadasya rūpasya praticaksanaya...<sup>1142A</sup> refers to both soul and Supreme soul (Lord). One is seer and another is seen (seeable). Thus, the ultimate reality of these forms is evident. The term Māyā in the above passage aims at and refers to the greatness of the Lord. Hence, it cannot be understood as the Māyā of the Advaita concept, which is ultimately unreal.

The passage also promises that there is no Māyā (illusion) in the release. There, everything is spiritual. The objects of enjoyments, though utilized, will not come to an end. They are eternal and real. All this is possible

by the Lord through His special power. This power of the Lord makes everything possible that normally looks difficult and impossible. When this is the case, there cannot be the talk of either identity or of attributelessness of the Lord. Though, the Lord is Omniscient, Omnipotent, He will not mind Himself to make possible what is impossible. Because, whatever is absolutely impossible is nothing but invalid. He will never utilize His special power for such invalid destructive and unworthy purpose. Because, the Lord is not intended to achieve self-destruction for, the very idea of identity destroys supremacy and the view of attributelessness disproves the very special power. So, the idea of mutual identity, identity with the Lord, attainment of the Advityatva, declaration of the view of formlessness and attributelessness etc., are all baseless and invalid. Therefore, there is neither Maya (illusion) nor its effects in the abode of the Lord (release).<sup>1143</sup>

Thus, the release is not the state of either identity or of emptiness. It is the state of experiencing one's own bliss by the grace of the Lord. It is spiritual, extra-ordinary and crowded with infinite number of liberated souls. And there lies absolute difference in between souls and the Lord. This difference is called Viśesa which is possible by the very nature of all.<sup>1144</sup> And this Viśesa

nature helps to realize the difference in between souls and the Lord.

In the Advaita, as release is devoid of all distinctions, the very fact of enjoyment is not possible. According to the Advaita, there remains nothing for enjoyment and the like. So release accordingly would be nothing but a Sūnyamokṣa.

So the liberation which is real and difference-based is the only release attaining which one will not have the experience of any displeasure and will not come back to transmigration.

The Viśeṣa, referred to above, is the peculiar and individual nature of each entity that establishes the difference mutually. Viśeṣa is there in the Lord, it is also there in the Svarūpadeha of the liberated souls. The Viśeṣas, present in the souls, are controlled by the Viśeṣa of the Lord.<sup>1145</sup>

The very fact proves the difference between the Lord and other liberated souls. The Lord is eternally liberated and others attain the release, only when they fulfil the prescribed course of Sādhana and gain the grace of the Lord.

The Lord is the ultimate resort and support to all, including released, and hence, He is acclaimed as Superior to and Supreme.<sup>1146</sup>

INTERPRETATION OF THE ŚRUTI PASSAGE DVITIYĀD VAI BHAYAM  
BHAVATI<sup>1146A</sup>

The above passage does not deny the existence of other entities. And it ~~also~~ does not convey the identity. Advaitins contend that this passage negates the existence of the entity other than Brahman. But this is not correct. As this passage comes in the context of Ekāki na ramate,<sup>1146B</sup> it cannot deny the presence of other things.

Vādirāja understands and interprets the passage in different ways without spoiling the significance and beauty of the context. Here the term Dvitiya, according to Vādirāja, gives a good number of meanings. One may be afraid of second Āśrama (stage of life) as being householder since it leads to mixed experience by making him to get involved in Samsāra. One may be afraid of the second among the two Punya or merit and Papa or sin. Men are supposed to be afraid of the second among the company of the good and the bad. They may also be afraid of second world that is secular world. Here first is the abode of the Lord. They are afraid of the second world since it

is also the cause of rebirth. Thus, the passage states that the Lord, who is the source of spiritual delight and enlightenment, is not the cause of any fear. It is the worship of the Lord with pure devotion that enables to gain His grace and attain the liberation.<sup>1147</sup>

If this meaning is not admitted then the very import of the passage becomes contradictory and also opposes the import of other passages of the same context. And it will not help even for Advaitins in proving identity etc. Because, the world consists of both sentient and insentient things. And according to the Advaita, the insentient world is unreal. If identity is to be held and admitted then, Brahman too, since being compared with the second (world), will become Mithyā. And this type of identity stands sublated by the reason. Thus, the passage will not convey the sense of identity. So Vādirāja opines that, the sense of identity and absence of other entities, cause fear.

Therefore, the correct import of the passage is that, one has to cultivate and develop the feeling of detachment towards this world of sorrow. This world is second. He, who admires and gets immersed in this, has fear from this. So a qualified teacher, desirous of attaining the liberation, should give up the feeling of attachment. If this is

given up, then there is no fear from it. Hence, this passage has nothing to do either with identity or with the non-existence of the second entity. It precisely relates the necessary and required steps for attaining the release.

<sup>1148</sup>

#### THE SRUTI PASSAGES ARE NOT AKHANDĀRTHAPARA

The contention of the Advaita is that the passages are Akhandārtha-pratipadaka. If this view is held, then the very concepts, identity, attributelessness and unreality are supposed to be given up. Because, Akhandā means the ultimate presence of only one entity. But, unless there is second entity, identity is impossible. And also, when the presence of second entity is totally negated, there is no charm in proposing the unreality. Thus, the aim of considering the passage as Akhandārtha-para, will not yield any results such as identity and others.

Vādirāja states that, this work does not only aim at refuting the Advaita concepts or views but ensues valuable guidance to the honest so that they can have the peace, in mind, content in heart and devotion at the feet of the Lord.

<sup>1149</sup>

Therefore, all the passages such as Amṛtasyaīśa setuh,  
Muktānām parama gatih<sup>1149A</sup> and others declare that the God  
is the Lord to all liberated. He is the sole support,  
guide and controller even in the release. No single  
Śruti passage conveys the sense of Akhandā. All the passages  
proclaim the greatness of the Lord in one or other way.

THE PAVAMĀNA AND PŪYAMĀNA ŚRUTIS DECLARE THE GREATNESS  
OF MADHVA

The last two chapters of sixth Aṣṭaka and first five  
chapters of seventh Aṣṭaka of Roveda, contain Pavamāna  
hymns. Vādirāja says that these hymns, when properly  
interpreted, give an account of the deeds of the incarna-  
tions of god Mukhyavāyu that are Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva.  
The expressions, Pavamāna and Soma, found in these hymns  
refer to the forms of Vāyu.

The hymn, Sa pūrvyah...<sup>1150</sup> states that Pavamāna  
(Vāyu) is incarnated as Madhva. Pavamāna means he who  
purifies. Soma means he, who abides in all living beings  
in the form of controlling the very breathing of them  
during all the states (awakening, dreaming and sleeping).  
Soma also means he who is also an efficient cause in the  
process of creation and who abounds in divine richness.  
In the above passage, the expression as Madhva, is clearly

made. The adjectives in the passage are more significant and glorify the greatness of the forms of Vayu.<sup>1151</sup> The term Vevijāna glorifies Madhva and states that Madhva is he, who establishes the five-fold difference. Pūrvyah refers to the fact of being Jīvottama. Syenah means he, whose Lord is blissful. It is also explained that at the time of final annihilation he (Vāyu) swallows or destroys the outskirt or flap of Tejas. His form is fierceful. He is furious to vicious and silent in the case of virtuous. Since, time immemorial, all the forms of god Vāyu are specially meant for correct preaching of right knowledge. Therefore, they are called Gomati. Vāyu with his Bhīma (furious) form destroys the subtle body or Lingadeha of qualified souls after their gaining direct knowledge. Next to the Lord He is also the bestower of release. The forms of Vayu are also called Indus, since fulfilling the desires of devotees and being rich in divine wealth.

The hymn, Ajitaye apahataye...<sup>1152</sup> which contains the expressions of Pavamāna and Soma, refers to the incidents (Pavana movements) of Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva. The hymn deals with the adventurous activities of the forms of Vayu. Vādirāja gives the derivative meaning of the term Pavana as he, who is capable of purifying. He also explains each and every term of the passage and assures that Madhva is the incarnation of Vayu.

The hymn, Prasenāni śūro agre...<sup>1153</sup> particularly refers to Bhīma form of Vāyu as the real leader of Pāndava family and party. It also conveys that Hanumān was the leader of Vānara family and party. As this passage describes the valourous deeds of Hanumān and Bhīma, it can also be explained with reference to Madhva.

Further, two hymns of same context, Somah pavate... and Brahmā devanām...<sup>1154</sup> have the reference of Madhva clearly and explicitly. Here Madhva is described as Janaka in various senses. The expression Vishnoḥ janitā signifies that it is Madhva who made the people conscious and known about the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. Matinām janitā glorifies him as giver of right knowledge. Vādirāja opines that the repetition of the expression Janitā indicates that Madhva has dispelled the fear and ignorance through his outstanding contribution. He is described as Janitā prthivyoḥ, since he established the reality of the world.<sup>1155</sup>

The Śruti Prāvīvipat...<sup>1156</sup> clearly mentions that Madhva is the great teacher who taught real and right knowledge. Here, he is acclaimed as great preceptor (Jagadguru). It is well described and known fact that god Vāyu incarnated on earth as Madhva and unveiled the treasure in the form of the import of the Śruti passages.

Thus, like previous passage, this also describes the greatness and gives an account of manifold deeds of Madhva form of Vāyu.<sup>1157</sup>

Another Śruti of the same context, Unmadhva Urmi...<sup>1158</sup> relates the greatness of Madhva. He is called Mahiṣa as he is superior among all the souls. He is referred to Urmi as he is highly qualified and well-versed. He is glorified as Apah since he sportively swims in unlimited ocean of Śāstras. He is called Atisthat as he showed that all the Vedas and Vidyas primarily and ultimately declare the greatness of the Lord.

One more Śruti, Saptasvār...<sup>1159</sup> mentions that it is Madhva who has understood the real import of all the Śāstras since the knowledge or understanding of these is essentially required for the realization of the Lord. Madhva, unveiling the correct import of all the Śāstras, has rendered the devotional service at the feet of the Lord. Hence it is evident that he is Vāyu incarnated.<sup>1160</sup>

Another Śruti passage, Vistambho diva...<sup>1161</sup> refers to Madhva. Vistambha means supporter. He is described as the supporter in the sense of establishing the reality of the world. The term Amśuh conveys that Madhva too is

endowed with the same natural strength of original form of Vāyu. He is called Utsa as he has great enthusiasm in respect of Haribhakti.

The Śruti running, Simham na santa...<sup>1162</sup> brings out the fact that Madhva is the supreme and ardent devotee of Lord incarnated Narasimha. It is also explained that he is foremost among those fortunate, who have the privilege of having direct studentship of the Lord.<sup>1163</sup>

The Śruti passage, Pradhāra Madhvo...<sup>1164</sup> deals with the academic success and prosperity of Madhva. Agriyah conveys that Madhva enshines with complexion of supreme knowledge. The term Mahīrapah denotes that Madhva is well-versed in all Śāstras. He is called Havīḥ as he is adorable and being worshipped by other gods. He is Havīḥ, since he is very dear to the Lord and as he is the foremost among the gods, invoked in Jñānaya jña.

Another hymn, Asmabhyaminda...<sup>1165</sup> also consists of the praise of Madhva. He is called Indrayuh as he is devoted and also always associated with the Lord by name Indra. Vādirāja says that the term Indra primarily and ultimately aims at the Lord for having unlimited and eternal treasure, unlike the Indra who heads the heaven. Vādirāja

also promises that the term Madhva is significant and meaningful since he (Madhva) is the bestower of bliss in the form of imparting the right knowledge to all the qualified.

Thus, in all these hymns, the glorious deeds of god Vāyu, are described with reference to his forms, Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva.

#### TAPTASUDARŚANA MUDRĀDHĀRANA IS ALSO MENTIONED IN PAVAMĀNA

##### HYMNS

The hymn, Yena devah pavitrena...<sup>1166</sup> clearly states that Taptamudrādhārana should be done with Sudarśanacakra. (the Lord's weapon, wheel as a holy mark). Vādirāja argues that here the term Pavitra stands for Sudarśana and not for Daśapavitra which is used in sacrifices. It is clear from the reference as Sahasradhāra (having thousand (more) edge points). It is well-understood that with the help of this holy mark, purity of the body and mind could be gained.

Vādirāja also makes it clear that when and from whom the above mentioned holy mark is to be received. One has to receive this holy mark from a well-known scholar and teacher.<sup>1167</sup> He also says that on other days, the above mentioned holy mark is to be enmarked with Gopicandana.

In one of the hymns of the R̄gveda, the Taptamudrā-dhārana is clearly mentioned. The hymn is, yet te pavitram...<sup>1168</sup> Vādirāja says that this hymn is also the praise of Madhva. If the term, Pavitra is taken to mean as Daśapavitra, then it cannot be heated. So it also ascertains that Pavitra is Sudarśana. Vādirāja also makes it clear that both the marks, Sudarśana and Śaṅkha are to be got imprinted on both the arms. He also states that Sudarśana is to be made of gold and Śaṅkha of silver.

In the Pavamāna hymns, not only god Vāyu is praised but also the Lord who is the Indweller of god Vāyu. Vādirāja promises that all the hymns or verses of Veda, primarily aim at and glorify the Lord and the same hymns can also be understood as the praise of god Vāyu. So the Lord is the primary object of glorification and god Vāyu is the next or secondary object of glorification of all the Vedic passages. And this god Vāyu, abiding in all Gurus (teachers), accomplishes the sacred deeds. The above cited passage clearly indicates that it is god Vāyu with his Madhva form, being present in sacred fire, Sudarśana and in Gurus (spiritual teachers), offers the Taptamudrā to all the devotees.<sup>1170</sup>

Similarly, the verses of Pūyamana hymns also glorify

and Vāyu and Mudrādhārana. The verse, Pavitram te vitatam..<sup>1171</sup> glorifies the Lord indwelling in god Vāyu. By the by it also relates the necessity of Taptamudrādhārana. Vādirāja stresses that this Taptamudrādhārana is also an essential means to secure the grace of the Lord and it is with this that the souls gain the eligibility for the performance of sacred religious duties.

Vādirāja opines that the glorification of Madhva, seen in the Pavamāna and Pūyamāna hymns, is nothing but the great and an elaborate praise of Madhva formed god Vayu.<sup>1172</sup>

#### MADHVA IS VĀYU INCARNATED.

Vādirāja, referring to some Śruti passages, declares that Madhva is Vāyu incarnated.

The passage, Idam te pātrām...<sup>1173</sup> consists of the praise of Madhva. The Lord is described as Indra that means He is possessing unlimited treasure. And the Lord by name Indra abides in Madhva and hence, Madhva is called Sanavittam. It means he is blessed with pure knowledge, devotion and feeling of detachment.<sup>1174</sup> And he is also glorified as the main or prime object of presence (Sannidhāna) of the Lord. Madhva is also described as he, who is capable to discuss, understand and bring out the real

import of the Veda.<sup>1175</sup> He is acclaimed as Pūrnajñāni as he is also Sarvajña (Omniscient) next to the Lord. He is called Āhava since he, abiding in the qualified souls accomplishes the Jñānayajña. He is spiritual teacher not only to the sages but also to the gods.

Another verse, Madhvo vo nāma...<sup>1176</sup> deals with the glorious description of the three incarnations of god Vāyu. It is also explained that Madhva formed Vāyu came down to the earth and lit the lamp of right knowledge for the upliftment of the good.

The passage, Tadasyapriyamabhipātho...<sup>1177</sup> describes the glory of the Lord and Madhva together. The first half of the passage brings out the significance of the sipping of Viṣṇupādodaka. The second half describes Madhva as Mukhyabandhu, in the sense, foremost among the devotees of Lord Viṣṇu.<sup>1178</sup>

#### THE BALITTHĀSŪKTA DESCRIBES THE THREE INCARNATIONS OF VĀYU

The hymn, Balitthā tadvapuse...<sup>1179</sup> describes the three incarnations of god Mukhyavāyu, viz., Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva. The first and second represent the states of Brahmacarya and Gṛhasthya respectively. The third one represents Sanyāsa.

In the above passage, the term Mati signifies and denotes Hanumān. Hanu means knowledge. So Hanumān is he, who has vast right knowledge.<sup>1180</sup> The second form Bhīma is glorified as Pitumān. Pitumān is he, who eats plenty.<sup>1181</sup> It is well-known fact that, Bhīma ate plenty when he was sent to kill the demon Baka. The third form is referred to by the name Daśapramati. As Daśa stands for complete or vast and Pramati for knowledge, and it is an equivalent of Pūrnaprajña, who is Madhva.<sup>1182</sup>

In the same hymn, Madhva is described as Mātariśvā. It means he, who churning out the unlimited ocean of the Śāstras brings out the greatness of the Lord who is dwelling in the cave of the heart of all. It also means he, who show the way of realizing the indwelling form of the god. The term Dohase conveys that Madhva milks and gives the relevant and agreeable exposition of the Śruti. He is called Pradiva as he is engaged always in preaching the gods and the good. It also indicates that he is endowed with extra-ordinary lusture. The term Adhave states that Madhva is foremost and superior among all beings and also the best among well-qualified.<sup>1183</sup> Thus, the Balitthasūktā extols the majestic glory of all the three forms of god Vāyu.

ESTABLISHING THE ULTIMATE SUPREMACY OF THE LORD THROUGH  
DISCARDING THE VIEWS OF JIVAKARTRTVA ETC.

This is really a complicated and controversial topic in the philosophy, particularly in the Dvaita as to who is the Kartā (Doer). The general logic and common experience ascertain that the soul is the Doer. But the deep inquiry poses the question as to who is the real and independent doer.

Vādirāja examines this view in its fitness and critically explains it. He, himself, as if representing all, says that he knows nothing as to what is good and what is bad. Neither he is capable of doing something nor undoing. He acts, as initiated and activated by the Lord like the doll's dancing as being regulated by state-manner. Thus, he admits that he is not an independent and real doer.<sup>1184</sup>

Soul, although like matter, is a dependent; he is not matter since, he is a sentient one. He is capable to act only when initiated and activated by the Lord. Because, it is well experienced that the soul, although minds, is not capable in doing something good. It is also known fact that, the soul, although wishes not, does something wrong. So what all happens, is owing to the will of the Lord and, what not happens, is also at the will of the Lord.

The past Karma cannot be held as the sole initiator or activating agent for the performance of present deed. Because, further it may be questioned as to what was responsible for that past deed. And thus, it ultimately, leads to endless regression. And Karma, being Jada (insentient) neither can act itself nor can activate others. Further, as already said, the soul cannot activate this Karma according to his will. Thus, it is evident that both, the soul and matter are dependent. Difference is only in respect of sentiency and insentiency. Therefore, an independent being is to be inevitably admitted and He is the Lord. He, being Independent in all the respects, can activate the entire world comprising of souls and matter.<sup>1185</sup>

The very fact that the birth and death are not under the control of the soul, ascertains the dependence of the soul. Like soul, even the Karma and others are also under control of the Lord. Śruti passage also substantiates that it is the Lord by whom, this world is created, sustained and destroyed. He is Independent activating agent of the entire universe. So it is not proper to hold the view that there is something that activates. Because, as already said, it leads to ad infinitum. And this view also becomes contrary to Śruti passages. So admitting an

Independent Lord, as prime initiator to the actions of all, is most welcome.

Then, the question arises as to why there is distinction as good and bad in the actions when there is only one independent Preraka (initiator)? Reply is, it is because of the inherent eternal ability (Svarūpa yogyata) of the souls. The Lord activates the souls according to this ability. And, even this ability, like soul, is dependent and hence cannot make the soul to function. So, neither the soul himself, nor his inherent ability and nor even the matter (Karma etc., that is insentient) is held Preraka or activating agent for functioning.<sup>1186</sup> Even the Adṛṣṭa or unseen power cannot be traced as the cause of functioning. Because, like Karma, it is also Jada. As without the presence of the potter, mud cannot get changed itself into a pot, in the same way, functioning cannot take place without the independent Lord who is the prime and sole activating agent.

When the souls are incapable of doing their functions independently, the question of becoming Preraka or initiator to each other and creating the world etc., is gone afar. Further, the factors, time, Prakṛti and others

cannot be considered as activating agents, since they themselves are insentient and require something else for functioning (movements).<sup>1187</sup>

So, the Lord is the sole and Independent doer and prime activating agent of entire world. He is the possessor of all the three powers of creation, sustenance and destruction, independently.<sup>1188</sup>

The critical examination of a few passages, at this point, by Vādirāja, is to make it clear that the sole and independent doership of the Lord is thus evident and unobjectionable, since it being supported and substantiated by the supreme authority, Veda. The given exposition also promises that it is not the souls only that that are not real and independent doers but also the gods like Brahmā, Rudra and others. Therefore, what all happened so far, has been according to the will of the Lord, what is happening at present, is also controlled by the Lord and what will happen in the future, will also with the blessings of the Lord.

From this point till the end of the Phalasaurabha, Vādirāja gives the summary of the detailed exposition of the entire work given so far, in nut-shell.

### CONTRIBUTION

#### CONTRIBUTION OF VĀDIRĀJA THROUGH THE YUKTIMALLIKĀ TO THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL AND THE DVAITA (PHILOSOPHY) IN PARTICULAR

Philosophy is defined, 'At the outset, philosophy included the whole field of higher learning everything beyond reading, writing and arithmetic. But as a time honoured saying has it "philosophy is the mother of sciences..."<sup>1189</sup>

The department of knowledge or study which deals with ultimate reality or with the most general causes and principles of things (Now the most usual sense)...

Some times used especially of knowledge obtained by a natural reason...<sup>1190</sup>

Thus, the philosophy is the systematized branch of knowledge that deals with the science of truth.

The contribution of Vādirāja through his magnum opus the Yuktimallikā is unique and outstanding to the Indian philosophy and the Dvaita system.

The salient features of Indian philosophy are:

1. Indian philosophy is at least as old as Rgveda whose date is still indefinite.<sup>1191</sup>
2. Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual.<sup>1192</sup>
3. Philosophy is called Darśana in India. Darśana means vision. Philosophy is the vision of the Reality as a whole. It is an insight into the nature of the whole reality. Indian philosophy is based on reflective thinking, subordinate to the authority of the Vedas.<sup>1193</sup>
4. Indian philosophy is not a blind methodology and approach. The sources of it are firmly based on infallible evidences. Here, importance is also given to perception and valid experience.
5. It is a prime source of theistic<sup>1194</sup> and spiritual enlightenment and experience. It is a positive approach and application.
6. It primarily aims at realizing the Truth and also at gaining the unmixed pleasure.

Indian philosophy, although based firmly on the authority of the Vedas, has not discarded the significance of reflective seasoning. Logical reflection in the form of reason, does play significant role in Indian Philosophy. Reason or reasoning is an outcome of gifted thought and the basis or source of which is the wide and unsublated

experience. Radhakrishnan writes "Philosophy proceeds on the facts of experience. Logical reflection is necessary to ascertain whether the facts observed by one individual are accepted by all, or are only subjective in their character. Theories are accepted if they account for facts satisfactorily."<sup>1195</sup> But it is evident that this reason has its own limitations. It cannot work independently. It always seeks the valid data of other means, and depending on those, works out and fulfils the requirements of the application and argument.

Madhva states that this reason or Yukti is of three kinds. Generally, it is a core of argument and it necessarily refers to and relates with perception, invariable concomitance and testimony. Yukti's are the reasons that produce right knowledge. Hence, the role of reason or Yukti, in determining the fact through argument, is significant.<sup>1196</sup> Madhva does not prefer the reasons or Yukti's that have no support of either perception or of testimony.

Madhva referring to the statement of Tattvasāra, explains that the very strength or power is two-fold. One is physical and the other intellectual. The physical is explicit and intellectual is implicit. And this

intellectual strength is nothing but the understanding of the reasoning in the form of technique of advancing with the core of argument. Hence, it is more vigorous and firm.<sup>1197</sup>

And this reason or Yukti in the hands of Vādirāja attains novel shape. It does not appear in mere logical form but is present with two forms or shades, logical and artistic. Yukti in the Yuktimallikā is not a bare or naked reason but it is an embellished one. Hence, the Yukti, adduced in the Yuktimallikā and other works, by Vādirāja, is peculiar and rare of its kind. As the logical element or content of the Yukti in the Yuktimallikā, advances with the line of argument, the artistic element of that makes the very argument most appealing and thus, would be come the source of retaining the interest of the readers. It is because of its enshining with poetic beauty. B.N.K.Sharma has rightly remarked "He (Vādirāja) thinks in poetry and argues in it, with all the richness and irresistibility of its appeal... His argument have a distinctive flavor of wit and piquancy of their own."<sup>1198</sup>

Now let us know the contribution of Vādirāja to the common characters of Indian philosophy, accepted by different systems in spite of their wide differences.

### THE COMMON CHARACTERS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

#### 1. The Reality of the Ātman

All the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy believe in the existence of the Ātman. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsa, the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta admit that Ātman is an eternal and sentient substance. The Jainas regard the existence of the permanent self that is endowed with infinite knowledge, perception, bliss and power. In this regard Vādirāja, ridiculing the views of the Jainas, and refuting the objections of Cārvāka, and others states that the existence of Ātman or soul, is to be admitted. Because the body which is the product of matter and insentient, cannot fulfil the requirements for the survival of the life. Vādirāja asks that if such an entity (soul) is not admitted, then one cannot differentiate the living body from the dead. In addition, he also discusses the nature and form of the soul. He says that the nature of soul is that of knowledge and (bliss). His form is atomic.

#### 2. Faith in Karma

All the schools of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas, have faith in the doctrine of Karma. They also believe that moral system is manifested through the theory of Karma in the life. According to this theory, it is stated that the results of actions (Karmaphala) are always

with us in the form of impressions and it is these impressions (*Samskāras*) that direct the course of life. A good action produces merit (*Punya*) and this with impression (*Samskāra*) brings about pleasure, whereas a bad action produces sin (demerit - *Papa*) and that brings about pain. It means, the actions good or bad, leave behind some potency in the form of impressions and these cause pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow in the future.

No doubt Vādirāja agrees with this theory of *Karma*, and in addition to this He says that this concept *Karma* has some significant sense and state only when its nature is known. He says that the *Karma* (in the form of result-impressions) cannot exert its influence independently as it is *Jada*, insentient. And an insentient entity neither can act itself nor can activate something else. Hence, for execution to have influence, it is to be initiated and activated by sentient being. Vādirāja also specifies that, the embodied soul cannot make it to be active. So, inevitably it is to be accepted that, even this *Karma* is dependent and under the control of the Lord. It is being activated by that Supreme Being.

### 3. The Ignorance - the root cause of bondage

Transmigration of soul also is a common feature of all

the systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas. It is well-known fact that the very bondage and the misery in the life are the products of ignorance. The transmigration is a beginningless series of births and deaths. It is due to ignorance or false-knowledge. When this ignorance is removed by the true knowledge of the Reality, the transmigration would get ceased.

Vādirāja discusses the nature of ignorance and promises that it is real unlike the nescience of the Advaita, and also beginningless. He also makes it clear that the embodied soul is the locus of this ignorance. Unlike the view of the Advaita, Vādirāja says that, the Lord cannot be claimed as the locus of ignorance. And it can also not be attributed to Jada which insentient. Further, he argues that a single and universal ignorance cannot be held responsible for the transmigration in the form of bondage and misery, for all the souls, lest there should not be any difference or variation in the results. It is well-experiencing fact that, the results or effects do differ from soul to soul and hence individual ignorance is to be inevitably accepted. And then only there is some meaning for individual life.

#### 4. Ethical discipline

All the schools of Indian philosophy refer to discipline in life. And they also claim that the practice of discipline should aim at higher values as gain. The rigid self-control, constant meditation on truths right faith and devotion are the some aspects of discipline. They also urge that philosophical investigation and ethical discipline should go together. Vādirāja, in the Yuktimallikā, not at a stretch and at one place, but at different places and on different occasions, stresses for ethical discipline. He talks of the vow of non-violence, the truth, absence of close attachment towards worldly things and pleasures, practice with faith and showing respect in a teacher (spiritual), pure devotion in the Lord and others. In the Bhedasaurabha, interpreting some of the Bhāgavata statements, Vādirāja appeals for non-indulgence in worldly things. In the Phalasaurabha, he stresses on pure devotion and urges for the long and rigid practice of vow of sacred hearing and others for the same. While, refuting the view of excess indulgence in the practice of the vow of non-violence of the Jainism, he alarms that one should practise the vary vow in view of the situation and also taking into consideration its limitations.

### 5. Pramāṇas

Pramāṇas are the means of knowledge. And these means help us to gain the knowledge of entities. The ontology of the systems is based on their epistemology. Because, ontology is the theory of reality and epistemology is the theory of knowledge. Though there is difference of opinion regarding the number of Pramāṇas, the three means perception, inference and testimony are generally accepted by all except Cārvākas and Buddhists. Vādirāja, closely following Madhva, upholds the view and argues that in primary and absolute sense and state, the knowledge originated through the means, is itself the prime means to realize the entity. And it is called Kevalapramāṇa. The others, perception, inference and testimony are the instruments and hence are called Anupramāṇas. Vādirāja discusses in detail the nature, the application and the significance with limitations of these Pramāṇas in their fitness to the exposition. The critical explanation of these aspects is vivid in the discussion of problem of validity, and in the refutation of Cārvāka, Jainism and Buddhism, given in the Gunasaurabha.

### 6. Belief in the authority of the Vedas

All orthodox schools of Indian philosophy recognize the valid authority of the Vedas. And this recognition of authority of the Vedas, is not a blind belief or dogmatism.

Because, there available the vast literature that systematically makes an inquiry into the validity of even authority. Vādirāja declares that the Vedas are Apauruseya and eternal. The impersonality and the eternity of the Vedas must be accepted, otherwise it is impossible to ascertain as to what is right (Dharma) and what is wrong (Adharma), since the human intellect has its limitations. Moreover, human intellect, being limited cannot deal with and discuss the things that are super-human and sometimes abstract. Vādirāja says that the Vedas are authorless. Not only human beings, even the Lord also is not the author of them. He is the reproducer since eternity. Vādirāja discusses the very topic at the beginning of the Yuktimallika. The reasons or Yuktis cited there, in defence of this, are novel and most appealing. The arguments, advanced there, are simple, deep and at the same time scholastic.

#### 7. The reality of the world

All the schools of Indian philosophy, except the Advaita, recognize the reality of the world. The Nyaya-Vaisesika recognizes the reality of the world in space and time as governed by the law of causality. According to this school, the origin of the material world is out of atoms in space and time. The Sāmkhya holds that the

world is real and it is the evolution from the Prakrti. The Mīmāṃsaka school recognizes the reality of the world formed out of atoms under the guidance of law of Karma. The Advaita admits the empirical reality of the world and not the absolute or ontological reality.

In this regard, Vādirāja, refuting the Advaita views, states that the world is neither illusion nor merely an appearance. It is absolutely real. The entire chapter, the Viśvasaurabha, in the Yuktimallikā, critically examines the view of opponents and establishes the ontological reality of the world. Vādirāja adduces hundreds of Yuktis or reasons and states that the world is absolutely and eternally real. It is eternal like a current (Pravāhanā). Vādirāja opines that the total destruction of the effect that is the world, is impossible. Even when it is destructed, it is present with minute form in its cause. So even during Pralaya or annihilation, world is present in the form of its cause, Mūla prakrti or primeval matter. So total destruction or disappearance is impossible. When total destruction or disappearance is not possible, the reality of the world is unquestionable and beyond doubt. Vādirāja also discusses this issue in the Bhedasaurabha, on the ground that the difference or Bheda is possible only when the concerned two entities are real.

Therefore, to know and realize the difference between soul and matter, God and matter, the matter (world) must be taken to be real.

#### 8. Liberation, the ultimate end

In Indian philosophy, prime aim of true knowledge is the divine transformation of life and emancipation of worldly miseries. No doubt, there lies wide difference of opinion regarding the nature and means of attainment of release. But it is common that the release is the state of absence of worldly miseries.

At the beginning of the Phalasaurabha in the Yukti-mallika Vādirāja discusses the nature of release and also the means of attainment of that. He states that the release is not only the negative end as the state of absence of miseries, but it is also a positive gain. The souls, in the release realizing the innate and inherent nature, enjoy the bliss. The release is a state or an abode of blissful enjoyment. He promises that the sacred hearing and others are only auxiliaries to gain the grace of the God and it is the grace of the God which is the prime means of attaining the release.

### 9. Synthesis of religion and philosophy

Ramnath Sharma writes, "The most striking common feature of all Indian philosophical systems lies in the fact that problems of religion and those of philosophy have not been divided into water-tight compartments. The concept of Dharma in India has been used in a wide and comprehensive sense. In fact, the transformation of life and emancipation from worldly misery constitute the common goal of both philosophy and religion."<sup>1199</sup>

While explaining the relation of worshipped and worshipper in the Bhedasaurabha and Phalasaurabha Vādirāja briefs the account as to how to worship. He stresses on the real practice and not only relates the idea of that. He puts in test the philosophical principles on the touchstone of life. In defence of this, He also elucidates the incidents narrated in the epic and Purānic literature.

In this way, on the work on Yuktimallikā throws light on the common characters of Indian philosophy with its new approach and novel treatment.

B.N.K.Sharma writes, "His works show an intense personal fervor and passionate faith in the religious

and metaphysical satisfyingness and superiority of Madhva Siddhānta.<sup>1200</sup> It is clear that Vādirāja has successfully attempted, skilfully solved the objections raised by opponents against the Dvaita. He also has explained the main tenets or doctrines of the Dvaita in the Yuktimallikā in detail. In the Yuktimallikā, Vādirāja, like Madhva, profusely documents the references or statements from original sources of different fields. At every step, in defence of his argument and conclusion, he examines the validity of the quoted statements. His is the purely rationalistic approach.

The main tenets of the Dvaita have been summarised in a verse, the authorship of which is ascribed to Vyāsatīrtha by the tradition.<sup>1201</sup>

#### 1. Viṣṇu is the Supreme God

Madhva asserts that the prime import of entire scripture is Lord Viṣṇu. All the passages originally and primarily glorify the greatness of the Lord. He is the sole and Independent creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. He is the main efficient cause of bondage of transmigration. He is the bestower of liberation. The others, time, space, ignorance (avidyā), Karma etc., are under His control and are secondary causes for transmigration.

The very nature of the soul and the prime material cause (Prakrti) are also under his control.

All the five chapters or the Saurabhas ultimately aim at and establish the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu. In the Gunasaurabha, the Lord is proved as an embodiment of infinite auspicious attributes. It is also evidently proved that He is devoid of or free from material qualities Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Vādirāja promises that the Lord is not affected or associated with these material qualities. He is spiritual and His form is that of the nature of bliss and knowledge. In this Saurabha, to substantiate the view of Supremacy of the Lord, Vādirāja critically comments on the Mahānārāyaṇopanisad elaborately and states that all the declarations of sacred literature undoubtedly proclaim the supremacy of Lord Viṣṇu.

In the Suddhisaurabha, the concept Ajñāna of the Advaita is refuted and proved baseless. It is also explained that the real and individual Ajñāna or ignorance is the cause of bondage. As there is no ignorance in the Lord, there is no need for Him to come down and assume the state of the soul. He is eternally Pure and released. Hence, He is Supreme and Superior to others who are caught hold in the chain of Samsāra.

In the Bhedasaurabha, Vādirāja adduces the reasons to establish difference between the Lord and the world of soul and matter. He also asserts that this difference is not with equality but with gradation. Referring to the relations of Bimbapratibimba, Sevyasevaka, Preryapreraka and others, Vādirāja argues that He, who is Bimba or reflective, Sevya or worshipped and Preraka or initiating and activating agent; must be supreme and superior to those who are Pratibimbas or reflections, Sevakas or worshippers and Preryas or cultivated.

In the Viśvasaurabha, the view of the Advaitins that the world is the illusory projection, is set aside and with the help of valid means, perception, inference and testimony, the absolute reality of the world is established. Vādirāja argues that to create such a wonderful world, the creator must be Omniscient and Omnipotent. Because, ordinary beings with their little and limited knowledge, cannot create this world. So, the creator, who, as already said is Sarvajña and Sarvaśakta must be supreme.

In the Phalasaurabha, it is strongly ascertained that the Lord's grace is the ultimate means for the attainment of release. The Lord is declared as the sole and

Independent giver of the Mukti, a state of experiencing blissful enjoyments. So, He, who is bestower of the release, must be Supreme,

Thus, all the Saurabhas glorify the supreme nature of Lord Visnu.

## 2. The World is Ultimately Real

The world, either in effect form or in the state of cause (Prakrti), exists at all times. It is beginningless and eternal.

The entire Viśvasaurabha, in the Yuktimallikā, is dedicated for the establishment of reality of the world. Vādirāja's argument in this regard is deep and subtle. At the outset, he disproves the view that the world is the product of nescience and hence is an illusory projection. He states that the Ajñāna or nescience is impossible in the Advaita. Because, it is neither real, nor unreal and nor even non-unreal. So, such entity (so called) cannot produce or fabricate the world. That means nescience cannot be the material cause for the emergence of the world. Because, that which is Mithyā, cannot produce this wonderful world. Since it being unsublated to the valid cognition and experience. Vādirāja says that it is a source or an

abode of real and manifold enjoyments. So, the world must be admitted as absolutely real. Even during final annihilation, the world is present in the form of its original and subtle cause (Mula prakrti). So, the total destruction of the world cannot be thought of. As it is real, it is also eternal like a current. Moreover the creation of the Lord who is Omniscient and Omnipotent, cannot be a unreal.

### 3. The Ultimate Reality of Five-fold Difference

The concept difference, which is the very soul of the system (Dvaita), is discussed elaborately in the Bheda-saurabha of the Yuktimallikā. At the beginning Vādirāja discusses and proves that the entities of which the difference is referred to, are real. The Lord, the soul and the matter (world) are all real with distinct nature. He states that, difference is that of the nature of Annyonyābhāva or mutual non-existence as in between jar and cloth. Jar is not a cloth and cloth is not a jar. So there is Bheda in between the two. Vādirāja says, as Brahman is the only reality, in the Advaita, Advaita is helpless in advancing the argument in the form of inference to refute the view of difference. They have nothing to cite in place of illustration as an instance. So the very logical statement or inference is defected and thus does not fulfil the necessary conditions of a syllogism. Vādirāja, relating

with the vivid and valid experience of perception, adducing the appropriate reasons and referring to the scriptural passages proves the five-fold difference and promises that the difference is the basis, solution and pioneer guide for smooth and easy dealing.

#### 4. All souls are dependent on God

The nature of dependance of the souls is explained in the Yuktimallikā in contrast with the nature of Independence of the Lord. Vadiraja deals with the dependent nature of the souls in so many places. He shows the helpless condition of the souls, and states the relations in between the God and the soul. The relation of master and servant or worshipped and worshipper, initiator and initiated etc., clearly mention the state of dependence of the souls. Especially, in the Phalasaurabha, it is made clear that the souls cannot get rid off the cycle of birth and death and attain the release themselves. Their seeking refuge in God, is the clear indication of the state of dependence. Befitting to the context, Vādirāja deals with and discusses the distinct nature of Supreme soul and of embodied souls. The distinct nature of the Lord as being eternally liberated, Omniscient and the like, and of embodied souls as being caught hold by ignorance since beginningless, knowing little being helpless in the removal or destruction of the

ignorance and attainment of the release etc., support the view that the souls are dependents.

##### 5. There is gradation among the souls

According to the Dvaita, there are three kinds of souls. The souls fit for liberation, the souls eternally travel through the cycle of birth and death and the souls fit for attaining the Tamas. This is a broad classification. The gradation is not only pertinent to this group classification, but it is also there in respect of individual capability.

Quoting the passages from the Bhaqavatītā, the Bhagavata, the Brahmasūtra and others, Vādirāja refers to gradation, whenever he minds to deal with the difference. He opines that the concept difference would be meaningful and significant provided there is gradation and vice-versa. He states that as there is gradation and difference in both, the subjective aspects such as experiences, thoughts and in the objective entities, (means of enjoyments), it is evident that this gradation and difference is also there in respect of nature. Thus, in the opinion of Vādirāja, these two concepts are intact and appear as two sides of a coin. Vādirāja also mentions that the facts of difference and gradation continue to exist even in the state of release.

**7. Devotion is the means to attain it (release)**

Really speaking, it is the God's grace which is the ultimate, direct and prime means for the attainment of the release. And to secure the grace of the Lord, devotion is the only step. The others, namely, sacred hearing, repetition and meditation, are secondary means. Vādirāja defines devotion as, it is the transcendent, supreme, unshaken and perfect love at the feet of the Lord. It is defined as Bhaktiśca Bhagavatsneḥah. Devotion has two faces, one is the correct understanding (true knowledge) of Lord's supremacy and the other the highest and true love towards Him. Vādirāja ridicules the view of the Advaita that the knowledge of identity is the means for liberation. He argues and states that there lies no significance, charm, propriety and also any relation in this view. Because, the prescribed Sādhana, as a means of attainment of release, in fact, does not involve and indicate any identity. When it is not there in the course of the practice of prescribed Sādhana, it as an effect or a goal, cannot be there even after the fulfilment of prescribed Sādhana. So knowledge of identity is not a means for attaining the release.

8. There are three means for the gain of the knowledge, namely, the perception, the inference and testimony. Discussing the nature and scope of these means, Vādirāja states that the perception is the prime and foremost only when there is uninterrupted contact of defectless senses with relevant objects. He also opines that this perception has its own limitations since being conditioned. But, the verbal testimony in the form of Veda (Āgama) is an eternally evident and authority unlike the declaration of others. Because, Āgama is impersonal and eternal. The inference would be defectless and more stronger, only when it has the support of either perception or of testimony. It seeks the support of other means as its base and source since it being advocated in the form of argument. Thus, Vādirāja critically examines the validity of the means and defends that it is the defectless nature and universal application which is the criterion of determining the truth or validity of the means.

9. The God could be known only by correct methods of reasoning, the source of which is the eternal, defectless, impersonal and infinite Vedas (Āgama). Vādirāja states that the Lord is Nirdosa. And this Nirdosatva nature of the God could be realized through only the defectless means as evidences. In the Gunasaurabha, it is strongly agreed

and proved that Vedas are defectless as being Apauruseya. Vādirāja also traces the causes of defects. In his opinion, defects or demerits originate owing to the effect of matter, Prakrti. As there is no effect of matter, the God is defectless and meritorious. And, Vedas being the declarations of this meritorious God since beginningless, are defectless in nature. And, God is the prime object of glorification of all the Vedas.

In this way, with novel approach and new line of argument, Vādirāja has enriched the field of Dvaita literature. As already mentioned, Yukti or reasoning of Vādirāja not only implies the aspect of argument but promises something more. It is the reason (reasoning) in series of arguments of different shades graced with befitting and apt analogies. The impact or influence of argument is pertinent in the analogies illustrated.

Vādirāja uses or adduces his Yukti or reasons with dual purpose, that means the reason has two faces. The very content of argument, in view of refutation, exposing the defects of the view of opponents, shows as to what extent the very proposed view or contention of opponents, would be irrelevant and incompatible. And in the case of defence, it critically examining the view of the expounder,

from different angles; proves the fact convincingly. And the analogy, illustrated therein, in defence of and to substantiate the core of argument and which is the part and parcel of argument, also plays the dual role of establishing or proving the demonstrated theory or doctrine of the expounder and disproving the contention of opponents.

Vādirāja's introduction of Pūrvapakṣa and its examination are also new points to be noted. At the beginning, he explains the Pūrvapakṣa very clearly and elaborately. He deals with almost all steps or options of the view in the Pūrvapakṣa. And in so many places, he mentions the name of the work and quotes the statement verily. So, this part or portion of exposition, indeed, affords sufficient material to understand Pūrvapakṣa better. And his examination of Pūrvapakṣa is perfect and promising as at every step, he analyses the things vividly. He then adduces the arguments for refutation.

Novelty and propriety are the two distinct features of Vādirāja's elucidation of the Siddhānta view. He profusely quotes the statements from different sources in defence of given exposition or discussion. Sometimes, he also interprets the quoted statements in a manner most appealing and befitting to the context.

Apart from nine genus of tenets, enumerated above, the contribution of Vādirāja, to some of the distinctive problems of philosophy, particularly the Dvaita, could also be well-known through the Yuktimallikā.

The problems or features which distinguish one school from another are no doubt the concepts, peculiar to that school and in some respects some of them are common even to other systems but, with different sense and application.

#### 1. The Witness (Sāksin)

The Sāksin is the very sentiency of soul. It contributes to knowledge by perception (Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa- organ). In this role, it functions as a sense. The Sāksin is not an entity other than the self but it is the permanent quality of sentience of the self. With the help of Viśesa, present in the self, distinction is referred to. The Sāksin plays the role of revelation of the presence and validity of knowledge. The mind, though internal sense, is not capable to reveal the presence and validity of knowledge. It belongs only to the Sāksin.

In the Gunasaurabha of the Yuktimallikā, Vādirāja, while discussing the problem of validity, explains the nature of the Sāksin and the like. According to him, it is

the inner pure sense the nature of which is the very sentiency of the soul. He also traces the limitations and defects of mind and its cognition. He argues that the Sāksin is pure since being the very sentiency and hence, the cognition of Sāksin is invariably and undoubtedly valid.

## 2. Problem of validity

It is one of the controversial topics in the Indian philosophy. Some like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the validity of knowledge is subject to external verification. Whereas others, like Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta hold the view that validity of knowledge is not subject to external verification. It is evident by itself. It is evident that in the Dvaita, the acceptance of the concept Sāksin, verily fulfil the need and conditions and has made the said theory or doctrine more scientific and appropriate.

In the Gunasaurabha of the Yuktimallikā, this problem has been discussed in elaborate. Vādirāja discusses the validity of knowledge with regard to its origin and ascertainment distinctly. He shows the irrelevancy and defective nature of validity theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and also points out the limitations and weak-points of self-validity theory of the Mīmāṃsakas. He at this point, cites definitions of some concepts which are more compact, concrete, clear and comprehensive.

### 3. Concept Viśesa

T.P.Ramachandran writes, "Viśesa is that peculiar power of substance by virtue of which a quality is distinguished from the substance to which it belongs.<sup>1202</sup> It is also novel contribution of the Dvaita. It helps and solves the technical difficulty in the relation of substance and quality.

At the end of Gunasaurabha of the Yuktimallikā, Vādi-rāja deals with this concept, particularly referring to the Lord, His qualities and incarnations. Viśesas are infinite in the Lord and they are the very nature of the Lord. As Viśesa in the Lord helps for difference or different dealing it also establishes the identity between the Lord and His qualities or forms. Thus, Viśesa is a individual distinct feature of substance which helps for Bhedavyavahāra in respect of the qualities and other aspects of that substance, that are, in reality, identical with the very substance; and with its distinct nature, also promises the difference of that particular substance from others.

### 4. Causation

Regarding the theory of causation, different views have been expounded by different systems of Indian Philosophy.

Some advocate the theory of Satkāryavāda and others state the Asatkāryavāda. The theory of causation propounded in the Dvaita school is a combination of both. It is the Sadasatkāryavāda. It implies that the effect, in one sense, is present in the cause and in other sense, absent in it. Vādirāja, summarising the theory of causation, attacks the view of the Naiyāyikas that the absence of obstacle is also a cause or means for the emergence of the effect. He explains and proves that the presence of an obstacle does prevent the origin or emergence of the effect, but its absence has nothing to do with the process of emergence. Absence of obstacle is neither the material cause nor the efficient cause. Hence, it cannot be regarded as the cause of effect.

Apart from this, mention with regard to the contribution of Vādirāja, through the Yuktimallikā, may also be made about the critical exposition of the doctrine of Kartrītva (Doership), the unique interpretation of some Vedic hymns and as a crown to all these, the wide and exhaustive reference of other works. The detailed and critical exposition of some of the Pavamāna and Pūyamāna hymns, given in the Phalasaurabha, is an outstanding contribution to the Dvaita in particular. B.N.K.Sharma remarks, "We also meet with purely logical arguments and

discussions, in his work. But his outstanding feature is what may be termed a "common sense approach" to philosophy. He is a master of the art of clever and sustained use of popular analogies redolent of life and literature, in its varied aspects, to drive home his points and establish the superiority of the Dvaita views and expose the weakness of the Advaitic positions. Arguments of a practical nature, instead of logical niceties, that could be comprehended by all and sundry, are thus his forte and some of his hits in this direction are really masterpieces of wit and wisdom. He claims to adopt a purely rationalistic approach.<sup>1203</sup>

### C O N C L U S I O N

"The system of Madhva is founded on the continuous authority of a wide range of religious and philosophical literature of India which has been the main source of Indian thought, in its widest sense."<sup>1204</sup>

The Dvaita system of philosophy is an outstanding asset and contribution to the perennial flow of Indian thought. The distinction of this system, in respect of originality and novelty, lies in its sound approach and close observation of the facts of the truth on firm logical grounds, and in the unique exposition. B.N.K.Sharma writes, "Madhva built up a cogent and independent system of Theistic philosophy and worked its details and put it on a firm and enduring basis of textual sanctions and logical satisfyingness."<sup>1205</sup>

Vādirāja, who flourished in the sixteenth century, was an eminent scholar of repute in the line of exponents of Dvaita literature. He was a great saint-philosopher, the most facile writer in the Dvaita literature, a gifted poet, a great mystic, a noted Haridasa and the like. He was a saint of salient features, man of merits, devotee of devotion and overall a religious and social reformer.

The greatness of the gifted scholar can be known and realized through his distinct contribution to the field of philosophy and literature. Including all, more than hundred works stand to his credit. Most of them are available in printed and unprinted. And others are missing. Among all the works, attributed to the authorship of Vādirāja, the Yuktimallikā, in his magnum opus, running to 5379 Slokas. In essence, the Yuktimallikā is an elaboration of the teachings of the Brahmasūtras in the light of Madhva's commentary. The salient features of the Yuktimallikā are:

1. It is a monumental work written in defence of the Dvaita system.

The Dvaita system, propounded by Madhva, then well nourished and developed by his successors. Among them, Vādirāja, too, stands in front row. Unlike others, he did not like to dive deep in the logical niceties. The work Yuktimallikā affords an impartial and thoughtful discussion and delineates critical exposition of the main aspects of the Dvaita system. The work is, no doubt, an asset and forceful source to meet with and tackle the objections raised by and the contentions of the opponents, on sound and firm arguments of practical nature.

2. It is a rare philosophical work of its kind as being embellished with poetic beauty.

We find a number of works, in general, written either in prose form or in śloka (verse) form. The tenets of philosophy as being the objects of exposition in these works, we seldom find the literary merit or poetic appeal. But the Yuktimallikā, as an exception to this contention of opinion, enshines with poetic beauty. The easy, sweet and beautiful analogies, often quoted as fine samples of illustration, contribute to the appreciation of poetic beauty.

3. It is a descriptive work, giving information and exposition of main topics or contents of philosophy, particularly of the Dvaita.

It can certainly be stated that the Yuktimallikā is like a compact encyclopaedia that gives the brief account of and sometimes stock definitions of the concepts of philosophy, particularly the Dvaita, but not in alphabetical order. In addition to this, it also, in course of discussion, elucidates the detailed exposition of main tenets of the system.

4. It is a treasure of reasonings (Yuktis).

The Yuktimallikā contains a number of logical-cum-artistic arguments. As already pointed out in the previous part, the Yuktis in the Yuktimallikā, have a distinctive flavour of wit and humour, and sharpness of their own.

Thus, the Yuktimalika, as the very title signifies, is a work of unique collection of jasmine flowers in the form of reasonings. The fragrance or sweet odour of these spreads distinctly in five-fold that means through the five Saurabhas and, clearing away or setting aside the objections and contentions of the opponents, makes the very field of wisdom (Philosophy) the pure and perfumed.

The style of Vādirāja is unique and peculiar of its kind. It is simple and lucid in exposition, deep in devotion and novel in narration. His hair splitting criticism, appealing argument and enlightening exposition cause thrilling sensation to the admiring readers. To conclude with the observations of B.N.K.Sharma, "It was Vādirāja who first brought the wisdom of his predecessors within the reach of all. In this respect, his work marks a new and necessary phase in the history of Dvaita literature and breathes the spirit of a new age which produced other popular exponents of Madhvā Siddhānta, both in Sanskrit and in Kannada."<sup>1206</sup>

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मासे फाल्गुनिके सितोत्तरतृतीयायां तिथौ विदिदने  
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आचार्ये पारणासक्ते तदा केदारस्त्यकम् ॥  
— — —  
तदा तत्रैव सुषुप्ते भास्करपूर्भमात्मजम् ॥  
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श्रीवेदनिध्याख्ययतीस्तदाङ्गामालम्ब्य संवच्चिम गुरोऽश्चरित्रम् ॥  
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 रहस्यतिरहस्यं तद्ब्रह्म ब्रह्मसमोददौ ।  
 अमुष्यै पूर्य तपसो न विदुर्यत्तपस्त्विनः ।  
 प्रेमामृतप्रसन्नास्यस्तिमताइशापाह्वग्पूर्वकम् ।  
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 कल्पयामास स चारे सौकर्यं यतीनां ततः ।  
 तथा प्रत्येकमष्टानां यतीनां निर्ममे मठम् ॥  
 ततः प्रभूति श्रीकृष्णपर्यायमहसमूमः ।  
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इत्याधोष्य च सम्मान्य प्रार्चयत्कविस्ततम् ॥

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स रुक्मणीशविजयाख्यं महाकाव्यमातनोत् ।  
प्रेषयामास राज्ञे तत्प्रेष्य सर्वे विप्रिचतः ।  
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सुपुत्रेण त्वयाकार्यं महाभारतटीक्या ।  
लक्ष्मगन्धिपदार्थनां विवृत्या लक्ष्मूषान् ॥  
मद्यनैन मात्रोक्तं साधितं स्यादितीरितः ।  
व्याताज्ञां सिरसा धृत्वा बदरीं गतवान्मुदा ॥  
प्रणम्यमध्यवृत्तेन्द्रान् व्यासमध्यपृथोदितः ।  
लक्ष्मालझारटीकां स विलिख्यार्पयते स्म इ ॥

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शिलासोपानल्पेण दैवमावीक्ष्य द्विव्यद्वृक् ॥  
जानुभ्यामेव शैलेन्द्रमालरोह महाबलः ।  
श्रीनिवासं निरीक्ष्याथ सालिङ्गामसुमालिकाम् ॥  
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त्रिविक्रमं सहरथमानयन् - - - ॥

...

— — —  
रुद्राङ्गा सह यतीन्द्रोऽसौ त्रिविक्रममुदारथीः ।  
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सरहस्यं सप्रमाणं वादिराजवदोऽमृतम् ॥  
— — —  
हृष्यत्तनुरुहं गात्रे स्वर्पितश्चेत्रमानसम् ।  
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Raghunātha. Vrttaratnasamgraha p.367, III-27,  
मधुकितभूषणमर्पति त्वदायख्यानसुवासिनी ।  
नानापुष्पलसत्केशबन्धनी भावगन्धनी ।  
Subbarao H., Vādirāja, Svāpnavrndāvanākhyāna XL.69.  
Sode Vadiraja Mutt, Udupi.

35. Prabhākar Press, Udupi, 1935.
36. Sri Vādirājīya Grantha Prakāśana Samiti, Udupi (S.V.G.P.S.)
37. Sri SodaVādirāja Mutt, Udupi (S.S.V.M.) 1953.
38. भावमान्नाधवाक्यानामक्रिलष्टं वर्णयन्त्स्फुटम् ।  
विष्णूलक्ष्मि गिरे हैन्यं साधयामास तत्पवित् ।  
— — —  
हरिभक्तिलतां दिव्यामकाषीद्विद्वदगणीः ॥  
Satpurācārya, Vādirājagunaratnamālā, p.54, VII-71 & 72.
39. Sri Soda Vādirāja mutt, Udupi, 1954.
40. S.V.G.P.S., Udupi, 1954.
41. S.V.G.P.S., Udupi, 1953.
52. See, Stotraratnamālā, (S.R.M) 1953, S.V.G.P.S., Udupi
43. Ibid.
44. Rāmatattva Prakāśana (R.T.P.) Belgaum, 1911.
45. See, Stotraratnamālā, S.V.G.P.S. Udupi.
46. S.V.G.P.S., Udupi, 1955.
47. S.S.V.M., Udupi, 1955,
48. R.T.P. Belgaum.
49. S.S.V.M., Udupi, 1954.

50. See: S.R.M., S.V.G.P.S., Udupi.
51. Manuscript with V.Prabhanjana, Sri Vadiraja Stotra Mañjari (S.V.S.M), Aitaveya Prakāśana, Vyāsanakere, 1979, Pp.i-ii.
52. Ibid.
53. Fd.Cikkeruru Govindācārya, Harapanahalli.
54. Not found, as mentioned in the S.V.S.M.
55. S.V.G.P.S., Udupi, 1943.
56. S.S.V.M., Udupi.
57. Not found, as mentioned in the S.V.S.M.
58. S.V.G.P.S. Udupi, 1954.
59. Ibid., 1969.
60. Ibid.,
61. Ibid.,
62. Ibid., 1954.
63. Bannanje Govindācārya A.B.M.M.M.Bangalore, 1966
64. S.V.G.P.S.Udupi, 1952.
65. Ibid, 1954.

66. सूत्रभाष्याभ्योद्योतां टीकोवितश्लाघनोत्तराम् ।  
 महितां सुरमुन्याधैर्यके गुर्वर्थदीपिकाम् ॥  
Satpurācārya, Vādirājagunaratnamālā, p.65, X -37.
67. S.V.G.P.S., Udupi, 1954.
68. Ibid, 1960.
69. R.T.P., Belgaum.
70. - - -  
 सुवर्णमाधुर्यरसादिभिर्च पूर्णि महाकाव्यफलं सुखुत्तं ॥  
 - - -  
 विरक्तिविज्ञानसुभवितयुक्तपौद्यादिपूर्णस्य मनोहरत्य ।  
 - - -  
 अत्र सारमनुभूय कवीन्द्रास्तोषमापुरतुलं रसिकेन्द्राः ॥  
Raghunātha Vṛttaratnasamgraha, I-35, 37 & 38.  
 - - -  
 विदुषांमत्यविदुषां मनोहारिभिरुज्ज्वलैः ॥  
 पूरितं सुरसोपेतं माधुर्यादिगुणान्वितम् ।  
 - - -  
 शुद्धमध्वरितदभवितसिद्धिद्विसमृद्धिदम् ।  
 - - -  
 कैवल्यवर्त्मपाथेऽन्नानविज्ञानसाधनम् ।  
 स रुक्मिणीशविजयाख्यं महाकाव्यमातनोत् ॥  
Satpurācārya Vādirājagunaratnamālā, V-41, 42, 43, 47, p.33.
71. H.D.S.V. & L., Vol.II, p.213.
72. Rāmakriṣṇappa Dvaita Vedānta Pāthasāla, Bangalore, 1956.
73. Ibid, (undated)

74. स्वदृष्टक्षेत्रतीर्थादिमाहात्म्यावबोधनम् ।  
 तीर्थप्रबन्धं कृतवान् पठतामधनाशनम् ॥  
 पठनाद्यतीर्थादिसेवनाल्लभ्यमंजसा ।  
 सुकृतं जनतायाः स्यात्तं स्तोतुं कोनु शक्नुयात् ॥  
 Rāmacandra, Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmṛtam, p.6 II-16 & 17.  
 अटन्नवर्यं तीर्थसमूहपूर्णं तीर्थप्रबन्धं कृतवान्दयालुः ।  
 जनांस्तदावर्तनशीलिनश्च चकार तीर्थटिनपुण्यभाजः ॥  
 Raghunātha Vṛttaratnasamgraha, I-34.
75. See; S.R.M., S.V.G.P.S.Udupi.
76. Śrīnivāśācār J. R.T.P., Belgaum, 1925.  
 Subbarao H. S.S.V.M.Udupi, 1980.
77. एहमूकं द्विं स्वप्ने बोधयन्नात्मपृत्तकम् ।  
 श्रीमद्भून्दावनाख्यानं पठतां सर्वसिद्धिदम् ॥  
 तोष्यन् सञ्जनमनः स्वमाहात्म्यावबोधकम् ।  
 मन्त्रतुल्यं महाग्रन्थं रचयामास वादिराव ॥  
 प्रातस्तददनाच्छ्वर्त्रं निःसृतं गुरुराणम् ॥  
 श्रीवेदनिधिराकर्ण्य लेखयामास मत्करात् ॥  
 Rāmacandra, Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmṛtam, p.39, VII-17,18 & 19.  
 तस्य रात्रौ शयानस्य स्वप्नं एत्य यतीश्वरः ।  
 - - -  
 सुगोप्यमगदत्प्रेम्या दिव्यमात्मीयैभवम् ॥  
 - - -  
 अलौकिकादश्चातं प्रेम्या वर्णयामास सर्ववित् ॥  
 Satpurācārya, Vādirājaunaratnamālā, XI-67,69 & 70.p.75
78. अणुष्टुन्दावनाख्यानं श्रीवेदनिधिसद्गुरुः ।  
 स्वाप्नपृन्दावनाख्यानात्संगृह्यालेख्य भक्तितः ।  
 लेखयित्वा गिलायां स वृन्दावनतटे बहिः ।  
 स्थापयामास भक्तानां निरन्तरजपाय हि ॥  
 Rāmacandra, Vādirājaguruvaracaritāmṛtam, p.39, VII-21 & 22.

79. See; Korati Srinivāsarao, 'Sri Vādirājaru', p.405
80. श्रीभागवतद्वार्थाब्धेष्टृतं संग्रहामूलं ।  
वादिराजाख्ययतिना माधवभूदेवतृप्तये ॥
81. Muttigi Bhimaseñacar, Bangalore-18, 1985
82. Rāmakṛṣṇappā Dvaita Vedānta Pāthasālā, Bangalore.
83. सुमात्यकाव्यस्तुतियुक्तिसारं गाथाश्चनानाविधाब्दहृथः ।  
ज्ञानादिदाश्चाप्रतिमाः कवीन्द्रः श्रीवादिराजो व्यतनोदसंख्याः ॥  
Raghunātha, Vrttaratnasamgraha, III-31.  
शताधिकग्रन्थगणैः कीर्तिस्तम्भं न्यघीखनत् ।  
V.G.C., III-66, p.16.
84. See: 'Stotraratnamālā', S.V.G.P.S.Udupi,  
'Stotramahodadhi', R.T.P.Belgaum.
85. V.Prabhañjana, 'Sri Vādirāja Stotra Manjari', Aitareya  
Prakāśana, Vyāsanakere, 1979, Pp.ii-iii.
86. Supra, fn.79, Pp.404-405.
87. - - - श्रीमद्भागवतादिकान् ।  
चकार सुबहूर्ने ग्रन्थान्प्राकृतान्स्त्कृतानुगान् ॥  
स्तोत्रानुध्यावचान्पौर्णमेष्टास्तरतमादिकान् ।  
मन्त्रानपि बबन्धाहर्त्ति स्त्रीणां प्राकृतभाषया ॥  
Satpurācārya, Vādirājaguṇaratnamālā, Pp.57 & 59:IX-30 & 31.
88. Madhvāsiddhānta Granthālaya, (M.S.G) Udupi, 1927.  
B.Bhimarao, Dāvaṇagere, 1972.
89. B.Bhimarao, Sarvajnācārya Sevā Sangha (S.S.S)  
Dāvaṇagere, 1980.

90. S.S.S. Dāvanagere, 1974.
91. M.S.G., Udupi, 1928; S.S.S. Dāvanagere, 1972.
92. Ibid, 1922.
93. }
94. } K.Raghavendraraao, Bangalore.
95. }
96. S.S.S., Dāvanagere, 1974.
97. Hombāli Prakāśana, Gadag, 1971.
98. S.S.S. Dāvanagere, 1974.
99. Prabodhini Pustaka Bhandar, Udupi.
100. M.S.G., Udupi, 1930; L.B.Muragoda, Bangalore, 1985.
101. M.S.G., Udupi, 1966.
102. महाभारतात्पर्यनिर्णयं प्राकृतं व्यधात् ।  
 Satpurācārya: Vādirājaṇāratnamālā. IX-29, p.57,  
 Pub-Trailekyaacārya Sevaka Vrnda, Bangalore, 1980.

The Yuktimallika:

103. Sinhā, Jādunātha, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, (Int. Ind. Phil  
 Laksmi Narian Agarwal, Agra, 1949, p.1
104. Paul Edwards: 'The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy'. The  
 MacMillan Company & The Free Press, New York, 1967, Vol.6, p.217.

105. लोकसिद्धो राजा परमेश्वरः । देहोच्छेषो मोक्षः ।

*Viśnumūrtibhat G: Sāyaṇamādhava 'Sarvadarśanasamgrahah'* (S.D.S) (Kannada) M.V.Balaganaṇapathi, Vāṇi Vilāsa Road, Mysore, 1973, Vol.1 p.3.

"God whose existence cannot be perceived, fares no better than the soul. The material elements produce the world, and a supposition of a creator is unnecessary".

Chatterjee & Dutta, 'An Introduction to Indian Philosophy' (An Intr.Ind.Phil) University of Calcutta, 1954, p.65.

See: "Saṅkhya asserts that the theology of the Prakṛti is sufficient to explain all order and arrangement of the cosmos. The Mimāṃsakas, the Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Jains, all deny the existence of Īsvara (God)".

Dāsagupta,S. "A History of Indian Philosophy"(A Hist.Ind.Phil)

106. रूपादिरहितत्वेनातीन्द्रियत्वात् ।

*Viśnumūrtibhat G: 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha'* Vol.2,p.63.

See:"This world, therefore, being an effect must be preceded by a cause, and this cause is Isvara. This cause we cannot see, because Isvara has no visible body, not because he does not exist."

Dāsagupta,S. "A History of Indian Philosophy" Vol.1,p.326,

107. ननु महता परिकरबन्धेन कण्ठवरेण उद्भव्य ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म "ज्ञेयं पृवक्ष्यामि" इति, अननुरूपमुक्तम् ... सवासु हि उपनिषद्गत्सु द्वये नेति नेति "अस्थूलमनु" इत्यादि विशेषपृतिषेधेनैव निर्विश्यते । न "इदं तत्" इति । वाचो गोचरत्वात् ।

Saṅkara, *Gītābhāṣya* XIII.12, 1942. p.181.

Cf: सर्वशब्दवाच्यस्य लक्षणापि न हृष्टेति न तस्य शास्त्रगम्यत्वम् ।

Madhva; 'Viśnusatatvanirṇaya'.(V.T.N) Sri Madhvāraddhānta Samvardhini Sabhā, Madras-1969, p.962.

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Cf : "Brahman, in this absolutely transendent aspect, say Sankara, cannot be described at all and it is, therefore, called interminate and characterless or nirguna. The description of Brahman even as infinite, real, consciousness, though more accurate than accidental descriptions, cannot directly convey the idea of Brahman"

Datta & Chatterjee, 'An Intr. Ind. Phil.' University of Calcutta, 1954, p.397.

108. लदिदंगुणपूर्वैव सर्वमित्येवशब्दितम् । भाविभूतभवत्कालेष्वेकं रूपतया हरिः ।  
सर्वदा नित्यं इत्येषा व्याख्योक्तारस्य कीर्तिरितिष्वृहत्संवित्तायाम् ।

Madhva, 'Māndūkopaniṣadbhāṣya (Mā.U.Bhā) (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ)  
Akhila Bharat Mādhva Mahā Mandal (ABMM) Bangalore, 1969.  
Vol.1, p.513.

109. अनुमा युक्तिरेवोक्ता व्याप्तिरेव तु सा स्मृता । ॥31॥

Madhva, 'Anuvyākhyānam (AV) (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) Vol. 1, p.61.

110. कामाच्य नानुमानापेक्षा ।

यथाकामं हि अनुमातुं शक्यते । अतोन तत्त्वे पृथग्नुमानमपेक्षयते ।

Madhva, 'Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (Br.SūBhā) (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ)  
ABMM. Bangalore, 1969, Vol.1, p.18.

111. स्यात्तत्र युक्त एवार्थो युक्तिश्च त्रिविधा मता ॥ 19.

व्याप्तिप्रत्यक्षणा यस्या युक्तिगतेऽगमगा तथा ।

प्रत्यक्षागममूला तु युक्तितत्त्र बलीयसी ॥ 20.

Madhva, Anuvyākhyānam. ABMM. Bangalore, Vol.1, p.60

112. श्रीमध्वाचार्यमतोक्तयुक्तिमवलम्ब्ययुक्तिरसिकतयायुक्तिमल्लिकाख्यग्रन्थं  
करिष्यमाणो भावान्वादिराजमुनिः . . . . .

Surottamatīrtha, 'Bhāvavilāśini (Bh.Vi) com.on Vuktimallikā  
(Y.M) Kumbhakonam, 1903, p.2.

Gunasaurabha:

113. भक्त्या स्तुत्या विरक्त्या भजदमलजनौ न्नत्यभूत्यर्पकाय  
 क्षित्यामत्यल्पभूत्येष्वपि कुजनकृतौ द्वित्यभूत्याजकाय ।  
 कर्त्रे धर्त्रेष्व हर्त्रे हयमुखहरयेऽमुत्रपत्रे नमस्ते  
 तस्मै कस्मै चिदस्मन्मनसिधृतकथा विस्मृतौ स्मारकाय ॥ १-१.  
Vādirāja. Y.M. Gunasaurabha (G.S.) Slokas 1 to 5 Pp.2 & 3.
114. हयगीर्वं देवं वयमिममुपात्थेवकृतिनः ।  
Ibid. p.3, S1, 6.
115. बौद्धजैनागमौ पूर्वपक्षो लवगिमस्य हि ।  
 ततः परस्ताज्जातेषु मतेषु च यथाकुर्म ॥  
 पूर्वः पूर्वः पूर्वपक्षो यावन्मध्यवमतोदयः ॥  
 अन्ते सिद्धस्तु सिद्धान्तो मध्यस्यागम एव हि ॥  
Ibid. p.4b, S1, 8 & 9.
116. निर्णेतुं शक्यते युक्तायुक्तपद्धविमर्शिभिः ।  
 ---  
 तस्मात्स एव तिद्वान्त इति निश्चित्य घैतसा ।  
 ---  
 मयेत्थं युक्तिलिखिना क्रियते युक्तिमलिका ।  
Ibid., Slokas 9-11 Pp.4b & 4.
117. अतो मायावादमतान्नाम्नैवाति जुगुष्टितात् ।  
 भीतो हमभं तत्त्ववादिनामेव पद्धतिं ॥  
Ibid., p.5b, S1.20.
118. न त्नेहा न्नविस्त्नेहा द्युलत्याकृष्टेन केवलं ।  
 यतः कृताति सत्तर्करसिकानां मुदे भव ॥  
Ibid., p.6b, S1.24.
119. Winternitz, 'A History of Indian Philosophy',  
 Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi-1972, Vol.I p.52.

120. Rādhākrṣṇan, 'Indian Philosophy' George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1971, Vol.I, p.63.
121. मानाधीना मेषतिद्वः । न पृयोजनाधीना ।  
Q.Pāñcamukhi R.S. 'Vedāpauruseyatvavādah' (Ve.Aup.Vā)  
Karnataka Historical Research Society, (K.H.R.S) Dharwad,  
(Undated) p.XV.
122. The number of Pramanas differs from one school of philosophy to another, perhaps all but Cārvākas and Buddhists etc., have accepted these three (Perception, Inference and Verbal testimony) in general.
123. निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्नकर्षः प्रत्यक्षम् ।  
Madhva. Pramāṇa Laksana (Pra.Laks) Srīman Mādhvarāddhānta Samvardhaka Sabhā, Poornaprajna Vidyāpeetha, Bangalore-1969, p.33.
124. Infra.198  
निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमानम् । ... उपपत्तिश्च यथार्थतो ज्ञातैवार्थं बोध्यति ।  
Madhva.Pramāṇa Laksana p.34.
125. अविनोभावो व्याप्तिः ।  
Pañcamukhi R.S.'Pramāṇa Paddhati' (Pra.Pad) by Sri Jayatīrtha, K.H.R.S, Dharwad-1982, p.49.
126. निर्दोषः भाष्यः आग्रमः ।  
Madhva. Pramāṇa Laksana, p.38,
127. Cf. 'They are the indispensable guides to the correct meaning and import of the verbal testimony in general'.  
Panchamukhi R.S. Vedāpauruseyatvavāda ,K.H.R.S,Dharwad,p.iv.

128. Cf: "Hence, for the proof of Dharma, Adharma, Virtue, Sin, heaven and hell which the Buddhists also admit, Verbal testimony untouched by human failings is the only acceptable evidence. That is evidently the Vedas which are known from generation to generation to be Apauruseya".  
Ibid, p.x.
129. वेदा ह्यनन्ता इति हि श्रुतिराहाप्यनन्ताम् । {23}  
 अनन्तवेदनिर्णीतिर्महापूर्व्यवारिधः ॥ {24}  
 Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna p.145, III-iii-23 & 24.
130. व्यधदाद्वासंतत्यै वेदमेकं चतुर्विधम् ।  
 श्रग्युजः सामाथवश्चिं वेदाश्चत्वार उद्गताः ।  
 Pañcamukhi R.S, 'Ve.Aup.Va' K.H.R.S,Dharwad p.II
131. "The Vedas are oldest extant literary monuments of the Aryan minds" : Sharma C.D., 'A critical survey of Indian Philosophy' Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1979, p.13.
132. मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोः वेदनामधेयम् ।  
Ibid, p.14.
133. प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्यातेषु त्रिषु त्मृतमिति वचनात्  
 अलोके ये प्रबलमाणमूरत्य वेदस्य ... ।  
 Surottamatīrtha, Bh.Vi., com.on V.M.Guṇasaurabha (G.S.)p.7.
134. Pāṇḍurangi K.T. 'Essentials of Yukti-mallikā of Sri Vadirajatīrtha, Bangalore, 1983, p.5.
135. बहुत्वेन बलीयांसि वचनानीति में मतिः ।  
 अनेकदर्शनाचार्यान् कथमेकोनिवारयेत् ॥  
V.M. G.S., Pp.7 & 8b. Slokas, 34 & 35.
136. असर्वज्ञवर्यांस्येवं विलोक्यानि परत्परं ।  
 न धर्मनिर्णयायालम् ... ॥  
Ibid, p.8 b S1.36.

137. बुद्धस्थापीश्वरावतारत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वात्तेन य तदुक्तविपरीतधर्मस्थैरो-  
कतत्वात् यज्ञादेवीश्वरोक्तमार्गेण न धर्मत्वनिर्णयो भवतीति भावः ॥  
Bh.Vi. com. on Y.M., G.S., p.8b, ३५८.

138. अतः पुंवाक्यतो धर्मः कर्थं निणीयते घद ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.8, S1.39.

139. Supra, fn.110.

140. ततः पुरुषस्यन्युक्तिप्रत्यधाणामतीन्द्रिय धर्मान्वयचायकत्वात् ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on Y.M. G.S., p.8.

141. अनादिनित्यावाच्चाच्या धर्मसिद्धै ततो खिलैः ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.8, S1.42.

142. अनादितः पर्वपूर्वसम्प्रदायबलागत ।  
सा तु नार्थं व्यभिचरेत् कर्तुद्वीषविवर्जिता ॥  
Ibid, p.9b, S1.44.

143. अस्ति चतुण्मित्यायणिं वेदप्रामाण्ये संमतिः ।  
Bh.Vi. Com.on Y.M. G.S., p.9b, ३६८.

It is to be noted that the reference of Jainism in terms has not been made with Carvaka and Buddhism in negating the authority of the Vedas. The reference of Jainism is to be accounted for as Vadiraja deals with Buddhism and Jainism together - Infra - p.

Cf: The orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vēdānta believe in the authority of the Vedas. But the heterodox schools, the Carvaka, the Buddhist and the Jaina reject their authority.

Sinha. Jadunatha. 'Outlines of Indian philosophy'  
Sinha Publishing house, Private Ltd., Calcutta Ch.II, p.18.

144. In the Kāṇḍasūtras, though the reference about the God is not clearly made, is indeed hinted at and suggested (i) whereas it is explicitly done in the Nyāyasūtras of Gotama. (ii).

...

(i) तद्यनादान्वायस्यपामाण्यम् । Vai.Sū.3.

Sreṣṭhi, Kanāda (Vaisesikasūtrāṇi), Kṣemarāja  
Śrī Kṛṣṇadāsa, Bombay, 1969, p.5.

(ii) ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकमफ्लूयदर्शनात् । ... -IV-i-19.

गुणविशिष्टमात्मान्तरमीश्वरः । तत्स्यात्मकल्पात् । कल्पान्तरानुपत्तिः । ।  
Sāstri & Súkla, 'Nyāyadarśana of Gotamamuni with the  
Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. Jayakṛṣṇadāsa. Haridāsa Guptā.  
The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares city-1942,  
Pp.190 & 191.

Cf: " The technical aspects of God functioning presumably did not occur to the earliest formulators of these theories, engaged in developing the fundamentals of the mechanics of atomism and causation, and it is only when they discovered that they needed additional agents besides humans that they were moved to postulate a Super-self, God, who can fulfil the requirements."

Potter.Karl.H. The Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy  
Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1977, Vol.II Pp.22 & 23.

145. The idea of bodyless (formless) God has been developed in to a conception in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School later (iii)  
And creatorship etc, (even the authorship of Veda) is also attributed to that bodyless God (iv)

(iii) यत्पुनर्विकल्पतं - स्वारीरः ईश्वरः सूजति जगत् ? अशारीरो वा ?  
इति - तत्रांश्वारीरस्यैव सूक्ष्मत्वमभ्यपगच्छामः ।

Jayantabhatta, & 'Nyāyamañjari', Oriental Research Institute,  
Mysore, 1969, Vol.1, p.507.

(iv) अशारीरस्य वेद्वर्तुत्वम् ।

स्वेच्छानिर्मितदेहमेदसचिवो वेदप्रणेताग्निः ।

नह्येताहुश्वदेहयोगिनममुँ नेच्छन्ति नैषायिकाः ॥ ... ॥

Subramanya Sāstri, S., Nyāyasāraḥ of Bhāsarvajña,  
Govt.O.M.L, Madras, 1961, Ch.II, p.11.

Potter, dealing with Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayana, writes: " The Vedas are valid, being utterances of a trustworthy person whose existence is to be inferred as the creator of the universe. The universe is a product, the agent of which must be an Omni-scient person, who is God... Since God needs no body to satisfy the requirements of agency, where as ordinary human agents do require a body... Since God has direct control over everything, unlike ordinary mortal agents, He needs no body to create the World.

...

...  
The Vedas and Āyurvedas are His compositions, and so authentic.

God, therefore, must be taken to create the world and to utter the Vedas at that time.

Potter.Karl.H. 'The Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophy'  
Vol.II. Pp.554, 555 and 556,

146. अशरीरः तदीशस्तां नैव वकित कदाचन ।

Y.M., G.S, p.9, S1.47

147. Ref: Sharma,C.D. 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy'  
p.183.

148. Rgveda X-90-9.

प्रादुभविजनेस्तस्मादृचस्तामानि जग्निरे ।  
ऋक्सामादेरभावे प्राग्यज्ञसोऽन् कृतोभवत् ।  
देवास्तेनायजन्तेति पूर्वोऽनुतिमनुस्मर ॥  
Y.M., G.S. p.10, S1.53.

149. श्रीमूर्तुर्गति या भिन्ना प्रकृतिशशक्तिरूच्यते ।

- - - ताभिः शयानं पुरुषं सैवतुं श्रुतिरूपिणी ।  
अस्तौत् प्रकाशयात्मानं प्रकृतिं जीवबन्धनाम् ... ॥

Madhva, 'Bhāgavata Tātparya' (Sarvamūla granthāḥ) ABMM, Bangalore, Vol.3, Pp.560 & 561, 10-94.

150. न च वर्णं पदादिनामनित्यत्वं वक्तुं युक्तम् । सर्वज्ञत्वादीशवरस्य

तद्बुद्धौ सर्वदै प्रतीयमानत्वात् ।

न केवलं वर्णमात्रं नापि पदादिमात्रं किंतु समस्ताऽच्य यथायोगं शाश्वताः ।  
सर्वेषि नोप जायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति चेति ।

Madhva. 'Visnūtavatvanirñaya', Pp.260 & 261.

151. यस्यास्ति पुस्तर्कं हस्ते हयास्यस्य विधुरोः ।

स च वक्ताऽनादिनित्यसिद्धबुद्धिमात्रम् ।

Y.M., G.S, P.11b, S1.56

152. देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमिति श्रुतेः स्वबुद्धिस्वभावादेव वेदस्थ -  
पौर्वपर्यं घट्येन्नतु सर्वज्ञत्वशक्त्या ... ।  
Bh.VI., com.on Y.M. G.S. p.11b.

153. Cf : सर्गे सर्गेऽमुनैवेत उद्गीर्यन्ते तथैव च ।  
तत्क्रमेणैव तैर्वर्णेन्तैः स्परैरेव नान्यथा ॥  
Madhva.Visnusatvanirnaya p.243.

154. उपाधिनित्यतायां तु नित्यताप्यस्य शोभते ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.11 Sl.58

See for details, Subbachar D.V, 'Vedasvarupavicārah'  
Sri Guru Nivasa, 120, Telugu Brahmin Street, Coimbatore-1  
1982, Pp.29 & 30.

155. अतो कर्तैव को नन्तवाक्लर्तर्हि निश्चयेत् ।  
कर्तृप्रसिद्ध्यभावेन तदेदौयमकर्तृकः ॥  
अकर्तृत्वं धूमलभे या नित्येति श्रुतौ श्रुता ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.17, SlOKas, 99, 100 & 101.

156. Supra.

Cf: " They are the God's commands transmitted to the sages  
for the good of His entire creation, at different times  
and places, unconditioned by the limitations of time  
and place.

Panchamukhi R.S, Ve.Aup.Vā. P.XXXXIV & XXXXV.

157. Nārāyaṇa pandita 'Sumadhvavijaya', P.405, Ch.XVI-5.

158. धर्मस्यवेदनादेव स वेदो नात्र संशयः ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.20, Sl.127

159. हयग्रीवमुखोदगीर्ण सा वाणी धर्मशासनं ।  
अतस्तदुदितो धर्मो हयधर्मस्तदिपर्यः ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.21b, Sl.131.

160. Chatterjee & Datta, 'An Introduction to Indian Philosophy'  
p.57.

160.A. Garbe says "several vestiges show that even in the pre-Buddhistic India, proclaimers of purely materialistic doctrines appeared".

Sharma C.D., 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy'  
p.40.

161. पूर्विक्यप्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वम् ।  
तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा ।  
किञ्चादिन्ध्यो मदशक्तिपदिङ्गानम् ।  
चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः ।  
काम स्वैकः पुरुषार्थः ।  
मरणमेवापवर्गः ।

Q.Sivakumaraswamy M. Sad-darsanasamuccaya (Sad.D.Sam)  
Bangalore University, Bangalore Pp.99 & 100.

162. शिष्यप्रमाणै वाग्वाच्या सा शोच्या मानता न घेत् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.21 S1.133.

त हयप्रमाणभूताच्छास्त्राच्छिष्याणां तत्त्वबोधो भवति ।  
Bh.VI, Com.on Y.M. G.S., p.21.

163. किं च प्रत्यक्षमैकैं मानमित्यादिरूपिणी ।  
वाक्य प्रमाणिका घेत्स्यादाक्यार्थं प्रच्युतिस्तदा ।  
यद्यप्रमाणिका सा स्यादाक्यार्थप्रच्युतिस्तदा ॥  
अथयाथार्थ्यतः प्राहुः अमानत्वं यतो बुधाः ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.21, Slokas 134, 135.

164. चारकस्य न वाऽ चार्वी कुवीतात्मवर्धं यतः ।  
अक्षैकमानतावाकिं रक्षेदात्मप्रमाणताम् ॥  
Ibid, p.21b S1.132.

165. Cf: To accept the validity of perception and, at the same time and from the same standpoint, to reject the validity of inference is a thoughtless self-contradiction.

Sharma C.D., 'A Critical survey of Indian Philosophy' p.43.

166. प्रत्यक्षस्यैव मानत्वे युक्तिश्चेतुकथ्यते त्वया ।  
अनुमानं तदामानं यदियुक्तिर्नकथ्यते ॥  
अनुमानं तदामानं राजाङ्गा न हिते वचः ॥  
Y.M. G.S., p.23b. S1.144.

167. Cf: Thoughts and ideas, not being material objects, cannot be perceived, they can only be inferred.

Sharma C.D., 'A Critical survey of Indian Philosophy' p.43.

168. तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमानां मानता धूता ।  
Y.M.G.S., p.23b S1.146.

169. Sharma C.D. 'A critical Survey of Indian Philosophy' p.43 844

170. Ref: वच्चित् फलप्रतिलभ्यतु मणिमन्त्रौषधादिवत्  
याहृच्छकः । अतस्तत्साध्यमद्बृष्टादिकमपि नास्ति ।  
Viṣṇumūrtibhāṭ G., Sāyanāmādhava, 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha'  
Pp.16 & 17.

171. अदृष्टं च तदेष्टव्यं दृष्टवत् कार्यगौरवात् ।  
कार्यस्य निर्निमित्त-त्वं उन्मत्तो वक्तुमर्हति ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.23, S1.151.

172. अहृष्टानियमात् ।  
अनादिविद्याकमद्विवैचित्र्यात् वैचित्र्यम् ।  
Madhva, 'Brahmasūtrabhāṣya', (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) p.107.  
त स्वाधीष्ठ जीवस्थनिस्त्व्यानादिकालिकात् ।  
धमधिर्णु तदापश्यनु स्वेच्छ्या बोध्यत्यजः ।  
Madhva, 'Anuvyākhyāna' (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) p.202.

173.

Y.M. G.S., p.24, S1.158.

174. अत्रयत्वारिभूतानि भूमिवार्यनलानिलाः ।

चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चैतन्यमुपजायते ॥

Viśnūnumurtibhāṭ G., Sāyaṇamādhava, 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha'p.8.

Vādirāja's mentioning of only three material elements, the earth, the water and the fire looks surprising. The element air might be dropped in the hands of Vādirāja on account of its having unperceivable nature unlike water, earth and fire.

पूर्थिव्यप्तेजसार्योगो जीवदेहैपि नापरः ।

Y.M. G.S., p.24, S1.156.

175. तथा च शरीरातिरिक्तजीवाभावे जीवत्त्वरीरवत् कुण्ठेषि

प्रमातृत्वादिकं स्थात् ।

Bh.Vi. com.on Y.M. G.S. p.24.

176. ज्ञानं हु पंचभूतात्मजडवर्गं न कुत्रित् ।

अतो जडस्वभावो न तद्योगेऽपि जडे कर्थं ॥

Y.M. G.S., p.25b, S1.162.

177. जीवस्तज्जडदेहान्यो मान्यो र्यं देहिनं विदुः ।

Y.M. G.S., p.25, S1.167.

178. देहि पदवाच्यत्वादेव देहादन्यो जीवः सिद्धयतीति भावः ।

Bh.Vi.com.on Y.M. G.S., p.26.

179. नित्यदेहान्यजीवस्य पक्षेतु क्षेममेति सा ।

Y.M., G.S., p.26b, S1-169.

180. जडदेहात्मताजीवे जडाकारेण चाकृतिः ।

यच्छेदभेदवेधाग्निदाहायैस्त्ववध्यप्रदा ॥

तद्बुधास्तां न मन्यन्ते मनःखेदाय यत्सदा ॥

Ibid. p.27b, S1.173.

181. "बलमानन्द ओजस्व सहो ज्ञानमनाकुलम् ।  
स्वरूपाण्येव जीवस्य व्यञ्यन्ते परमाद् विभोः ॥  
इति गौपदवनश्रुतिः ।  
Q.Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (II-iii-30) p.102.
182. सुख्योतिस्वरूपात्मचितां साकारतां स्तुमः ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.27B, S1.174.
183. अण्नामणुराकारो यथानित्योत्त्यनादितः ।  
ज्योतिर्मयास्तथाजीवास्ताकारास्तनु संततं ॥  
अतो नित्यचिदाकारो युक्तिसिद्धो न वायति ।  
Ibid, p.27 & 28b, Slokas, 176 & 180.
184. ... तस्मादेवं जातीयकेषु वाक्येषु यथाश्रुतं निराकारभेद-  
ब्रह्म अवधारयितव्यम् ।  
Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Hindi Ed.) III-ii-14.  
Satśātri, Chowkhamba Vidyabhavana, Varanasi, 1967, Vol.2, p.526.
185. परमाणुपारभ्य पंचमहाभूतपर्यन्तस्य सर्वस्य च जडप्रपंचस्य सर्वेषां चेतनांनां च  
उक्तविध्यासाकारत्पात् सहस्रीष्टाद्याकारवति भगवति निराकारस्य च  
सुतंरामयोगात् सार्वजनीनमिदं प्रमेयं ... ।
- Bh.Vi., Com.on Y.M., G.S., p.28.
186. वयंतु ज्योतिषस्तस्य ज्योतिरूपमुखं रौ ।  
यरणावुदरादीश्च वदामोऽत्र किमद्भुतं ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.29b, S1.186.
187. वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः । Br.Sū. II-iv-23.  
भूतानां विशेषसंयोगादेव विशेषव्यवहारः ।  
"पार्थिवाणां शरीराणामर्थेन पूर्थिवी स्मृता ।  
इतरेण विभागिन्य आपस्तेजस्तु भागतः ।  
इति सामान्यतो इयं भेदं च प्रतिपूरुषम् ।  
स्वर्गस्थानां शरीराणामर्थं तेज उदाहृतम् ॥ इति ब्रह्मसंहितायाम् ।  
Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, p.116.

188. सुखरूपाश्चते सर्वे ज्ञानरूपाश्च सर्वदा ।  
 अनादिनित्यसत्याश्च चिद्रूपाक्षयवायतः ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.29, S1.189.
189. Supra.
190. तत्त्विलंगदेहता चैषां तत्तद्वूपानुमापनात् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.30, S1.197.
191. अतस्यभावतसर्वे साकारा जीवराश्यः ।  
 तत्कर्म्युकोपमा तत्तत्त्विलंगमूर्तिश्च तादृशी ॥  
*Ibid*, p.31b. S1.201.
192. जडान्तराद्वृष्टरूपं तच्चनामेवमागतं ।  
*Ibid*, p.31, S1.203.  
 तस्मात् स्वाभाविककरणरणाद्विमन्त्यदेहो अंगीकार्यः ।  
Bh.Vi. com. on Y.M., G.S., p.31.
193. तत्य निर्मलनायास्ति धर्मः कोपि न ते मते ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.32; S1.212.  
 Cf: न च तेन लोकोपकारः । धर्माभ्यावज्ञाने परस्पर-  
 हिंसादिना अपकारस्यैव प्राप्तेः ।  
 Madhva, 'Viśṇutatvanirnaya', p.98.
194. हुः खोजिज्ञतं सुखं प्रार्थ्यं न तु हुः खोन्वितं सुखं ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.33, S1.220.
195. अतो निष्फलमेवाभूच्छास्त्रं ते कलीबशास्त्रवत् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.34b, S1.223.
196. Pāndurangi K.T., 'Essentials of Yuktimallikā of Vādirāja-tīrtha', Bangalore, 1983, p.21.
197. Sharma C.D., 'A critical survey of Indian Philosophy', P.46.

198. व्याप्तिधर्मिलिंगं हक्षप्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमागमं वा अनुसृत्ये  
प्रमाणं ननु अनुमता ।  
Bh.Vi. com. on Y.M., G.S., p.35.
199. अतो युक्त्यापि नार्थस्ते यत्सा हिंसां प्रशंसति ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.35, S1.236.
200. किंच युक्त्येकभक्तव्येत्कथंयांसं निषेधति ।  
भूतेभ्योन्यन्तवै मासै नान्यदन्ने पि दृष्टयते ॥  
सर्वं त्याज्यं भोज्यमन्यदित्येतत्केन ते मते ॥  
Ibid., p.36b, S1.239.
201. कुल-जौणि-जीव-मण्णण-ठाणा-इसु-जाणिउण जीवाणि ।  
तस्सारं भणिष्यत्ताण-परिणामो होङ्क पदमवदं ॥  
Gautamacandraji. Jīvarāja, 'Kunda Kunda Prābhṛta Saṅgraha'  
(Hindi Ed.) Gulabchanda Hirachanda Doshi - Sholapur, 1960, p.201.  
Ref.: " THE CONCEPT of ahimsā is a complex ethical virtue.  
It has figured prominently and is given an enormous  
significance in the religion of Jainism".  
Nāgarājarao P. 'Essays in Indian Philosophy and Religion'.  
Lalvani Publishing House, Bombay, 1971, p.87.
202. See for details : Vādirāja, 'Pāśandamatakhandana'  
Rāmatatva Prakāsana, Belgaum, (Undated)
203. कर्त्त चर्वस्य कार्यस्य कस्मादीशो विसृज्यते ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.37b, S1.244.
204. The Svabhāvavāda of Buddhists appears as/the original  
conception of their school. The root of its origin would  
be seen in materialism.  
See: "Except the materialists (the Svabhāvādins) who advocated  
the chance-origin of things, .....".  
Murthi T.V.R., 'The central philosophy of Buddhism'  
Georgre Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1960, p.167. ...

नन्वदृष्टानिष्टी जगदैचित्रयमाकस्मिं स्यादिलेचेत् -

न तद्भद्रम् । स्वभावादेव तदुपपत्तेः ।

तदुक्तं - वहिनृष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलाः ।

तेनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात् स्वभावात् तद्यवस्थितिः ।

Visṇumūrtibhāt G. Sāyanāmādhava 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha'

p.16 & 17.

205. The conception 'Svabhāva' is, as not an original idea of Buddhism, also not exclusively related to Buddhism.

The school of Jainism also talks of this:

See: "The things according to him, have their own nature - a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation - and that nature is not caused by adṛṣṭa.

Fire burns because it has got the nature of burning. We cannot say that fire burns because of adṛṣṭa is there.

"It burns of itself.

Mehtā, Mohanlal - 'Outlines of Jaina Philosophy', Jaina Mission Society, Bangalore, 1954, p.59.

But it is true that, the conception 'Svabhāva' gained perfect shape in the hands of Buddhists.

See: (i) स यस्यात्ति साध्यधर्मस्यावयवे समुदायो-

पयारात् तस्मिन् । "स्वभावो हेतुः" । साध्यधर्मश्रुतत्वात् तस्यैव स्वभाव इति गम्यते ।

Sanghavi & Jinavijayaji, 'Hetubindutikā of Bhatta Arcata'. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1949, p.57.

(ii) Svabhāva (sk), As applied cosmically 'the own nature' basic substance of the universal Mūlaprakrti or root essence. Thus, equating with Tathatā (q.r.). At human level, it equates with Ātman, 'Svabhāvakaaya' own nature body', equates with Dharmakaya (q.r.) Christomas H. 'A popular dictionary of Buddhism' Curzon Press, London, 1976, Pp.190 & 191.

206. स्वभावादेव तदुपपत्तेः ।  
 ... स्वभावात् तद्यवस्थितिः ।  
Visnumurtibhat G. Sāyañamādhava! Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha' p.17.
207. स्वभावादेव सर्वं च जगत्स्थात्तथराचरं ।  
 ...  
 स्वभावोपि जडशचेत्स्यादन्यप्रेयो घटादिवत् ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.37b, Slokas, 245, 246.  
 प्रवृत्तितदेहुभूत ज्ञानेच्छाप्रभावात् ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on Y.M., G.S, p.37.
208. स्वातन्त्र्येतु किमीशेनापराद्दं लघुमूर्तिना ।  
Y.M., p.37, S1.247.  
 Jada, Jīva and the Lord  
 Jada is Acetana and Paratantra  
 Jīva is Cetana and Paratantra  
 The Lord is Cetana and Svatana
209. महभीमहीधरादेश्च यःकर्ता समहेश्वरः ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.38b, S1.249.  
 अस्मदादीनां अस्वातन्त्र्येण अस्मत्प्रेरणकर्तृत्वेनापि  
 इश्वरस्य अंगीकार्यत्वाच्य ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., G.S, p.38b.
210. सर्वस्य कर्ता तत्रापि किं न कर्ता महेश्वरः ।  
 यस्तंभसम्भवो डिम्बे हिरण्यकशिष्योरपात् ।  
 सोन्तयामी ममस्वामी कस्य नस्याद्विग्राय ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.39b, Slokas, 256 & 257.
211. अद्वृष्टमीश्वरादेवेत्योक्तीत्सर्वधुरंधरः ।  
Ibid: p.40b, S1.264.
212. पद्धतमानीमानि यत्कार्यं तत्सकुर्कं इत्यस्मद्दुक्तव्याप्तेः  
 न व्यभिचारस्थलानि इति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi, Com.on Y.M., G.S, p.40.

213. Cf: "The soul has been said to be the possession of material Karmas. The characteristic is meant to refute a two-fold belief. First, it attacks those philosophers who do not regard Karma or adrsta as a valid existence. (The Ārvākas of Indian thought fall into this category) Secondly, the adjective 'material' is directed against those thinkers, who do not regard Karma or adrsta as 'material'.

Mehta, Mohanlal, 'Outlines of Jaina Philosophy', p.61.

See also: Walther, Schubring 'The doctrine of Jains'  
Motilal Banārasidass, 1978, Pp.172 & 173.

214. Cf: धर्मं जैमि निरत एव । Br.Sū. III-ii-41.

यतः फलं तदेव कर्मश्चराद् भवति । "एष हयेष साधुर्म  
कारयति ॥ इति श्रुतेरिति जैमिनिः ।

Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, p.144.

215. नरेषु कश्चिचन्मूकोस्ति वाचालोप्यत्तिकश्चन ।  
सोयं नरस्वभावो न तवापि च ममापि च ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.41b, S1.271

216. कर्मापि चेद्गतं तर्हि स्वभावाद्युपसर्णं ।

Ibid. p.41, S1.272.

217. स्वभावकालकमदिः सर्वस्थास्थनियामकं ।

Ibid., p.42b S1.279.

Cf: द्रव्यं कर्मच कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यद्बोक्ष्या ॥

Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna, p.2, S1.13.

218. Hiriyanna M., 'The essentials of Indian philosophy',

George Allen and Unwin (India) Private Limited, Bombay, 1973, p.98

219. "The Sāksī is an intelligent and conscious perceiver - 'It is the Sāksī that is capable of comprehending both the knowledge and its validity'.

Dāsaguptā, S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Motilal Banarasidass Delhi, 1975, vol. IV. p.168.

See also:

"Madhva finds such an ultimate and absolute principle of knowledge and validation, in the inner sense(organ) of the self of man-his "Svarūpendriyam" which he calls Sāksī, and which is "Jñānāgrāhaka" and also "Jñānaprāmānyagrāhaka" (intuting knowledge and its validity)".

Sharma, B.N.K, 'Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya'

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1962, p.108. "Sāksī is given the highest place in the Dvaita epistemology.

Even to prove the validity of Pramāṇas Sāksī is essential. Without Sāksī it would not be possible to prove the essential validity of any Pramāṇa on which depends the validity of all knowledge."

Shanbhag D.N, 'Some problems in Dvaita Philosophy in their dialectical setting', Sri Rāma Prakāsana, Dharwad, 1982, Pp.67 & 68.

220. Dāsaguptā S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. IV, p.168.

दोषाद्युतिरूपेन ज्ञानग्राहकसाधिणा ।

स्वतस्त्वं ज्ञानमानत्वनिर्णीतिनिष्ठमो हि नः ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.47, Śl.321.

221. अभ्यं परतः एवेति नैयायिकादयः ।

Pancamukhi R.S., 'Pramāṇa Paddhati by Sri Jayatīrtha', p.161.

222. नैयायिकमते प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययोरूपत्तिज्ञपत्त्योः परतस्त्वमुपपादयति ।

Pancamukhi R.S., 'Janārdanabhatta, Jayatīrthavijaya', Com.on 'Pramāṇa Paddhati' p.163.

223. ज्ञानजनका तिरिक्तकारणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ स्वतत्त्वम् ।  
 ज्ञानज्ञापका तिरिक्तप्रमाणापेक्षात्वं इप्तौ स्वप्तस्त्वम् ।  
 तत्र ज्ञानं इन्द्रियादि जन्यं प्रामाण्यं पुनरिन्द्रियादिगुणजन्यम् । - - -  
 स्वं ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यम् ।  
 Panchamukhi R.S. 'Pramāṇa Paddhati' of Sri Jayatīrtha,  
 Pp.161 & 162.
224. प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रामाण्यं परतः इति मीमांसकाः ।  
 Kevalananda sarasvati 'Mīmāṃsākosa' Prājnapāṭhasāla  
 Mandala grantha mala, Wai (Surat), 1960, Part V, p.2856.
225. मायावादिनो वेदान्तनस्तु दोषाभावे सति यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकसामग्रीग्राहयत्वं  
 स्वतस्त्वम् । यदा यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राहयोग्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वं इत्याहुः ।  
 एतन्मते प्रमात्वं स्वतं स्वोत्पद्धते ज्ञायते । तथाहि । प्रमात्वं  
 ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्री प्रयोज्यम् । - - - - अस्मिन् मते स्वतो  
 ग्राहयत्वं च दोषाभावे सति यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकसामग्रीग्राहयत्वम् ।  
 ॥वेदान्तपरिभाषा ॥अनुपलब्धिं परि. ॥
- Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa B.O.R.I.Poona 1978, p.561.  
 अप्रामाण्य तु न ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीप्रयोज्यम्  
 प्रामाण्यमत्यप्रामाण्यापत्तेः । किंतु दोषप्रयोज्यम् ।  
 Joshi., Vedāntaparibhāṣa of Sridhararajadhvarindra.,  
 Akhil Bharat Sanskrit Parisat, Lucknow, Vikram Saka,  
 2021 p,242.
- 225.A. In the Advaita, the problem of validity and invalidity, really, speaking, has no concrete scope and appropriate application. Because, to gain the validity of knowledge, the knowledge, the object of knowledge the relation and means there of must be true. But in the Advaita, Brahman alone is real, though It is real, It is not an object of knowledge.

ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म "ज्ञेयं पृथक्यामि" इति अनुरूपमुक्तम् । .....  
वाचोऽगोचरत्वात् ।

Sāṅkara, Gitābhāṣya, 1942 XIII-12, p.181.

And other than Brahman everything is unreal.

.....मनसैव इदं ब्रह्मैकरसं आप्तव्यं आत्मैव नान्यदस्तीति ।

Katha Up.Bhā.IV.11.

So, Ultimately, there is nothing in the Advaita, to be an object of knowledge. Hence, validity has no meaning.

And, even if empirical reality is talked of, it is not possible to admit the theory of validity since, the very reality is the product of nescience. (Ajñana-Avidyā) which is also Mithyā. (having no existence in all the three times). And it cannot be contended that the knowledge and other dealings are positively possible due to Adhyāsa of Avidyā. Because Avidyā and its Adhyāsa is Mithyā.

तमेतमविद्याख्यं आत्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य  
सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहाराः लैकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः ।  
श्वमयमनादिरनन्तः नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासः  
मिथ्यापृत्यरूपः कर्तृत्वभोत्कृत्वपृष्ठकः सर्वलोकपृत्यक्षः ॥

Adhyāsa, Bhā.

Satsāstri, Sāṅkara, BrahmasūtraBhāṣya Vol.1, Pp.15 & 18,

226. एवं च विषयनिष्ठज्ञाततया तन्निष्ठमेव ज्ञानं अनुमीयते

"घटो ज्ञानवान्" ज्ञाततावत्वात् इति ।

तत्र घटत्वनिष्ठपृकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन

ज्ञानानुमितौ तादृशपृकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यता-

रूपप्रामाण्यग्रहः ।

Kevalanandasarasvati 'Mīmāṃsākosah' Vol.5, p.2858,

227. अप्रमाणं तु नास्त्येवेति प्रामाकराः ।

Pañcamukhi R.S, 'Pramāṇa Paddhati' by Sri Jayatirtha p.162.

228. प्रामाण्यं अप्रामाण्यं च ज्ञानस्य उभयं स्वतः इति सांख्याः ।  
Kevalānandasarasvati; 'Mīmāṃsa Kosa' Part V. p.2856.  
सांख्यमते प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये ।  
निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ।  
स्वभावस्थानपायित्वादनुष्ठ॑मीलक्षणम् प्रामाण्यम् ।  
Bhāttācārya R. 'Sāṃkhyasūtram with Bhāṣya of Vijnānabhikṣu'  
Bharatiya Vidyā Prakāśana, Varanāsi, 1977 Pp.17 & 185.
229. ज्ञानजनका तिरिक्तजनका नपैक्षत्वमुत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् ।  
ज्ञानज्ञापका तिरिक्तज्ञापका नपैष्ट॑ ज्ञाप्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् ॥  
Pañcamukhi R.S. 'Pramāṇa Paddhati of Sri Jayatīrtha p.161.
230. तदा तज्ज्ञानं गृह्वतः साक्षिः तत्र ज्ञानयाथार्थर्यग्हे  
महानाग्रहो नियम इत्यर्थः ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on Y.M., p.48.  
गृहणेज्ञानं याथार्थर्यग्हे तस्याग्रहो महान् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.48, Sū.318.
231. तथा प्रामाण्यं तदर्थजन्यम् ।  
Pañcamukhi R.S, Pramāṇa Paddhati by Sri Jayatīrtha, p.162.
- 231A. तदासामान्यसामाग्रीमात्र जन्याप्रमामम ।  
सवप्यभूत्स्वतस्त्वैन केन वाहानिरुद्धयता ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.69b, Sū.445.
232. Cf: The raison d'être of attributing to Sakṣi-Pratyakṣa absolute infallibility and self-validation, which is denied in respect of ordinary perceptions of the mind and the sense, is that the mind is liable to err and is open to doubt, albeit rarely; whereas, the judgements of the Sakṣi could not be doubted and have never been shown to have been in the wrong and invalidated at any time in life.  
Sharma B.N.K, 'Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya' p.108.

233. यद्धर्थनिश्चयाश्वासः प्रामाण्यस्य निनिश्चये ।

अनवस्था तर्हि सुस्था निश्चकासु प्रवृत्तिषु ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.57, S1.374.

यदि प्रामाण्यनिश्चये सति ... अर्थनिश्चयाश्वास  
इति संबन्धः । .... । तर्हि ज्ञानस्यप्रामाण्य निश्चय-  
रूपायमनुभितावच्छर्थनिश्चयाश्वासः तत्प्रामाण्य विनि-  
श्चयरूपाऽनुभित्यंतरादेव । तत्रापि तथेत्यनवस्था स्था-  
दित्यर्थः । .... । तत्तदर्थनिश्चयार्थं तत्तज्ञान प्रामाण्य-  
निश्चयानुसारणेऽनवस्था सुस्थेत्यर्थः ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.57 & 58b.

234. काचादिदोषं चैकत्र तत्कार्यनुभितं पुनः ।

यदान्यत्रानुसंधतते ज्ञानमात्रगृहीतदा ॥

विषयेयिपद्मूरत्वपूर्वदोषानुदर्शनात् ।

उदासते चतुरस्ताक्षी प्रामाण्यगृहणे किल ॥

Y.M., G.S., p. 48b, Slokas, 315 & 316.

235. तत्रप्रामाण्यप्रामाण्यं च संवादविसंवादलिंगम्यमिति ।

Pāncamukhi R.S., Pramāṇa Paddhati by Sri Jayatīrtha p.162.

236. तदा रागादिदोषेण कलुषं चंचलं मनः ।

गृहीति तत्र प्रामाण्यमर्थगृहण कातरं ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.48b, S1.317.

237. समीपस्थ पदार्थानां चक्षुरादीन्द्रियैश्चक्षुमैः ।

गृहणे ज्ञानयाथार्थगृहणे तस्यागृहो महान् ॥

Ibid., p.48, S1.318.

238. See:

Madhva, Visnūtavāñirnaya, p.155.

O अन्यथेति - प्रामाण्यं तावदवश्यं केनवित्प्रमाणेन ज्ञातव्यम् ।

अन्यथा तदभाव प्रामाण्याभावः प्रसंगात् । न च ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तेन -

तदृहणं सम्भवति । तत्प्रामाण्यस्याच्यन्येन

गृहणांगीकारे अनवस्थानात् ।

Jayatīrtha, com. on Visnūtavāñirnaya A.B.M.M.M, B'lore  
1969, p.155.

अनवस्था - कृकृ कलृप्तवस्तुसजातीयवस्तुपरंपराकल्पनस्य  
 विरामाभावः । .... ॥ खृ ॥ अव्यवस्थतपरंपराधीनोनिष्टप्रसंगः ।  
 Jhalakikar Bhīmacārya, Nyāyakośa, p.19 & 20.

239. Cf: "Freedom from defect and contradiction is sufficient to account for the rise of valid knowledge. If the validity of knowledge is due to an external condition like some excellence in the causes of knowledge or correspondance or fruitful activity, then this second knowledge of excellence or correspondance or fruitful activities would require third knowledge to validate itself before it can validate the first knowledge and so on ad-infinitum.".  
 Sharma, C.D., 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy' p,215 & 216.
240. Ibid.
241. यदि व्याप्त्यादिदाद्येनशङ्कांधिकृस्ते भवान् ।  
 तद्दृष्टिविषयाद्यत्साक्षीह क्षोभयेद्वितां ॥  
Y.M, G.S, p.56, S1.366.
242. सुखादिविषयं स्वरूपमूर्तं चैतन्येन्द्रियं साधीत्युच्यते ।  
Jayatīrtha, Nyāyasudhā, II-i-p.87.
243. प्रामाण्यग्रहणेऽपिकितस्ताद्धिष्ठावेन तेजसा ।  
Ibid, p.52b, S1.337.
244. परीक्षापेक्ष्यतेऽपापि तदभावे स्वर्यं पट्टः ।  
Ibid., p.52, S1.338.  
 See also: Ibid, p.55b, S1.353.

- 244A. उपत्तावपिच्छप्तौ तस्मात्सदिभूदीरितं ।  
 स्वतस्त्वं परतस्त्वं च तत्त्वं वित्त्वस्य साधकं ।  
Y.M.G.S., p.75b, S1.483.  
 प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वम् प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वं ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.G.S., p.75b.

- 244B. ....If validity did not belong to knowledge, and if it were to be established by an objective reference to facts, then since that objective reference is also knowledge, and as such is invalid by itself, there should be some other means by which its validity could be determined, and this would lead to an infinite regress. For this reason it is to be admitted that knowledge, produced by any means of knowledge or Pramāna, must be regarded as valid by itself.  
 Dasagupta, Surama: 'Development of Moral Philosophy in India', Orient Longmans Bombay, 1961, p.80.

- 244C. The real fact of the matter in this connection, is however, that self evidence seems to be too subjective to deserve to be regarded as a criterion of truth and so may be taken to be synonymous with 'no-evidence'. The way in which the advocates of the self-evidence theory of truth, including the Vedānta in particular, understands the criterion of falsity should then be regarded as a model to which the way of determining the criterion of truth should conform.  
 Banerjee, N.V., 'The spirit of Indian Philosophy'  
 Arnold - Heinemann Publishers (India) Private Limited,  
 New Delhi, 1974, p.114.

- 244D. प्रतिबन्धकत्वम् - कारणीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । {कु. ॥}  
 .....। यथा वा दाहं प्रति मणः प्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । ....। एव -  
 मणिबन्धकाभावकूट एव कारणम् ।  
 Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa, Pp.532 & 533.

245. ॐ रुद्रा द्वि यद्वि सामृगीसत्त्वेष्यमिमर्तं फलं ।

बुधैसत्तदेव सर्वत्र प्रतिबन्धकमुच्यते ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.52, S1.340.

246. अतो न कारणीभूताभावस्थ्यप्रतियोगिता ।

प्रतिबन्धकता किन्तु पूर्वोक्तैषसतां मता ॥

Ibid, p.53, S1.343.

247. दोषाभावानपेक्षैव सेयं यादृच्छिका प्रमा

...

दोषाभावस्तस्तुत्रापि न प्रमां प्रतिकारणं ।

Y.M., G.S., p.66, S1s.428 & 429.

248. In the Advaita, the way interpretation of Sruti passages and also the remarks summarising the import or jist in nutshell, denotes the contention of the Advaita, that the passages, imparting the right knowledge (knowledge identity) are Tattvavedakas and the Passages, imparting some tentative knowledge. (Knowledge difference, injunction etc) are Atattvavedakas. This view is clear from the original statements cited below:-

(i) द्वृष्टव्यादिशब्दा अपि परविद्याधिकारपठिताः

तत्त्वाभ्युखीकरणपूर्णानाः, न तत्त्वावबोधविधि-

पूर्णाना भवन्ति ।

Br.Sū.Bhā (Sāṅkara)(III-ii-21)

Sātsāstri, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.2, p.753.

(ii) वाक्यजनितविज्ञानमात्रात् नाब्रह्मानात्मविज्ञान-

विवृतिः इति चेत् । न । "तत्त्वमसि", "नेतिनेति",

"आत्मैवेदं", "रक्षेवादितीयम्", "ब्रह्मैवेदममृतम्",

"नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्वृष्टिः", "तदेव ब्रह्मत्वं विद्धि"

इत्यादिवाक्यानां तदाद्वित्पात् ।

Brih.Bhā.(Sāṅkara)(I-iv-7) Bhagawat R.R., Sāṅkara,

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (Upaniṣadbhāṣyam) Astekar Com.,

Poona, Salivahana Saka, 1840, p.143.

(iii) अतः पार्थगृह्यमेव उपासनावाक्यानां  
ब्रह्मवाक्यानां च न्याययम्, नैकवाक्यत्वम् ।  
Br.Sū.Bhā.(Sankara) III-ii-21.  
Saṅsāstri, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.2,p.732.

249. तस्मान्नित्यैव वेदाख्य विद्या विद्यावतां मते ।  
नित्यायां च कर्थं द्वैतमदैतं किल ते प्रियम् ॥  
Y.M.,G.S, p.78, Sl.511.
250. तत्स्वतस्त्वेन सर्वत्र प्राभाष्यं गृह्यते श्रुतौ  
...  
अतत्प्रावेदकत्प्रोक्तिरस्त्रो वेदे न शोभते ॥  
Y.M.,G.S, p.79b, Slokas, 512 & 513.
251. कार्यताबोधकपदप्रतिपादार्थात्मककार्ययुक्तत्वम् ।  
यथा प्राभाकर मीमांसकन्ये घटमानयेत्यादौ घटादि-  
पदानामानयनादिरूप क्रियाविशिष्ट एव घटादौ शक्तिरित्यत्र  
क्रियान्वितत्वम् । अन्विते शक्तिरिति तेषां मतम् ।  
Jhalakīkar Bhīmacārya, 'Nyāyakośa' p.229.  
See also; Madhva. Anuvyākhyāna p.4, Slokas 42-45.
252. Dasagupta:s. 'A History of Indian Philosophy' Vol.1,p.396.
253. Cf:"Prabhakara takes a strictly pragmatic view of all knowledge, knowledge leads to successfull activity. Action is the only import of knowledge ... All propositions must be injunctive, All knowledge, whether Vedic or Secular, points to cutivity. The so-called assertive and explanatory propositions in the Veda are authoritative only when they help persons to perform their duties".  
Sharma,C.D., 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy',p.220.
254. अतस्तेनैव विधिना वाक्सर्वा मानतां ब्रजेत् ।  
Y.M.,G.S, p.79, Sl.518.

255. तस्माद्यार्थतरपिसरणिष्ठशोभतेराम् ।

Ibid. S1.519.

अपौरुषेयतया विद्धेषि वेदे एकभागस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्त्वकथनमयुक्तम् ... ।

Bh.Vi.Com.on Y.M.G.S, p.79.

256. सर्वं श्रूत्योविरोधेषि यावागन्यार्थवर्तीनी ।

तर्हं तदस्मिपरां कृत्वा मोचयेत्कलहं तयोः ॥

Y.M., G.S, p.80b, S1.522.

257. There are some Sruti passages called Aikyaśrutis by the Advaitins. That means, those passages that convey the sense of identity expressively such as 'Tattvamasi', 'Ātmaivedam', Ekamevādvitīyam and others;

258. Sāvakāśa means that which is limited or that which is constrained with limitations. Niravakāśa means that which is not constrained with any limitations. This view promises that Sāvakāśa passages are secondary and Niravakāśa as Primary.

सावकाशानिरवकाशयोर्निरवकाशो बलीयानितिन्यायः ।

संभवद्विषयान्तरः सावकाशः, अतथाभूतो निरवकाशः । तेन

निरवकाशेन सावकाशो विधिबद्धियते ।

Kevalānandasarasvati, 'Mīmāṃsākōṣā' Part VII p.4312,

This type of view is found both in the Advaita and the Dvaita. But the application of these concepts with regard to Sruti passages differs in both. The Advaita declares that Aikyaśrutis are Niravakāśas and others are Sāvakāśas. (T.E.M) "तत्त्वमसि", "नेति नेति", "आत्मैवेदं", एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ... इत्यादिवाक्यानां तद्वादित्वात् ।

Bṛh.Bhā. I-4-7.

Saccidanandendrasarasvati, Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad

(Upaniṣadbhāṣya Vol.4) Adhyatma Prakasa Karyalaya,  
Holenārasipur, 1953, p.138.

अस्थूलमनणवृत्तमदीर्घम् (Bṛih.Up.-III-viii-87)

"अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्यम्" (Katha-Up.I-iii-5)

.... इत्येवमादीनि वाक्यानि निष्प्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मात्म तत्त्वप्रधानानि नाथन्तिरप्रधानानि इत्येतत् प्रतिष्ठापितं "तत्तुसमन्वयात्" (Br.Su.I-i-4)

इत्यत्र । .... इतराणि तु आकार वबूब्रह्मविषयाणि वाक्यानि

न तत्प्रधानानि । ... तेषु असति विरोधे यथा श्रुतमाश्रयितव्यम् ।

सति तु विरोधे तत्प्रधानानि अतत्प्रधानेभ्यो बलीयांसि भवन्ति ।

Satsāstri, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya Vol.2, p.726.

Here Pradhāna means Nirvakāśa and Apradhāna means Sāvakāśa.

Where in the Dvaita, the so-called Aikyasrūtis are Sāvakāśas and others are Niravakāśas.

As there is no well-resoned ground or base for the Advaita view, it is defective. Because, the Advaita interpretation of so-called Aikyasrūtis is contradictory and is not in the confirmation with other passages of the same context.

It is the Tatparyalingas such as Upakrama, Upasamhāra and others, pertaining to a particular context, that are responsible for understanding the correct import of the passages. The Advaita does not take into account this. The Advaita interpretes the passages individually and independently, taking into consideration only the expressive meaning of the passages and not the reference of contexts. e.g. The context as a whole wherein the passage 'Tatvamasi' occurs, really, speaking relates to sense of difference with stock illustrations. But without understanding the nature of Tatvamasi, depth and significance of these, the Advaita concentrates on 'Tatvamasi' passage only and thus prefers the sense of identity to difference.

If this is taken for granted, then it is not agreeable to the core of context in its fitness and thus contradicts with other passages of same context. Hence, Aikyasrūtis are Sāvakāśas that means they are to be interpreted in accordance with other (Sheda) S्रूtis.

The view upheld by the Dvaita in this regard, as Aikyaśrutis are Sāvakāśas and Bheda srutis are Niravakāśas, is agreeable to the core of context.  
See for details;

259. सादृश्यैवये स्थानमत्योरैवये व्याप्तैक्यपूर्वके ।  
सावकाशैक्यवाग्भेदवाक्युत्स्वार्थपरायणा ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.80b, S1.524.
260. एकीभूतास्तु कुरव एकीभूतौ नृपातिमौ ।  
ऐक्याद्वयस्य अभूमान् इत्याद्युक्तिर्विवार्यताम् ।  
Ibid, S1.525. श्रुतियोजना तु एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यत्र एकं सर्वोत्तमं सकलजीवजडात्मकात् प्रपञ्चादत्यन्तभिन्नमिति ।  
Bh.Vi. Com. on Y.M., p.81b.

Here 'eka' means supreme, omniscient, entirely different from the world of sentient and insentient beings. Thus, here supremacy and difference is the meaning of the term 'aikya'.

261. एके मुख्यान्यकेवलाः ।  
Sastri.Haragovinda, 'Amarkosa of Amarasimha'  
The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi 1970, p.546.  
The derivative form of eka is Ekatva (Aikya) In the same way Mukhyatva, Anyatva and Kevalatva.

262. इत्याह भेद ऐक्ये मुख्यतावा ततो भेत् ।  
यदा तवैक्यशब्दोऽर्थं भेदं वक्त्यखिलेश्वितः ।  
वक्तित सर्वोत्तमतर्वं वा प्रतिवक्तिकथंभवान् ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.80, S1.527.

- 262A. नहि उपनिषद्भ्यो "ब्रह्मैकमेवाद्वितीयम्, नैवच"  
इति प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति । Brih.Bhā.(Sāṅkara) II-i-20.  
Bhagavata,R.R, Sāṅkara, 'Bṛihadāraṇyakopaniṣad',  
(Upāniṣadbhāṣyam), p.216.  
नहि शास्त्रं इदंतथा विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयिषति, .... ।  
Br.Sū.Bhā.(Sāṅkara) I-i-4.  
Ṣaṭsāstri, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.I, p.51.

263. "सत्त्वादयो न सन्तीर्णे यत्र च प्राकृतागुणाः ।"  
 अतद्वयतया निर्गतः तत्संस्मर्त्तपि अस्पृष्टः ।  
 हेयगुणरहितः ।  
 Cakravarthi, S.G., 'Sabdārthakaustubha, 1978, IV,p.1603.
- 263A. गुणभूतन्निर्गुणो महान् ।  
 गुणानानन्दादीन् बिभर्ति गुणभूत । गुणानप्यथानभूतजीवान् बिभर्ति ।  
 सत्त्वादिगुणरहितसत्त्वान्निर्गुणः ।  
 Kalakoti K.G. Satyāsandhayati, Srīviṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣyam  
 R Nagaraja Rao, Tiruchirapalli, 1972, p.98.
264. सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिसम्भवाः  
Bhagavadgītā, XIV-5.
- 264A. The Nirguna-Sruti occurs in the Sixth Chapter of Svetāśvataropaniṣad. There, the com.of Saṅkara of Nirguna term, does not convey explicitly the sense of negation of attributes in general. But it negates the qualities such as Sattva and others.  
 "साक्षी येता केवलो निर्गुणः ॥ (Svet.Up.VI-11)  
 ... सर्वेषां भूतानां साक्षी सर्वदृष्टा । " साक्षादद्वृष्टरि संज्ञायाम्  
 शृपा. सू. V-ii-91 ॥ इतिस्मरणात् । येता येतयिता । केवलो  
 निरूपाधिकः । निर्गुणः सत्त्वादिगुणरहितः ।
- Saṅkara, Svetāśvataropaniṣad. Gītā press Gorakhpur,  
 Śaka, 2016, p.246.
- So the refutation of the Advaita interpretation of that Mantra may appear unusual and strange. Hence, it must be understood that the refutation aims not only at the connotative and expressive meaning of the com.of that Mantra, but the very Nirgunatva concept of the Advaita.

Sankara, commenting Viṣṇusahasranāma (Guṇabhṛt, Nirguṇa terms), makes it clear that Brahman, really speaking is attributless (i) He also states that the positive reference of qualities Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, is due to Māyā (form of Ajñana) which is Upādhi for that. And, in the Advaita whatever is Sopādhika-product of Māyā, is Mithyā, (ii)

(i) गुणभूतिन्दुर्णिः - विष्णुसहस्रनामस्तोत्रम् । भाष्यम् ॥  
सत्त्वरजस्तमसां सृष्टिस्थितिलयकर्मस्वाधिष्ठातुत्वात् - गुणभूत् ।  
वस्तुतो गुणाभावात् - निर्णयः ।  
विवृतिः ।  
गुणः - रजसत्त्वं तम इत्येवं प्रसिद्धाः, तान् विभर्ति -  
ब्रह्मविष्णुशिवरूपेणाभिमन्यते सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारार्थमिति गुणभूदित्थाह । ... ।  
परमार्थतो गुणाभावान्निर्णया गुणा यस्मात् सः निर्णय इत्याह .... ।

Ramasastri R.Sri Viṣṇusahasranamāstotram with com.  
Oriental Research Institute, Mysore University, Mysore  
1961, p.527.

(ii) निर्णय :- Cf. Gitabhāṣya (Sankara) XIII-13. & 14.  
उपाधिकृतं मिथ्यारूपमध्यस्ति त्वाधिगमाय  
द्वैयधर्मवत्परिकल्प्योच्यते ।

....  
उपाधिभूतपाणिषादादीन्द्रियाध्यारोपणाज्ञेयस्य  
तद्वा शक्ता माडभूदित्येवमर्थः ।

अपि अन्तःकरणोपाधिद्वारेणैव श्रौत्रादीनामप्युपाधित्वमित्यतो -  
न्तःकरण बहिष्करणोपाधि भूतैः सर्वेन्द्रियगुणैरध्यवसायसंकल्प श्रवणवचनादि-  
भिरवभासत इति सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियव्यापारैव्यापृतमिव तज्ज्ञेयमित्यर्थः ।  
सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितं सर्वकरणरहितमित्यर्थः । अतो न करणव्यापारै व्यापृतं  
तज्ज्ञेयम् ।

...स्थादिवं चान्यज्ञेयस्य सत्त्वाधिगमदारं-निर्गुण  
सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि गुणास्तैर्वर्णितं तज्ज्ञेयं तथापि  
गुणभोक्तृ च गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां शब्दादि-  
द्वारेण सुखदुःखमोहाकारपरिणतानां भोक्तृ  
चोपलब्धू तज्ज्ञेयमित्यर्थः ।  
Śaṅkara. Gitābhāṣya 1942 Pp.183 & 184.

Therefore, it is to be noted that Vādirāja, taking the Nirguṇatva view (Qualitylessness) of the Advaitins in consideration, has refuted it.

265. एवं निर्गुणवाक्यं च सामान्यवचनत्वतः ।  
दोषरूपगुणाभावं परं कर्तुं हि शक्यते ॥  
Y.M.G.S, P.81b, S1.528.

266. Bṛih.Up. IV-iv-22.

267. अतस्मामान्यतो यत्तु निषेधवचनं श्रुतौ ।  
विषेषवाक्यविहितं न द्वितीयतिषेधति ॥  
Y.M.G.S, p.81, S1.531.

अतः एषसर्वेश्वर इत्यादि विशिष्यविधायकवाक्यात्  
निर्गुण इति सामान्यतो गुणनिषेधक निर्गुणवाक्यमेव दुर्बलम् ।  
Bh.Vi. Com.on.Y.M.G.S, p.81.

268. Kevalanandasaraswati, 'Mīmāṃsākoṣa' Vol.IV, p.2294.

269. योसौ निर्गुणहत्युक्तशशा स्त्रेषु जगदीश्वरः ।  
प्राकृतैर्हेयसंयुक्तैर्गुणैर्हीनत्वमुच्यते ।  
इति पादमेत्रयस्त्रिशांध्याये लङ्घस्य वागियं ॥  
Y.M.G.S, p.81, S1.532.

270. भेदवाग्भेदमेवहि ।  
Ibid. p.82b, S1.535.

271. नारायणः परं ब्रह्म ना न्यद्ब्रह्म ततः परम्  
 ... स एव निर्गुण ब्रह्मेत्युक्तः सद्गुणबूँहितः ॥  
Y.M.G.S, p.82b, 537 & 538.  
 Cf : गुणा नारा इति द्वेयास्तदान्नारायणः स्मृतः ।  
 ब्रह्मशब्दो पि हि गुणधूर्तिभिर वदस्ययम् ॥  
Madhva.Anuvyākhyāna.p.7.
272. त एवान्वयनामानस्तै सम्यक् प्रविचारिते ।  
 मुख्यार्थो भगवान् विष्णुः सर्वशास्त्रस्य नापरः ॥  
Madhva; Anuvyākhyāna, p.10 & 11.
- 272A. Rgveda X-90-9.
273. ब्रह्मधर्मानिमान्तवर्नि यस्मिन्नारायणे श्रुतिः ।  
 सद्गुणीष्ठिर्णपुरुषे तन्मामैव पुनः पुनः ॥  
 आत्माते संकलयुपाह महातात्पर्यपर्वकं ।  
 त एव हि परं ब्रह्म लक्षणं वैदिनां ॥  
Y.M.G.S, p.83b, S1okas 548 & 549,  
 यस्तु प्रस्तावितः पूर्वं आत्मानारायणः परः ।  
 परमात्मेति चात्रोक्तः स एव स्यान्नसंशयः ।  
Ibid, p.84b, S1.556.
274. अतश्चूत्यर्थमीमांसानिपुणानां विवेकिनां ।  
 मते नारायणो देवः परं ब्रह्म न चापरः ॥  
Ibid, p.84, S1.560.
275. ....उपनिषदानामनियतपदत्वेन अनिर्णित्येव पदच्छेदस्य सुकरत्वात् ....।  
 सत्यनित्यगुणानां निर्गुण इति निषेधायोगात् अनिर्गुण  
 इति पदच्छेदः कर्तव्य इति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.G.S, p.86, & 87b.
276. तदुक्तगुणसत्यत्वनित्यत्वे नौपघारिके ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.87b, S1.579.

277. Dasagupta S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy'  
Vol. I, p. 317.

278. -समान प्रसवात्मका जातिः । II-ii-68  
-समानः समानाकारकः प्रसवो बुद्धिजननमात्मा स्वरूपं  
यस्याः सा । तथा य समानाकारबुद्धिजननयोग्यत्वमित्यर्थः ।  
गौ. वृ. - II-ii-68.  
-समानाकारबुद्धिजननयोग्यधर्मविशेषः नित्यानेकसमवेतः  
इत्यपि वदन्ति गौ. वृ. II-ii-68.  
-नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतम् ।  
सामान्यं नित्यमेकं स्यादनेकसमवायि । इता. र. 53॥

Jhalakikar. Bhimacarya Nyāyakośa, Pp. 291 & 1009.  
तत्र द्रव्यादित्रितयस्य द्रव्यत्पादिजातिलक्षणम् । Viṣṇumurtihat G.,  
Sāyanamādhava. Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha of Sāyana, Vo. II, p. 9.  
279. Cf: "The Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas enunciate the realistic  
theory of universal. According to them, Universals are  
internal (nitya) entities which are distinct from, but  
inhare in, many individuals (anekānuṣata). There is the  
same (eka) universal in all the individuals of a class.  
The universal is the basic notion of sameness that we  
have with regard to all the individuals of a certain class".  
Chatterji & Datta, 'An Introduction to Indian Philosophy',  
p. 241.

280. व्यवहारादनुगतात्सर्वत्रानुगता सदा ।  
जातिशैकाखिलार्थेषु सत्ताधावती किल ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p. 88b, Sl. 587.

281. व्यवहारानुगमनं नाम तस्यैकताकिम् ।  
उत तस्यैकधर्मेणावाच्छन्नत्वमुदीयते ।  
एकाकारत्वमधवा वक्तव्यं नापरं हितत् ।  
Ibid, Slokas 588 & 589.

282. नानासमानव्यवहारेण धर्मोपि तादृशः ।  
 सिद्धयेत्परं तस्य सर्वत्रैकता किंकृता वद ॥  
 यथानुरूपो हि बलिः प्राचांवाचमनुस्मर ॥  
Ibid, p.88; Slokas, 591 & 592.
283. अखण्डजातेरैकैर्यो यद्यांशो व्यवित्तष्टुच्यते ।  
 घटास्तर्हिघटांशाः स्युर्धटस्तुस्यान्नकश्चन् ॥  
Ibid, S1.593.
284. अनेकव्यञ्जकव्यञ्जया यथैकाजातिरूच्यते ।  
 तथा नेकघटत्वेभ्यो वागेकैवप्रवर्ततां ॥  
Ibid, S1.596.
285. कारणत्वान्यनेकानि तत्रतत्रतवापि च ।  
 तदपच्छेदकस्यापि कर्थं न स्यादनेकता ॥  
Ibid, p.89b, S1.598.
286. धर्मणामपृथक्त्वं च सिद्धेव मम प्रभौ ।  
Y.M., G.S.p.92b, S1.617.  
 किं चेयं श्रुतिरेवादौ नेहनार्हस्ति किंचन ।  
 इत्यादिना भिद्वामेनां निषेधति पदे पदे ॥  
Ibid, p.91 S1.621.
287. Really speaking, in the Advaita, Brahman is quality-less, and hence the question of either negating the difference or accepting it does not arise. But, here the contention of Vādirāja, is to tackle and show the futility of the application of the view of non-difference (identity) of the Advaita.
288. इति मन्यामहे तस्माद्वर्मा धर्म्यात्मकाः प्रभोः ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.91, S1.622.

289. ... स्वं अवयवावयविनोः गुणगुणिणोः क्रियाक्रियावतो-  
रपि भेदाभेदोऽनुसंधेयः ।  
Kevalanandasarasvati. Mīmāṃsākoṣa, VI.p.3072.

289.A. The term Mithyātva is understood differently by different followers: See: कालासंबन्धित्वम् । यथा शशाविषाणूमरोमवन्धया-  
पुत्रादीनां मिथ्यात्वम् । तुच्छत्वम् इति माधवाः प्राहुः ।  
निरूपाख्यत्वं [निस्त्वल्पत्वम्] इति बौद्धां प्राहुः ।  
बाध्याननिवर्त्थत्वम् । ..... ।  
Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakoṣa, p.653.  
- मिथ्यात्वं च स्वाश्रयत्वेनाभिमतयावन्निष्ठात्यन्ता-  
भावप्रतियोगित्वम् । ...  
तदुक्तम् -

"सर्वेषामपि भावानां स्वाश्रयत्वेन संमते ।  
प्रतियोगित्वमत्यन्ताभावं प्रति मृषात्मता ॥ इति.

Sāstri S.S.S., 'The Adyar Library and Research Centre,  
Madras, 1971, p.58.

See also: Gitsukha defines falsity as the non-existence  
of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause.  
Dasagupta S1. 'A History of Indian Philosophy' Vol.II, p.152.

290. यदि वाक्योदिताद्वैतादेव तदगुणमोचनं ।  
तदान्योन्याश्रयी दोषो वाक्यमथन्तरेन येत् ।  
Y.M.G.S, p.92b. S1.627.

291. सत्यनित्यगुणत्यागः सर्वथा नोपपर्यते ।  
Ibid, S1.628.

292. न चेच्छुन्योक्तिबलतः सत्यं ब्रह्मैव संत्यज ।  
Ibid, S1.629.

293. According to the Advaita, Sattā or existential reality is of three kinds. Prātibhāsika, Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika. The appearance of silver in the conch-shell is Prātibhāsikasatya since the very next movement, silver would not be there. And that which appears for a longer time and is treated as Satya is called Vyāvahārikasatya. So the world is treated as Vyāvahārikasatya. Lastly, the Entity, subjected to our cognition, as constantly present without change, is Pāramārthikasatya. Brahman is Pāramārthikasatya.  
 त्रिविधं सत्त्वं परमार्थसत्त्वम् ब्रह्मणः । अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यं सत्त्वं  
 मायोपाधिकमाकृशादेः । अविधोपाधिकं सत्त्वं रजतादेः ।

Viṣṇumūrtibhat G. Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Sāyana,  
 Vol.2, p.328.

294. अतोऽन्यर्थः स एवार्थो यत्रवाग्द्विमानता ॥  
Y.M.G.S, p.92, S1.632.

295. स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबल क्रियाचेत्याह हि श्रुतिः ।  
 ( श्रुतिः:- Swte.Up.6.8 ).  
Y.M.G.S, p.92, S1.634 .

296. See for details; Athalye & Bodas, Annambhatta, Bombay Sanskrit Series, No.LV, 1963, Pp.17 & 157.

297. एकत्रधर्मिणो नाशोन्यत्र धर्मान्तरं किल ।  
Y.M.G.S, p.92, S1.635.

298. अतस्तदूपसौन्दर्यशौर्यधैर्यपराक्रमाः ।  
 स्वातन्त्र्यवशितेशत्वपूर्वस्त्वर्वे गुणा धूवाः ॥  
Ibid, P.92,b, S1.639.

299. सति धर्मिणि धर्मणां असत्वं तु न कुत्रियित् ।

Ibid., S1.603.

300. प्रायशः सर्वत्र धर्मणां धर्मिसत्तासमान सत्ताकृत्वस्थियमदर्शनात्  
ब्रह्मधर्मणामपि ब्रह्मसत्तासमानसत्ताकृत्वं स्यात् ।

Bh.Vi.Com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.93.

अतस्त्वात्मधर्मश्च सत्यास्त्वयुनत्रि संशयः ।

Y.M., G.S., p.93, S1.645.

301. अतस्त्वाभाविकधर्मणां धर्मनाशेऽनाशदर्शनात् ।

अतस्त्वाभाविका धर्माः नश्येद्देव धर्मिणः क्षये ॥

Ibid, S1.649.

302. श्रुतौ स्मृतौ च कीर्त्यन्ते धर्माः स्वाभाविकाः हरेः ।

सत्या नित्या स्वभावात्तद्ये धर्मस्ते न मायिकाः ॥

Ibid, p.94b S1.650

303. मायावादि वेदान्तिनस्तु मिथ्याबुद्धिहेतुभूतमज्ञानं माया ।

तत्प्राज्ञानं इश्वरोरोपाधि ।

Q.Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, 'Nyāyakosa'.

अनिर्वचनीयत्वं तत्प्राज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकृत्वादिलक्षणजातस्य

मायाविधयोः समानत्वात् ।

Māyā means Ajñāna. According to the Advaita, Ajñāna appears in two garbs; Māyā and Avidyā. Māyā applies to Brahman and Avidyā to Jīva. (in essence both are same) And this Ajñāna (Māyā) is not real, not unreal but it is inexplicable. It veils or covers the nature of Brahman, for which It is supposed to be qualified as creator etc. But in reality it is unqualified. The Advaitin holds that attributes of Brahman are Māyika, i.e., products of Māyā. When the true knowledge gained by studying Sāstras, Māyā (Ajñāna) gets removed, then realizing identity, Brahman would be known as attributeless. See for further details: Sharma C.D, 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy' Pp.273 to 279.

304. नानात् विद्या चाविद्या च । (Chā.Up.I-i-10)  
क्षरं त्वविद्या हयमृतं तु विद्या । Śvet.Up.1.
305. सत्यात्त्वाच्य स्वभावत्वान्नित्यत्वात् ब्रह्मवत् सदा ।  
अमायिका ब्रह्मधर्मा इति स्यादनुमापि नः ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.94b, S1.652.
306. जडेष्वसंभावितास्त्युः मायोपाध्या हि ताः कथम् ।  
Ibid, S1.654.
307. न यस्यमायागुणचित्तवृत्तिभिः निरीक्षितो हयण्वपि दृष्टिरिज्यते ।.....।  
Bhāgavata.. V-xvii-19.
308. स्वाभाविका अस्युर्हि तदभावः कदा वद ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.94, S1.656.
309. एवं च प्रतिबिम्बभूवजीवगुणानां कर्थचिदौपाधिकत्वप्राप्तावपि  
बिम्बभूतब्रह्मगुणानां स्वाभाविकत्वमेव न्याय्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.94.  
किंचोपाधिर्बिम्बमेव प्रतिबिम्बस्यशोभते ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.94, S1.657.
310. प्रतिबिम्बस्य सर्वस्य शुद्धिबिम्बं ब्रह्म तद्विमे ।  
तच्य सत्यं च नित्यं च निर्णीणं स्यात्कदाचन ॥  
Ibid, p.95b, S1.660,
311. Giving an example of such kind, in this context,  
is not to prove the unreality and non-eternity of the  
world created by the Lord like the magic things created  
by a magician. But, the aim is to prove the 'Svābhāvikatva'  
to the attributes of the Lord.

312. अतो गुणत्यागावसराभावात् परोदितं ब्रह्म निर्गुणं ब्रह्म  
 अनवसरदुस्थं असौतं च । स्वेभाविकसार्वज्ञादिगुणनिषेधायोगेन  
 निर्गुणशूल्यापि सत्त्वादि गुणनिषेध मुखेन समुणस्यैव प्रतिपादनीयत्वात्  
 प्रतिपादकशूतिशून्यं चाभूत ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on.Y.M.G.S, p.96.
313. सर्वस्याधारता सर्वव्यापिता केशस्य चेत् ।  
 अन्यब्रह्म किमर्थं ते व्यथेत्वादपि तदशतम् ॥  
Y.M.,G.S., p.96, S1.676.
314. Chā.Up.VI-ii-1.
315. सर्वव्यापित्वाद्विष्णुः विष्णुव्याप्तावितिधातोः ।  
 Kalakoti K.G., 'Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāsyam of Sri Satya-  
 sandhatirtha', R.Nāgarajarao, Tiruchirapalli, 1972, p.2.
316. अतः सगुणस्यनिर्गुणतायोगात् अन्यत् सगुणात् निर्गुणं  
 सर्वधर्मशून्यरूपं वाच्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on.Y.M., G.S, p.97.  
 अतोन्यनिर्गुणं वाच्यं तदा ब्रह्मद्विता न किम् ।  
Y.M.,G.S., p.97b S1.680.
317. विष्णोरन्यत्परंब्रह्म कोविदान् वक्तुमर्हति ।  
Ibid, p.97, S1.681.
318. नास्ति नारायणसम् न भूतं न भविष्यति ।  
 एतेन सत्यवाक्येन सर्वार्थानु साधयाम्यहम् ॥  
Q.Y.M.,G.S, p.97, S1.682.  
 नारायणसम् न भूतं नास्ति न भविष्यतीत्यनेन तस्यैव  
 परब्रह्मत्वं ततोतिरिक्तब्रह्माभावश्च सिद्ध्याति ।  
Bh.Vi. Com.on.Y.M.,G.S, p.97.
319. तस्मादभारतवाक्यानां लक्ष्मैकार्थ्यसिद्ध्ये ।  
 विष्णोरत्युत्तमत्वाख्यमर्थमाहेति सिद्ध्यति ॥  
Y.M.,G.S., p.98b, S1.692.

320. अत्र दैवप्रेष्ठयोर्ब्रह्मसद्गयोर्विष्णवधीनस्त्वप्रवणात्  
सिद्धाविष्णोरेव सर्वात्मता ।  
Bh.VI, Com.on.Y.M., G.S.p.98.

321. मध्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे । Bhāg.VI-4-48.  
इति भागवतेकृष्णो निस्संख्यान्स्वगुणानपि ।

....  
देशतःकालतश्चैव गुणतोपिद्यनन्तता ।  
अतस्त्वचन्निर्णण्ड्रहम कस्मिन्देशे कदा भवेत् ।  
सर्वेभ्यो देशकालेभ्यः प्रायस्तत्पु बहिष्कृतं ।  
Y.M., G.S, Pp.100b, 100 Slokas 713 to 716.

322. The reference of Nirguna occurs here is from the Svetāśvatara Upanisad (VI-11).

The passage runs :-

" एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः । सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ।  
कमदियक्षः सर्वभूताधिकासः ॥  
साक्षीयेता केवलो निर्णिष्ठ ।  
Bhagavata R.R, 'The Svetāśvatara Upanisad'  
Tukarama Jivaji, Bombay 1900, p.44, Ch.VI-11.

323. दुष्यते च तदामानमेयता ज्ञान दुष्यता ।  
इति धर्मद्वयं प्राप्तं तत्पदेन च वाच्यता ॥  
लक्ष्यता च यतो वश्यं तेन प्राप्ता पदार्थता ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.100, Slokas 718-719.

324. ब्रह्मशब्देन चाप्युक्ता गुणबृहिततैव हि ।  
अतस्तपदयौश्च स्यात्परस्परविलक्षिता ॥  
Ibid, P.101b S1.723.

325. सत्त्वं पारमार्थिं व्यावहारिकं प्रातिभासिकं च । ...।  
 पारमार्थिं सत्त्वं त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वम् ।  
 व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानातिरिक्ताबाध्यम् ।  
 प्रातिभासिकं सत्त्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानातिरिक्त बाध्यत्वम् ।  
 तथा ए देवान्ते केवलं ब्रह्मण एव त्रिकाला-  
 बाध्यतथा तस्य पारमार्थिं सत्त्वम् । घटपठेः  
 ब्रह्मज्ञानोदयं विना अबाधितत्वेन तत्र व्यावहारिकं  
 सत्त्वं । शुक्तिरूप्यादेः ब्रह्मज्ञानातिरिक्तेन आरोपा-  
 धिठानवैतन्यावच्छेदीभूतशुक्त्यादिज्ञानेन  
 बाधात् प्रातिभासिकसत्त्वम् ।

Joshi, Srimadanandajha, Bhagavati, com.on.  
Vedāntaparibhāṣa of Sri Dharmarajadvarindra,  
 Akhila Bharata Sanskrit Prasad, Lucknow, Vikram Saka 2021,  
 p.142.

326. बोध्यं चेन्निर्णुण्ट्वं स्यान्निर्णुण्ट्वं न सिद्धयति ।  
 न बोध्यं निर्णुण्ट्वं चेन्निर्णुण्ट्वं न सिद्धयति ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.102b, S1.733.

326A. Supra.

327. एष निष्कण्टकः पन्था यत्र सम्पूज्यते हरिः ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.102b, S1.735.

328. कुपथं तं विजानीयादशो विन्दरहितागमं ।  
Ibid, S1.735.

329. हरेभिन्नत्वपूज्यत्वस्वामित्वपृतिपादिका ।  
 निष्कण्टकामाधवशुद्धपद्मतिशयेति सिद्धयति ॥  
Ibid, p.102 S1.738.

330. पञ्चलक्षणात्मकः शास्त्रविशेषः ।  
 ... यथा वेदव्यासकृतान्यष्टादश पुराणानि ।  
 तथोक्तम् - लर्णवप्रातिसर्गश्च वंशो मन्वन्तराणि च ।  
 वंशसानुचरितं चैव पुराणं पञ्चलक्षणम् ।  
 Q.Jhalakikar Bhāmacarya, Nyāyakośa, p.503.

331. Cf: पुराणानि च सात्त्विकराजसतामसभेदेन विभक्तानि  
पदमपुराणे । - - -  
अग्नेः विषस्य माहात्म्यं तामसेषु चं कथयते ।  
ब्रह्मणस्तत्पुराणस्य माहात्म्यं राजसेषु च ।  
सात्त्विकेष्वधिं तत्तद्विष्णोर्महात्म्यमुत्तमम् ॥

Ibid.

332. शैवं ब्रह्मं वैष्णवं च पुराणमखिलं यतः ।  
अतस्तेभ्यः पुराणेभ्यो यद्बहिस्तश्चुतेरपि ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.102, S1.740.  
पुराणश्रुत्योरैकार्थ्यनियमात् ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.G.S, p.102.
333. इतिहासः -  
धर्मर्थिकाममोक्षाणामुपदेशसमन्वितम् ।  
पूर्ववृत्तकथायुक्तमितिहासं प्रचक्षते ॥  
Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa, p.140.
334. इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् ।  
बिभेत्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रचलिष्यति ॥  
... यःश्रुतेर्यजिना तस्मात् विष्णुब्रह्मश्रुतेर्बलात् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.103b, 745 & 746.  
तस्मात् सात्त्विकपुराणानुसारेण भारतानुसारेण  
श्रुतेर्यजिनीयत्वात् ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.103.
335. सत्यंज्ञानप्रनन्तमानन्दं ब्रह्म ।  
Sarvopaniṣatsāra-3.
336. यस्मात्त्वदुक्तवाक्यार्थस्त्वयैवत्याजितोखिलः ।  
तस्मादैक्यं नैव सिद्धेन्निर्णयत्वादिकं च ते ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.103, S1.753.

337. सर्वथार्थपरित्यागात् संकोचं कौन मानयेत् ।  
 अतो निर्जुणवाग्वप्ये हिं त्रिगुणवर्जितम् ॥  
Ibid. p.104b, S1.755.
338. विमतो परमो मुक्तः परमात्मा घटादिवत् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.104b, S1.756.  
 अत्र परमोमुक्तः परमात्मेति पक्षः, भावधर्मणां धर्मी  
 ॥सुणः॥ इति साध्यं, मुक्तत्वादिति हेतुः, घटत्वादिति दृष्टान्तः ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.104b.
339. अव्याहतमतिर्मुक्ते बन्धाभावं न को वदेत् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.104b, S1.758.
- 339A. सम्भवति ब्रह्मणः सर्वविशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव  
 विजिङ्गापयिषितत्वान्न सत्तन्नासद्व्यत इति ।  
 Sāṅkara, Gitābhāṣya, XIII.12 p.181.  
 We follow the Upaniṣads in which 'BRAHMAN' is always  
 described negatively.
340. मुक्तत्वं नास्ति चेतर्हि बद्धत्वैनैव धर्मवान् ।  
 बद्धपूरुषवत्स्याद्वि व्याहतित्तु त्वाधिका ॥  
Ibid. S1.759.  
 व्याहतिरित्यत्र मुक्ताइत्यंगीकृत्य पुनर्मुक्तत्वाभावांगीकारात्  
 एका मुक्तस्य बद्धत्वांगीकारात् अपरा चेति व्याहतिद्वयं  
 दृष्टव्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.104b.
- 340A. ब्राह्मविधात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्द-  
 निर्देशया परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासुप्तिः ।  
Sū.Bhā.(Sāṅkara) I-iv-3.  
सूक्तोऽस्ति, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabṛhmaśya Vol. p.304.

341. बन्धोबन्धवंसरूपमुक्तत्वं च न यत्परे ।  
 नित्यमुक्ता नापि घटे ततः का मे क्षतिर्बद्द ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.104, ₹.761.

In the previous verse, 'Baddhatva' and 'Muktatva' are referred to not with the intention to ascribe the same to 'Nirguna-Brahman'. But by means of that author wants to prove 'Nityamuktatva'. (the state of eternally liberated). So the Nityamuktatva of the Lord is proved by discarding the Baddhatva and Muktatva (attainable). Even if with wrong notion, Baddhatva is taken, the Buddha-jīva (Brahman) becomes Saguna. This argument is just to prove Saunyatva of the Lord, in case of those who do not accept Saunyatva of the Lord on account of being Nityamukta. So the aim of the author is to prove 'Saunyatva' of Brahman and not Baddhatva in Brahman.

342. सर्वसु हि उपनिषद्सु "नेति नेति" "अस्थूलमण्डु"  
 इत्यादि विशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव निर्दिष्यते । न "इदं तत्"  
 इति । वायो गोचरत्वात् ।  
Saṅkara, Gītābhāṣya (Gītā-Bhā) (Saṅkara) XIII-12.p.181.

343. अभावाधारत्वतो वा भावधर्मी कपालवत् ।  
 समस्तधर्मभावेषि हयभावाधारता धृता ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.104, ₹1.762.  
 परमात्मा सुणः अभावात्रयत्वात् कपालवत् ॥

344. मुक्तत्वं भावधर्मी यत्तत्सर्वे धर्मवान्नु गिम् ।  
Ibid, p.105b, ₹1.765.

345. According to the Advaitins, Brahman alone is real and all else is unreal. Therefore, even this 'Vyāvahārika-satyatva' becomes unreal. They define 'Mithyātva' as -

"नास्ति नासीन्न भविष्यति इत्याकारक्षानविषयत्वं मिथ्यात्वं ।

Mithyatva is the cognition of negation in the present, the past and the future. That which did not exist, in the past, does not exist in the present and will not exist in the future. So Vyāvahārikasatyatva means not real factually during all these times but appearing to be real for a longer period in the present only.

346. मुक्तत्वव्याहतिरूपस्याद्यावहारिकसंगमे ।

मुक्तादिस्याम्मुक्ततादिर्नेतिरुव्याहतेर्गुह्यं ॥

Y.M., p.105, S1.770.

347. विप्रस्याद्विप्रतानैव गोमान्त्यादगौर्नकाचन ।

धनी नैव धनं चेति को नुन्मत्तो वदेद्वद् ॥

Ibid, p.106b, S1.772.

347A. लक्षण -

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे लटितोथप्रयोजनात् ।

अन्यो थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥

Pathaka & Rama, 'Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammata'

Ganganathajha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapitham, Prayag, 1976.

p.29.

348. सुखरूपमितीयं वाक्सुखरूपत्ववादिनी ।

तद्योगाद्वृपमप्याह न सा हि स्वाग्रहानुमा ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.106, S1.779.

349. According to the logicians, Mukti is a state of absence of Duhkha and not Sukharūpa.

अतो मुक्तिरमुक्तिरूपस्यादियं तार्किकमुक्तिवत् ।

मुक्तत्ववेत्तोरुचित्तः साध्याभावे ततो धृवा ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.107b, S1.782.

समस्तविशेषणोच्छेदे तंहारावस्थायामाकाश-  
वदात्मनो त्यन्तावस्थानं मोक्षहति । . . . । न च सुखार्थैव  
प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिः ।

Com:- सुखदुःखाविनाभावात् यदि मोक्षावस्था-  
यां सुखं स्यात् तर्हि दुःखं स्यात् . . . ।  
दुःखं केवलं परित्यज्य सुखस्यैव भोक्तुम-  
शक्यत्वादित्यर्थः ।

Subrahmanya Sastri S. & Subrahmanya Sastri V.,  
'Nyāyasārah of Bhāsarvajñā G.O.M.L.Madras, 1961.  
Pp.II-155, III-72.

350. योत्र अभिनिष्पद्धते इत्युक्तः स सर्वबन्धविनिर्मुक्तः  
शुद्धेनैव आत्मना अवतिष्ठते ।

Br.Sū.Bhā. (Sāṅkara) IV-iv-2,

Saṅkara, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhbāśya, Vol.2, p.1056.

351. उक्तरीत्या बहिर्भूतग्राहैतमभवद्धूधम् ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.107b, S1.783.

352. अतश्चुतिपुराणस्थ निर्णाख्या हस्तिप्रभुं ।  
निर्णण ब्रह्म मद्दासी संग्येवासीन्न मत्प्रियं ॥  
स्वस्वामिनो गुणान्वित्वा ज्ञात्स प्राकृतगुणान् ।  
Ibid, Pp.108b, & 108. Slokas 788,790.

353. नैर्गुण्येनैव गुणिता नैर्गुण्यं च न घेन्नओ ।  
सगुणत्वं स्थिरीकृत्य विशुद्धार्थत्वकारकौ ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.108, S1.791.

353A. "नेहनानास्ति किंचन" (Kāṭha.Up.II-11)  
...आत्मैव नान्यदस्तीति । आप्ते च नानात्वप्रत्युपस्थापिकाया  
अविद्यायानिवृत्तत्वात् इह ब्रह्मणि नाना नास्ति किंचन अण्मात्रमपि ।

Sāṅkara, Kaṭhopaniṣadbhbāśyam (Śrī Sāṅkaragrānthaḥvalih)  
Nyayakosa, p.507.

354. निर्गुणशृतिरपि पूर्वितप्रिया ह्मामेव युक्तिं  
 अनुसंधाय स्कलशृतिप्रामाण्यरक्षायै  
 त्रैगुण्यवर्जितमिदमित्यादि ३स्मृतिसमाख्यया  
 दुर्गुणानेव निषेधति ।  
Bh.Vi.Y.M., G.S, p.109.

355. वाच्यत्वेनैव गुणिता वाच्यत्वे निर्गुणोक्तिः ।  
 नोभ्यं वेदशाब्दत्वधर्मेण स्याद्विधर्मिता ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.110b, S1.801.

355A. पूर्थकत्वम् -  
 असाहित्यम् ।  
 यथा इदमस्मात्पूर्थक् इत्यादौ ।  
Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakosā, p.507.

~~त्रैगुण्यवर्जितमिदमित्यादि~~ न मृषा निर्गुणत्वं वेन्निर्गुणत्वशृतिर्गता ।  
 तेनैव सगुणत्वाप्ते भविमात्रनिषेधने ॥  
 अन्योन्याभावमेदस्य पद्मबन्धोभविष्यति ॥  
Ibid, p.110, S1.806.

356. अन्योन्याभावातिरिक्तं पूर्थकत्वं तत्त्ववादिता ।  
 निषेद्धं शक्यते जीवे विभागाख्याभिदा तथा ॥  
Ibid., p.111, S1.810.

357. विशेषो नास्ति भावस्ते भेदो भावोगतिर्घवा ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.112b, S1.814.

358. सार्वज्ञादिगुणनिषेधार्थं मुख्यवृत्याप्रवृत्तया निर्गुणोक्त्या  
 सार्वज्ञादिगुणनिषेधकाले स्व न शाब्दत्वादिकं निषेद्धशक्यम् ॥  
Bh.Vi. com.ob.Y.M.G.S, p.113b.

358A. उपजीव्यत्वम् - See;  
Jhalakikar, Bhimacarya, Nyāyakosā, p.159.

359. ततोपि निगुणतर्वं न स्वोपजीव्यस्यबाधकं ।  
तस्माच्छब्दत्वं बोधयत्वधर्मित्वादिगुणानुगा ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.113, S1.823 & 824

360. मुख्यावृत्तिश्च गुणिनि तत्तत्सत्तामपेक्षते ।  
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यदा यत्र घटस्तत्र तदा किं तन्निषेधनं ॥  
Ibid, p.114,b, Slokas, 829, & 830.

361. अतोपि ता श्रुतिस्सर्वं हृयुपजीव्यैव मे भवेत् ।  
बिभेमि तद्विरोधाय त्रिगुणास्तु जडात्मकाः ॥  
जीवेषु प्रभिता भान्त्या प्राप्ता बहमणि निमिले ।  
निरवश्चत्तिस्थेमने निषेध्या इत्यगाद्बहिः ॥  
Ibid, Slokas 831 & 832.

362. अभावे गौरवं प्राहुः भावेच लघुतां लुधां ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.114, S1.834.

636. बोध्यार्थं ह्व बोधकश्चतिरप्यबाधैव भवेत् । ...। अतोभावोपि अवशेषणीय इत्यर्थः।  
Bh.Vi.com:on.Y.M.G.S, p.114 & 115b,

364. सतोपि दोषतो दोषस्वासत्त्वे किं न दुष्टता ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.115 & S1.842.

365. व्यावहारिकसत्त्वेन बोधकं यदि बोधकं ।  
व्यावहारिकसत्त्वेन न बोध्यस्याप्यस्तु बोध्यता ॥  
Ibid, S1.844.

366. एवं च यदि बोध्यस्य तत्त्वतायां भरो मम ।  
बोधकस्यापि तद्भावे भरोवश्यमपेक्षितः ॥  
Ibid, S1.846.

367. त्रैगुण्ये वजिते विष्णौ गुणत्रयमहूषयत् ।  
धर्मनिर्मलनं धर्मं न मेने इति मै मतिः ॥  
Ibid, p.116b, Slokas 848 & 850.

368. It is surprising to note that unlike Saṅkara, Madhva has not written commentary on 'Svetāśvataropaniṣad'. But, the reference of this Upanisad is seen widely and oftenly in his works and in the works of his followers.

But, during last century, a renowned scholar by name Satari Narayanacarya, has written commentary. This commenatry is unique, simple, lucid and at the same time deep. The exposition given, is in the light of Dvaita system.

Com.on Nirgunaśruti:-

एकः प्रधाने गृद्धो गुप्ततया स्थितः  
सर्वभूतान्तर्यामी कर्मणैः प्रेरकः साक्षात् दृष्टा चेता  
ब्राता जडामिश्रत्वरूपः सत्त्वादिगुणशून्यो न तु सर्वथा  
गुणशून्यः साधित्वादेः । ॥.

Swarnur Govinda, Svetāśvataropaniṣad, with com.of  
Satari Narayanacarya, Dharwad,Saka,1855, p.59.

368A. "एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।" (Chā.Up.VI-ii-1) शांखिभा. (Śāṁ. Bhā)  
.....। एकमेवेति । स्वकार्यपतितमन्यन्नास्तीति  
एकमेवेत्युच्यते । .....। तस्मात् असतः सर्वभावरूपात् सत्  
विद्यमानम् तमुत्पन्नम् ।  
Saṅkara: Chhāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya ( Śāṅkaragrānthaḥavalīḥ),  
Sriyanivilasa Press, Srirangam, Vol.5, Pp286,288.

"तत्त्वमसि" ( Chā.Up.VI-viii-7)

स यः सदाख्यः एषः उक्तः अणिमा-अणुभावः  
जगतो मूलम् ऐतदात्म्यम् स्तत्तदात्मा यस्य सर्वस्य तत्  
ऐतदात्म तस्यभावः ऐतदात्म्यम् ।  
... येन च आत्मना आत्मवत् सर्वमिदं जगत्,  
तदेव सदाख्यं कारणं सत्यं परमार्थसत् ।  
Saṅkara, ' Chhāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya ( Śāṅkaragrānthaḥavalīḥ)  
Sriyanivilasa Press, Srirangam, Vol.5, p.322.

369. अपि चैकत्वधर्मस्य सत्त्वे भावगुणोस्ति ते ।  
तदभावे गतंशास्त्रमैक्यमेकत्वमेव यत् ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.116b, S1.851.

370. विद्प्रयोगबाहुल्याच्छदस्यार्थोभिधीयते ।  
पदलभ्यत्वतो नैव यद्वातद्वा निर्गथते ॥  
नहि पंकजशब्देन भृङ्गलोकोनुभीयते ।  
किं वा सुवर्णशब्देन व हि: केनापि कथयते ॥  
अशब्देते प्रयोगोन् प्रयोगबहुता कृतः ॥  
Ibid, P.116 & 117b, Slokas 854,855,856.

371. एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढ इति श्रुत्या देवत्वादिगुण-  
विशिष्टेहरावेवनिर्गुणपदश्रवणात् । हरिस्तु निर्गुणसाक्षादिति-  
स्मृतौ स्पष्टं हरावेव निर्गुणपदप्रयोगाच्य ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on. Y.M., G.S., p.117b,

372. तत्तत्पदार्थसामर्थ्यनुपमर्देन शब्दतः ।  
अर्थो बोध्योनशब्दस्य सत्त्वादर्थोपमर्दनम् ।  
गुरौ गुरुपदं हित्यादुपदेशादिकैर्गुणः ।  
भारेणतु शिलायां स्यात्कल्पनायां बहुत्वतः ।  
Y.M., G.S., p. 117b, Slokas 858& 859.  
स्वं हरौ प्रयुक्तं निर्गुणपदमपि संकोचमाप्नित्य  
तस्यायोग्यगुणत्रयमेव निषेधति । न तु तदगतसार्वज्ञादि  
गुणमपि उपमर्दयतीति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi, Com.on.Y.M., G.S., 117.

373. सुशोभनगुणैः पूर्णे प्रयुक्तं तत्पदं हरौ ।  
अशोभनगुणानेव निषेधति न शोभनान् ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.117, S1.862.

374. हरिस्तु निर्गुणसाक्षात् पुरुषः प्रकृते परः ।  
स सर्वद्वृगुपद्वृष्टा तं भजन्नर्गुणोभवेत् ।  
Bhāg.X-88-5.

...

...

इति भागवते प्रोक्तो हरिरेव हि निर्णयः ।  
 समस्तगुणसम्पूर्णः श्रुत्यास्मृत्या समार्थया ॥  
 केवलो निर्णयचेति व्यापी देवस्स कथयते ।  
 अतस्त्रिगुणशून्यत्वाद्गुणसर्वस्वबूंहितः ।  
 स एव निर्णयं ब्रह्म शुद्धं ब्रह्म स एव नः ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.118b, Sllokas, 867 to 869.

375. सद्यशुद्धकरी नूणां सोशुद्धः किल दुर्धियां ।  
Y.M., G.S., p.118, S1.870.  
 आपस्तेऽयवनेजन्यस्त्रीलोकानुभवयो मुनन् इत्यावि  
 भागवतोक्तवाक्यान्तरार्थसंग्रहः ।  
Bh.Vi.Com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.118.
376. मोक्षस्य निर्णयस्वं च त्रैगुण्योऽिङ्गतैष हि ।  
 लुप्तयै समस्तभाग्यानां कोनून्मतः प्रवर्तते ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.118, Sllokas, 871 & 872.
377. अतो निर्णयबद्धोयं हरौ त्रिगुणवर्जनात् ।  
 मुक्तोपि तेन तद्वद्वो ... ॥  
Ibid, p.119b, S1.875.
378. किं चाप्राकृतपुंसोस्य चिन्मात्राकारता धूमा ।  
 स च सार्वज्ञादि धर्मा सर्वधर्मच्छ्रुतिः कदा ॥  
Ibid, p.119, S1.880.
379. Savanur Govind, 'Svetāśvataropaniṣad' with com.of.  
 Satari Narayanacārya, p.55, Ch. VI, S1.2.
380. यः सर्ववित् येन च नित्यं सर्वदा ... ।  
 तेनावृतं नित्यमिदं हि विश्वं ज्ञः कालकालो गुणी सर्वविद्यः । ... ॥  
Ibid.
381. स सर्वदुग्धितिप्रोक्तो वाक्येस्मिन्ने व सद्गुणः ।  
 एकः साक्षी देव इति श्रुतिवाक्येषि सद्गुणः ॥  
 अतस्त्वदर्थकथने स्वविरुद्धैव वाग्भवेत् ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.119, S1.881.

381A. अनुवादः-

... प्राप्तस्यानुपश्चात्कथनं सप्योजनमनुवाद इति  
सामान्यं लक्षणम् । शृगौ.वृ. 2.1.65५.

Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa, p.33.

382. किं च ब्रह्मसूत्रानुसारेण श्रुतिव्याख्येया,  
न स्वेच्छानुसारेण, सूत्रं च भगवद्गुणानेव अंगीकरोति  
न प्रतिषेधति । अतः श्रुतिरपि तथैव व्याख्येया ॥  
Bh.Vi.Com.on.Y.M.,G.S, p.120.  
व्यासश्चात्मगुणाम्भोधौ नैकत्यार्थं च मन्यते ।  
सर्वधर्मोपत्तेष्वयेत्याह यत्स्वयमंजसा ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.121b, S1.891..

383. न ऽविभज्ययोगेत् श्रौतं ततृतन्निषेधनम् ।  
तमस्तन्निषेधभागस्यायोगादार्थं निषेधनम् ॥  
Y.M.,G.S, p.121b, S1.893.  
आर्थं निर्णय इति सामान्यतो गुणनिषेधे गुणत्वाकृत्तत्वादेकत्वादि-  
गुणानां निषेधस्यादित्यथर्त्तिसद्वाभित्यर्थः ॥  
Bh.Vi.com.on Y.M.,G.S, p.121,b.

384. Suprā.

385. अद्विवादकलिंगं यत्तदित्यादिकं न हि ।  
भिन्नवाक्यतया यत्र निषेधस्तप्रत्यद्वृचं ॥  
स्कवाक्ये निषेधे तु न अलिंगं इतरत्र तत् ॥  
Y.M.,G.S, p.121 S1.898.

386. निर्गुणत्वे स्थिरे तेन मानानां स्था दमानता ।  
तत्सत्त्वे चाविलक्ष्मं ते निर्गुणत्वं स्थिरं भवेत् ॥  
Ibid, S1.900.

386A. यः सर्वद्वाः सर्ववित् ।  
Mund.Up.I-i-9.

387. श्रुतिप्राप्तस्य च श्रुत्या निषेधे मानता हता ।  
 इतद्भावे सावकाशे निर्णयैक्यागमे तव ॥  
 विश्वासस्त्यात्कथं नृणां ... ॥  
Ibid, p.122b, S1.904.

388. अतोनुवादमात्रेण नार्थस्य स्याद्वि द्विष्ठ ।  
 बहुप्रमाणलंबादादुदाद्यमेव भविष्यति ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.122, S1.906.

389. एवं हरेहिंसार्वज्ञं सा श्रौतं न निषेधति ॥  
Ibid, p.123b, S1.909.

390. इत्थं श्रौतगुणेभ्यो यच्छ्रुत्या एव प्रयोजनं ।  
 अतस्तेषामभावं सा स्वाभावं मनुते सती ॥  
Ibid, p.123, S1.910.

390A. एषनित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य ।  
Brih.Up.IV-iv-23.

390B. Q.Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., G.S, p.123.

391. सर्वधर्मेषतर्ज्ञः सर्वस्येशान इत्यपि ।  
 श्रुतयस्त्मृतयो गायन्त्रुणानित्यादयो न किं ॥  
 मयूयनन्तर्णुणेऽनन्ते गुणतो नन्तविग्रहे ।  
 जन्मकार्माभिधानानि सन्ति मैंगसहस्रशः ।  
 न शक्यनन्ते नुसंख्यातुमनन्तात्प्रान्मयापि हि ॥  
Ibid, p.124, Slokas, 924 & 925.

392. किंचान्निर्णु इत्येव पदच्छेदे लसत्पदं ।  
 वाक्यस्त्यान्नांगविच्छेदस्तस्येत्यतिसमंजसं ॥  
 श्रुतिस्त्वोक्तगुणस्येम्ने नैर्णयं प्रतिषेधति ।  
 इति संगतिरप्यस्ति वाक्यस्याप्येकवाक्यता ।  
Ibid, Slokas, 927.& 929.

393. Suprā Fn.364 A.

394. किंच निर्गुणतावाक्ते गुणमात्रनिषेधने ।  
ज्ञानानन्दाधर्मितगुणानां स्यान्लिषेधिका ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.124. S1.930.

394A. Katha.Up. II-11.

395. यद्यभिन्नं सुखं ज्ञानं गुणात्सर्वप्यभेदिनः ।  
सन्तु नेहेति वाक्यस्य भ्यादृशर्भाता हरेः ।  
Ibid. p.125b S1.931.  
नेहनानेति वाक्यबलात् ज्ञानानन्दादिवत्  
सर्वज्ञादीनामप्यभेदसाम्यादिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.G.S, p.125b.

396. The qualities such as form etc, of a pot are identical with that pot. But when a wet pot is heated then the colour gets changed. So as long as Dharmas are there with a Dharmin, there is Abheda in between them. When some Dharmas get changed, then with these Dharmas there may be 'Bheda'. So in such cases Bheda and Abheda are admitted.

396A. Infra. See; Fn 426

397. न शक्यन्तेनुसंख्यातुमनन्तत्वान्मयापि हि ।  
इतीरन्यगुणादीनामानन्त्यं स्वगुणादिषु ॥  
गुणादित्वं च किं तत्त्वमुत्तिसुक्षति स प्रभुः ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.125. S1.937.

398. नोपयारादितस्तद्वात्तत्सर्वं च स सर्वदा ।  
आत्मशक्तिविशेषेण सर्वथा निवृहित्परं ॥  
Ibid. S1.940.  
स एव भेदाभावाख्यस्थलेभेदकार्यनिर्वाहिक इत्युक्तं  
भवति ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., G.S, p.126b.

398A. आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि । (II-i-29)

मध्वभाष्यम् -

परमात्मनो विचित्राश्च शक्तयः सन्ति ।

नान्येषाम् -।

अनुव्याख्यानम् -

अप्यनेकस्वरूपेषु विशेषादेव केवलम् ।

.....

तस्य त्वशेषापितात्माद् युज्यते सर्वमेवहि ॥

Madhva. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya & Anuvyākhyaṇa (Sarvamūlagrānṭhāḥ)

p.68.

398A. ... उपाधिस्तु कायन्वयी व्यावर्तको वर्तमानश्च ।

Joshi 'Vedāntaparibhāṣā of Śrī dharmarājādhvarīndra'. p.71.

उपाधिकृतं मिथ्यारूपम् ...।

Sankara. Gitābhāṣya (XIII-13.7 p.183)

399. य ईशी अस्य जगतो नित्यमेव , (Svet.Up.VI-17)

... कर्विमनीषी परिभूः स्वयम्भूयथानृथ्यतो थनि

च्यध्वदाच्छाश्वतीभ्यः समाध्यः ।

(Isa.Up-I-1)

भाष्यम् -

स सत्यं जगदेतादृह् नित्यं मेव प्रवाहतः ।

अनाथनन्तकालेषु प्रवाहैकप्रकारकम् ।

नियमैव ससृजे भगवान् पुरुषोत्तमः ॥

Madhva. Īśāvāsyopaniṣadbhāṣya. (Sarvamūlagrānṭha) p.511.

400. मिथ्योपाधिक सार्वज्ञमिथ्यात्मान्नैकतेति चेत् ।

सत्यविश्वस्य सामध्यादिति तस्योत्तरं वदेत् ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.126b, S1.943.

401. सत्यत्वे यदि संदेहो मिथ्यात्वे कस्य निश्चयः ।

कलहेनविल्लेस्तिमत् तत्सत्यत्वे न बाध्यः ॥

Ibid, p.126, S1.944.

- 401A. घटोपाधिकवृत्तेश्च मनोरूपत्वमिष्यते ।  
 घटस्तु न मनोरूपो ब्रह्मयोसावांतरं मनः ॥  
Ibid, S1.945.
- घटोपाधिकवृत्तेः घटविषयकमानसज्ञानस्य ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., G.S, p.126.
402. अतस्सार्वज्ञैकतायां सर्वस्यैक्यं च नोच्यते ।  
 मिथ्यादज्ञतद्वृष्टेश्च साक्षिगः सत्यता तत् ॥  
Y.M., G.S, p.126, S1.946.
403. मिथ्याभूतार्थसम्बन्धान्मिथ्याज्ञानं यदीष्यते ।  
 सत्येभाज्ञानसम्बन्धादर्थस्त्याः कथं न ते ॥  
Ibid, S1.947.
404. निर्दोषवरचिथोगात्सत्यता लोकसंमता ॥  
Ibid, S1.949.
405. किंच नानापदार्थनां भ्रमोपि ब्रह्मचिन्तव ।  
 मिथ्यार्थज्ञानरूपं ते ब्रह्म किं नाभवत्तव ॥  
 सत्यार्थं ज्ञानरूपोसौ कथं मिथ्या मम प्रभुः ॥  
Ibid, P.127b & 127., Slokas, 953 & 954.
406. अतो भगवतो धर्मः सर्वे सर्वश्चरात्मकाः ।  
 तत्त्वकत्या धर्मधर्मित्वं एकता नेकतादि च ॥  
Ibid, p.127, S1.956.
407. अभिन्नगुणसत्यत्वधौव्यादब्रह्मसुखादिवत् ॥  
Ibid, p.128b, S1.960.
- 407A. Brih.Up.III-ix-28.
- 407B. Tait.Up.II-iv-1.

408. गुणता गुणिता च स्यात्सुखतासुखिता यथा ।  
आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् इत्यप्याह श्रुतिस्तकुं ॥

Ibid., S1.963.

अस्य सुखस्य ब्रह्मणाद्य सुखता सुखिता यथा  
तथा अस्य ब्रह्मणः तत्सार्वज्ञादेष्व गुणता -  
गुणिता च स्याद्विति योजना ।

Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., G.S., p.128b & 128.

409. अतो गुणात्मका एते गुणाहया यथा श्रुतिं ।

पूर्णभाक्तिविशेषण सर्वतद्वि समंजसं ॥

Y.M., G.S., p.128, Slokas, 965 & 966.

409A. तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानामण्डार्थबोधकत्वम् ।

... "एवं सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म"  
इत्यप्यवान्तरवाक्येष्वप्यण्डार्थत्वं ज्ञेयं ।

Sacchidanandendrasarasvati ('Vedāntaprakriyāpratyabhijñā'  
Adhyatmaprakasana Karyalaya, Holenarāśipura, 1964, Vol.I.  
p.648.

409B. Tait.Up.II-ii-1.

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म | (Tait.Up.II-ii-1)  
शांकरभाष्यम् -

... तत् तस्मिन्नैव ब्राह्मणवाक्योक्ते अर्थे एषा ऋक् अभ्युक्ता, आम्नाता ।

"सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म" इति ब्रह्मणः लक्षणार्थं वाक्यम् । सत्यादीनि हि त्रीणि विशेषणार्थानि पदानि विशेष्यस्य ब्रह्मणः । ..... ।

तत्र अनन्तशब्दोऽन्तवत्त्वप्रतिषेधद्वारेण विशेषणम् । सत्यज्ञानशब्दौ तु स्वार्थसमर्पितैव विशेषणे भवतः ।

... सर्वविशेषप्रत्यस्तमितस्वल्पत्वाद् ब्रह्मणः । ब्राह्यसत्त्वासामान्यविषयेण -  
सत्यशब्देन लक्ष्यते "सत्यं-ब्रह्म" इति । न तु सत्यशब्दवाच्यमेव ब्रह्म । एवं

सत्यादिशब्दाः इतरेतरसन्निधौ अन्योन्यनियम्यनियामकाः सन्तः ॥

सत्यादिशब्दवाच्यात् तन्निवर्तकाः ब्रह्मणो लक्षणार्थाश्च भवन्ति इत्यतःसिद्धं  
"यतोवाचो निवर्तन्ते" । "अप्राप्य मनसा सह" "अनिरुक्ते निलयने" इति च

अवाच्यत्वं नीलोत्पलवत् अवाक्यार्थत्वं च ब्रह्मणः ।

Saccidanandendrasarasvati 'Taittiriyopaniṣad' with  
Sahkarabhaśya, Adhyatma Prakas Karyalaya, Holenarāśipura, 1973,  
p.120, 121, 130, 135.

410. अतःकश्चन्द्र इत्येष प्रश्नः प्रश्नविदां मते ।  
 किं लक्षणं इत्येव स्वार्थमर्थनुरो भवेत् ॥  
 चन्द्रत्ववान्क इत्येव वाक्यस्यार्थो यतःस्फुटं ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.129, Slokas 973 & 974.

411. सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यं तद्रिशिष्टब्रह्मतत्परं ।  
 लक्षणपूर्वनवाक्यत्वात् . . . . ॥  
Ibid, p.130b, S1.977.

412. स्वरूपमात्रज्ञानस्य पदेनैकेन सम्भवात् ।  
 व्यर्थं पदान्तरं च स्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञापनेन किं ॥  
Ibid, S1.978.

413. Supra. fn 347A

414. किं च मुख्यार्थं बोधे हि लक्षणा ते न सत्यता ।  
 ज्ञानतानन्तता चैव भवेद्ब्रह्मणि बोधिता ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.130, S1.983.

414A. सत्यत्वरहितं ब्रह्म मिथ्यैवस्याद्विवत् ।  
 सद्गुपमपि तन्नस्यात्तद्विनैव हेतुना ॥  
Ibid, S1.984.

415. अतस्तत्यत्वरहितं मिथ्यैवस्यान्नसंशयः ।  
 विरसो मुण्डने तस्माच्छखामुण्डनमप्यभूत् ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.130, S1.986.  
 सत्याभावे त्वदभिलषितसद्गुपत्वमपिगतमितिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi.Com.on. Y.M., G.S., p.130.

416. Supra. fn 368A

417. भेदश्च श्रुतिमुख्यार्थसुस्थिरोभूदिति स्थितं ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.131b. S1.989.

418. सत्त्वादिमुण्डने किं न लक्ष्यत्वादैस्तस्थण्डता ।  
Ibid, p.131. S1.993.
419. अखण्डत्वाधभावेतु तैवा याद्वि सखण्डता ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.131, S1.994.
420. Sharma B.N.K., 'Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya', p.45.
- 420A. See: भेदहीनेत्वपयधिशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।  
विशेषो नाम कथितः सो स्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥  
Madhva Anuvyākhātyāna (Sarvamūlagrantha) (AV) 0.9.
- 420B. Cf: This Viśesa steps to explain the relation of identity-in-difference between object and 'difference'. It is here that Madhva introduces his concept of Viśesa to keep both Bheda and Dharmin intact and yet manages to account for their distinction of reference.  
Shanbhag D.N. 'Some problems in Dvaita philosophy in their dialectical settings' p.126.
421. विरुद्धयोत्सतोर्योगस्त्वमूलाधातिनोभवित् ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.132b, S1.996.  
न तु घटकशक्तेरेव धातकयोर्बद्धत्वमूकतात्वादिरूप-  
योरितिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on. Y.M., G.S, p.132b.
422. अणुत्वं च महत्वं च तथैव घटयेच्छुतं ।  
Y.M., G.S, p.132, S1.998.
423. भद्रहीनेपि भेदस्य कार्यं योघटयेच्छुतं ।  
स सामर्थ्यविशेषो हि विशेष इति गीयते ॥  
Ibid, S1.1002.

424. परप्रकाशको दीपो न किं स्वस्यप्रकाशः ।  
विशेषोन्यत्रनिवही स्वनिवही कथं न सः ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.133b, S1.1003.
- 424A. स्वनिवहिको विशेषो नाम पदार्थाक्तिरभिधिच्यताम् ।  
(Vādāvali, p.97b)
- 424B. Viśesa renders possible both difference and identity, thus satisfactorily explaining the relation of identity-in-difference between the object and its attributes (difference). Shanbhag D.N., 'Some problems in Dvaita Philosophy in their dialectical settings!' p.127.
- 424C. See; एकस्य ज्ञानलूपस्य हरेलक्तिविभागतः ।  
अभिन्नो पि विशेषैषान्य इत्युदितो हरिः ॥  
Madhva. Anuvyākhyāna (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) p.15.
425. मूलाभेदेपि कृष्णाद्या नानन्ताकिं न सन्ति किं ।  
यथानन्ताश्च सन्तश्च न भिन्ना मूलसदृगुणाः ॥  
Ibid, p.133. S1.1008.
426. गुणत्वस्य गुणित्वस्य तदभेदस्य देशवरे ।  
प्रामाणिकस्य घटना शक्तयैव स्यात्सुखादिवत् ॥  
Y.M., G.S., p.134b. S1.1010.
427. यथोक्तं कुर्वतुष्टं पवतिषु विधावति ।  
एवं धर्मन्यृथः पश्यस्तानेवानुविधावति ॥  
इति श्रुतिर्यतोर्धर्मजाहुल्यप्रतिपादिकां ।  
निषेधति पृथम्भावमात्रं सैव विशेषात् ॥  
Ibid, Slokas 1011 & 1012.
428. न च भेदप्रतिनिधिरभावे धर्मधर्मिभावो धर्मणामनेकवयनं च युक्तः ।  
Nym., p.564. Cf: It would be impossible to effect an 'identity' between the 'intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects' of a thing, without the help of 'viśesas'. It is the only wayout.  
Sharma B.N.K. Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya, p.48.

429. यत्र यावन्तो व्यवहारास्तत्र तावन्तो विशेषा हति ब्रातव्यम् ।  
Jayatīrtha, Nyāyasudhā, p.23.  
Cf: विशेषास्ते प्यनन्ताश्च परस्परविशेषिणः ।  
स्वनिवहिकतायुक्ताः सन्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥  
Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) p.9.  
See for details: Madhva, Upādhikhaṇḍanam (Daśaprakaraṇāni)  
SMRSS 1969, Pp.365, 366,367.
430. महत्सुगुणसारेषु दोषान्वेषणधीर्मुद्धा ।  
अनन्तगुणहृषिपि निरवद्यो न किं हरिः ॥  
Vādirāja, Yuktimallikā (Y.M) Suddhisaurabha (S.S) p.1. S1.1.
431. अपि संहृत्यनिखिलमपवादी किमच्युतः ।  
Ibid, S1.2.  
अल्पस्य यो दोषः स सहतो दोषो नेति यावत् । लोकेष्येवं  
येत् अलौकिको च्युतः न कर्मणा लिप्यते पापकेनेत्यादि श्रुतेः  
करकर्मकरणेष्वप्यपलेपाख्यच्यतिरहितः ।  
Surottamatīrtha, Bhāvavilāsini com.on Y.M., S.S. p.1.  
Cf: अच्युतो यो गुणैर्नित्यमेवाखिलैः  
प्रच्युतोऽशेषदोषैस्तदा पूर्तितः ।  
उच्यते सर्ववेदोर्खादैरजः  
स्वर्चितो ब्रह्मस्त्रदेन्द्रपूर्वेस्तदा ॥  
Madhva. Dvādaśastotra (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) ABMM, 1974,  
Vol.5, p.211.
432. यदा पत्रस्याविनाशित्वादिकं तदा किमुवाच्यं पत्रशायिनो  
हरेरितिभावः ।  
Surottamatīrtha, Bhāvavilāsini, com.on Y.M.S.S.p.2.
433. लघे सतः प्रागभावाभावात् न हि हरेभिः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.2b, S1.4.

434. नाभिजन्मा विधिस्तस्य क्रोधाजजातस्त्रिलोचनः ।  
नारायणो मूलरूपी जातः कस्मा द्विवार्यताम् ॥  
Ibid, S1.5.
435. पूर्णपूर्वतिरन्यार्था न वै पूर्त्यर्थमान्मनः ।  
तटाकोत्सकततोयैः किं तटाकस्यैव पूरणम् ॥  
Ibid, p.2, S1.7.
436. न हि पूर्णसुखानो दुःखमान्तर्घवकाशवान् ।  
Ibid, S1.8.
437. प्राग्जन्मार्जितदुष्कर्म दुःखमूलंधृवं नृणाम् ।  
Ibid, p.3b, S1.9.
438. See: Bhagavadgīta, (BG) III-23.
439. श्रीमद्भागवते प्रोक्तं निरवद्यस्ततः प्रभुः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.4, S1.14.  
See: Bhāgavata V-xiv-5,6.
440. सेतुंबृष्टदेवा समुद्रस्य ब्रह्मदत्यां व्यपोहति ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.5b, S1.15.
441. See : Madhva Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya, ABMM, B'llore,  
Vol.2, p.86.
442. कुक्षौ यस्याखिला लोका लक्ष्यन्ते स्म शिशोः किल ।  
जननं मरणं चास्य न युक्तं युक्तिविन्मते ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.5, S1.18.
443. See: Bhāgavata - x-iii-9.
444. तदेवदेवकीर्गर्भजातस्य किलवक्षसि ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.6b, S1.20.

445. See : Bhagavadgīta (BG) II-24.

446. छेदोवेधः कथं प्रभोः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.6, S1.24.

447. अतोऽन्नजनमोहाय नटवद्दर्शयित्परं ।  
... नाटो, नाद्यकृते नारी नार्यवाङ्गस्य किं दृशा ॥  
Ibid, p.8b, Slokas 35,36.

448. एवं श्रुतिस्मृतियुक्तप्रत्यक्षाख्यपुमाणत्रितयेनापि भगवतः  
निर्दोषत्वे सिद्धेषि यस्तं दोषिणं मनुते स निर्दोषमहापुरुष-  
द्रूषणाख्यदोषेणान्धेतमसि पाति ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., S.S., p.9,  
तस्मात्स्वमूलरूपेच स्वावहतारेषु च प्रभुः ।  
अवधगान्धविधुरः इति सर्वं मनोरमम् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.10b, S1.47.

449. Ajñāna:-

Ajñāna, in the Advaita, appears in two forms, Māyā and Avidyā. So, there is no difference when reference is made about the nature and content of Ajñāna. These terms are therefore, used, sometimes, without the idea of difference in the sense.

See: Maya also sometimes, used by Śaṅkara, for Avidyā and he does not seem to hold that there is any difference between them, though the later Advaitins did distinguish the one from the other.

Mudgal S.G, Advaita of Sankara, Motilal Banarasidas Delhi, 1976, p.10.

Some Advaitins draw a distinction between Māyā and Avidyā . ---

But this distinction is not valid. It cannot be conclusively proved that in the case of Māyā there is non-delusion of the abode.

Mahadevan, T.M.P., 'The Philosophy of Advaita', Ganesh & Co. (Madras) Private Ltd., Madras, 1957, p.229.

See also: "From what has been said above it is evident that Māyā (also called Avidyā or Ajñāna) is in itself an indefinable mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence, but also an autological existence as well."

Dasagupta, S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Vol.II,p.73.

In the Advaita, this Ajñāna or Avidyā or Māyā is explained as -

- (i) तमेत्मविधात्यं आत्मानात्मनोरितरात्थ्यासं  
पुरस्कृत्य सर्वप्रमाणमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः ।
- (ii) अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देशया  
परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासुप्तिः ।
- (iii) तमेत्स्वं लक्षणं अध्यासं पठिङ्टता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते ।

Satśāstri - Śāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.1, Pp.14,15,304.

In the Advaita, it matters not much difference, as to what is Māyā and what is Avidyā, because it is false in both cases. There lies no much difference of opinion among modern scholars in respect of Māyā and Avidyā as shown above. Whereas some ancient scholars did hold slight difference.

See; Muralidharapandeya Srīśāṅkarātpṛāgadvitavedāntah'-  
Varanasi, Samvat 2028, p.28 & 29.

So far as the discussion of the nature of Ajñāna is concerned, from Śāṅkara , till today, all scholars have greatly excercised to explain it.

Śāṅkara explains it as the aspect of mutual superimposition of self and non-self. He also says that it is a root cause of power associated with Brahman.  
(See; above quations)

And moreover, it is Mithyā, means neither real nor non-real. It is inexplicable.

It is positive, beginningless, natural, and it is that which effects the activity and enjoyment etc., :-

स्वमयम् अनादिरनन्तः नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासः,  
मिथ्यापृत्यरूपः कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वपूर्वकः  
तर्वलोकपृत्यक्षः ।

Satśāstri, Sāṅkara: Adhyāsabhbāṣya, (Brahmasūtrabhāṣya) p 8 18.

See also:

भव्यकृतनाम्नी परमेश्वराकृति  
रनाध्विद्या त्रिगुणात्मिका परा ।  
कायन्तुमेया लुधियैव माया  
यया जगत्सर्वमिदं प्रसूयते ॥ 108.  
सन्नाप्यसन्नाप्युभ्यात्मिका नो  
भिन्नाप्यभिन्नाप्युभ्यात्मिका नो ।  
सांगाप्यनंगा हयुभ्यात्मिका नो  
महद्भुता निर्वचनीयस्पा ॥

Madhavananda, Sāṅkara, Vivekachūdāmani - Advaita Asrama, Mayavati 1926, Pp.44, 45.

Sadananda defines:-

अज्ञानं तु - सदसद्भुयामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञानविरोधि  
भावरूपं यत्त्वं चिदिति वदन्त्यहमज्ञ इत्याध्यनुभवात् "देवात्म-  
शक्तिं स्वगुणैनिगूढाम्" इत्यादि श्रुतेष्वच ।

Nikhilananda, Vedāntasāra of Sadānandayogīndra -  
Advaita Ashrama Calcutta, 1968, p,23.

अज्ञानम् -

तत्रोक्तम् - अलादि भावरूपं यदिज्ञानेन विलीयते ।  
तदज्ञानमिति प्राज्ञा लक्षणं संपूर्णत इति मायावादिवेदान्तिनो वदन्ति ।  
॥ सर्वद. पृ. 83. ॥

Jhalakikar Bimacarya, Nyāyakośa p.5,

## माया -

मायावादिवेदान्तिनस्तु मिथ्याबुद्धिरेतुभूत-  
मज्ञानं माया । तच्याज्ञानमीश्वरोपाधिः । . . . ।  
सर्व. सं. पृ. 179.  
Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa, p.652.

अज्ञानं च न ज्ञानाभावः लिङ्गं भावल्पं अनादि  
अनिवच्यं आवरणविक्षेपं व्यापारं ।  
तच्य शास्त्रजनिततत्त्वज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वात् अज्ञानं  
अविद्या इत्यादिशब्दैः उच्यते ।

तद्विविधं माया अविद्या ऐदादित्येके ।  
अपरेतु स्वाक्ष्रयव्यामोहनाव्यामोहनरूपव्यापार-  
ऐदात् एकमेव वस्तु अविद्या, माया इत्युच्यते  
इत्याहुः ।

Q. Venkateshachar.B, 'Sri Śruti Tattva Prakāśikā of  
Vādirāja, Dr.B.V. Raghavendrarao, Basavanagudi, Bangalore,  
1972, p.152, (Appendix)

Mandana holds that Avidyā is Māyā false appearance  
and though not a characteristic of Brahman, is not different  
from it. It is neither existent nor non-existent.  
According to him it belongs to individual souls. See:  
Dasagupta, S. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.2, p.89.

Suresvara opines that the Avidyā is based upon pure  
intelligence and not an individual persons.  
See; Ibid, p.101.

For detailed information of ancient scholars about  
Ajñāna, refer - Dasagupta, S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy'  
Vol.2, Pp.105, 110, 113, 114, and 117.

Even modern scholars, including Dasagupta and  
Radhakrishnan are not well satisfied with the conception  
of Ajñāna of the Advaita.

See; Dasagupta, S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy' Vol.2, p.11,  
Radhakrishnan, 'Indian Philosophy', Vol.2, p.565.

It may be the inexplicable and unthinkable and contradictory nature of the concept, that has made the scholars, both ancient and modern, to postulate different views and explain in different ways. The view as it being ~~Mithya~~ in nature and application, could be known with modern scholars like T.M.P.Mahadevan.

See: Māyā is the power of Brahman. It cannot be really different from Brahman-intelligence, since, if it were really different, the spiritual texts declaring non-difference would be contradicted. Nor can it be non-different from the absolute, since identity is not possible as between the intelligent and the inert. Nor can it be both different and non-different since contradictions like difference and non-difference cannot reside in one and the same thing. Similarly, Māyā is not real, because of conflict with the spiritual declaration of non-difference. Nor is it unreal, because there would be no other primal cause of the world. It cannot be both real and unreal because of contradiction. Mahadevan T.M.P., 'The Philosophy of Advaita' Ganesh & Co., Madras) Private Ltd., Madras, 1957, p.

The saint philosopher 'Satchidanandendrasaraswati' goes to the extext of ridiculing the serious speculative discussion of the very concept:

See; Therefore, it is futile to indulge seriously in speculative discussion about its cause, locus, object or number as many Post-Sākara Advaitins have done; for all these catagories pertain to the magic phenomena invented by Avidyā and can never be applied to avidyā itself, which projects these phantoms.

Satchidanandendrasaraswati, 'Essays on Vedānta', Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipura, 1971, p.48.

...

Thus, it is clear from the above discussion that, the Very concept Ajñāna admitted by the Advaitins, is not clear for understanding as to what it is and would be. Inspite of instant exercise of both; ancient and modern scholars, it has not been explained precisely and convincingly. The explanation of it is not agreeable to the reason and thought. And the conception Ajñāna itself appears to be ambiguous. It is not explained properly and faithfully as it is Mithyā. It is evident that the falsity notion of the concept has led to the origin of different views and problems since Sankara till today.

450. आत्मत्वमात्रविषयाश्रयताबलेन ।

Saṅkṣepasārīraka, Vol. I, St. 21.

Q.Sarma, V.A., 'Citsuka's contribution to Advaita'

Mysore Kavyalaya publishers, 1974, p.69.

See also:

Cfn. 12. In the later Advaita, the question also is raised about the locus (āśraya) of Avidyā. Is it the Jīva, the individual self, or Brahman, the universal self? The Bhāmati school argues for Jīva and Vivarāṇa school for Brahman.

Eliot, Deutsch., 'Advaita Vedānta', East West Center Press, Honolulu, 1969, p.33.

451. इदं रूप्यतात्रैत्येवं वा भ्रमविग्रहः ।

अन्योन्यधर्मनिधयस्य चान्योन्यात्मकतां तथा ॥

Y.M., S.S., p.10b, S1.48.

Cf: अन्योन्यस्त्विन्नन्योन्यात्मकतां अन्योन्यधर्मशिंचाद्यस्य ...।

Saṅkṣasti, Saṅkara: 'BrahmasūtraBhāṣya', Vol. I, p.12.

452. नाज्ञानमहमित्यस्ति नाज्ञानत्वं मयीत्यपि ।

भ्रमो ब्रह्मणि ते न स्यात्कथमज्ञानकल्पना ॥

Y.M., S.S., p.10b, S1.50.

453. अज्ञोहमिति तु ज्ञानं सिद्धाज्ञानस्य वेदनं ।

Ibid., S1.51.

454. Suptrā., fn.353A.

455. नाज्ञानमन्यथर्मयिं ब्रह्माज्ञानैकवादिनः ।

Y.M., S.S. p.10. S1.53.

456. अज्ञानारोपतस्तत्र तद्योगस्याप्यमाववाक् ।

अज्ञानारोपमूलैव स च सर्वत्र दुर्लभः ॥

Ibid., p. S1.55:

उक्तरीत्या अज्ञानतादात्म्यारोपस्य अज्ञानत्वरूपतद्भर्म-  
रोपस्य च क्वाप्यदर्शनात् । ततश्च अज्ञानत्यानारो-  
पितत्वात् तत्संर्गस्यापि आरोपितत्वपद्धो न घटते,  
घटादौ जडे अज्ञानसंर्गरहिते तत्संर्गपृतीतौ संसर्गरोप-  
स्त्यात् । न चैवं । अतः संसर्गोप्यनारोपितः ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on Y.M., S.S. p.11b.

Ajñānaropa or Adhyāsa is a peculiar concept in the Advaita system. Accordingly, only one entity, that is Brahman is eternally real. And It is Cidrūpa. And remaining all is unreal. ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मध्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः॥  
There is no difference between Brahman and Jīva. Brahman on account of the association of nescience, becomes Jīva. And this Ajñāna is not an independent, real and different entity. It is superimposed and hence is considered to be associated with Brahman. And this superimposition is of two kinds. One is Tādātmyāropa, second one Dharmāropa. It is also called Dharmaropa in the sense of mistaking the association of attributes of one entity with another. Looking at conch-shell, if mistaken for silver then it is Tādātmyāropa. If the attributes, Rajatatva etc., are referred, then, it is Dharmāropa or Samsargāropa.

Now to the self(Brahman), there is experience as 'Ajñānam Brahma'. Here, non-difference is not at all seen. So it is not Tādātmyāropa. If it is argued that there is Aropa then, Ajñāna and Brahman, both should be real, independent and different entities or Brahman should be the very nature of Ajñāna. Both these views are not admitted by the Advaitins. Because, according to them, Brahman is not of the nature of Ajñāna, and Ajñāna is not an independent, different real entity. Further, Dharmāropa (Samsargāropa) is also impossible, since the Ajñānatatva etc, the attributes of Ajñāna, are not superimposed. For superimposition, Ajñāna must be a different real entity somewhere, and then only, its attributes could be superimposed. But, as the very concept Ajñāna is Mithyā, its association in the form of superimposition, is impossible. Thus, the cognition of experience such as 'Ajñānam Brahma' or Ahamajñānah and Brahma Ajñānam etc, doesnot contain either of these superimpositions. So the superimposition of Ajñāna is untenable.

457. तत्रैव सन्निकृष्टस्य सन्निकर्षे कथं भ्रमः ।  
Y.M., S.S. p.11, S1.57.
458. आत्मा आप्नोते: ... नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः ... अद्यः ।  
Sankara, Aitareya Bhasya, I-1.
459. तेनाज्ञानान्तरं चाज्ञानस्योपोद्बलकं भवेत् ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.11, S1.59.  
अज्ञान बाहुल्ये अज्ञानस्य सुतरां प्रमैवस्यादिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., S.S.p.11 & 12b.
460. अनाज्ञानवादे च तस्याज्ञानं न किंचन ।  
Y.M., S.S. p.12b, S1.61.

461. दोषस्य भ्रमकारणत्वेन कारणस्य च पूर्वभावित्वावश्यंभावात् ।  
Bh.Vi.,com.on.Y.M.S.S, p.12b.

462. भ्रमात्पूर्वो हि दोषस्त्वाददोषजात्य भ्रमो भवेत् ।  
Y.M.,S.S, p.12b, S1.62.

463. अज्ञानरूपदोषतत्त्वे अज्ञानभ्रमः अज्ञानभ्रमेतत्त्वे  
प्रतीतिकाज्ञानरूपदोषतत्त्वं इत्यन्योन्याश्रयः ।  
Bh.Vi.,Com.on.Y.M., S.S. p.12b, S1.63.

464. मायावादि वेदान्तिमते उपाध्युपहितं केवलं चैतन्यं साक्षी ।  
Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa, p.989.

See also: " In fact, Saksin is nothing other than pure consciousness reflected on the mode or Vrtti of Ajñāna. (Sākṣi cāvidya vrttipratibimbita caitanyam). Thus, Sāksin is the intuitive knowledge of self and avidyā being connected to it, is always revealed to it. (Rahubat Svavrtacaitanya Prakasyavidya). Avidyā thus being always revealed to the intuitive knowledge. The effects of Avidyā too are always revealed to intuitive knowledge".

Gupta,S. 'Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusūdana Saraswati'.  
Sanskrit Pustaka Bhandara Calcutta, 1960, p.45.

465. जन्मैवास्य न युक्तं तद्दोषजात्वं तु द्वूरतः ।  
Y.M.,S.S.p.12b, S1.64.

466. सजातीयविजातीय स्वगतभेदवर्जितं निविशेष ब्रह्मैव तत्त्वम् ।  
Q.Venkateshachar, 'Sri Śrutitattvaprakāśikā of Vādirāja'.  
Dr.B.V.Raghavendarao Basavanagudi,Bangalore,1972,p.150.  
सर्वासु हि उपनिषत्सु "नेति नेति" "अस्थूलमनु"  
इत्यादि विशेषप्रतिषेधेनैव निर्दिष्यते ।  
Sankara - Gitābhāṣya, XIII-12.

467. यद्युपेण यन्निविचतं तदूपं न व्यभिचरति तत् सत्यम् ।  
 Śaṅkara, Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya II-1.  
 Sacchidanandendrasaraswati, Taittirīyopaniṣad  
Adhyatmaprakasa Karyalaya, Holenarasipur, 1973, Pp. 123, 124.
468. परेण ब्रह्मवत्सत्यस्य निवृत्त्यमंगीकारादिति भावः....  
 .... अनेन अज्ञाननिवृत्तिरूप चरम शाखापि  
 पतिता इति हृष्टव्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.S.S., p.13.
469. अज्ञानारोपमूलस्ते शास्त्रविस्तृतपादपः ।  
 मूलस्य दुर्बलत्वे तु सोपि वाताहतःपतेत् ।  
Y.M.,S.S., p.13b, S1.68.
470. अज्ञानासम्बवादेव शास्त्रं सर्वं गतं तव ।  
Ibid, p.13, S1.72.  
 वस्तुतस्तु मिथ्याभूताज्ञानस्यासम्बवे सत्याज्ञानस्य  
 च तेनैवानंगीकारेणाज्ञानस्वपूर्त्यैवाभावात् ....  
 तत्प्रक्रिया सर्वापि विक्रियैवाभूदिति हृष्टव्यम् ॥  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.,S.S. p.14b.
471. ऐक्यसिद्धौ भवेदद्वां ब्रह्म तस्याज्ञतावशात् ।  
 जीवभावे भवेदैक्यं ततोन्योन्याश्रयो न किम् ॥  
Y.M.S.S. p.14b, S1.75.
- According to the Advaita, Brahman attains the Jivabhāva by the association of Ajñāna and hence there is Aikya. If it is not associated with Ajñāna, then Aikya cannot be admitted. Thus, if Ajñāna is proved in Brahman, then the Aikya associated with it, is proved. If Aikya is proved then, Ajñāna in Brahman is proved. Thus, there is Anyonyāśraya.

Really speaking, this is not the admitted view of the Advaitins. They talk of Vyāvahārikabhedā between-Brahman and Jīva. Brahman who is Bimba, owing to the Upādhi of Ajñāna, would become Pratibimbajīva. Here, attributes of Bimba are said to be transferred to Pratibimba and not vice versa. Because the knowledge is 'I am ignorant' of Jīva, which is an attribute of Pratibimba. (Jīva) cannot be there in Bimba Brahman. So, even this view of Vyāvahārikalva does not help to prove Ajñāna and Aikya.

472. तान्यहं वेदसर्वाणि नत्वं वेत्थं परंतप ।  
Bhagavadgītā, IV-5.

- 472A. जीव ईशो विशुद्धा चित् तथा जीवेश्योभिदा ।  
 अविद्या तच्यतोर्योगः षहस्राकमनादयः ॥  
 Q.Joshi,H., 'Dharmarajadhvārīndra', Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p.106.  
 तदज्ञानवशात् जगदीश्वरजीवलैण प्रतिभासते ।  
 Q.Venkateshachar B. 'Srutitatvaprakāśikā' of Vādirāja,  
 Dr.B.V.Raghavendrarao, Basavanagudi, Bangalore, 1972, p.151.  
 (Appendix)

अपि च मिथ्याज्ञानपुरस्तरो यमात्मनो बुद्ध्युपाधिसम्बन्धः ।  
 Sāṅkara, Br.Sū.Bhā-II-iii-30.

यावदेय चार्यं बुद्ध्युपाधिसम्बन्धः लक्ष्मावज्जीवस्य जीवत्वं संसारित्वं च ।  
 Sātsāstri, 'Sāṅkara:Brahmasūtra bhāṣya'(Br.Sū.Bhā-II-iii-30)  
 Vol.1, p.583, 584.

473. अज्ञानसिद्धौ तत्कल्प्यो जीवसिसद्देन्नयान्यथा ।  
 ... तस्मादज्ञानकल्पितः ॥  
 जीवोऽवश्यं त्वयावाच्यः कथं नान्योन्यसंश्रयः ।  
 Y.M., S.S., p.16b, & 16, Slokas 84 & 85.

474. जीवानुभूतमज्ञानं सर्वज्ञे केन नीयते ।  
Ibid, p.17 S1.93.

475. Ajñāna is of two types, Bhāvarūpa and Abhāvarūpa (Positive and Negative). When a perceptible thing makes the other one disappear, the Ajñāna of that is Bhāvarūpa. When, [redacted] the knowledge of the existence of an object and peculiar characteristics are unknown, that is the Ajñāna of Abhāvarūpa.
476. अहमसी नते ज्ञानं किन्त्वानन्दादिके परम् ।  
 अपचेदकतज्ज्ञाने भव स्व पुनर्भवः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.18b, & 18. Slokas, 97 & 98.
477. वाच्योऽवचेदकादीनां ज्ञानं तु विशेषतः ।  
Ibid, p.18, S1.101.
478. ज्ञानाभावपदार्थस्य सर्वथाभाव स्व चेत् ।  
 अत्यन्ताभावशून्यं तज्ज्ञानं स्यात्परमार्थतः ॥  
Ibid, p.19b, S1.103.  
 अत्यन्ताभावाभावे तत्प्रतियोगित्वस्य  
 सुतरामभावेन सत्यत्वापरिहारादिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., S.S., p.19b,
479. सर्वथाऽज्ञातस्य वस्तुनोऽसम्भात् ।  
 सर्वथाऽज्ञाते वस्तुनि प्रमाणाभावात् । विद्यानस्य  
 ज्ञानात्यन्ताभावस्य ज्ञानमपि घटनीयम् ।  
Ibid.
480. नित्यज्ञानमते ज्ञानसामान्याभाव स्व न ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.19, S1.109.
- 480A. चक्षुषा ब्रह्म विज्ञानस्याभावोऽज्ञानमुच्यते ।  
Ibid.

480B. वेदान्तास्तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणे प्रमाणम् इति व्यवहारस्तु  
 तस्मिन्नन्धयारोपितादंप्रत्ययविषयत्वापनयनमात्रेणाति ज्ञेयम् ।  
 Sacchidanandendrasaraswati - 'Vedāntaprakriyāpratyabhiṣṭā'.  
 Adhyatma Prakasnana Karyalaya, Holenarasipura, 1964, p.43.  
 "वेदा अवेदा:" (बृ.ज.. IV-iii-22) इतिवचनात्,  
 द्रुक्यते स्वास्माभिः श्रुतेरप्यभावः प्रबोधे ।  
 Br. Sū. Bhā. IV-i-3. Śaṭsāstri, Saṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,  
 Vol.2, p.966.

481. अतो मम मतेऽज्ञानज्ञानस्य दौर्धत्यमेवन ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.20, S1.113.

In the Dvaita view, the Viśeṣajñānābhāva does not set aside the would be happening Brahmadarśana (direct cognition of Brahman). The direct cognition of Brahman becomes possible, when the prescribed Sādhana of a qualified soul is completed. As Brahman is an embodiment of infinite knowledge and auspicious qualities, even after His direct cognition Viśeṣajñānābhāva remains in case of that soul subject to the limited ability as an eligibility since possessing limited knowledge.

482. परासिनातिकूरेण या ह्यविद्या क्षतापि न ।  
 यतो ब्रह्मघिता नाशो नाज्ञानस्य भवन्ति ॥  
 सप्तन्तानासिना मन्दधारेण छिद्यते किल ।  
 अविद्यमनोरूपविद्यानाशकीर्तनात् ॥  
Y.M., S.S. p.20 & 21b. Sllokas, 115 & 116.

483. मनसोपि हि चिद्योगाच्छक्तिरथेषुकाशने।  
 अज्ञाननाशने स्याच्छक्तिस्तद्योगतः परम् ॥  
Ibid, p.21b, S1.117.

484. अम्बकल्प्यं हि सर्वं ते कालाद्वृष्टादिकं जगत् ।  
 अमस्यनित्यसिद्धत्वात्किं न स्यात्सदातव ।  
Ibid, p.22b., S1.121.

485. माया तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् । {स्त्रेकड. 4-10}

यथा कुलालश्चक्रीत्यात्तथा मायी तया सृजन् ॥

Ibid., p.22b & 22, S1.123.

चक्रीपदवा व्यस्य कुलालस्य चक्रेण लब्धन्थाभावात्

मायिपदवा व्यस्य भगवतो मायया लब्धन्थाभावात् ।

Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., S.S.p.22.

486. सर्वज्ञं खलु तद्बुद्धम् कथमज्ञानपदभवेत् ।

Y.M., S.S. ; p.22, S1.125.

अतः सर्वज्ञः अज्ञानवानितिमतं भातावन्द्या इतिवत्

व्याहतमिति भावः ।

Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., S.S. p.23b.

486A. तद्दर्यसंगम्नुते: ... निरवध्युतिसमाख्यया

दोषरूपगुणासंगस्व ... ।

Bh.Vi., Com.on.Y.M., S.S., p.24b.

486B. ... असंगो हृष्यं पुरुषः । Brih.Up.VI-iii-15- ¶ S.Bh...

न हि अमूर्तः कश्चित्त्रियावान्दृश्यते । अमूर्तिचात्मा,

अतोऽसंगः । यस्माच्यासंगो यं पुरुषस्तस्मादनन्वागतस्तेन

स्वप्नदृष्टेन । अत स्व न क्रियाकर्तृत्वमस्य कर्थं चिद्रूपपद्यते ।

कर्यकारणसंलेषणं हि कर्तृत्वं स्यात्स च संलेषः

संगोऽस्य नास्ति यतोऽसंगो हृष्यं पुरुषः ॥

Bhagavat, H.R. Sankara: Brihadāraṇyakopaniśadbhāṣya,

Astekar & Co, Poona, 1918, p.352.

487. यदिस्वभावतोऽसंगं इत्पर्यस्याच्छ्रुतेस्तत्त्वं ।

मायाप्युपाधितोऽसंगं इतिस्यादुक्तयुक्तितः ।

Y.M., S.S., p.23, S1.130.

487A. See: अवरत्वादिधर्मनियन्तृत्वं तत्त्वादात्म्यवत्त्वं

चेतिद्विविधमपरत्वादि । "निरनिष्टो निरवद्यः" इत्यादि श्रुतेः... ।

Q.Madhva, Nyāyavivaranam (Sarvamūl agranthah) ABMM, Bangalore. p.53.

488. किंचसार्वज्ञानसापेक्षमितियद्वयः ।  
 मूकोहमितिवत्तच्चविलङ्घमितिमे भृतिः ॥  
Ibid, p.24, S1.136;
489. मायां व्युदस्यचिच्छन्न्या कैवल्ये स्थित आत्मानि ...।  
Bhāq, I-vii-23.
490. यदभातं न तद्ब्रातंमितियत्तच्चत्त्वदीपने ।  
 स्वयमप्याहसार्वज्ञानात्त्वे तद्दूरदूरगे ॥  
Y.M.,S.S., p.25b, S1.139.
491. अज्ञाताखिलसंवेत्तुर्धटते न कुतश्चन । = (Upādhi, kh)  
 इत्युक्तमत एवार्थः कार्यपुर्यमहात्माभिः ॥  
Ibid, p.25b, S1.140.
- 491A. Cf : अ इत्युक्तो हरित्स्य विद्या विद्येति संजिता ।  
Madhva. Viṣṇutatvanirṇaya (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) Vol, 5, p.30.
492. न ब्रह्मणि मनोप्यस्ति तस्याज्ञानं तु केन तत् ।  
Ibid, S1.142.  
 स्वरूपज्ञानं प्रति अविरोधित्वात् मानसज्ञानस्य च  
 ब्रह्मव्यभावात् न द्वेषापि तस्याज्ञानमिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.,S.S. p.25.
493. कथमावरणेसत्येवान्यस्याप्यपरोक्षधीः ।  
 ज्ञानोत्पत्तिविरोधेव यस्मादावरणं विदुः ॥  
Y.M.,S.S. p.26b, S1.148.  
 अज्ञानावृते ब्रह्मणि जीवस्यापरोक्षवृत्तिरेव  
 नोत्पत्तमर्हति ।  
Bh.Vi.,com.on.Y.M.,S.S. p.26b.

493A. Q.Madhva.Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, p.162.

See: दर्शनाच्य । (III-iii-49).

न केवलं विद्या, किन्तु ? अपरोक्षज्ञानेनैव च ।

"सर्वानि परो मायया यं सिनीते दृष्टवैव तं  
मुच्यते नापरेण" इति कैश्चिक श्रुतेः ॥

494. Really speaking in the Advaita as Brahman alone is real and as It is associated with Ajñāna, It is the locus of Ajñāna. Some post-Sankara Advaitins argued that Jiva is the locus of Ajñāna: (See for details: Supra) Here, it matters not much difference and create confusion since in the Advaita, Brahman and Jiva are identical in nature. Further, as there is nothing real other than Brahman, in the advaita, the view that Ajñāna is Viṣayāśrita is not sound. But, here taking in to account the empirical reality of the objects of the world, the view is taken for consideration and refutation. The objects of the world are the illusory creations. The Viṣayāśritatva of Ajñāna is talked of and related to, with the idea that the Ajñāna is the veil as it conceals the objects.

See; "The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested an account of the veil of nescience".

....." The Ajñāna is one, but it seems to obstruct the pureCit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the Ajñāna has many states as constituting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience".

Dasagupta,S. 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Vol.1,  
Pp.449, & 458.

495. विषयाश्रितमज्ञानं यद्यावरणमिष्यते ।  
तद्वैक्षण्यात्पृत्या तन्नाशो सर्वद्वैष्येत वस्तुवत् ॥  
Y.M.,S.S. p.28. S1.165.

496. यद्ज्ञानान्तरं तन्नपुनरावरणं भैत् ।  
 तर्हि केनापि तदस्तु न दृश्येतावृत्तवतः ॥  
Ibid. S1.167.
497. ततस्तस्मादिदं पुरुषैचित्रयेण आवरणं  
 अपामाणिकमितिसम्बन्धः ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.,S.S.p.29b.
- 497A. Since, Ajñāna is not Mithyā in the Dvaita, it is understood as wrong knowledge unlike the Ajñāna (nescience) in the Advaita, which is Mithyā. The usages nescience and wrong knowledge are used to know the difference of sense as Mithyā and Satya with regard to Ajñāna.
498. अतःपुंगतमेवेदं तमः सत्यं हि तामसाः ।  
Y.M.,S.S. p.29b, S1.170.  
 इदं प्रमाप्रतिबन्धकं तमः अज्ञानं पुंगतमेव, ज्ञातूपुरुषनिष्ठमेव ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M.S.S.,p.29b.
499. ज्ञानं तु ज्ञातूपुंस्येव तन्नाशयाज्ञानमप्यतः ।  
 वप्तव्यं ज्ञातूपुरुषे ब्रह्मणिस्त्यात्कथं वद ॥  
Y.M.,S.S. p.29,S1.173.
500. प्रमाता जीव एवेति जीवाज्ञानमभूद्वित् ।  
Ibid, p.30b, S1.175.
- 500A. प्रमाणैतन्यस्य विषयैतन्यादभेद इति ब्रह्मः । ....।  
 तथा तैजसमन्तः करणमपि चक्षरादिद्वारा  
 घटादिविषयदेशं गत्वा घटादिविषयादाकारेण परिणमते ।  
 Com: तथा संचिद्वात् अन्तःकरणाशयात्  
 चक्षः पृष्णाल्या बहिः निर्गतमन्तःकरणं  
 विषयदेशं गत्वा विषयाकाराकारि भवति ।  
Joshi, H. Dharmaraj advarindra<sup>1</sup> Vedāntaparibhāṣa with com.  
Pp.33.35 & 36.

501. चक्षुषासन्नकृष्टार्थकानंस्यादन्तरेव हि ।

Ibid., S1.176.

502. मनो यात्रा तु जीवस्य यात्राकालेपरं भवेत् ।

अन्तःकरणमेतत्सादन्तःकार्यकरं हि तत् ॥

Ibid., p.30. S1.179.

The mind that gains the knowledge of the Lord and of Vaikuntha, cannot go to Vaikuntha, whereas it cognizes the presence of Lord inside and gains the knowledge of Him. Even at the down of direct cognition of the Lord (Aparoksajñana), mind need not go out of the body (to the Vaikuntha). So moving of mind out of the body is possible with soul where there is no return of the soul to the same.

503. अतो ब्रानवदज्ञानमात्तरं साक्षिणो बलात् ।

स्कदेशत्वमनयो नाशयनाशक्योर्ध्वम् ॥

Y.M., S.S., p.30, S1.180.

504. अनादिमाययासुप्तो यदाजीवः प्रबुद्धयते ।

Māṇḍ. Up. (Goudapāda Kārikā) I.16.

Q. Y.M., S.S.P. S1.182.

504A. संचिदाश्रयत्वैनैवात्मनः प्रत्यक्षत्वम्, न तु कर्मत्वम्,

कर्मकृत्यभावस्य भिन्नाश्रयत्वनियमात्, अतः आह-

यो पिण्डाहकरूपेणसिद्धिं सवसु वृत्तिषु । बुवाणः,

कर्मभावेन नेम प्रत्यक्षमिच्छति ॥

Anantakrishna Sastri, N.S. & Ramamurthi Sastri :

'Nyāyacandrikā of Anandapūrṇamunīndra with com. G.O.M.L,  
Madras. 1959.'

505. परमते कर्तृकर्मभावविरोधांगीकारात् प्रमेये ब्रह्मणि

प्रमातृत्वं न जीवैक्षेनापि नेतुं शक्यते ॥

Bh.Vi.com.on., Y.M., S.S., p.31b.

506. न्येत्सर्वैक्यतस्मर्व । अस्तव्यस्तमभूत्तव ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.31b, S1.184.  
 विवादपदमज्ञानं ज्ञातृपुंनिष्ठं ज्ञानसमानाश्रयत्वात् ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on.Y.M., S.S., p.31b,
- 506A. शुक्लिकाद्ब्रानं रजताद्धुपादानम् । तस्मिन् सत्यैव  
 तददर्शनात् । तदन्यस्योपादानत्वात्सम्भवात् ।  
 .... नियमेनाङ्गानदशायामनुभूयमानस्य  
 तदुपादानकत्वत्यैव वक्तव्यत्वाच्य ।  
 Narayanaswami Sastri 'Nr̄simhamiśra' Vedāntatattvaviveka  
 with coms., Oriental Research Institute, Mysore-1955,  
 Pp.473 & 474.
507. अतो जगत्सर्जनार्थमपि नाङ्गानमिष्यते ।  
 ...  
 मायी मायाधीश्वरत्वादगोमान्गोपालको यथा ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.31b, S1.186.
508. जीवस्तु मायया सुष्टत्वान्नस्वानन्दादि वीक्षते ॥  
 मायाभावे सतीक्षेत तस्माज्जीवा प्रितैवसा ।  
Ibid, p.31, S1.187.
509. एवमङ्गानमप्यानन्दानुभवप्रतिबन्धकमप्यहमिति  
 स्वरूपमात्रानुभवे न प्रतिबन्धकमिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M.S.S., p.31.  
 सा सत्याप्रकृतेरश्वभूता जीवेषु तिष्ठति ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.31, S1.189.
510. जीवस्याच्छादिका त्वेका परस्याच्छादिका परा ।  
 द्वयं जीवगतं नित्यं हरिस्तुभ्यमोचकः ॥  
Ibid, p.32b, S1.191.

See also;

अनान्ये प्रकृती दुष्टे नृषु प्रास्ताविं स्थिते ।  
स्वगुणाच्छादिकात्वेका परमाच्छादिकापरा ॥  
स्वगुणाच्छादिकां हत्वा परमाच्छादिकां परः ।  
व्याधुदय मोक्षपदवीं ददाति पुरुषोत्तमः ॥

Madhva, Bhāgavat Tātparya. (Sarvamūl agranthāḥ, Vol. 3) p. 561.

511. निश्चेन निबद्धान्त्रिर्नहि राजाविमोक्षः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p. 32b, Sī. 192.
512. धाम्ना स्वेन सदानिरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमही ॥ Bhāg-I-1-1.  
सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहीति भगवतो निरस्तकुहकत्वोक्तुया  
परं केवलं तामपि कुहकविधास्य मायां नोरीचकुरितिसम्बन्धः ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on. Y.M., S.S., p. 32.
513. स्वदोषाच्छादनायाल्पो निर्दिष्ट्वपि तं वदेत् ।  
जीवसम्पदज्ञानं ब्रह्मण्यपि न किं जगुः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p. 36, Sī. 196.  
स्वस्याङ्गानित्येनागतैच्य परिहाराय ब्रह्मण्यज्ञानं  
जगुः । न तु प्रमाणबलादिति भावः ॥  
Bh.Vi., Com.on. Y.M., S.S., p. 32.
514. मामहं न विजानामि मां जानाम्यहमित्यपि ।  
सर्वस्यानुभवात्स्वस्य विषयोपि स्वयं भवेत् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p. 33, Sī. 201.
- 514A. असतः फलस्य उत्पादकम् कर्म । ...  
कर्म अस्माभिः इतिकर्तव्यसायुक्तं फलसाधनं दृष्टम् ।  
Kevalanandasaraswati, 'Mīmāṃsākōṣa' Vol. III, p. 1395.  
परतमवेत्त्रियापलशालि । ... । यथा देवदतः  
ग्रामं गच्छतीत्यादौ ग्रामः कर्म ।  
Jhalakikar Bhimacarya, 'Nyāyakosā' p. 207.
515. परस्मिन्समवेता या क्रिया तत्फलशालियत् ।  
Ibid, Sī. 202.

515A. Advaitins slip into self-contradiction because they declare difference between Karma, Kartr and Bhāva in one place and negate the difference in another place.

In the Advaita, Brahman is Svaprakāśa. It cannot realize itself. It will not become an object of Its knowledge. If it becomes an object of knowledge, then they are supposed to accept the difference between the two. They say that Brahman is the substratum of knowledge. It has the cognition as being the substratum of knowledge and never as being an object of knowledge.

संविद्वाश्रयत्वेनैवात्मनः प्रत्यक्षत्वम्,

न तु कर्मत्वम्, कर्मकृत्भावस्य भिन्नाश्रयत्वनियमात् ।

See Supra:

In defence of Svaprakāśatva of Brahman, Advaitins do not wish to have the relation of subject and object.

If the subject, the object and the action are considered to be same then the Advaita, unlike Dvaita has to accept the Pramātrtva and the like of Sākṣin in Brahman. But in the Dvaita it is the Viśesa with the help of which one and the same can be the Subject and Object for one and the same action. The Advaita, not desirous of admitting Pramātrtva etc, of Saksin, prefer the difference between Karma, Kartr and Bhava. Whereas in defending the Svaprakasa view, the Advaita denies the above mentioned view of relation.

It is to be noted clearly that, the denial of relation of subject and object by the Advaitins is also in defence of their view of superimposition. Since they declare that the subject-object relation (Jñāna-Jñeyarupa-relation) cannot be applied and attributed to Brahma. If something might be real as an object, then only the said relation would be possible. As everything is Mithyā and superimposed the above mentioned relation cannot be talked of.

Thus, the Advaita accepting the view of difference between Karma, Kartr and Bhāva, is similar to the view-of that of Prabhākaras. And, the view of disregarding the very relation is similar to the view of that of Bhāttas.

See for details:

Chatterji and Datta; 'An Introduction to Indian Philosophy'

Pp:

516.

ग्रामस्थधनपूर्वर्थिष्ठापितरेव प्रयोजनम् ।  
न येत्पदे पदे पुंसः क्रिययास्याद्विभागवान् ।  
पूर्वपूर्वदेशसंयोगशाली स्यादुत्तरोपि च ।  
त्पदुक्तलक्षणे न स्यादिष्यत्वं तयोरपि ॥  
अतः स्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषस्य हि कश्चन ॥

Y.M.S.S Pp.345 & 34. Slokas 206, 207 and 208.

517.

तथा च परस्मवेतक्रियाफलशालित्वं घटे अव्याप्तत्वात्  
न विषयलक्षणमित्यर्थः । अतस्त्वरूपसम्बन्धविषय एव  
विषयत्वं सर्वैः वाच्यम् । स च स्वरूपे सुतराँ घटते  
इति कुतो न ज्ञानस्य स्वकर्मत्वम् ।

Bh.Vi.com.on Y.M., S.S., p.34 & 35b.

518.

ज्ञानस्य विषयत्वं तज्ज्ञाततास्यान्न चापरा ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.35b, S1.210.

518A.

स्वयमेवात्मनात्मानं वेत्थत्वं पुरुषोत्तम ।  
Bhagavadgītā, X-15.

अत्र स्वयमेवेत्युक्त्या स्वस्यैव कर्तृत्वं, आत्मानं  
इत्युक्त्या स्वस्यैव कर्मत्वम् ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on Y.M., S.S.p.

519. ज्ञानं पृथक्पराण्डेयमिति बाह्यार्थीस्थले ।

नान्तरे यन्मनोज्ञाने द्वेयपृथक्परस्तव ॥

Y.M., S.S., p.35, SI.215.

ज्ञानरूपे तु वस्तुनि आत्मादौ स्वस्यैव ज्ञानता द्वेयता च ....।

Bh.Vi.com.on., Y.M., S.S., p.36b.

ज्ञानरूपं तु यद्वस्तु स्वेनापिद्वेयमेव तत् ।

Y.M., S.S., 36b, SI.217.

519A. Viśesa:

"It is a differentiating or pluralising agency which serves at the same time to exhibit the pluralities as flowing centripetally towards a given object which happens to occupy the focus of attention on account of a dominant pragmatic interest at the moment. It renders possible the validity of countless viewpoints while the object itself retains its unity, independence and integrality".

"The function of Viśeṣas in Madhva's philosophy, is not merely to distinguish, but to unify the part and the whole, and to render a distinction of reference..." "It is Svanirvahaka, self-explicable, self-contained and self-related".

Sharma, B.N.K., 'Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya' Pp.48 & 56.

520. अवान्तर विशेषण स्वस्य क्रियाकर्मभाव

घटना इति भावः ।

स्वमेकस्यैवात्मनः स्वज्ञानप्रयत्नदशायां कर्मत्वं च ।

Bh.Vi., Com.on.Y.M., S.S., p.37b.

520A. स्वयं प्रकाशत्वमखंडवस्तुनः

स्वभावसिद्धं श्रुतियुक्तिनिश्चितम् ॥

Shastri S.K. Sadananda & Pratyaktattvacintāmanib. with com., Achyutagranthamala Karyalaya, Kasi - Samvat.1988 p.305.

521. अन्यानजानन्नप्यन्धो जानात्यहमितिस्फुटं ।  
 स्वपरज्ञानशून्धो सौ घटस्यादथवा पटः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.40b, S1.299.  
 असौ मुक्तिदशायां विद्मानः परमात्मा स्वपर-  
 ज्ञानशून्धः मुक्तात्प्रदेव परज्ञानशून्धः स्वावेद्य-  
 त्वादेव स्वज्ञानशून्धश्च जात इति ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., S.S., p.40b.
522. ज्ञानस्वरूपतामात्रं व्यवहारे प्रयोजकम् ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.40, S1.244.
- 522A. “बलमानन्द ओंजश्च सहोजानमनाकुलम् ।  
 स्वस्पाण्येव जीवस्य व्यज्यन्ते परमाद विभोः ॥”  
 इति गौप्यवनश्रुतिः ।  
Madhva. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (II-iii-30)  
 (Sarvamūlagraṇthāḥ) p.181.  
 अनुभूयते सुखमनन्तस्यैः  
 सकलैरलम्पतिपदं सततम् ।  
Narayana Pandita' Sumadhva vijaya' p.243, Ch.XI, S1.24.  
 यत्रानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुद प्रमुद आसते ।  
 स्वधा च यत्र त्रुष्टिश्च तत्र माममृतं कृधि ॥  
 (RV.IX-113-1).  
 523. न चेदपुरुषार्थत्वं मुक्तेस्याद्बुक्तवर्त्मना ।  
 तस्यात्स्वरूपानन्दस्य नानुभूतिः कथं तदा ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.41b, S1.248.
524. स्वगोचरत्वमेवातो वक्तव्यास्वप्रकाशता ।  
 आनर्थक्यं न चेन्मुक्तेस्त्वप्रकाशपदस्य च ॥  
 स्वस्य प्रकाशो यस्य स्यात्स्वप्रकाशं तदेव हि ॥  
Ibid, p.41b, Slokas 249 & 250.

524A. Supra, Fn. 518A.

524B. तस्य इन्द्रजालकुशलस्येव माययोपादानत्वो पपत्तेः ।...  
ब्रह्मणो मायाशबलितस्य मूलप्रकृतिता हित्रौती ।  
...  
अतो मायाशबलितं ब्रह्मैव मूलप्रकृतिः ।

Sāstrigal Jagadīśvāra, Kalyāṇasundara Ānandānubhava'  
Nyāyaratnadīpāvalih with com. Vēdanta Viveka by Ānandagiri.  
G.O.M.L, Madras 1961, Pp. 89, 90, 92, 93.

525. नित्यशुद्धं तु यद्ब्रह्म परब्रह्म तदेव हि ।  
नित्यशुद्धश्चभगवान्नित्यमुक्तो ममप्रभुः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p41b, S1.251.  
नित्यमुक्तत्वं च सर्वदासंसाररहितयेतनत्वम् ।  
नित्यशुद्धत्वं च अज्ञानभ्रमादिदोषरहित येतनत्वम् ।  
मुक्तस्याज्ञानादि दोषान्यत्वं सर्वादिसम्प्रतिपन्नम् ॥  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., S.S., p.41.

525A. तवब्रह्मत्वविद्याख्यदोषेण कलिलं सदा ।  
अनादिकालमारम्भ्य देहेदेहे च संसरेत् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.41, S1.252.

526. ब्रह्मत्वमाग्रहादेव जीवयैतन्यमेव तत् ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.41, S1.253.  
नहि पादे वैदनावश्नन्यत्र तदभाववान् पुरुषो  
वैदनान्मुक्तः इत्युच्यते ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., S.S. p.41.

527. द्वासुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया  
समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।  
तयोरन्यः पिष्ठालं स्वाद्वत्ति  
अनशनन्नन्यो अभियाकशीति ॥  
Mund. Up. III-I-1.

528. In the 'Samsara', both Jiva and the Lord abide in the same 'Prakrta' body. But, Jiva enjoys the fruits of his deeds may be good or bad, Whereas the Lord without eating the fruit of any action enshines himself. In the state of liberation also, as Jiva has 'Aprakrta' body, the Lord lives with him. There also, it is the Jiva who enjoys the limited bliss of his own and not the Lord.. Thus, in the both states, Lord is unaffected and unchangeable. He is eternally Paripurna in Himself and enjoys unlimited bliss of His own forever.

529. बन्धमिथ्यात्वतोमुक्तमस्तु बद्धं कथं भवेत् ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.42b, S1.256.

530. अतो बद्धोपरस्तज्ज्ञानात्यमुक्तोपि चापरः ।  
इत्येव सर्वथावाच्यं इत्थं सूत्रकृदाह हि ॥  
Ibid, p.42, S1.258.

530A. See; स्थित्यदनाभ्याम् च ।      Br.Sū.(I-iii-7)

530B. Bhāgavat.XI-xi-1.

531. सत्त्वं रजत्तम इति गुणा जीवस्य नैवमे ।  
इतित्रिगुणशून्यत्वं स्वस्योक्तवा हरिरंजसा ।  
स्वाधीनगुणतो बन्धो जीवस्यैवेति शंसति ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.42, S1.261.

531A. Infra, fn.532.

532. बद्धो मुक्त इति ह्याख्या गुणतो मे न वस्तुतः ।  
गुणस्यमायामूलत्वान्नमे मोक्षो न बन्धनम् ॥  
मदधीनगुणाज्जीवे बद्धाख्या न स्वभावतः ।  
इति पूर्वार्थ वाक्यार्थो मे धनाज्जीवतीति वत् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p43b, S1.262 & 263.

532A. श्रीधरस्वामि ...।

•नित्यमुक्तो नित्यबद्ध एव एवेति मे भ्रमः  
इति यदुक्तं तत्त्वं वस्तुतो विरोधः पृतीतितो वा  
नायः, बन्धमोक्षोवस्त्वत्वाभावादित्याह बद्धो मुक्त इति द्वाभ्याम् ।  
Shastri Krishnashankara, 'Srimadbhāgavatamahāpurāṇam'  
Sri Bhagavat vidyapeetha Divyagiri Sola, Ahmedabad, 1973,  
p.482.

533. कथंचित् बन्धमात्रस्य मिथ्यात्वसम्बवेऽपि बन्धनिवृत्तिरूपमुक्तत्वस्य  
मिथ्यात्वासम्बवेन न वस्तुत इत्यस्य अस्मदुक्तरीत्यवार्थः त्वयापि  
वक्तव्यः .....। अस्मन्मते तु बन्धस्य बन्धधर्वसदशाया-  
मभावेन बन्धधर्वस्य बन्धदशायामभावेन उभयोरप्यसदातनत्वा-  
दस्वाभाविकत्वमिति ।

Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., S.S., p.43.

534. प्रकृतिमूला हि गुणाः । अप्राकृते मयि प्रकृतिमूल-  
गुणाभावेन बन्धो बन्धान्मोक्षश्च कथं स्यादित्यर्थः ।  
गुणस्य मायामूलत्वात् मायायाश्च मायांव्युदस्य  
यित्रष्कृत्या इति श्रुत्या मध्यभावात् तन्मूलगुणाभावः ।  
गुणाभावे तन्मूलबन्धाभावः । बन्धाभावे च  
प्रतियोगिसत्तापूर्वक बन्धधर्वसाख्य मोक्षाभावश्च ।  
अतो नित्यमुक्त एवाहम् । जीवस्तुबद्धेति भावः ।  
Ibid, pp.43, 44b.

534A. Mund.Up. III-I-1.

535. स्वभिन्नांशस्य जीवाख्य खण्ड्यैकस्यकेवलम् ।  
बन्धस्य बन्धान्मोक्षश्च न स्वस्यैत्याह स प्रभुः ।  
अतो जीवस्य बद्धत्वं मुक्तत्वं व परात्मनः ।  
नित्यमुक्तत्वमेवेति ....।  
Y.M., S.S., p.44, 45b, Slokas 267 & 269.

535A. तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् । (Br.Sū.I-vi-3)

तदधीनत्वाच्याव्यक्तत्वादीनां तस्यैवाव्यक्तत्व-  
परावरत्वादि कर्मर्थवत् ।

"यदधीनोगुणोन्यस्य तदगुणी सो मिधीयते ।

यथा जीवः परात्मेति यथाराजा जयीत्यपि ।"

इति च स्कान्दे ॥

Madhva .Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, p.48.

536. स्वातन्त्र्यगुणतो बद्धाद्याख्यां व्याख्यान्ति मे बुधाः ।

बन्धादिवस्तुतस्तत्तन्नाम बन्धोज्ञितस्य मे ।

Y.M., S.S, p.47b, S1.284.

यथा राजाजयीत्यत्र भट्टनिष्ठजयनियामकतया  
राज्ञि जयशब्दप्रयोगः । एवं जीवनिष्ठबन्धादि  
नियामकतया भावति बद्धुःखादि शब्दप्रयोगा-  
दितिभावः ।

Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., p.47.

537. अस्वतन्त्रस्य जीवस्य बद्धाद्याख्या तु वस्तुतः ।

इति सूचिता चात्र मुक्तामुक्तदितोदिता ॥

Y.M., S.S, p.47, S1.286.

538. इत्थं प्रमाया विष्णः प्रमिनन्तीति च श्रूतौ ।

श्रूतो बन्धः कर्थं मिथ्या सत्त्वं हि ज्ञानदो गुणः ॥

Ibid, p.48, S1.290.

539. प्रमातारोपि बन्धस्य प्रमिन्वन्ति न ते हरिम् ।

अतो हयविद्या बन्धः इत्युक्तं न मृषात्वतः ॥

Y.M., S.S, p.49b, S1.292.

540. अजोनुबद्धस्तगुणैर्न वेदत्वां गुणात्परम् ।

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति भवन्ति प्रकृतेगुणाः ॥

सप्त प्राकृताः प्रोक्ता आब्रह्मस्थावरादयः ॥

Ibid, p.50, S1.294 (Bhāg-X-40-3)

540A. अनादिकालतः सर्वं दोषजीना गुणाधिकाः ।  
 सर्वजीवशेषयो ये तेहिवायुत्प्रमाणनुयुः ।  
 ऋजवो नाम ये देवा देवानामपि देवताः ॥  
 Madhva, 'Mahābhāratātapatrāyanirṇaya' (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ)  
 Vol.II, p.460, (h.32, Slokas 72 & 73).

540B. "अपूर्णतादि भावो वा द्वःखं वाचास्ति किंचन ।  
 मुक्तस्य पारतन्त्रयेऽपि तारतम्येष्यत् सुखी " ति च मृतिः ।  
 Madhva, Nyāyavivaraṇa, (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) p.209.

541. Bhagavadgītā-IV-14, & IX-9.  
 इति कृष्णेन गीतायां कर्मबद्धत्वमात्मनः ।  
 जीवानां गुणबद्धत्वं चोक्तं वाक्यद्वयेन हि ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.51b, Slokas 299,300 and 201.

541A. Rgveda X-90-2'.

542. सोमृतस्याभ्यस्थेशो मर्त्यमन्नं यदत्यगात् ।  
 परान्तकाले सर्वेऽपि विमुच्यन्ते परामृतात् ॥  
Bhāg.II-6-17.  
 उतामृतत्वस्थेशानो यदन्येनातिरोहति ॥  
Rgveda.X-90.2.  
 संसारिणामीश्वरत्वान्मुक्तानामपि श्वरः ।  
 मुक्ताश्च नित्यमुक्तान नित्यमुक्तस्तदापिराद् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.51b, S1.304.

543. मुक्तोपि बद्धो यस्तस्मान्नित्यबद्धोप्यसौ भवेत् ॥  
Ibid, p.51, S1.305.

544. There is difference of opinion among scholars regarding the attainment of the goal (liberation) by Madhyamajivas. Others say that these souls remain in Samsara eternally enjoying mixed experience. But Vadiraja states that they too get released of Samsara. That means they also attain prescribed goal (state) but they will have the mixed experience of pleasure and displeasure there also.

नित्यसंसारिणो ये तु मध्यमास्ते प्रकीर्तिताः ।

सदा संसूतिबद्धावच गुणदोषोभ्यात्मकाः ॥ 70

Anandatirthacarya, 'Sattatvaratnamala' with com.,

T.R.Krishnacharya: Madhva Vilas Book Depot, Madras, 1918. p.29.

545. ब्रह्मवदा मोक्षवदा यन्नित्यं तत्कर्थं मृषा ।

Y.M., S.S., p.52, B. S1.308.

546. अनुत्तीर्णस्त्वयं पंकात्किमन्योत्तारको भवेत्

यदि बद्धं परं ब्रह्म कः स्याद्बन्धस्य मोक्षः ॥

Ibid, p.52, S1.313.

546A. तत्रापि क्रमयोगेन ज्ञानाधिक्यात् समीपगाः ।

सालोक्यं च सरूपत्वं सामीप्यं योगमेव च ।

... स्युजः परमात्मानं प्रविश्य च बहिर्गताः ।

Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagrāntihāḥ) pp.226 & 227.

... सालोक्यं देति । समानलोकस्थित्वं सालोक्यं

समीपस्थित्वं सामीप्यं चतुर्भुजत्वादिरूपसाम्यं

सारूप्यं भगवद्ग्रन्थेशः सायुज्यं योगस्व च ... ।

Magadi Ranganathachar. Madhva, 'Brahmasūtrabhāṣyam' with

Dīpikā of Jagannatha, Bhāṣyadīpikāprakāśana samīti' 1965,

Part-IV, p.114.

As it is said these four types of liberation are wholly concerned and conditioned by the fact of gradation in the acquisition of true knowledge. Sālokya is that

...

...

attaining which the liberated dwell in similar world.  
(abode of the Lord) Sārūpya means liberation with privilege of having similar form of the Lord such as four arms and others. Sāmīpya means dwelling in close proximity with the Lord. (It does not negate others' having the relation of the Lord). Then, Sāyujya liberation is that, which could be attained only by great gods wherein the liberated, entering the particular limb of the Lord enjoy their own bliss.

547. किंचेदं शबलत्वंते किं मायाशबलत्वतः ।  
उत सर्वेश्वरत्वादि सदगुणाम्भोधिसम्भवात् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.53b, S1.318.
548. अङ्गने जीवगत्वस्यैवोक्तत्वाच्य न तन्मतम् ।  
Ibid, p.53b, S1.320.
549. Bhāgavata -X-29-6, I-7-23 & I-7-24.  
इति भागवते प्रोक्तं चतुर्मुखोक्तिः ।  
कृष्णस्य बन्धकीभूतमाया दूरत्वनिर्णयात् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p. Slokass 348 & to 351.
550. न यत्र मायेत्याद्युक्त्या यत्त्वोक्तोपि न मायिकः ।  
कथं मायामयाकारस्तत्त्वोक्तो भवेद्दद ॥  
Ibid, 56, S1.352.
- 550A. The Māyā is defined and understood in so many ways as shown below. But it should be borne in mind that nowhere falsity is attributed to Māyā.  
मायांतु प्रकृतिं विद्धि मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।  
Swet.Up.IV-10.  
महामायेत्यविद्यति प्रकृतिर्मोहिनीति च ।  
प्रकृतिवत्सिनेत्येव तवेच्छानन्तकथयते ॥  
Madhva, Viṣṇutatvanirṇaya, (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) Vol.5,p.30.

अत्र मायाभव्दो "दृष्ट्वा स्त्रियं देवमायामि"  
इत्यादाविव प्रतिबन्धकराकितमत्परः ।

Arakeri Jayacharya, Viśnūtīrtha; 'Bhāgavatasāroddhāra',  
Dharwad, 1981, p.210.

माया नारायणीशानी । - X-2-12. Bhāg.

माया बलं भगवतो जन ईश पश्येत् III-9-9. Bhāg.

मायां मदीयां तरतिस्म दुःस्त्यजाम् IV-20-32. Bhāg.

माया हिंसा च मत्सरः । VII-15-43. Bhāg.

551. शक्तिसौनुदर्थबौधार्दियोगाच्छ्लाद्यतरो हरिः ।

ज्ञानेनाज्ञानदोषान्यद्दूरे द्रावयेत् प्रभुः ॥

Y.M., S.S., p.53, S1.369.

552. यदित्परम्परानस्य नाज्ञानप्रतिकूलता ।

तदा मुक्तस्य चाज्ञानात् पुनः संसारिता पतेत् ॥

अतस्त्वरूपं ज्ञानेन ज्वलज्ज्वालोज्ज्वलेन हि ।

अज्ञानोच्याटने वाच्यं यत्संगान्माससोपि चित् ॥

Ibid, Pp.59b & 59, Slokas, 370, & 374.

552A. Bhāg. I-7-23,

553. नित्यमुक्तत्पश्चद्विव्यनात्क्षवास्य दोषिता ।

Y.M., S.S., p.60b, S1.376.

अस्य परमात्मनः ... विद्यामयो यस्तु तु

नित्यमुक्तः, अविकारोक्षरशुद्धः इत्यादि

व्यनात् दोषिता क्व ।

Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., S.S, p.60b.

553A. अकर्मोक्तात्मपदप्रमादात् ।

संसारबन्धः प्रविभाति सद्गत् ।

कर्तृत्वमध्यस्तमपास्य शुद्ध

स्वरूपबोधेन विमुक्तिमेति ॥

... प्रमादादज्ञानकृतावरणात् संसारे बधनातीति संसारबन्धः कर्तृत्वादिः....

तस्मात् शुद्धत्वरूपः कर्तृत्वादिधर्म विनिर्मुक्तः आत्मा .... ।

Sāstri K., Sadananda, Pratyaktattvacintāmanih with com., Achyuta granthamala Karyalaya, Kasi, Samvat 1988, Pp.2 & 3.

554. क्रियावेशमुसंगेन कर्तृत्वं न यितो यदि ।  
 तर्हि इष्टिश्च चिन्नस्यात्सा धात्वर्थं क्रिया यतः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.60b, S1.377.

554A. निष्क्रियं निष्कलं शान्तम् ।  
Swet.Up.VI-19.

555. परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैवश्चयते स्वाभाविकी  
 ज्ञानबलक्रिया च । Swet-Up.VI-8.  
 परास्येति श्रुतिःप्राह सद्ज्ञानबलक्रियाः ।  
 ...श्रुतिर्निष्ठतीक्ष्णो द्वे पुण्यपापाभिधक्रिये ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.60, S1.379.

555A. Swet.Up.VI-8.

555B अशब्दमस्यर्थमरूपम् । Katha.Up.III-15.

Sahkara understands the terms Asabdam etc, as that which is not an object of the quality of ether (Akasa - matter) and the like. There is nothing wrong in understanding this and negating the association of material effects or qualities of five great elements:

See; Subramanya Sastri,S. Upaniṣadbhāṣyam, Mahesh Research Institute, Varanasi, 1979, Pp.98 & 99,

But the passage not only aims at negating the material association or effect but the aim of the passage is to declare and glorify Brahman an object of spiritual declaration. That means He is the prime-object of defect less declaration or expression, which is the Apauruseya and eternal Veda. Here, the fact that Brahman being an object of expression etc, is not at all discarded and denied.

Cf: ○ लोकसिद्धार्थनाम्नः स राहित्यान्नामवर्जितः ।

अरूपोऽप्राकृतत्वाच्य सत्त्वाभावात्तथाऽगुणः ॥

अक्रमाऽक्लिष्टकारित्वान्नित्यत्वादज एव च ।

अलौकिकार्थसन्नामनन्तत्वाज्जनार्दनः ॥

Madhva. Bhāgavatātātparya (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) Vol.3,p.510.

556. अशब्दश्रुत्यबोधयत्वे मुख्यार्थाबदतागता ।  
 यद्याबदश्रुतेरर्थः सर्वथा शब्ददूरता ॥  
 तर्हीयं च श्रुतिस्तत्र मानं नेति जितं परैः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.61b, Sllokas 383 & 384.

557. यद्यस्पर्शश्रुतेरर्थः सर्वथास्पर्शश्रून्यता ।  
 न स्पृशेत्तद्दर्शविद्यापि जितं त्वत्पृतिवादिभिः ॥  
Ibid, p.61, S1.386.

557A. Cf :  अरूपोऽप्राकृतत्वाच्य सत्याभावात्तथाऽगुणः ।  
Madhva. Bhāgavatatatparya (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ, Vol.3) p.510.

558. सर्वथाल्पराहित्ये रूपमर्णश्रुतिर्गता ॥  
Ibid, p.62b, S1.390.

558A. Sukla Yajurveda Samhitā Ch.35-17.

559. आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तादिति वैदिकी ।  
 वागविद्या निवृत्तौ च रूपमाह परात्मनः ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.62, S1.393.

560. युक्त्यापि तमसः परस्तादित्युक्ताप्राकृतप्रदेशेषिपि  
 रूपस्पशाकिराणां साधितत्वात् ।  
Bh.Vi.Com.on.Y.M., S.S., p.62.

561. सुखरूपं हि यद्ब्रह्म ज्ञानरूपं न मृणमयम् ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.63b, S1.396.

562. एवं महाकायस्य नारायणस्य असौ कायः  
 कोटिब्रह्माण्डविग्रह इति वासुदेवसहस्रनामोक्त-  
 कोटिब्रह्माण्डाश्रयकायः चिन्मय एव व्याप्त-  
 परमात्मस्वरूपज्ञानानन्दात्मक एव ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.Y.M., S.S., p.63b, & 63.

- 562A. अतः कशब्दोक्तसुखस्पत्वात् अथपयगताविति  
 धातोङ्गनिरूपत्वाच्य काय इति युक्तिं हिशब्देन सूचयति ।  
Bh.Vi.com.on.y.m.,SSp.63.  
 Ref: Apte V.S, 'The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary,  
 Motilal Banarasidass, 1978, p.323.

- 562B. सर्वं शपदोक्तसुखं रपदोक्तलीडाँ ईरपदोक्तज्ञानं  
 यादाय श्रुतौ शरीरमिति चोच्यत इति दृष्टव्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi. com.on. Y.M.,S.S, p.63.  
 Ref: Apte V.S, 'The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary,  
 Pp.252, 790, 902.

563. सुखज्ञानसुखस्पर्शसुखगन्धसुखाकृतिः ।  
 नयादि स्वशिखान्तं च सुखतज्रोमयः प्रभुः ॥  
Y.M.,S.S, p.63,SI.400.

564. सर्वथाशारीराभावे वागुच्यारणस्यैवायोगा दलौकिकशारीरोच्यरितैव  
 वाक् यथा शारीरवाक् तथाऽलौकिकशारीरेषु भगवद्वपेषु अशारीरता  
 युक्तैव ॥  
Bh.Vi.,Com.on.Y.M.,S.S, p.64b.

- 564A. Supra fns,527 & 528.  
 See: द्वासुपर्णा- Mund. Up. (III-I-1) (Atharvāṇa.Up)  
M.Bhāṣya -  
 स्वादुवत् सर्वदा तिति । नत्वस्वादेव ।  
 "तस्येदाहुः पिष्पलं स्वाद्येत तन्नोन्नशाद् यःपितरं न वेदं"  
 इत्यज्ञानां स्वादुनिषेधात् । जीवाद्येव नाशनाति भगवान् ।  
 न तु नाशनत्येव । "तस्येदाहुः पिष्पलं स्वादु" इत्युवतत्वात् ।  
 "स्वातन्त्र्येणैव भोक्तृत्वाद् दुःखाभीगाच्य सर्वदा ।  
 अभीक्ता चैव भोक्ता च भगवन् विष्णुरव्ययः" इति तत्त्वसारे ।"  
 Madhva, Mundakopaniṣadbhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) Vol.I,  
 p.496.

- 564B. Supra, fn,553 A.

565. विगिष्टस्य हि कर्तृत्वे विशेष्यस्यापि कर्तृता ।  
वस्तुतः कर्तृतां कोवा वक्त्यनात्मनि युक्तिमान् ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.64, S1.404.

565A. Pāṇini Sūtra I-iv-54.

566. मत्यैर्वर्त्ये येहस्वतत्त्वः कर्तृत्योहुर्विपश्चितः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.64, S1.405.

567. जीव एव तथा कर्ता तत्सर्वं कारणान्तरम् ।  
मनो द्विकारणं तस्य देहोधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥  
कर्तृत्वे कोसि उदायादी मायापि कारणान्तरम् ॥  
Ibid, Pp.64, 65b, Slokas 407 & 408.

568. कालप्रकृतिकस्यैस्त्वैव कुरुते जगत् ।  
Ibid, p.66b, S1.415.

569. हरेस्तु नित्यमुक्तस्य देहसर्वत्र सर्वदा ।  
बलज्ञानप्रभासौख्य सौन्दर्यादिगुणात्मकः ॥  
Ibid, P.68b, S1.429.

569A. नायमात्मा प्रवयेनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न  
बहुना श्रुतेन । यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्त-  
स्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते ततुं स्वाम् ॥  
Mund.Up.IV-3.

569B. Supra fn.510.

570. तनुशशरीरमेवेयं रूपमात्रं न वै तनुः ।  
स्वामित्युक्त्या तनुस्ता य स्वरूपैवेति तिष्ठयति ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.68, Slokas, 432 & 433.

571. अतश्चुत्यर्थं तत्त्वज्ञास्तनुं मुक्तपरात्मनोः ।  
चिदानन्दमयीं प्राहुर्नप्राहुर्जडेहितां ॥  
Ibid, p.69b, S1.436.
572. अतस्तया शब्दलता न विद्वज्जनसम्मता ।  
Ibid, p.69, S1.440.
573. ददतीशं बलं च त्वच्छबलत्वं बहिःक्षिपेत् ।  
बिन्दुमात्राधिकत्वेषि प्रबलो दुर्बलो क्षिपेत् ॥  
चित्रप्रकाशबलतः शब्दलो ब्राह्मनः प्रभुः ।  
Ibid, p.69 Slokas 441,442.
574. नान्तं न मध्यं न पुनस्तवादिं पश्यामि विश्वेश्वर विश्वरूप ।  
पश्यामि देवांस्तव देव देहे ...।  
Bhagavadgītā - XI-16, XI-15.
- 574A. Māyika means product of Māyā (Prakrti) or Avidyā.  
If the form of the Lord were to be product of Māyā,  
then it would never be extra-ordinary. The above cited  
passages promise that the form of the Lord is Aprakṛta  
(not Māyika).
575. अतः तत्यैव स्पस्य स्थूलतां सूक्ष्मतां च  
स्वगत्या भगवान् प्रदर्शयति ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., S.S, p.70.
576. अपरिच्छन्देहोयं पार्थपत्यक्षणोचरः ।  
परिच्छन्दनभवन्मायामयो नैवेति मे मतिः ॥  
Y.M., S.S, p.70, S1.448.
577. यं परमात्मानं श्रवणमननादिना प्रपन्नः शरणं प्राप्तः,  
यां मायां - मायैव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते  
इति वदनात् । यदा तद्भक्तोषि मायातरणसमर्थः  
तदा सुतरां स भगवानिति युक्तिरनेन सुचिता ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., S.S, p.71b.

578. प्रायो दग्धपत्राया या घज्जानोदये हृदि ।  
मायानिस्तरणोपायस्तोयं मायामयः किल ॥  
Y.M., S.S., p.71b, S1.451.

578A. ...  
तसैवं विदित्वा तिमूल्युभेति नान्यः पन्थाविद्वते अयनाय ।  
S.V.S., Ch.35-17.

579. सृष्टारं हि यं विदान्मुच्यते स किलाल्पकः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.71, S1.553.

579A. पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं ....। (Rv.90.2)  
यत् इदं वर्तमानं जगत् तत् सर्वं पुरुष एव ।  
Sontakke & Kashikar, 'Rgveda Samhitā' with com.of Sāyana  
N.S. Sontakke, Vaidikā Samsodhana Mandala, Poona, 1946, p.615.

580. मुक्तामुक्ताचितोरीशः कथं सर्वजडात्मकः ।  
Y.M., S.S., p.71 S1.474.

581. नित्यमुक्तश्चभगवान्परंब्रह्म स एव हि ।  
Ibid, p.83b, S1.524.

581A. श्रीश्च ते लक्ष्मीश्च ते पत्न्या अहोरात्रे पाश्वे  
रूपमश्विनौ व्यात्तम् । ....।  
S.Y.S.K.S., 35-22.  
श्रीः आश्रयणीया लक्ष्मीः धनकनकादिरूपा  
ऐश्वर्याभिमानिनी देवता, है परमात्मन् श्रीश्च  
लक्ष्मीश्च ते तव पत्न्यौ भायस्त्यानीयै च ....।  
Sharma Chintamani mishra' Sukla Yajurveda Samhitā with  
Sāyana Bhāṣya. Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya,  
Varanasi, 1978, p.311.

582. इत्थं सूक्तोक्तमहिमा यस्य सर्ववरस्य हि ।

Y.M., S.S., S1.527.

583. परब्रह्म स एको नारायण इति स्थितम् ॥

Y.M., S.S., p.83, S1.527.

584. साकारसुगुणश्रीशसेवकामृतपद्धतिः ।

नान्यस्य सेवा मौक्षस्य पन्थाइत्याह हि श्रुतिः ॥

Ibid, p.84b, S1.530.

584A. सत्यंज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । (Tait. Up. II-i-1)

शांकरभाष्म -

.....। सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्मेति ब्रह्मणो लक्षणार्थं वपक्यम् ।

सत्यादीनि हि त्रीणि विशेषणार्थानि पदानि विशेषयस्य ब्रह्मणः ।.....।

सत्यादिशब्दा न परस्परं सम्बद्धयन्ते परार्थत्वादिशेषार्थं हि ते । अत

एकैको विशेषणशब्दः परस्परं निरपेक्षो ब्रह्मशब्देन सम्बद्धयते । .....।

सत्यमिति यद्युपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्वपुं न व्यभिरति तत्सत्यं यद्युपेण निश्चितं

यत्तद्वपुं व्यभिरदनुतमित्युच्यते । अतोविकारो नृतं "वाचारम्भणं विकारो

नामधैर्यं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" एव सदेव सत्यमित्यवधारणादतः सत्यं ब्रह्मेति

ब्रह्मविकारान्निवर्तयति । अतः कारणत्वं प्राप्तं ब्रह्मणः । कारणस्य य

कारकत्वं, वस्तुतस्यामृद्दद्युच्यता च प्राप्ताऽत इदमुच्यते ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति ।

ज्ञानं इतिरवबोधो भावसाधनो ज्ञानशब्दो ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वात्सत्यानन्ताभ्यां

सह । .....। तत्र त्रिविधं ह्यानन्तर्यं देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्चेति ।

तद्यथा देशतो अनन्त आकाशो नहि देशतस्तस्य परिच्छेदोऽस्ति ॥ न तु

कालतश्चानन्तर्यं वस्तुतश्चाकाशस्य । कस्मात् कार्यत्वात् । नैवं ब्रह्मण

आकाशवत्कालतो प्यनन्तवत्त्वमकार्यत्वात् । कार्यं हि वस्तु कालेन

परिच्छिघते । अकार्यं च ब्रह्म तस्मात्कालतोऽपि अनन्तम् । तथा वस्तुतः ।

कथंपुनर्वस्तुतः आनन्तं सर्वनिन्त्यत्वात् भिन्नं हि वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरस्यान्तो भवति ।

.....। अतो वस्तुतोप्यानन्त्यम् । कथं पुनः सर्वनिन्त्यं ब्रह्मण इत्युच्यते,

सर्ववस्तुकारणत्वात् । सर्वेषां हि वस्तुनां कालाकाशादीनां कारणं ब्रह्म ।.....।

अतो निरतिशयमात्मन आनन्तर्यं देशतस्तथा कार्यत्वात् कालतस्तदिभन्नतत्व-

न्तराभावाच्यं वस्तुतो त एव निरतिशयसत्यत्वम् ।

Subramanyashastri S. 'Upaniṣad-bhāṣyam' Mahesh Research -  
Institute, Varanasi, 1979, Pp.443, 445, 446, 456 and 457.

585. सर्ववस्त्वात्मकत्वं च यदनन्तत्वमीरितं ।  
तदयुक्तम् मन्ये युक्तायुक्तविद्यारणे ॥  
*Vādirāja, Yuktimallikā (Y.M) Bhedasaurabha (B.S) p.1, S1.1.*  
तत्र वस्तुतोन्तराहित्यं नाम सकलवस्तुभेदराहित्य-  
मिति यदन्ति ।  
*Surottamatīrtha, Bhāvavilasini (Bh.Vi) com.on.Y.M., p.1.*
586. विभोस्तदणुरूपत्वं नित्यस्यानित्यरूपतां ।  
कथं पुनरसौ ब्रूयान्न हि स स्वात्मधातकः ॥  
*Y.M., B.S, p.2b, S1.5*
587. देशकालव्याप्ततोक्तया यत्तदिभन्नमभूत्पुरा ।  
कथंपुनर्वस्तुरूपात्तत एव तदेकता ॥  
*Y.M., B.S, p.2b, S1.6.*
588. देशकालान्तशून्यत्वं देशकाले च वर्तनम् ।  
यथा वस्त्वन्तशून्यत्वं तथा वस्तुषु वर्तनम् ॥  
*Ibid, p.2, S1.9.*
- 588A. बहुवस्त्वाश्रयत्वं वा भवेल्लोकनिर्दर्शनात् ।  
*Y.M., B.S, p.3b, S1.10.*
589. रत्नतोनन्तराहुर्यतोरत्नाकरं जनाः ।  
तथागुणानन्तता च स्यादगुणैःपूर्णिता हरेः ॥  
*Y.M., B.S, p.3b, S1.10.*
590. तत्सर्वदेशकालेषु सम्बन्धोनन्तता यथा ।  
समस्तगुणसम्बन्धो गुणानन्त्यं तथा विभोः ॥  
*Y.M., B.S, p.4b, S1.13.*
- 590A. सम्बन्धशब्द यथायोगं संयोगोद्वच्ययोस्तयोः ।  
*Ibid, p.4b, S1.15.*  
एवं च देशकालादिभिस्त्रभिरपि हरेराधाराधेयभाव  
स्वार्थोपि सम्बन्धः । स च क्वचिदाधारत्वं पूर्वकः ।  
क्वचिदाधेयत्वपूर्वं इति न नाम्नापि विशेषः ।  
*Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.4b,*

590B. Tait. Up. II-1.

590. महत्परम् चिद्रोधित्वादपि नैतदिहोयितम् ।

Y.M., B.S., p.4, S1.19.

591A. Bhāg. I-18-19.

592. अर्थद्वये न सन्देहः नूतीयार्थं हि संशयः ।  
अतो विशिष्य तं व्यासो निर्णयायान्वर्वर्णयत् ॥

Ibid., p.6b, S1.25.

वस्तुतस्तु व्याप्तित्वनिर्त्यत्वयोरपि गुणत्वात्  
गुणानन्त्यमेव अनन्तशब्दार्थः ।

Bh. Vi., com. on. Y.M., B.S., p.6b.

593. सूष्टित्वित्तिसंहारा इति त्रितयमपि सत्त्वम्।  
तदेतत्रितयं च जगतः प्रापयतीति सत्यशब्दोदितो  
भगवानिति समुदायार्थः ।

Ibid., p.7b.

593A. Supra. Fn. 584 A.

593B. अन्नाद् वै प्रजा प्रजायन्ते । . . . । अथो अन्नेनैव जीवन्ति । . . ।  
सर्वं वै तेऽन्नमाप्नुवन्ति ऋ ।

Tait. Up. II-2.

य एष भगवान् विष्णुर्भूतसृष्टा गुणाधिकः । . . . . ।

अतृत्वात् सर्वलोकानामन्नमित्युव्यते हरिः ।

उपजीव्यश्च भूतानामिति वाऽन्नं जनार्दनः ॥

Madhva. Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ Vol.1)  
p.529.

594. अतस्त्वेतरसर्वत्य सृष्टृता सत्यता भवेत् ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.7, S1.35.

594A. Tait. Up. II-4.

594B. Ibid., III-4.

595. पुनरन्नमयत्वोक्त्या महासंहृतोच्यते ।  
 अधेतित्त च भूतानीत्युक्तेसंहृतान्यता ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.7, S1.36.

595A. In the Dvaita, Kośa or sheath is not the primary meaning of the passages of Tait.Up. Unlike in the Advaita, (i) Annamaya etc, describe the greatness of the Lord as sole creator, protector and destroyer of the world. The suffix Mayat does not convey the sense of Vikāra as the Advaita holds, (ii) but means abundance:

प्रयुरं मय इत्युक्तं प्रयुरात्मा यतो हरिः ।

प्रयुरैः सेव्यते नित्यमतोऽन्नमय इरितः ॥

Madhva, Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagrānṭhāḥ. Vol.1), Pp.529 & 528.

The secondary meaning of the phrase is no doubt that it is the Kośa or sheath. Five Kośas [ ] that are gross as well as subtle, are present in each Jīva, and they are governed and controlled by the Lord with His five presiding forms - Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva and Nārāyaṇa. And these forms bless the Jīva and make him active for acting, enjoying knowing experiencing etc., Thus, He is prime-activating agent. Though, they fulfil different activities, they are not distinct. They are identical and perfect.

सर्वे पि पुरुषाकारा उत्तरात् पूर्वसम्भवः ।

उत्तरैः पूरिताः पूर्वे निर्विद्वत्वेन सर्वशः ॥

अत्तृत्वं च पृथेतृत्वं बोधो विविधेतृता ।

आनन्दश्च यतः पृथिव्यस्ततो न्नादिमयाः स्मृताः ॥

अत्त्यादिदात्ते प्रत्येकं सर्वसर्वगुणा अपि ॥

Madhva, Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya (Sarvamūlagrānṭhāḥ) Vol.1, p.531.

(i) अन्नमया दिभ्य आनन्दमया न्तेभ्य आत्मश्योऽश्यन्तरतम् ।  
 ब्रह्म विथा प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन दिवर्षीयिषु शास्त्रं  
 अविधाकृत अविधाकृतपंचकोशापनयनेन अनेक तुष्कोद्रव-  
 वितुष्टीकरणेनेव तदन्तर्गत तण्डुलान्प्रस्तौति,  
 तस्माद्वा स्तस्मादन्नरसमयादित्यादि ।

Sankara: 'Taittiriyyopaniṣadbhāṣya' p. 489, Mahesh Research Institute, Varanasi.

Vedāntists analyse the material body into five Kosas, or Sheaths, namely the gross physical sheath (annamayakosha), the sheath of the Prāṇa. (Prāṇamayakosha), the sheath of the mind (manomayakosha), the sheath of the buddhi or intellect (Vijñānamayakosha) and the sheath of bliss (Anandamayakosha). They are sheaths because they conceal Atman, as a sheath conceals a sword. They are described as being one inside another - the physical sheath being the outermost and the sheath of bliss is the innermost. Each succeeding sheath is finer than the preceding one. As a fine substance permeates a gross one, so the finer sheath permeates the grosser sheath. Atman is unattached to the sheaths. Its light and consciousness permeate them all; though in varying degrees according to their density. By cultivating detachment toward these sheaths one by one, and gradually penetrating deeper, a man realizes Ātman as pure consciousness.

Nikhilananda: The Upanishads, Harper & Row, publishers, New York, 1963, Pp.56,57.

See also; Ranganathananda, 'The message of the Upanisads', Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1980, Pp.2,422 and 424.

Ramakrishnarao, K.B., Advaita Vedānta: Problems & Perceptives, University of Mysore, Mysore, 1980, p.208.

(ii) मयद्य अत्र विकारार्थे दृष्टो यथा स्तम्भय  
 इत्यादि । तस्मात् कार्यतमा आनन्दमयः प्रत्येतत्वः ।

Sankara, Taittiriyyopaniṣadbhāṣya, Mahesh, Research Institute Varanasi p.507.

596. प्राणं जीवनं प्रोक्तं प्राचुर्यर्थं यतो मयद् ।  
 अतः प्राणमयैत्वोक्त्या महापालकतोच्यते ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.8, S1.40.

597. विशिष्यत्ववित्तुत्वं ज्ञानत्वमिति च श्रुतिः ।  
 मनोमयगिरा प्राह यतो धातुस्सबोधने ॥  
Ibid, p.9b, S1.43.

598. सूष्टद्युक्त्या प्राप्तसार्वज्ञ लक्षणस्येदमीरणम् ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.9b, S1.45.

598A. Tait. Up. II-6.

599. आनन्दमयवाचान्ते स्वोक्तानन्तत्वमेव ता ।  
 जगौ किल तदानन्त्यं आनन्दादिगुणैर्न किम् ॥  
Ibid, p.9, S1.46.  
 अन्ते प्रोक्तानन्तत्वलक्षणस्य अन्तिमेन आनन्द-  
 मयप्रकारणेन प्रपञ्चनात् आनन्दादिगुणपूर्वत्वमेव  
 अनन्तत्वं, न परोदीरितसकलवस्त्वैक्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S., p.9.

600. तत्तत्पूर्त्यै तत्रयैकं गुणं पूर्णमवर्णयत् ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.10b, S1.50.

600A. जन्माद्यस्य यतः ।      Br. Su. I-1-2.  
 सुष्ठितिसंहारनियमनज्ञानान्बन्धोक्ता यतः ।  
Mādhyā, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagraṇthāḥ- Vol. 1) p.8.

601. प्राक्सर्वकर्तृतां पश्यात्तत्तत्तिसद्यै सर्ववित्तुताम् ।  
 सुखावित्कृपाद्याप्त्यै सान्ततो नन्ततां जगौ ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.12b, S1.59.

- 601A. The passage might be either Vijñānāmānandam brahma (Brih.Up.III-9-28) or Satyam jñānāmanantamānandam brahma (Sarvop-3) although it is mentioned as 'Satyam Jñānāmanandam Brahma,' See <sup>also</sup> Jacob, 'A concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā' Motilal Banarasidass, 1963, Pp.185 & 186.

602. आनन्दमितितस्थाने प्राहतेनात्रयोग्यता ।  
गुणस्यैवास्ति तत्त्वागे दोषो स्यादिति तर्हि ॥  
Ibid, p.12, S1.63.

603. आनन्दाद्विगुणैस्तस्मादानन्त्यं स्यादिवं प्रभ्रोः ।  
Ibid, S1.64.

603A. Chā. Up. VII-23-1.

604. तत्पूर्णसौख्यसिद्ध्यर्थं आनन्त्योकितश्चशोभते ।  
अतो देशाच्यकालाच्य गुणतश्चान्तश्चान्यता ॥  
शुत्युक्तं तदनन्तत्वं नान्यतत्त्वमितिस्थितम् ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.13b, Slokas 69,70.

605. एवं च वस्तुतोप्यस्य नान्त इत्युदिते सति ।  
सर्वैश्च वस्तुभिसिद्धये ततदा सम्बन्धं एव हि ।  
अयं च देशाव्याप्त्युक्त्या गतार्थत्वान्नसार्थकः ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.13 & 14b, Slokas 74 & 77.

606. धनैःपूर्णस्तदैव स्याद्वनं च बहुलं यदि ।  
तदगुणैःपूर्णतावाच्या गुणानां पूर्णतारूप्यभूत् ॥  
Ibid, p.14, S1.79.

606A. मयूरनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोनन्तविग्रहे ।

Bhāg. VI-4-48.

607. गुणसंख्यावधिर्नीति योनन्तगुण्डरितः ।

स एव गुणतोनन्तः प्रत्येकं गुणपूर्तितः॥

Y.M., B.S., p.15b, S1.84.

608. ... धर्मिव्याप्तौ व्याप्तागुणाश्च तत् ।

Ibid, p.15, S1.87.

609. अमायिको हरिस्तिसदः तद्वर्मा अप्यमायिकाः ।

अण्मयोऽखिलजीवेभ्यो विभेदश्च विभोरभूत् ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.16b, S1.90.

610. सर्वोपनिषदामर्थं निर्णेतुं बादरायणः ।

निमिषं ब्रह्मसूत्राणि स्यनात्सूत्रमुच्यते ।

Y.M., B.S., p.16, S1.93.

611. निष्ठायिकानुसारेण निर्णयस्यगतिं विदुः ।

Ibid, S1.95.

611A. भाष्यम् - सूत्रार्थो क्वयति धेन पदैः सूत्रानुसारितिभः ।

स्वपदानि च कर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

Jhalakikar, Bhimacarya, Nyāyakośa, p.627.

611B. Tait.Up.II-5.

611C. Tait.Up.II-6.

611D. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् । Br.Sū.I-1-12.

.....। अन्नमयत्वादेश्च । तथापि न त आनन्दमयशन्देनोच्यन्ते ।

किन्तु विष्णुरेव । .....। ब्रह्मशब्दः परे विष्णौ नान्यत्र क्वचिदिष्यते ।....।

"ब्रह्मेति परमात्मेति भगवानिति शब्दयते ।" "वासुदेवात्मकं ब्रह्म

मूलमन्त्रेण वायतिः" इत्यादिषु तस्मन्नेव प्रसिद्ध ब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यासात् ।

Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Sarvamūl agranthāḥ)-vol.1  
Pp.14 & 15,

612. ब्रह्मशब्दबलात्पुच्छमेव ब्रह्मेति हुर्धिः ।  
श्रुतिसूत्राधवनानन्दमर्य ब्रह्मर्चि शंसति ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.17, S1.100.

612A. Tait.Up.II-9.

612B. ....। तस्मात्कार्यपतित श्वानन्दमयो न पर श्वात्मा ।  
आनन्दहृति विद्याकर्मणोः फलम् । त द्विकार आनन्दमयः ।  
सर्वं चेत्कृष्णमाणस्यानन्दमयस्यात्मनः परमार्थब्रह्मविज्ञानापेक्ष्या  
ब्रह्मे परमेव यत्पूर्णं सत्यज्ञानानन्तलक्षणं, यस्य च प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं  
पंचान्नादिमयाः कोशा उपन्यस्ताः.

See also; Supra.fn.595A.

Sāṅkara, Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya, Mahesh Research Institute,  
Varanasi, Pp.508 & 510.

613. कोशस्य जडत्वेन तदेकदेशभूतपादस्यापि जडत्वावश्यंभावात्  
तद्ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादिका न स्यादिति भावः ।  
परमात्मनि लोमनरवादीनामपि ब्रह्मत्वात्तस्य तस्य  
ब्रह्मतोप्रतिपादकं वाक्यं तत्र तत्र योज्यम् ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.B.S., p.18.

613A. आनन्दब्रह्म कं ब्रह्मेत्यादि वेदो न किं श्रुतः ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.19, S1.109.

614. मोदानन्दप्रमोदादि न ब्रह्म किल चिन्मये ।  
ब्रह्मणस्सुखलपत्वे सुखस्य ब्रह्मता न किम् ॥  
आनन्दं ब्रह्म कं ब्रह्मेत्यादिवेदो न किं श्रुतः ॥  
Ibid, Pp19b & 19. Slokas, 108 & 109.

615. विल्लजीवब्रह्मैक्ये यस्याशामूलसीं तत्र ।  
अंगांगिनोः कुतो नैक्यमेकजातीयोर्वद् ॥  
Ibid, p.19, S1.110.

616. पुच्छस्य ब्रह्मतायांतु मध्यस्याब्रह्मता कथम् ।  
मृत्युच्छं मृणमयस्योदण्डत्यज्ञाभाणकं स्मर ॥  
Ibid, S1.112.

616A. Q.Y.M., B.S, p.20b, S1.115.

617. पादौ ब्रह्म करौ ब्रह्म मध्यं ब्रह्म शिरो हरेः ।  
ब्रह्मै वेदं सर्वमिति श्रुत्या हयेषोर्ध ईरितः ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.20b, S1.115.

617A. Bhāg.X-8-37 & 38.

617B. आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् ।  
आनन्दाद्येव खल्चिमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ।  
Tait.Up.III-6.

आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् । Tait.Up.II-4.  
आनन्द आत्मा । Tait.Up.II-5,  
ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ॥

618. आनन्दमय मध्यस्यानन्दो ब्रह्मेति किं न सा ।  
सदेतुकं ब्रह्मभावमाद संशयनुत्तये ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.20, S1.117.

618A. Supra. fn 617 B

618B. Supra. fn 617 B

619. पुच्छे ब्रह्मपदादन्यन्न ब्रह्म यदि ते मते ।  
तद्यनानन्दता पुच्छे मध्यस्यानन्दताश्रुतेः॥  
Ibid, p.21b, S1.119.

619A. Supra. fn 184

620. यद्यानन्दमयः कोशस्तपुच्छे ब्रह्मता कथम् ।  
साकारस्य जडस्यास्य ब्रह्मता न हि ते मते ॥  
Ibid, p.21, S1.124.

620A. Supra. fn 617B.

621. किंच श्रुतावादरश्चत् पुरुषस्यब्रह्मतास्तुते ।  
अन्यस्याब्रह्मता कस्मात् स्वीकृता न हि सा श्रुता ॥  
Ibid, p.22, S1.128.

622. पादस्य ब्रह्मतोक्तौ हि सर्वस्य ब्रह्मताबलात् ।  
यतो भवेत्ततस्तेर्थः प्रबलार्थहतो भवेत् ।  
Ibid, p.23b, S1.132.

622A. तटस्य लक्षणं नाम यावल्लक्ष्यकालमनवस्थितत्वे  
सति यदव्यावर्तकं तदेव । . . . .  
प्रकृते च जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वम् ।  
— तत्पदार्थस्य ब्रह्मणः तटस्थलक्षणमित्तिशेषः ।  
Joshi H., Dharmarajadhvavindra ' Vedāntaparibhāṣha ' with  
com.p.247.

622B. जन्माद्यस्य यतः ।

अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्यानेक-  
कर्तृभोक्तुसंयुक्तस्य ... जन्मस्थितिभां यतः  
सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणादभवति तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः ।

It must be noted that in the Advaita that Brahman is not Kartā. And what all Kartr̄tva is referred to, relates to Īśvara product of Māyā. So the definition in the above cited Br.Su., does not apply to pure Brahman but to Īśvara., means the definition of Kartr̄tva in respect of creation of the world etc, cannot be attributed Brahman. Hence, it becomes Tatsthā-contingent; silent, non-applicable:  
See: Supra-fns, 553A.

623. किंचनिर्विकृतेरेव निमित्तत्वं परात्मनः ।  
कुलालवद्धतो युक्ता तद्युक्ता तटस्थता ॥  
Y.M., B.B. p.23b, S1.134.

623A. पाणिनिना तस्मिप्रत्ययान्तस्य सार्वविभक्तिकर्त्त्वं कथनात् ।....।

कर्तृकरण्योस्तृतीयेति कर्त्तरि तृतीयाया  
अनुशासनात् ।

See: Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., B.S, p.23.

624. लक्षणस्य तटस्थत्वे सर्वकार्यमकर्तृकम् ।

Y.M., B. S, p.24b, S1.139.

624A. Tait.Up.III-1,

624B. Ibid.

625. जिज्ञास्ये लक्षणं नामूदजिज्ञास्येस्ति यन्ति किम् ।

तद्ब्रह्मेत्युपदेशं किं जिज्ञासा कस्य कथ्यताम् ॥

Ibid, p.24, S1.140.

625A. Supra. १०५५४

626. निमित्तवस्तु तद्ब्रह्म जगज्जालस्य कालवत् ।

उपादानत्ववातार्थं नात्र श्रौताध्वशोधने ॥

Ibid, p.26b, S1.147.

626A. Ativyāpti: is extension of the attribute to things not denoted by the definitum, as when we define a cow as a horned animal and thereby include buffaloes that have horns but are not cows.

Athalye & Bodas: Tarkasāmgraha of Annambhaṭṭa' Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1963, p.81.

626B. यद्यक्तलक्षणोपेतं तद्ब्रह्मेति हि योजना । ....

तल्लक्षणस्य ताटस्थये द्वैयतापितटे तव ॥

Ibid, p.27, Slokas, 155, 156..

तत्तस्माद्ब्रह्मणि योजना योगात् । अज्ञानस्यैव योजनीयत्वाच्य ।....।

यतो जन्मादिं तदज्ञानमिति सत्रवाक्यपर्यवसितार्थे सति प्राचीनसत्रोक्तद्वैयज्ञापि

Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., B.S, p.27.

तस्यैवस्यात् ..

627, आदोपोस्या यत् इति वचने का दरिद्रता ।  
Ibid., p.28b, S1.158.

627A. Supra, fn 622A

627B. एवंचन्द्रिणित्वोक्त्या तटस्थं लक्षणं न ते ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.28b, S1.166.

628, किंच निर्गुणतापृथौच्ये लक्षणस्य तटस्थता ।  
लक्षणस्य च ताटस्थये निर्गुणत्वं पूर्वं भवेत् ॥  
अतोन्योन्याश्रयः स्यान्नपरमात्मपदाश्रयः ।  
Ibid., p.28, S1.161.

629, निष्कृयत्वं श्रुतिश्चास्य क्रियायाशास्त्यलेपनं ।  
अकर्तरिं हि तं प्राहुर्यःकृत्वापि न लिप्यते ॥  
Ibid., p.29, S1.167.

629, A. Brih.Up., I-9-1.

629B, आकाशस्तलिंगात् । Br. Sū. I-i-22.  
.....। एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः - "आकाशस्तलिंगात्" ।  
आकाशशब्देन ब्रह्मणो गृहणं युक्तम् ।  
Sātsāstri, Sāṅkara, 'Brahmasūtrabhāṣya', p.115.

629C. "आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ।  
शारीरत्वमप्यानन्दमयत्यान्नमयादिशरीरपरम्परया प्रदर्शयमानत्वात्.....!  
It is to be noted that, though Sāṅkara declares that  
Anandamaya is Supreme and Ātmā but admits the Sārīratva  
indirectly by applying the sheaths or Kosas respectively  
See; Satsastri, Sāṅkara, 'Brahmasūtrabhāṣya', p.96.

629D. Brih.Up., I-2-5.

630. स इदं सर्वमृजतेति श्रुतिसमाख्यया ।  
 कर्तृत्वमिह देतुत्वं नोपादानत्वमिष्यते ॥  
Ibid., p.30, S1.171.
631. अज्ञानेस्थितदुर्धर्मं को ज्ञानप्रस्तुतो वदेत् ।  
Ibid, p.31, S1.176.
632. किंचोपादानमात्रेण कार्यं स्थान्नावयोभिते ।  
 अतःकर्तृरवश्यत्वे न तद्वाच्यं कथं वद ॥  
Ibid, p.32, S1.186.
- 632A. तत्र केवला प्रकृतिः प्रधानपदेन वेदनीया मूलप्रकृतिः । . . . .  
 महदादेः कार्यकलापस्यासौमूलम् ।  
 Visnūnumūrtibhas, G, Sāyana, 'Sarvadarśanasamgraha' Vol.2, p.150.  
 सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः ।  
 Jhalakikar Bhimacārya; 'Nyāyakosā' p.519.
633. अनिच्छताऽपि कर्तृत्वमतो वाच्यं त्वयापि हि ।  
 P.32, S1.188.
- 633A. ईश्वरस्यैव कर्तृत्वमुक्तम् । यत् कर्म कुरुते तदभिसम्यग्दते" इति जीवस्योपलघ्यते ।  
 अत आह -कर्ता शास्त्रार्थत्वात् -  
 Br.Sū.II-iii-32.  
 जीवस्य कर्तृत्वाभावे शास्त्रस्याप्ययोजकत्वप्राप्तेः  
 जीवोऽपि कर्ता ।  
 . . . . परात्तु तच्छुलेष्टः । Br.Sū.II-iii-40.  
 सा च कर्तृत्वशक्तिः परादेव ।  
 "कर्तृत्वं करणत्वं च स्वभावश्चेतना धृतिः ।  
 यत्प्रसादादिमे सन्ति न सन्ति यद्वप्यक्षया ॥"  
 इति हि पैणिश्रुतिः ।  
 Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Pp.103 & 104.  
 See also; Madhva, Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya  
Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) Vol.2, p.297, Ch.XXII, Slokas 75,77 & 81.

634. कर्ता जीवोपि हि यदा श्वतःकिमु तदा प्रभुः ।  
p.33, S1.192.

अस्वतन्त्रस्य जीवस्य प्रयोजनवशात्कर्तृत्वे  
अंगीकार्ये स्वतन्त्रस्य सर्वशक्तस्य हरेः कर्तृत्वं  
सिरसा धार्यमिति भावः ।

Bh.VI, com.on Y.M., B.S, p.33,

635. Chā.VI-2-1.

निष्क्रियत्वश्रुतेस्सत्वात्तटस्थं लक्षणं यदि ।  
तहर्यज्ञानं तटस्थं स्यादद्वितीयश्रुतेर्बलात् ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.34b, S1.196.

635A. अनादि ब्रह्मणो ज्ञानमनाधेय हि ते मते ।  
द्वितीयं तत्कृतं तस्मात्तृतीयमयिलं जगत् ।  
तेनाविधानिषेचयैव वागेषेति मतिर्मम ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.34b, S1.197.

635B. Supra, fn.626A.

635C. Asambhava is the total absence of the characteristic from the definitum itself, as when we define a cow to be an animal with uncloven hoofs.  
Athalye & Bodas, Tarka-samgraha of Annambhatta - p.81,

636. अतो लक्षणस्त्रस्य बलाज्ञानबलादिभिः ।  
गुणैर्युक्तमभूद्ब्रह्म लक्षणं गुणेन च ॥  
Ibid, p.35b, S1.201.

636A. Supra., p. 100

637. नेहनानेतिवाक्याच्युण्णयभिन्ना गुणाश्च ते ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.35, S1.204.

638. सूत्रमयदिया एव गुणाण्य भेदस्य गुण-  
गुणिकावादेश्च सिद्धेस्तद्वटकविवेषस्यापि अर्थात्सद्विः ।  
Ibid.,

638A. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ॥ Br.Sū.I-i-12.  
आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । Tait.Up.III-6.

639. आनन्दमयसूत्रोक्तरीत्या लोपि सुखाकृतिः ।  
निराकारः कथं कुर्यादिध्वस्तहस्तकुलालवत् ॥  
Y.M.,B:S, p.36b, S1.206.

639A. Br.Sū.I-iii-7.

640. भेदसाधकसूत्राणामस्मादप्यादौ सद्विवेच्छि सयुक्तिकत्वात्  
ग्रन्थस्य युक्तिमलिकात्पादस्यैव प्रथमतो ग्रहणम् ॥  
Bh.Vi., com.on, Y.M.,B,S, p.37 b.

640A. Br.Sū.I-ii-20.

641. स च त्रिथत्यदनाभ्या चेत्याह भेदं सयुक्तिकम् ।

...

उभयेषीतिसूत्रेसौ भेदोक्त्या चान्यताँ .... ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, pp.37 b & 37, Slokas 212 & 213.

641A. Bṛih.Mādhyandinapāṭhah,

641B. अन्योऽन्तर आत्माऽसनन्दमयः । .... । आनन्द आत्मा ।  
ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । Tait.Up.II-9.  
आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । Tait.Up.III-6.

641C. Munḍ.Up.III-1-2.

641D. Munḍ.Up.I-1-9.

641E. धरःसर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते .... ।  
यस्मात्क्षरमतीतो हमधरादपि घोत्तमः ।  
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदेय प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ।  
Bhagavadgītā XV- 16 & 18.

642. विशेषणे भेदस्य व्यपदेशेन येति च ।  
 सयुक्तिकं भेदमाह यत्सार्वज्ञं विशेषणम् ॥  
Ibid, p.38b, S1.215.

643. शोरीरो नुपपत्तेन नितरो नुपपत्तिः ।  
 इतिसून्द्रये चौक्तो भिन्नेऽजीवस्युक्तिकम् ॥  
Ibid, p.38, S1.216.

643A. Mund.Up.II-2-5,  
 643B. Chā.Up.III-8-7,  
 643C. Brih.Up.III-4-10.  
 643D. Śvet.Up.VI-13,  
 643E. Ibid, IV-6.

644. भेदमाधोष्यामास सब्रस्त्रे स सूत्रकृत् ।  
 पञ्चधा यो भिन्ततीदं तभेदः केन वार्यते ॥  
Ibid, p.40b, S1.222.

644A. Ait.Ara.II-2-3.  
 645. इत्यैक्यवचसां सत्रे लक्षणा गतिरीरिता ।  
Ibid, p.41b, S1.226.

645A. Mund.Up.III-2-7,

646. इतिप्राप्तमतो भेदं परमार्थी चकार सः ।  
 तस्माद्भेदोपतिद्वन्द्वस्तत्रत्रोदितो भेत् ।  
Y.M., B.S., Pp.44 & 45 b, S1okas 237 & 238,

647. मोक्षार्थं ब्रह्ममीमांसामारभ्य स पदे पदे ।  
 यतो निरण्यद्भेदं अतस्तत्त्वं महद्वि तत् ॥  
Ibid, p.48b, S1.250.

648. न हि शास्त्रमिदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म पृतिपादयिष्यति ।

Sāktśāstri, Sāṅkara: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ' p.

अशब्दमस्थर्शमरूपम् - Kath.Up.III-15.

यद्विशब्दादिमत्तद्येतीदं त्वक्षब्दादिमत्त्वात् ....।

Sāṅkara: Kāthakopaniṣadbhāṣya, p.99.

शब्दादिराहित्यम् ....।

Subramanya shastri, Gopalayati, Kāthakopaniṣadbhāṣyavivaraṇa, M.R.I.Varanasi, 1979, p.99.

649. "तद् विज्ञासस्व तद् ब्रह्म" इति ब्रह्मशब्देन  
पूर्णगुणत्वे कतोननुभवसिद्धात्पगुणजीवभेदः । "अथ

कस्मादुच्यते ब्रह्मेति बृहन्तो हयस्मिन् गुणाः" इति श्रुतेरिति ।

Madhva. 'Nyāyavivaraṇa' (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ-Vol.1) p.4.

ब्रह्मशब्दोऽपि हि गुणपूतिभेद वदत्ययम् ।

Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ-Vol.1) p.7.

650. गुणेलिंगाभिधैः यस्मात्प्रतिसूत्रं विपक्षिणः ।

प्रत्याक्षिपत्तं भगवान् तद्ब्रह्म गुणबृहितम् ॥

Y.M., B.S, p.48b, S1.252.

651. अतस्तदाप्यबाद्यत्वं गुणानां व्यासशासनात् ।

Y.M., B.S, p.48, S1.254.

652. तत्तन्नमोक्तधर्मणां यदि ब्रह्मणि नान्वयः ।

रूपमात्रस्यैकनामाभिदेवशास्त्रमनर्थकम् ॥

Ibid, p.49 S1.258.

653. See;

Sāṅkara, 'Brahmasūtrabhāṣya' Introduction to second quarter of first Adhyāya.

Sāktśāstri - Sāṅkara: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.1,p.145.

See also; In the first Pāda, it has been said that according to the Sūtra "Janmādyasya yataḥ" (Br.Sū.I.i.2) Brahma is the cause of all this transitory world such as the Akāsha etc., and by that, impliedly it is as good as said, how Brahma, the cause of all this world, has the attributes of being all-pervading, eternal, omniscient, all powerful and the self of all. After stating that certain words well-known to have another meaning, are infact indicative of Brahma, and that certain sentences, though they are clearly the indicatory marks of Brahma, are doubted as being so, it has also been determined that they refer to Brahma. Again, there are certain other sentences which do not clearly seem to be the indicatory marks of Brahma, and are doubted as to their significance, i.e, it is doubted whether they propound Brahma or something else. The second and the third Padas are begun with a view to determine that.

Apte,V.M., Brahmasūtra Śākārabhāṣya \* Popular Book Depot, Bombay,1960, p.93.

653A. द्विवाद्यायतनत्वाद्य धर्मस्तर्वत्र वर्णिताः ।  
निविशेषं क्व मीमांसा क्वेयस्त्विलंगशब्दभ्यः ॥  
Y.M.,B.S; p.49, S1.259.

654. अतोनन्तरुणं ब्रह्मेत्येव सूत्रकृतोमत्तम् ।  
Ibid., S1.260.

655. See for details Supra.

656. तत्त्वस्यावेदकं किंचित्किंचित्तत्त्वस्यवेदकम् ।  
इति वेदेषु यद्वैषं न तत्सूत्रकृतो मत्तम् ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.50b, S1.262.

657. जीवेश्वेददाहर्योक्तेरहमज्ञ इतीरितं ।

अङ्गपत्यक्षम् ..... ॥

Ibid., S1.264.

658. See;

आनन्दमयरूपे तु ब्रह्मणः पुच्छतोकिताः ।

... ब्रह्मता वयवेऽपिस्यात् तथाऽवयविनि स्वतः ॥

Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna, (Sarvamūlagranthah- Vol.1) p.15.

659. Tait. Up. II-5.

Sāṅkara comments the very passage, that the Ātman abiding in blissful sheath has its Sira as lovely as that of the sight of affectionate ones, since Sira (head) being the chief organ or part.

तस्यानन्दमयस्यात्मनः इष्टपुत्रादिर्दर्शनं प्रियं

शिरः इव शिरः प्राधानान्यात् ।

Subramanyashastri, Upanisadbhāṣya, Shankara; Taittirīyopanisadbhāṣyam, p.509.

660. Tait. Up. II-5.

661. Ibid.,

662. प्रियमोदप्रमोदानन्दात्मोध्वग्निस्य पादपि ।

सजातीयो यतो वशं ततो ब्रह्मबृहत्सुखम् ॥

प्रियमोदप्रमोदानन्दादिसर्वं सुखं हि तत् ।

प्राचुर्यर्थं मयद्वाच्यं सर्वं पूर्णं च तत्कल ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.51b, Sllokas 270, 271.

प्रकृतवयने मयद् । V-4-21.

वृत्तिः- तदिति पृथमा समर्थविभक्तिः, प्राचुर्येण प्रस्तुतं प्रकृतम् ।

पृथमासमर्थति प्रकृतोपाधिके ये वर्तमानात्स्वार्थे मयद् प्रत्ययो भवति ।

समूहवच्च बहुषु । 5-4-22.

वृत्तिः- तत्प्रकृतवयन इत्येव । बहुषु प्रकृतेषु च्यमानेषु समूहवत्प्रत्यया भवन्ति ।

यकारान्मयद् च ।

Vasu.S.C. The Aṣṭhādhyāyi of Pāṇini,  
Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, Vol.2, 1962, p.991.

663. सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान्सह । ब्रह्मणां चिपश्चितेति ।  
Tait.Up.II-1.
664. अतोत्रापि ब्रह्मपदं मुन्नामसुखसूचकम् ।  
Y.M.,B.S, p.51, S1.273.
665. अन्योऽन्तर आत्माऽनन्दमयः । ...। आनन्द आत्मा ।  
Tait.Up.II-9.  
 विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म-Brih.Up. III-9-28.  
 आनन्दमय इत्याद्यैः शब्दैवर्च्यो हरिःस्वयम् ।  
 Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna, Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ-Vol.1) p.15.
666. पादादिकेशपर्यन्तभेवमानन्दरूपताम् ।  
 श्रुतिस्तु स्पष्टमाचष्ट सूत्रकारोप्यसूत्रयत् ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.52b, S1.275.  
 Cf: "अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति यस्य ब्रह्मणः जिज्ञासा  
 कर्तव्यतयोक्ता तच्च ब्रह्म तैत्तिरीयश्चृतावानन्द पर्यस्य  
 पुच्छाख्यावयवरूपं प्रतीयते । ....। अतः संगतिसद्भावादानन्दमयस्य  
 ब्रह्मत्वमत्रसमर्थ्यत इति भावः । ...। अवयविन स्वानन्दमयस्य  
 जिज्ञास्यत्वप्राप्तेः । ....। अतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा सिद्ध्यर्थमानन्दमयोऽभ्यहसादि-  
 त्यानन्दमयस्य विष्णुत्वमाह सूत्रकार इति भावः ।
- Panchamukhi R.S. Jayatīrtha, Tattvaprakāśikā:(Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya with com.of Jayatīrtha and Rāghavendratīrtha)K.H.R.S,  
 Dharwad., 1980 p.90.
667. Supra. fn 347A
668. See; Supra, 659.  
 See also:- यच्चतेऽस्यो आऽन्यन्तरं, येन ते सर्वे आत्मवन्तः,  
 तद्ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठात । तदेव च सर्वस्याविद्यापरिकल्पितस्य  
 द्वैतस्यावतानभूतमद्वैतं ब्रह्म प्रतिष्ठात ।  
 Subramanya shastri: Sāṅkara: Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya,  
 (Upaniṣad-bhāṣyam) p.510.

669. Tait.Up.II-5.

670. यतश्च सैव पुरुषविधं स्वेति तद्ब्रुः ।  
विनिर्णयति तेनास्य तनुरासीद्बाधिता ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.52, S1.278.

671. अतःपूर्णनिन्दमात्रं सुखाद्याकारसुन्दरम् ।  
नारायणं परं ब्रह्म प्रियमेवेति य श्रुतिः ॥  
अवधारयन्ती प्रकृतिप्राकृतांशविवर्जितम् ।  
केवलानुभवानन्दस्पाकारमनोहरम् ॥  
Ibid, Slokas, 279 & 289.

672. त्रयाणामेकभावानाम् . . . . ।

Bhāg.IV-7-54,

तस्मादेवमैक्यं पश्यन्कृतार्थो भवतीत्याह ।  
त्रयाणां ब्रह्म विष्णुरुद्राणामेको भावः स्वरूपम् येषाम् ।  
Krishnashankarshastri, Śridharaswāmi, 'Bhāvārthadīpikā'  
(Srimadbhāgavatam Vol.4) Nadiyada Gujarat, 1966, p.185.

673. निर्णयिकानुसारेण निर्णयस्य गतिं विदुः ।

Y.M., B.S., p.53b, S1.285.

674. भेदशब्दो हि विद्वदिभर्मिथो भद्रे प्रयुज्यते ।  
श्रमे विरोधे धीभद्रे नाशेन्योन्यविमिश्रणे ॥  
असंयुक्ततयान्योन्यस्त्यतिशयापि भिदोच्यते ॥  
Ibid, S1.287.

675. अप्यवर्गवृत्तयो यस्य महित्वे स्वभवादयः ।

यथामति गृणन्तस्म कृतानुग्रहविग्रहम् ॥  
Ibid, p.57, S1.312.

676. अन्तर्यामिविवक्षायां भेदोनाशो श्रमो पि वा ।  
मिश्रणं वा क्रमोद्देषु त्रितयं वाइनिषेधति ॥  
Ibid, p.60b, S1.329.

677. भयं द्वितीयाभिनिवेशतःस्यादीशादपेतस्य विपर्ययो स्मृतिः ।  
तन्माययातो ब्रुध आभेत्तं भक्त्यैकयेषां गुरुदेवतात्मा ॥  
Bhāg.XI-2-37.

678. भयं द्वितीयाभिनिवेशतः ... ।

Bhāg.XI-2-37.

ननु विषयविक्षिप्तचित्तस्य कुतो व्यभिचारिणी भक्तिः  
सम्भवति कुतल्लरामभयम् । तत्र न तावद्विषयो नाम  
वास्तवोऽस्ति किञ्चु मनोविलासमात्रमतो मनो नियमनेन  
भजनादभयस्यादित्याह । अविघमानो पीति ।  
द्वयः द्वैतपृपंचः इयातुः पुंसो धिया मनसा स्वप्नश्च  
मनोरथश्च यथा तथेत्यर्थः । ..... ।

Krishnashankarashastry, Śrīdharaśwāmi Bhāvārthadīpikā  
(Śrimadbhāgavatam Vol.11) p.70.

679. तत्राग्रहादभयं तेस्यात्ततो भक्त्या भजेश्वरम् ।  
इत्याह नो चेद्वाक्यस्य पूर्वोत्तरविलङ्घता ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.63 S1.361.

680. पूर्वोत्तराविलङ्घार्थं वदेन्मीमांत्या ब्रुधः ।  
न चेद्वाकाशशब्देन परं ब्रह्म कथं जगुः ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.64b, S1.366.

681. Bhāg.VII-6-20.

Bhāg.VII-7-41.

॥ Bhāg.III-32-41.

682. अपिचाभिनिवेशस्य भयदत्ते स एव हि ।  
त्याज्यस्यात्सोपि बाध्योन द्वितीयं केन बाध्यते ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.64, S1.369.

683. द्रुव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावोजीव एव च ।  
यद्वन्नुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेष्या ॥  
Madhvā, Anuvyākhyāna (Sārvamūlāgranthāḥ-Vol.1) p.2

684. Bhāg. IV-28-62.

अहं भवान्लयान्यस्त्वं ..... | Bhāg. IV-28-62.

तत्त्वं पदार्थो विद्यशैनैक्यमाह । अहमेव भवान् । उपचारं वारयति ।

न चान्य इति । व्यतिहारोपदेश उक्ताभिष्माय एव ।

Krishnashankarashastri, 'Śridharaswāmi, 'Bhāvārthaśadīpikā'  
(Srimadbhāgavatam: Vo.4) p.709.

685. त्वमेवाहमितिप्रोक्तोप्यैक्याशा नैव शक्यते ।

त्वमेवाहमितिप्राहुरतिस्त्वं यतो जनाः ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.67 S1.382.

686. तस्मादेताद्वृशो वाक्ये प्रतीतार्थे तु बाधिते ।

प्रेमणाह्यम् । ..... ।

Ibid., S1.384.

687. इति भागवते प्रोक्ता ततो हंसस्य वाग्यि ।

लोकानुसारिणी बोध्यहंसे प्रेमैवगंसति ॥

Ibid., S1.386.

688. अथवा बिम्बभूतस्य स्वस्यस्वप्रतिबिम्बतः ।

जीवाद्वक्त्यविनाभावं नत्वैक्यं वक्ति बाधितम् ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.68b, S1.387.

689. अहं भवान्लयेत्येकं वाक्यं वात्र विभिते ।

अन्यस्त्वमित्यन्यदेव वाक्यं तेनात्मभिन्नताम् ।

इतिवाक्यान्तरेणासौ त्वमेव त्वयुयहं मतिं ।

कुरुनान्यैरिति ब्रूते स्पष्टं तद्यवियोर्भिर्दा ॥

Ibid., p.68, Sllokas, 391, 392 & 393.

690. Bhagavadgītā- XI-8.691. Bhāg. IV-28-42.

सर्वं स मानसो हंसो हसिन प्रतिबोधितः ।

स्वस्तस्तद्याभिवारेण नष्टामाप पुनस्त्वृतिम् ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.70, S1.401.

692. भूतेन्द्रियान्तःकरणात्पृथानाज्जीवसंज्ञितात् ।  
आत्मा तथा पृथग्द्वृष्टा भगवान्ब्रह्मसंज्ञितः ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.70, S1.404.
693. Chā.Up.VI-2-1.
694. Bṛih.Up.III-9-26.
695. तृतीयस्कन्धैषावाग्जडाज्जीवात्पृथक्कृतम् ।  
अद्वितीयशुतेरर्थं तृतीयं ब्रह्मशंसति ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.71b, S1.405.  
न तु द्वितीयाभावमिति स्वविस्त्रैक्यवचनस्य  
गतिकथनपूर्वकमनया वाचा भगवति जीव-  
जडभेदः साधित इति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on Y.M., B.S., p.71b.
696. Supra (fn.520A, & 648)  
तस्मादेवंजातीयकेषु वाक्येषु यथाश्रुतं  
निराकारमेव ब्रह्म अवधारयितव्यम् ।  
Br.Sū.Bhā.III-2-14.  
Saṭśāstri, Sāṅkara. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,  
केवलोनिर्ण्णण्डय ।  
Śvet.Up.VI-11.
697. वाक्यलक्षणास्वीकारे तत्त्वमसीत्यादौ वाक्यलक्षण्यापि  
अखण्डचैतन्यं बोधो निर्विकल्पकरूपः  
सुसम्पादः इत्यपि बोधयेम् ।  
Joshi.H., Dharmarajadhvarendra, Vedāntaparibhāṣa, with com.  
p.182.
698. Supra.
699. भगवत्पेन नैर्गुण्यमखण्डार्थं च संज्ञया ।  
निराचर्ष्टं ब्रह्मनिष्ठां स्पष्टमाचर्ष्टचान्यताम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.71, S1.409.

700. Supra, fn 258

701. मतिभेदोपि भेदेस्यानैकदैकस्यधीर्दिधा ।  
युगपन्मतिभेदो वा युगपत्स्थानभिन्नता ॥  
वैकक्षण्यं च युगपदिभमन्योरेवनान्यथा ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.72b, Slokas, 413 & 414.

702. Swet.Up., IV-6, Mund.Up., III-1-1.

703. मत्यैक्य स्थानैक्य कथकपदद्वयबलान्मति  
भद्रादौ नेतुमपि न शक्येति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on. Y.M., B.S., p.72.

704. बद्रत्पापूर्णतातृत्वपूर्वजीविप्रकाशैः ।  
नित्यमुक्तत्वपूर्णत्वानत्तृत्वादैः परप्रियैः ॥  
विलङ्घधर्मसद्रुत्वैः युडारत्नाधितैसदा ।  
अलंकृता भेदवाक्तु नैवस्वार्थं विमुच्यति ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.72 & 73b, Slokas, 418 & 419.

705. एक्यश्रुतिस्तुमत्यैक्ये स्थानैक्ये स्वार्थमुज्ज्ञति ।  
एकीभूताविमावित्यत्रैक्यं न हि तयोर्द्वयोः ॥  
Ibid., p.73b, Sl.420.

706. The Śruti passage occurs in both the Kathopaniṣad and the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad<sup>with</sup> some change in the second Pāda or line. But it is to be noted that the dissolution of the Śruti words changes from one Up., to another in the Advaita. In the Kath.Up., the Advaita reads the passage 'Nityo anityānām' whereas in the Swet.Up., reading is 'Nityo nityānām'. And in both the cases, passage is interpreted accordingly. (i) This difference in reading of the passages has not been even traced and notified by Jacob. (ii) In the Dvaita, reading of the Passage is as 'Nityo nityānām ...'. Here Vādirāja does not refer to Swet.Up. but refers to the passage of Katha.Up. running 'Nityo nityānām ...' (iii) and not as 'Nityo anityānām ...'

...

(i) नित्योऽनित्यानां येतनश्चेतनाना  
 मेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।  
 तमात्मस्थं येऽनुपश्यन्ति धीराः ।  
 तेषां शान्तिः शाश्वती नेतरेषाम् ॥

Kaṭha.V-13.

Subramanya shastri,S., Sāṅkara: 'Kaṭhopaniṣadbhāṣya'  
 (Upaniṣadbhāṣya),Mahesh Research Institute, p.114.

नित्यो नित्यानां येतनश्चेतनाना  
 मेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।  
 तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं ।  
 ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वं पापैः ॥

Śvet.Up.VI-13. Gīta Press, Gorakhpur, p.245.

(ii) Jacob, A Concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1971, p.491.

(iii) Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M.,B.S, p.73b.

707. आत्मस्थमनुपश्यन्ति नाभेदेन तमीश्वरम् ।  
 केचित्पश्यन्ति केचिच्च न पश्यन्ति किलप्रभुम् ॥  
 शाश्वतं च सुखं तेषामुक्तरीत्यैव पश्यताम् ।  
 नाभेदलूतबुद्धीनां नाज्ञानां च भवेत्तिकल ॥

Y.M.,B.S, p.73, Slokas, 424 & 425.

708. महासामर्थ्यमीश्वर्य प्रभुत्वं च प्रसाधितम् ।  
 उपादानादिपिज्ञानात् सार्वज्ञादिमहागुणाः ।  
 स्वातन्त्र्यं तस्य जीवानां पारतन्त्र्यं च साधितम् ॥

Ibid., p.74b, S1.429.

709. एक एव विदधाति न ल्पन्य प्रेरितं इत्युक्त्या स्वतन्त्रः  
 कर्त्तेति वयनात्कर्तृत्वोक्त्या च स्वातन्त्र्यम् । तददत्त-  
 भीगभीकृत्वाज्जीवानां पारतन्त्र्यं च ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M.,B.S, p.74

710. भद्रकार्यकरशक्तिविशेषः परमात्मनि ।  
Y.M.,B.S, p.74, S1.433.

711. मुक्तानां बहुता मुक्तस्वामित्वं च प्रभोरभूत् ।  
 आत्मस्थ भगवद्दृष्टेमुक्तावप्यनुवर्तनम् ॥  
Ibid., p.75b, S1.437.  
 इतोपि गुणादेनमिद्यात्प्रभितिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.75.

712. चेतनानां बहुत्वोक्त्या जीवभेदः परस्परम् ।  
 द्वातुः प्रभोरनेकेभ्यो भेदश्वैकस्य सिद्धयति ॥  
 तेन जीवेश्योर्भेदः साधितस्सोपपत्तिकः ।  
 काम्यानां च बहुत्वोक्त्या जडभेदः परस्परम् ।  
 तेषामीशङ्कौत्वोक्त्या जडेश्वरभिदा तथा ॥

Y.M., B.S, Pp.75, 76b, Slokas, 440, 441, 442.

712A. एकजीवकथाजीवाभेदो जीवेश्वराभिदा ।  
 चिद्रूपतैव जीवानां चित्यकर्तृत्वामित्यपि ॥  
 निष्प्रकारैक्यविज्ञानान्मुक्तिर्जगदसत्यता ।  
 सकृत्सर्वविमोक्षचेत्येतत्सर्वं हि दृष्टिम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.76, Slokas, 445 & 446.

712B. ...अतो ब्रवीत्यंश इति जीवो ईश्वरस्यांशो भवितुमर्हति,  
 यथानेविस्फुलिंगः । अंश इवांशो न हि  
 निरवयवस्थ मुख्योऽशो सम्भवति ।  
Satśāstri, Sāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.1, p.603.

713. तर्हि देहाद्युपाधीनां गमनं केन हेतुना ।  
 ब्रह्मणो निष्क्रयत्वोक्तोस्तदन्यस्य जडत्वतः ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.77, S1.453.

714. Supra. In 553A

715. ब्रह्मयैतन्यस्य व्याप्तत्वेन चालकत्वाभावात्  
 तथा जीवच्छरीराणामपि मृतशरीरस्वभावोऽभूद्वितिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.78b.

716. भैयुर्निष्क्रिया संगादेहोपि स्याधिद निष्क्रियः ।

Y.M., B.S, p.78, S1.465.

717. See; Gautamachandralji Jivaroja KundaKunda  
Prabhakta Saingraha (Hindi Edn). Gulabchand  
 Hurachanda Doshi. Sholapur, 1960. Pp. 29-30

718. See: उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् । Br. Su, II-3-19,

हेतुनां सकाशादणुरेव ।

"सौऽस्माच्छ्रीरादुत्तम्यामुं लोकमभिगच्छत्यमुष्मादिमं  
 लोकमगच्छति स गर्भिभवति स प्रसूयते स कर्म कुरुते"  
 इति पौष्ट्यायण्ड्रुतेः ।

स्वात्माना घोत्तरयोः । Br. Su, II-3-20,

... इत्युत्तरवाक्ययोः परमात्मनैवोत्क्रान्त्यादयः ।

Madhva. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Pp-97 & 98.

चलदंशो हि जीवः स्यान्न स्थिरांशः कदाचन ।

Y.M., B.S, p.79b, S1.469.

719. उपाधिस्तु कार्यान्वयी व्यावर्तको वर्तमानस्था

तदेव ... मायोपाधिकं यस्तु ईशवरसाक्षीत्युच्यते ।

Joshi, H., Dharmarajadhvarindra, Vedānta paribhāṣā, Pp. 71 & 73.

720. परिस्पन्दक्रियानैव परेब्रह्मणि ते मते ।

सहस्रोपाधि सम्बन्धेष्यक्रियस्य क्रिया नहि ॥

किं क्रिया निष्क्रिये व्योम्निं स्यात्कारकशैरपि ॥

Y.M., B.S, p.79b, S1okas, 470 & 472.

721. अतश्च्रौताणुता सिद्धा तवापि च समापि च ।

Ibid. p.73 S1.473.

722. अन्यच्चब्रह्म चैतन्यं सदा सर्वत्रतिष्ठति ।

स्वच्छमच्छेष्यमच्छिद्रं कूटस्थमयलं धूष्मं ॥

Ibid. p.80, b S1.480.

723. ब्रह्मण्डा न जीवात्तद्ब्रह्मणि क्वाप्यखण्डनात् ।

अखण्डत्वं च तद्ब्रह्म निच्छिद्रत्वाद्वित्तिश्चितम् ॥

Ibid. p.81, S1.489.

724. विवित्राकितयुक्तोसौ सर्वज्ञः सङ्गेश्वरः ।  
 स्वतन्त्रोखिलकर्ता च सदाणीयान्महान्किल ॥  
 तच्छक्त्या किं न धटते सोपि न स्वात्मधातकः ॥  
Ibid., p.82b, Sllokas, 494 & 495.
725. न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तास्त्वभावस्य तथोगस्तथोगाद्वृते ।  
Sāṅkhya Sū. I-19.  
 तस्मात् तथोगाद्वृते प्रकृतिसंयोर्गं विना न पुरुषस्य  
 तथोगो बन्ध सम्पर्कोऽस्ति, अपि तु स एव बन्धः ।  
Bhattacharya, R., 'Sāṅkhyasūtram' with Bhāṣya of  
Vijnanabhiksu, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashana, Varanasi, 1977,  
 p.16.
726. ब्रह्मणो जीवभावोक्तिरतोऽयुक्तितराविदाम् ।  
 यतः प्राग्क्रियाव्याप्ताचिदेका सक्रियास्त्वमी ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.84b, S1.507.
727. क्वचित्पुराणादौ ब्रह्मांश्चत्वेकथनं तदधीनत्वादेव ।  
 न तु मत्स्याद्विवृत् तदेकदेशत्वात् ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.84b.
728. अनादितोपि जीवात्ते संवरन्ति पृथक्य तत् ।  
 अतो मोक्षेष्वि नैवैक्यं न हि कन्धापरः पुमान् ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.84b, S1.508.
729. हरेरनेकताणुत्वं महत्वं येति मन्मतम् ।  
 अतो गतागताद्यं च युक्तं शक्त्या ममप्रभोः ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.84, S1.511.  
 जीवानां चाणुत्वैकस्वभावत्वेन केवलं सक्रियत्वेन  
 च भगवतोत्यन्तविलक्षणत्वादत्यन्तमेदश्चेति सर्वमवदातम् ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.84.
- 729A. Mahānārāyaṇopanisad.X-6.

730. अन्तर्बहिश्च तत्सर्वं व्याप्त्यनारायणस्थितः ।

इति श्रुतेन्यदव्याप्तवैतन्यद्वयमापत्तेत् ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.85b, S1.515.

731. जीवास्त्वाकाशमध्यस्थत्रसरेणुणणोपमाः ।

तस्माद्ब्रह्मैक्यमेतेषां नाभूदस्ति नैभविष्यति ॥

Ibid.

732. The cosmic Jīva is alone the awakened Jīva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekājīva (one-soul), Dasagupta S:

'A History of Indian Philosophy' Vol 1 p.477.

733. The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedāntists that there are many individuals and world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people ... According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground.

Dasagupta, S, 'A History of Indian Philosophy,' Vol.1, p.477.

734. देहादिकं मृषा तेऽस्तु नानादेहस्य येतनाः ।

मृषाचेदगमनं न स्थान्द्रज्जुसर्पो न सर्पति ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.87b, S1.531.

735. सत्येन ब्रह्मणा तेषामैक्यं न स्थान्मृषात्मनाम् ।

Ibid., p.87, S1.533.

736. मृषा भेदं घटव्योम प्रचलेत्तत्रत्र किम् ।

जलेन जलपंकेन लिप्यते किं दिने दिने ॥

Ibid., p.88b, S1.540.

737. निष्क्रियब्रह्मभागाश्चेत् सक्रियत्वं न कर्हियित् ।  
 निष्क्रियाकामभागास्ते सक्रिया केनवाकृताः ॥  
Ibid., p.88b, Sl.542.

737A. Rgveda, X-190.3.

738. सर्वनुभवसिद्धस्य मर्यादारक्षस्य च ।  
 जीवेवरादि भेदस्य मूषात्वं केन हेतुना ॥  
 यथानुभवमेवार्थसदां सर्वत्र तिष्ठतु ।  
 जीवो जीवोस्तु सर्वत्र जडमस्तु जडं सदा ।  
 इशासर्वत्र घैशोऽस्तु ... ।  
Ibid., p.88, 89b, Slokas 545, 546, and 457.

739. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म । . Chā.Up.III-14-1.  
 Sankara comments ...

इदं जगत् नामरूपव्याकृतं प्रत्यक्षादि-  
 विषयं ब्रह्म कारणम् ।...। एवं ब्रह्मात्मतया  
 त्रिषु कालेषु अविशिष्टं तद्यतिरेकेण अशृणात् ।  
 अतः तदेवेदं जगत् ।  
 Saccidanandendrasarasvati, Sankara: Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya,  
 (Upaniṣad bhāṣya Vol.6) Adhyatma Prakasa Karyalaya,  
 Holenarasipur, 1956, p.338.

740. जहौक्यमेव घटयेविदंतिप्रियंमतम् ।  
 ...  
 त्रृश्यमानमिदं सर्वं ब्रह्मेत्यैक्यानुशासनात् ।  
 जडस्य ब्रह्मणैक्येषि काते हानिर्निर्गच्छाम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.90 & 91, Slokas, 559 & 566.

740A. Supra. In §20 A

741. एवं च बन्धोमिद्या किमर्थं तत्परिहारोद्योग इत्युक्ते  
 सोपि मिद्येत्येव परस्यसिद्धान्तोनुमीयते । अतः  
 कस्य बन्धः कस्य मोक्षः न कस्यापीतिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on Y.M., B.S., p.92.

742. वाक्यार्थस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधोभावात् प्रत्युत भगवदधीन-  
त्वस्य सर्वेरप्यनुभूयमानत्वाच्य प्रत्यक्षसत्कृतम् ।  
Bh.Vi.,com.on.Y.M.,B.S, p.92,

742A. "मृदब्रवीत्" "आपो ब्रूवन्", इत्यादिवचनात्  
युक्तिविलङ्घो वेद इत्यतोऽब्रवीत् -  
अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ।  
Br.Su.II-1-6.  
मृदाद्यभिमानिदेवता तत्र व्यपदिश्यते ।  
तासां देतरेभ्यो विशिष्टं सामर्थ्यमनुगतिश्च लर्वत्र ...।  
Madhva,Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ-Vol.1)p.62.  
तत्तत्त्वामान एवैते तत्तद्वत्त्वमिमानिनः ।  
सन्ति तेषां विशेषण शक्तिरन्येभ्य उच्यते ॥  
Madhva,Anuvyākhyāna, (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ-Vol.1) p.62.

743. सत्यं प्रियं वयो वाच्यं वाच्यं नासत्यमप्रियम् ।  
यदच्युतोहमित्युच्यैरुच्यरन्पौङ्कश्चयुतेः ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.93 S1.582.  
See also; Bhāg.X-66-1 to 23.

744. ... नित्यमुक्तभगवत्सारुप्यमात्रस्य स्यात् कथंचिद्वप्मा ।  
Bh.Vi.,com.on.Y.M.,B.S, p.94.

745. स्वं मुक्तिथोऽय जीवस्थैव साधनानुष्ठानेषि  
मुक्तिस्त्यान्तु यस्य कस्यापि जीवस्य ...।  
तथा ज्ञानेन मुक्तोपि ज्ञानान्मुक्तजीवान्तरेण स्वभावमुक्त-  
परमात्मना चाभिन्नो न भवति । किन्तु स्वयमपि  
मुक्तान्तरवन्मुक्तो भवतीति भावः ।  
Ibid, p.95b.

746. स्वमेव परमात्मनि निलीनतया अन्तप्रविष्टानां  
सायुज्यमुक्तानां मन्ददृष्टिभिः पृथगदर्शनेषि नैक्यमिति भावः ।  
Ibid,

747. एवं भिन्नस्वभावानां जीवानां ब्रह्मणीष्वरे ।

...  
ऐक्यं वाक्यशतेनापि वक्तुंशक्यं न कुत्रचित् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.95, Slkas, 590 & 591.

748. यदीष्वरो समर्थस्त्यात्कथं सर्वं जगद्भवेत् ।

यदीष्वरस्समर्थस्त्यात्कथं सर्वं जगद्भवेत् ।  
Ibid, p.96, S1.599.

749. श्रुत्युक्तं यदि तत्त्वं स्याद्दैत्य न तत्त्वता ।

श्रुत्युक्तं यद्यत्त्वं स्याद्दैत्य न तत्त्वता ॥

Ibid, p.97, S1.604.

750. यदि ज्ञानेषि चाज्ञानं न संसारो हरेरयं ।

यदि ज्ञाने न चाज्ञानं न संसारो हरेरयं ॥

Ibid, p.98b, S1.606.

751. सर्वथा हरेज्ञानाभावे ज्ञानप्रतीतेरेव तस्मन्नयोगा-  
-दितिभावः ।

Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., B.S., p.98b.

752. अहंकारो हि लोकानां विकारो द्वुस्त्यजो महान् ।

अध्यादध्मो जीवो ह्यधिकादधिकः किल ॥

Y.M., B.S., p. S1.611.

753. शिवोहं भावधीभौगि रोगेमृत्युंजयार्चकः ।

Ibid, p.98b, S1.616.

754. अंशपदसाम्येषि जीवानामल्पशक्तित्वादिभन्नांशत्वं,

मत्स्यादीनां अंशिवदत्तिसमर्थत्वादभिन्नांशत्वमिति

भावः । तस्माद्विचित्र चरित्रयोऽशब्दसाम्येषि नार्थेक्षमिति भावः ।

Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., B.S. p.

755. Bhag.I-3-28.

755A. कलास्तर्वं हरेरेव सपुजापतयस्तथा ।

*Bhāg. I-3-27.*

756. स्वरूपांशोऽस्ति भिन्नांशोप्यस्ति शब्दविशेषणात् ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.100 S1.621.

757. भिन्नांशेतु तदीयत्वं भिन्नाभिन्नेर्धसाम्यता ।

अभिन्ने सर्वसाम्यं स्याद्यथा मत्स्यादिषु प्रभोः ॥

*Ibid, p.100b, S1.623.*

Cf: स्वांशचाथो विभिन्नांश इति द्वेधांश इष्यते ।

अंशिनो यत्तुसामर्थ्यं यद्यवर्लयं यथा स्थितिः ।

जदेव नाणुमात्रोऽपि भेदः स्वांशांशिनोः क्वचित्

विभिन्नांशोऽल्पशक्तिस्यात्किंचित्सादृश्यमात्रयुक् । इति वाराहे ।

See also;

द्विरूपांशकौ तस्य परमस्य हरेर्विभोः ।

प्रतिबिम्बांशकश्चाथ स्वरूपांशक शव च ॥

प्रतिबिम्बांशक जीवाः प्रादुर्भावाः परे स्मृताः ।

प्रतिबिम्बेष्वल्पसाम्यं स्वरूपाणि तराणि तु ॥ इति ॥

Madhva: Brahmasūtrabhaṣya - Pp.105,106 & 107.

758. जीवास्तु ब्रह्मभिन्नांशाः सार्वज्ञादेरभावतः ।

मत्स्यादयः स्वरूपांशाः सार्वज्ञादेः प्रभावतः ॥

भिन्नाभिन्नाः पटाद्यास्ते जडेष्वेव नाजडे ॥

अतस्त्रैविध्यमर्षेषु तुवरिभित्तिमेमतिः ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.101, S1okas 624, 625 and 626.

758A. Brih.Up.VII-1-1..

759. अतोतिभिन्नं स्वायं जीवाख्यांशो भवेधूवम् ।

विलङ्घयमक्रियान्तत्वं भेदंको न वदेद्बुधः ॥

*Ibid, p.102 S1.632.*

759A. एकस्यैव भमांशस्य जीवस्यैवं महामते ।

बन्धोऽस्याविद्यानादिः विद्या च तथेतरः ॥

*Bhāg.XI-11-4.*

760. See: अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दशकितवादि-  
त्त्वमधीयत स्के । Br.Sū.II-iii-43.

अंशो हयेष परस्य योऽयं ... ।  
अन्यः परोन्यो जीवो .... ।  
तथा चाग्निवेश्य श्रुतिः - "अंशो हयेष परस्य भिन्नं  
हयेनमधीयिरे अभिन्नं हयेनमधीयिरे ।" "इति ॥"  
Madhva. Brahmasūtrabṛhmaśya, (Sarvamūlagraanthāḥ- vol.1)  
Pp.104 & 105.

761. Radhakrishnan, 'Indian Philosophy', George Allen & Unwin,  
London, 1971, Vol.2, Pp.610 & 611.  
See also: Supra, fn.733.

762. उपाधिरेकस्ततत एव एव स  
जीवो निजाङ्गानवशेन कल्पितात् ।  
अनेक जीवान् प्रतिभासदेहिनः  
पश्यत्यबोधेऽपगते न पश्यति ॥  
...  
सर्वप्रयविधापरिकल्पित । यतो  
Sāstri,K. Sadananda, 'Pratyaktattvacintāmanih', Pp.301 & 302.

763. बहुजीवमते जीवा देहे देहे पूर्थक्षमूर्थक ।  
योनिभेदात्कर्मभेदाद्गतिभेदाच्य संसूतौ ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.104, S1.646.

764. ब्रह्मैकये जीवभावस्थैर्वाभावात्किं मिथो भिधा ।  
Ibid, S1.649.  
मुक्तानश्नानां जीवानां अंशिना ब्रह्मैकयेषि अंशानां  
परस्परमैक्यस्य लोके अद्वृष्टटत्पात् अयुक्तत्पाच्य ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on. Y.M., B.S, p.

765. अतोऽशानां समस्तानां मिथस्त्वैक्यं कदा वद ।  
विद्यार्थमाणे यन्नासीन्नभ्वे नापनभ्वे ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.105b, S1.651.

766. अन्योन्यं सुखदुःखभोगाभावे परस्परैक्यं  
वातभिक्रमिति भावः ।  
Sh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.105b,
767. तत्स्मात्पूर्वोक्तमार्गेण जीवैतन्यमेव तत् ।  
भिन्नभिन्नमनन्तं च भोगं भेदाय घेष्यते ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.106, S1.665.
768. अतस्वर्वशरीरेषु भिधन्ते भोगसाक्षिणः ।  
साक्षी धैतन्यमेवेति जीवं भेदस्तनौ तनौ ॥  
Ibid, p.107b, S1.669.
769. अनीशया शोचति मोहमागत  
एकामजामेक इति श्रुतिर्जगौ ।  
एकास्त्यविद्या तदुपाधिका विभु  
जीवो भवन्नेक इहास्ति विभमि ॥  
Sāstri,K, Sadananda: Pratyaktattvacintāmanī Pp.304.
770. Sheshagirirao V.N. Vacaspati's contribution to Advaita:  
Samvit Publishers, Mysore, 1984, p.94.
771. अनादिकालतौयस्य निद्रा स किल कल्पकः ।  
अनिद्रा वैदवेदान्तकर्त्तरः किल कल्पस्त्राः ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.109b, S1.684.
772. यद्यक्यमा प्रमा वक्तुस्तर्हि स्वप्नोपि न भ्रमः ।  
Ibid, p.109 S1.688.
773. किंच स्वप्नस्य सर्वस्य न दृष्टैको गृहे गृहे ।  
तद्वत्तद्वृष्टबाहुल्यस्थैवाप्तेः क्वच चते मतम् ॥  
Ibid, p.110 S1.694.
774. प्राप्नोति तेऽनुमानस्य नादृष्टोदृष्टखण्डने ।  
Ibid, S1.695.

775. सर्वे सत्याश्चेतनाश्च तत्स्वप्नो नल्पजीववान् ।

Ibid. p.111b, S1.697.

776. तस्यैवायं यदिस्वप्नः कस्य जागरणं वद ।

तच्च तस्यैव चेदेते विलङ्घे कथमेकदा ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.111, S1.699.

777. अतः सर्वथा जागरणं तत्समानाधिकरणस्वप्नश्च

अन्यस्यैवेति वक्तव्यम् ।

Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S., p.112b.

778. यदि देहेषु जीवात्स्युर्नैकजीवमतं तव ।

यदि देहेषु तै न स्युः नैकजीवमतं तव ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.112b; S1.703.

779. देहेन सह सर्वेषु देहेष्वेको न गच्छति ।

देहं विसृज्य गच्छेच्येन्मृतस्य स्यात्पुनर्भवः ॥

Ibid., p.112, S1.705.

780. यद्यस्यमायासुषिदस्सा दृष्टा कोस्यास्तदा वद ।

स्वयं येन्नास्य माया भून्नापरोस्त्येकजीविनः ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.115b, S1.721.

781. अथस्वयं ब्रह्मणोऽशस्त्वांशास्तर्वेन्य देहिनः ।

इति येदेकजीवत्वं किं स योगप्रभाववान् ॥

Ibid., S1.723.

781A. तर्हि ब्रह्म पालकमस्तु, विधिलङ्घौ सुष्टुसंहरतीरा-

विति पुराणप्रक्रियामाशंक्य तयोः कार्यत्वेन निलिल-

सर्जनसंहरणसामध्यभिवात् ... ।

Tailanga Ramashastri, Akhandanandamuni, 'Tattvadīpanam,'

The proprietors Messrs, Braj,B.Das & Co., Varanasi, 1902, p.3.

782. अज्ञानकार्यत्वात् विधिक्लृप्तयोः कर्तृतानेत्येकत्रोक्तम् ।  
 ह्नदानीं पुनरज्ञानकार्यस्यैकजीवस्य सकलजगत्कर्तृत्वमुच्यते ।  
 अतः पूर्वात्तरविलक्षणात् . . . . । सूत्रविलक्षण  
 जीवस्य जन्मादिकारणत्वांगीकारं हति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., Com.on.Y.M., B.S., p.116b.

783. एक जीवकथातस्माद्बृथैवेति मतिर्मम ।  
 बहुजीवत्त्वपक्षेष्विनिर्मला तेष्टभिन्नता ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.116, S1.736.

784. भेदत्वाद्यदि भेदस्य मिथ्यात्वं चन्द्रभेदवत् ।  
 तर्हि भेदो न मिथ्येति भेदत्पैनैव हेतुना ॥  
 ब्रह्म मौक्षिकभेदाख्यं दृष्टान्तैनैव साध्यते ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.117b, S1.737.

784A. त्रिविधः खलु सत्पदार्थः . . . . ।  
 परमार्थिकः, जीवाभिन्नं ब्रह्म ।  
 अथ मिथ्या यं पृष्ठं चो न त्वसन् । . . . । मिथ्या भूतमपि सत्  
 असदात्म्यात्, उभयथापि न . . . । सदसत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयं  
 मिथ्येति चेन्न ॥ इत्यभूतस्याप्रतिक्लित्वात् ।

Chandrashekharan, T., Anandanubhava, 'Nyāyaratnadarīpāvalih',  
 p.150.

784B. Q. Madhva: 'Bhagavatatatparyam' (Sarvamūlagraanthāḥ-Vol.3)p.11.

785. शून्यब्रह्मविभेदो वा दृष्टान्तस्तत्र कथयते ।  
 तद्भेदस्यापि मिथ्यात्वे ब्रह्मशब्दं भवेत्तत्व ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.117b, S1.740.

786. सत्यो भेदस्तसाध्यवान्न मिथ्या घेदेतुमान्न मे ।  
 रज्जुसर्पो न सत्सर्पस्तदभेदं भीषयेद्विकः ॥  
Ibid., p.117, S1.741.

787. नायमारोपितश्चन्द इति सच्चन्द्रधर्मिः ।  
Ibid, p.117, S1.744.
788. स च स्वरूपतोस्त्वयैव परंनास्तीतरात्मना ।  
 अतस्तत्र सदान्यस्माद्भेदावसर एव हि ॥  
Ibid, p.118b, S1.746.
789. यदारोपितश्चन्द्राणामेव भेदः परत्परम् ।  
 तदासाधनवैकल्यं दृष्टान्ते प्रतिवादिनः ।  
 अन्योन्याभावभेदोर्यं न हयसत्येषु मन्मते ॥  
Ibid, Slokas, 747 & 748.
790. तदेव नास्ति चेत्कस्य तादात्म्यं कस्य शंकते ।  
 शशशुर्गं स्वतो नास्ति न तु नास्तितरात्मना ॥  
Ibid, p.118, S1.750.
791. यतोपर्मिस्वरूपोयमन्योन्याभाव ईर्यति ।  
 अतोनासति सोभावो भावाभावबहिष्कृतः ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.119b, S1.753.
792. तस्मात्साधनवैकल्यमस्मिन्यक्षे दृढंविदाम् ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.125b, S1.796.
793. अत आरोपितो भेदो न भेदः सर्ववादिनां ।  
 . . .  
 अनारोपित भेदस्तु सत्य एवाखिलस्ततः ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.125b, S1okas, 797 & 798.
794. आत्मत्वात्परमात्मेव यदात्मायं मते तव ।  
 नारीत्वात्तर्हि भार्येव तेमाता स्यात्तथैव हि ॥  
Ibid, p.125, S1.800.
795. आभासोपमहेतूनां तन्मुखयेयमुदाहृतिः ।  
 अतोनुमानतोप्यैक्यं न सिद्धयेत्प्रतिवादिनाम् ॥  
Ibid, S1.802.

796. यतोनुमा ततोप्यक्षागमावन्वेव सा भवेत् ।

Ibid, S1.803,

797. Mund. Up. III-1-1.

798. त्वदभिलभितानुमानजातं च सर्वं द्वासुपर्णेत्यादि  
निरवकाशमृत्यनुसारित्वान्नाहं सर्वज्ञ इत्यादि प्रत्यक्षाननु-  
सारित्वाच्यानुमानपदयोग्यमपि न भवतीति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., B.S, p.125 & 126b.

799. विमतौ जीवपरमौ विरुद्धगुणवत्त्वतः ।

अभिन्नौ नैव तु हिनदहनाविव सर्वदा ॥

सर्वान्तर्भवसिद्धेयमनुमा भेदसाधिका ।

Y.M., B.S, p.126b, S1.805.

See: द्वासुपर्णा । सत्यंभिदा सत्यं भिदा ।

799A. Bhāg. II-8-10,

800. न यत्र मायेतिगिरा मायाया भगवत्पदे ।

सामान्यतो निषेधेन मायालेशोपि नेष्यते ॥

Y.M., B.S, p.127, S1.8019.

801. हरेरनुवृत्ता सर्वं तत्रापि किल चेतनाः ।

सर्वेयतुर्मुर्जा भिन्ना हरिणा च परस्परम् ॥

अतो जीवेशभेदाद्यं अभेदं सर्ववादिनाम् ॥

Ibid, p.128, S1okas 824 & 827.

802. सत्यं भेदोपि संसिध्यत्तोरागमिकात्वतः ।

Ibid, S1.128.

803. Bhāg. V-18-6.

804. पूर्वं पूर्वं विद्यमाने यत्रेदं पूर्वता ननु ।

Y.M., B.S., p.129b, S1.833.

अनादित्वं च निरवधिकप्राक्कालमारम्भय  
विद्यमानत्वमेव नत्वादिराहित्यमात्रम् ।  
तथा तति शश्वर्णादेरम्भ्यनादित्वप्रसंगेन...।

Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., B.S., p.129b.

804A. Mund. Up. I-2-8.

805. अप्रबुद्धश्च पूर्वर्थि सुप्रसिद्धो भिधीयते ।

उत्तरार्थेत्वजो निद्रस्वप्नशूल्प्रचक्षणं ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.129, S1.837.

806. यो बोद्धा न सबोद्धदो हि कर्तृकर्मविरोधतः ।

अतः पूर्वर्थमध्यस्थो नोत्तरार्थगतो पि ते ॥

Ibid, p.130b, S1.840.

806A. Mund. Up. I-2-9.

807. ऐदाभावात् स्वरूपेषु सदृशाभावतो पि वा ।

द्वन्द्वाभाव्य सो द्वैतो बोद्धद्वैतस्य साधनात् ॥

Ibid, p.130, S1.840.

808. यो विद्यान्यस्तु नित्यबद्धो विद्यामयो यस्तु नित्यमुक्तः ।

Bhāg. XI-11-7.

809. नित्यमुक्तोऽमृतस्यैष सेतुश्चोक्तः स्थले स्थले ।

जीवत्तु बधदो हुःखी च जन्ममृत्युजरावशः ॥

सर्वविस्फैतन्यदर्थं भिन्नं ह्यनादितः ।

तयोर्नैक्यं कदापि स्यान्मुक्तसारम्भमेत्यसौ ॥

Y.M., B.S., p.131b, S1okas 847 & 849.

810. किंचैक्यं यदि मिथ्या स्यात् तर्हि ऐदमृतिः सती ।

सत्यं येद्बहमणो भिन्नमभिन्नं वा निगदताम् ।

ऐदे तैव ते द्वैतश्चतेस्यादयाहतिस्फुटा ।

Ibid, p.131, S1okas, 853, 854.

811. ऐक्यमैक्यस्थ घटते कथं युक्तिविदांमते ।  
 ...  
 विलद्वांशपरित्यागे न सा जीवेष्वरैकता ।  
Ibid, Pp.131 & 132b, Sllokas 856 & 857.
812. सविशेषब्रह्मवादे नायं दोषो भविष्यति ।  
 ...  
 भेदहीनेपि भेदस्यकार्यं स कुरुते यतः ।  
Y.M.,B.S., p.133b & 133, Sllokas 867 & 868,  
 सः विशेषः । भेदिता अभेदेपि भेदभेदिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on Y.M.,B.S., p.133,
813. Chā.Up.VI.2.1.
814. Bṛih.Up.IV-4-19.
815. किंचिकमेवाद्वितीयं नेहनानेति च श्रुतिः ।  
 सर्वं ब्रह्मेति वाक्यस्याद्यदि विश्वस्य बाधिका ॥  
 तदाभेदपरेवाभून्नाभेदपरता श्रुतेः ।  
 अवाद्यबाद्ययोर्भेदो यतोऽवश्यमेपेक्षितः ॥  
Y.M.,B.S., p.133, Sllokas 872 & 873.
- 815A. Chā.Up.VI-8-7.
816. अद्वितीयमिति श्रुत्या द्वितीयादिभन्नतैव हि ।  
 सिद्धद्येदनश्च इत्युक्त्या यथाश्वादन्यथागजे ।  
Ibid, p.135b, Sl.886,
817. किंचाद्वितीयशब्दोयं लयस्थ ब्रह्मणोचरः ।  
 अतो जगत्प्राणभावधर्वसौ नवकित नापरम् ।  
Ibid, p.135, Sl.889,
818. अग्रशब्दोक्तकालस्य सत्त्वान्नात्समयेषि च ।  
 द्वितीयशून्यं तद्ब्रह्म न तदा नान्यदाप्यभूत् ॥  
Ibid, p.136b, Sl.895.

818A. See: Bhāg. III-5-27.

819. अतःस्वगतधर्मेषु स्वावतारेषु किंचन ।  
नानाभूतं नेति हरे: तैरैक्यं वक्षितवा गियम् ॥  
Ibid, p.137b, S1.901.

820. Kath.Up. IV-10.

821. Supra.814.

822. Brih.Up. IV-4-15,  
Kath.Up. V-5,

823. इशानोभूतभव्यस्येत्युपसंहारवाक्यं है ।  
अनीश जगद्दैतं भिनत्तीति मतिर्मम ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, p.139b, S1.911.

824. तर्हि किंचन नेहास्ति किन्तु सर्वचं नः प्रभौ ।  
सर्वधारे द्वरावस्तीत्यर्थोत्त्वतिमनोहरः ॥  
Ibid, p.140b, S1.919.

825. ब्रह्माहरस्मीतिवाक्ये कथमैक्यमस्तव ।  
Ibid, S1.920.

826. अहं ब्रह्म नियम्योत्प्रीत्यर्थश्चत्वखिलप्रियः ।  
Ibid, S1.923.

827. Supra [fn.648.]

828. किंचाहमर्थो नात्माते ब्रह्माहमिति वाक्ततः ।  
जडाहंकृत्यैक्यमाह न जीवैक्यं भवन्मते ॥  
मानसाहंकृतेरारोपाधिष्ठानचितैव हि ।  
सिद्धयेल्लक्षण्याद्यैक्यं न तु जीवचिता सह ॥  
Y.M.,B.S, Pp.141 & 142b, Slokas 929 & 930.

829. Brih.Up., I-4-10,

830. Chā.Up., III-14-1,

831. सर्वं ब्रह्मेति वाक्याच्य किंजडब्रह्मतापिते ।  
बाधात्ततस्तु संकोचे जीवादप्यस्तु बाधितात् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.142, S1.938,

832. Chā.Up., III-14-1,

तज्जलानिति शान्तसन्नुपासीतेतिपूर्ववाक् ।  
उपास्योपासकत्वं हि प्राह तच्य कथं तव ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.143, S1.943,

833. यदि सर्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वं सर्वपदोदितम् ।  
तदा मुख्यार्थसंत्यागस्तवाधिष्ठानतैव च ।  
Ibid, S1.945,

834. ... तमादेशमपाद्यो येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं  
मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातमिति कथं तु भगवः स आदेशो-  
भ्यतीति ।  
Chā.Up.VI-1-3,

835. यदेकज्ञानतसर्वविज्ञानं च श्रुतौ श्रुतम् ।  
अतोपि न परमात्मैष्यं सिद्धयेददैतवादिनाम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.144b, S1.950,

836. निष्पुकारक चिन्मात्रनिर्विकल्पक दृश्यतव ।  
ब्रह्मद्वयं जगतो ज्ञानं तदा कस्यास्ति कथयताम् ।  
Ibid, S1.952,

837. अतस्तत्यत्ववित्त्वादैतस्तदृशत्वाच्यराचरम् ।  
तदंगेष्वाद्वित्त्वा द्वा तज्ज्ञानेज्ञायते जगत् ॥  
Ibid, S1.971,

838. अद्भुतानीह यावंति भूमौ वियति वा जले ।  
त्वयि विश्वात्मके तानि किंमे दृष्टं विपश्यतः ॥  
Bhāg. X-41-4,

839. किंच्बृहमणि विज्ञाते सति तस्य प्रसादतः ।  
सर्वज्ञं जायते नृणामिति सर्वस्य संगतम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.148b, S1.981.

840. Chā.Up., VI-8-7.

... येन च आत्मना आत्मवत् सर्वमिदं  
जगत् तदेव सदाख्यं कारणं सत्यं परमार्थसत् ।  
अतः स एव आत्मा जगतः प्रत्यक्ष्वरूपं सतत्वं  
याथात्म्यम् ।...। अतः तत्सत् त्वमसि हे श्वेतकेतो ।  
Saccidanandendrasarasvati, 'Upaniṣad-bhāṣya',  
Vol.6, 745.

841. तथा तत्त्वमसीत्याह श्रुतिर्ब्रह्मसदृक्षताम् ।  
गुणैःकृतिपर्यैर्वक्तुं लोकयेदानुसारिणी ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.148, S1.987.

842. The com.of Madhva on this passage renders the reading  
as 'Sa ātmā atat tvam asi' unlike in the Advaita,  
... न च शारीरपराभेदे तात्पर्यमित्यत्र  
किंचिन्मानम् । "अतत् त्वमसि" इति भेदस्य  
नवकृत्वोऽभ्यासाच्य ।  
Madhva, 'Chāndogyo-paṇīṣad-bhāṣya', (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ-Vol.1)  
p.442.

See also:

अथवा जीवपरयोर्भूदं वक्तुं सविस्तरम् ।  
प्रावर्तत श्रुतिरियं नाभेदमिति भेदतिः ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.148, S1.989.

843. Chā.Up..VI-8-1.

843A. अक्षिणतस्य जाग्रदवस्था । कण्ठगतस्य स्वप्नः ।  
हृदिसुप्तिरित्तिक्षमात् स्वप्नावसानो विद्माना सुप्तिरिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S., p.149.

844. Bṛih.Up. I V-3-21.

845. प्राङ्गेन सम्परिष्वक्त इतिशाखान्ते श्रुतिः ।

प्राङ्गेन सम्परिष्वंगमेव सुप्तावकीर्तयत् ॥

Y.M.,B.S, p.149, S1.992.

846. सुप्त्युत्कृत्योऽच भेदेनेत्याहनिर्णयसूत्रकृत् ।

यतस्त्पत्तौ च मक्तौ च भिदाशास्त्रविदोहिता ॥

Ibid, p.150b, S1.996.

847. प्राणमेवोपश्चयते । Chā.Up. VI-8-2,

तन्मनो दिशं दिशं पतित्वा

प्राणबन्धनै हि सोम्य मनः ।

Chā.Up. VI-8-2,

848. एतत्समाख्यया प्रागुक्तप्राणमदस्य ब्रह्मपरता मनः

पदस्य जीवपरता च ..... ।

Bh.Vi.,com.on. Y.M.,B.S, p.150.

849. यस्मात्प्राग्भिन्नयोरैक्यं न स्याधत्नश्तैरपि

तस्मात्सर्वपि दृष्टान्ताः भेदस्यैव प्रसाधकाः ।

Y.M.,B.S, p.154b, S1.1028.

850. तस्माज्जीवेशभेदस्य साधिका भेदवाग्नियम् ।

Ibid, p.155b, S1.1042.

851. पदद्वयस्य लक्ष्यत्वाल्लिङ्गव्येकपदलक्षणा ।

Ibid, p.156, S1.1054.

852. तर्हि न सन्नधासदुभयं न चकालज्ज्वः किमपि न तत्र

शास्त्रमपकृष्यश्यीत यदा । जनिमसतस्तोमृतिमजात्मनि

ये च भिदां विपणमृते स्मरन्त्युपविश्वनिमास्वतः ॥

Bhāg. X-87-24.

853. अक्षस्य पक्षपातस्तु साक्षाद्भेदे प्रदर्शयते ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.161b, S1.1089.
854. सो यमित्यादिवाक्येषि न त्यागोस्ति पदार्थयोः ॥  
Ibid, p.163,b, S1.1107.
855. यो दण्डी कुण्डली चासाविति दण्डविशिष्टतः ।  
 स्यात्कुण्डलविशिष्टैक्यं किमेके दण्डकुण्डले ॥  
 विशिष्टयोपादानकस्य विशिष्टस्य हि जन्मनि ।  
 विशेषणं निमित्तं नस्तदैक्येऽस्यैकता कुतः ॥  
Ibid, p.163, Slokas 1111 & 1112.
856. यदि तत्त्वं पदार्थ्यां ते रूपमात्रनिल्पणम् ।  
 चिच्छिदित्येव चोक्तंस्यात्कस्यैक्यं तेन साध्यते ॥  
Ibid, p.167, S1.1133.
- 856A. अतः प्रत्यग्परागभावादल्पसाम्यात्तयोरुत्सदा ।  
 साक्षुशैक्यं परैवेयं वाग्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोः ॥  
 तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षपरागभावो नियामकनियम्यता ।  
Ibid, Pp.169 b & 170, Slokas 1150 & 1168.
857. See: Bhāg-X-66-1 to 23.  
Bhāg-X-51-46 to 57.  
 See also:  
Madhva, 'Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya,'
858. Bhagavadgītā XVI-14.
859. Mund. Up. III-1-1.
860. तयोर्मध्ये ब्रह्मणोन्यो यस्तुषीवाभिधः खणः ।  
 स पुण्यपापकर्मत्थं फलमत्तिरसुखासुखम् ॥  
 जीवादन्यस्तुयः पक्षी परमात्माभिधो महान् ।  
 सोनवनन्नभितो नित्यं चाकाशीति महाप्रभुः ॥  
 इतिश्रुतिस्तयोर्भेदं स्पष्टमाह सयुक्तिकम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.172b, Slokas 1194, 1195, & 1196.

861. तज्जीवपरमात्मानौ तवापि च ममा पि च ।  
 तदस्तेद्बोधिकासेयं श्रुतिरित्यति सम्मतम् ।  
Ibid, p.173, S1.1203.
861. Munīd. Up. III-1-1, S.Bhā.  
 ... । तं परिष्वक्तवन्तौ सुपर्णाविव  
 अविद्याकामकर्मवासनाश्रयलिंगोपाध्यात्मेश्वरौ ॥ तयोः  
 परिष्वक्त्योः अन्यः एकः क्षेत्रव्वः लिंगोपाधिः  
 .... अनश्ववन् अन्यः ... सत्त्वोपाधिः ... ।
862. यथा स्थितपदार्थस्यार्थयोगेऽयाहार इष्यते ।  
Ibid, p.176b, S1.1222.
863. जीवेश्योर्द्योस्तत्त्वादर्थोयुक्ततरो भवत् ।  
Ibid.
864. Tait. Up. II-1-1.
865. मुक्तो पि ब्रह्मणा साकं सवर्त्तिकामान् किलाशनुते ।  
 पारमार्थ्यं तदशने युक्तं नापरमार्थता ॥  
Y.M., p.176b, S1.1225.
866. कथं द्वितैकदैकन्त्र वृथैवमपि कल्पने ।  
 किमेकस्मिन्नपि घटे धर्मद्वित्वाद् द्वितीच्यते ॥ ..  
 नयेत्सौन्दर्यधैयभियां भार्ये द्वे भवतस्तत्र ॥  
Ibid, p.176, Slokas, 1228, & 1230.
867. यो विद्यांपस्तु नित्यबृद्धो विद्यामयोयस्तु  
 नित्यमुक्तः । Bhāg. XXI-11-7.
868. विमतो जीवपरयोर्भेदोर्य परमार्थसत् ।  
 संतारो न्मुक्तायैतन्योल्लेख्यत्वान्मौक्तसौख्यवत् ॥  
 इति जीवब्रह्मभेदं साध्यत्यागमानुगा ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.177b, Slokas 1232 & 1233.

869. तस्माद्वित्वा खययुक्तेष्व भोगाभोगाखययुक्तिः ।  
 अन्यत्वश्रूतितश्चाभ्यन्योन्याभाववाग्नियम् ॥  
Ibid., S1.1235.
870. नेत्रेष्वलं स्थानबुद्धि भेदमात्रेण भिन्नता ।  
 किन्तु स्वरूपभेदो यमिति साधयितुं श्रूतिः ॥  
 सखायौ सयुजौ घैति पदद्वयमुदाहरत् ॥  
Ibid., p.177, S1.1236.
871. व्यावहारिकभेदेते का वा वक्ति श्रूतिस्तयोः ।  
Ibid., p.178b, S1.1244.
872. परप्रयोजनार्थं हि परमात्मा प्रवर्तते ॥  
Ibid., p.178, S1.1246.  
 Cf : नमे पार्थास्ति कर्तव्यं त्रिष्टुलोकेषु किंयन ।  
 नानवाप्तमवाप्तव्यं वर्त एव च कर्मणि ॥  
Bhagavadgītā-III-22.
873. सो न नन्देहिनां द्वेषेष्वन्श्चान्यस्तथैव हि ।  
 प्रेरकप्रेर्यरूपौ तौ कथं न द्वौ तनौ तनौ ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.178, S1.1248.
874. See : इष्वरसर्वभूतानां हृददेशे जुनतिष्ठति ।  
 मामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रालङ्घानिमाययां ॥  
 न मां कर्मणि लिप्यन्ति नमे कर्मफ्लेस्पृहा ।  
Bhagavadgītā XVIII-61, IV-14.  
 न कर्मणा लिप्यते पापकेन न कर्मणावधीति नो कनीयाऽन् -  
Brih.Up. I V-4-23.  
 द्रष्टुर्नहृश्यत्य गुणविषज्यते  
 तस्मै नमो सकृतविविक्तसाक्षिणे ॥  
Bhāg. VI-19-12.
875. एवं चाशनदनशनन्तौ चिदंशौ द्वौ यतो बलात् ।  
 तच्छ्रूतिस्तत्परैवास्तु किमर्थाविलष्टकल्पना ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.179, S1.1257.

876. Supra, fn 325

877. यदिब्रह्मप्रमामात्रबाध्यो भेदस्ततःपुरा ।  
व्यवहारपदं प्राप्तो व्यावहारिक इष्यते ।  
तर्हि नाहं सर्ववेत्ता न सर्वशो हमित्यपि ।  
पृथ्यक्षबाधादधुना स्यादेकर्थं प्रातिभासिकम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.180, Slokes, 1263 & 1264.

878. अतो वृश्चिकतो भीत्या पलायन परत्यते ।  
महोरगबिलं स्थूले पातो जातो विचारय ॥  
Ibid, S1.1267.

879. अतत्यावेदकत्वाम्त्या यद्यूतेमानितागता ।  
इदं च बौद्धदराध्दान्तवार्थिमध्यप्रवेशनम् ॥  
उभयोमानितासिद्धै यो यतेत स वैदिकः ॥  
Ibid, p.181b, S1.1270 & 1271.

880. सर्वप्रकारकृन्यैव निर्विकल्पक धीस्तव ।  
ब्रह्मप्रमा तथाकस्य साधनं बाधनं वद ॥  
Ibid, p.182, S1.1285.  
निर्विकल्पकस्य साधकबाधकत्वायोगादिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.182.

881. अतो भेदाख्यरत्नस्य जगत्कल्पद्रुमस्य च ।  
पारमार्थिकतापन्ना बाधाभावादिदर्शदा ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.182, S1.1286.

882. यदि बाधस्तेन नाशः तदा दण्डादिनाशयता ।  
दुष्टा घटादौ यत्तस्मान्नस्युस्ते व्यावहारिकाः ॥  
अनादेरत्य भेदस्य तन्न ऋ स्याज्ञाननास्यता ।  
Ibid, p.182, 183b, Slokes, 1288 & 1289.

883. अर्धक्रियाकारितैव व्यावहारिकता यदि ।  
 शशमूङ्गमभूततत्वं परमार्थतरं तदा ॥  
Ibid, p.183, S1.1297.  
 अर्धक्रियाशून्यत्वस्यं पारमार्थिकलक्षणं च  
 शशमूङ्गेऽतिव्याप्तमिति भावः ॥  
Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., B.S, p.184b.
884. नाप्यविद्याकार्यता ते व्यावहारिकतोचिता ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.185b, S1.1308.
885. Six anādi entities:  
 See: Supra, fn.472A.
886. भेदस्तु श्रुतियुक्तमयां प्रत्यक्षेण च साधितः ।  
 ब्रह्मवत् पारमार्थ्यर्हिः कर्थं स्याद् व्यावहारिकः ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.185, S1.135.
887. परंज्योतिस्पसम्पद  
Chā.Up. VIII-3.4.
888. यद्ब्रह्मणा सहेत्युक्तं मुक्तौतन्नासतीभिदा ।  
 ...
 परंज्योतिरितिश्रुत्या तत्त्यागार्द्द कर्थभिदा ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.186, S1okas, 1328 & 1329.
889. Supra. Pp. 212 & 217
890. अनादिवेदवाक्येषु परापरकथावृथा ।  
Y.M., B.S, p.186, S1.1331.
891. निषेधविधिवार्ताद्वा दग्धाग्नीषोमपावके ।  
 परस्मात् पूर्वबाध्यत्वे त्याच्छ्रुतिबाधनं।  
Ibid, Pp.186, 187b, S1okas 1331 & 1332.

892. Supra [fn. 257.]

893. यद्बलादैक्यवाक्यानां बाधिकाभेदवाग्भूत् ।  
अतो निरेवकाशं यत्तदेव बलवत्तरम् ।  
दुर्बलं सावकाशं स्यादिसर्वं मनोरमम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.187b, Sllokas, 1336 & 1337.

894. Supra [p. 111 to 113]

895. यदन्यतः सिध्दभेदस्यानुवादेन मे प्रुतिः ।  
न भेदसाधिका तर्हि स्वप्नाशत्वशक्तिः ॥  
सिध्दस्य ब्रह्म सत्त्वास्याप्यनुवादपरां प्रुतिः ।  
अस्ति ब्रह्मेत्यादिल्पा न तत्सत्त्वं प्रसाधयेत् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.187, Sllokas 1338 & 1339.

896. कुतोनुवादं कुरुते तूष्णीं वा दूषणाय वा ।  
Ibid, Sl.1342.

897. मानस्यमानं संवादे प्रामाव्यावधूतिः किल ।  
Ibid, Sl.1344.

898. सिध्दे स्याः दूषकत्वे च दूषणाथनिवादिनी ।  
ता स्यादिति न कस्य स्यादन्योन्याश्रयदूषणम् ॥  
Ibid, p.188b, Sl.1347.

899. ऐक्यमुतेः प्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वे पूर्ववदन्योन्याश्रय  
लक्षणापूर्तेऽलच्छेदं च दोषम् . . . ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S., p.188.

900. दृढभेदमुतेर्वेशदृढप्रत्यक्षवैरतः ।  
नाभेदमागमो वक्ति जीवस्य परमस्य च ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.189b, Sl.1357.

901. अहःप्रत्यक्षयोऽयार्थे प्रत्यक्षी बलवत्सदा ।  
 अतीन्द्रियार्थमात्रेतु प्रबला वागिति स्थितम् ॥  
Ibid, p.189, S1.1358,
902. अष्टसिध्दानुवादे पि का हानिरिति चिन्त्यते ।  
 योथार्थमेव मानत्वं तस्य हानि र्काचन ।  
 न चैत्स्मृतिरमानं स्यात्स्मृतिकर्तृव्यपेक्षया ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.189, S1.1359,
903. See: Bhāg.X-1.4.
904. विरज्येतीत्तमश्लोकगुणानामनुवादतः ।  
 क इत्यादि व्यासवाक्यान्यनुवादं स्तुवन्ति इति ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.190, S1.1367.
905. दोषानहविसिध्दस्यत्वनुवादोपिवादवत्  
 न चेद्बहुमहावाक्याशास्यमैक्यं परस्परम् ।  
 अनुवक्ति भिद्वाश्रुत्या भेत्तुं सुन्दोपसुन्दवत् ॥  
Ibid, p.191b, S1.1373.
906. इति मन्यामहे द्रूष्यं द्रूषणं चैकवाक्यगम् ।  
 ...  
 न द्रूषणाय यत्ते वाक्यानामितिमे मतिः ।  
Ibid, p.191, S1.1379,
907. अविरुद्धात्वयं वाणी कुतोवा द्रूष्यतां वृजेत् ।  
Ibid, p.192b, S1.1382.
908. अनुवादादिरूपो यमित्याकारास्ति न श्रुतिः ।  
Ibid, S1.1384.
909. अविघ्नानो भेदोऽयं यद्युपास्त्यर्थमुच्यते ।  
 तर्हि त्रयक्षः सहस्राक्षः सहस्राक्षः त्रिलोचनः ।  
 कुतो न कीर्त्यते ध्यातुं तस्माद्ब्रह्मस्तु याद्वृशम् ।  
 तत्तथैव वदेदेवो ध्यातुं वा द्रृष्टुमेव वा ॥  
Ibid, p.192, Slokas 1388 & 1389,
- ...

तस्मात् तत्तद्वपैपरीत्येन तेषातिषां ध्यानाकथनात् ।  
 द्वृष्टुमेवेति वदता तत्त्वोपासनया तत्त्वदर्शनं च  
 विलङ्घमितिस्वयति ।  
Bh.Vi., cōm.on.Y.M., B.S., Pp.192 & 193b.

910. Kena.Up.IV-4 (II-4)

911. अतो नेवं यदि द्विभित्यादिवाक्यं न बाध्यम् ।  
 वाच्यो न्यो र्थः श्रुतेर्गुप्त्यै त्वयापि च ममापि च ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.193, S1.1397.

912. विषनिर्वरणे शक्तो ध्यातव्यो गलडस्त्वया ।  
 विषन्धवंसायविषनेशो ... ।  
Ibid, Slokas 1399 & 1400.

913. See: नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपास्ते इत्यादिना शब्दभान्त्या न प्रतीके  
 ब्रह्मदृष्टिः कार्य । किन्तु २ तत्स्थत्वेनैवोपासनं कायम् ।  
 ... नामादिस्थितिरेवात्र ब्रह्मणो हि विधीयते ॥  
 Madhva: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ-Vol.1)p.194.

914. यन्न प्रतीके न हि स इत्थं सूत्रकृतैव हि ।  
 अविध्मानत्योपास्तिर्नक्षाप्यस्तोति साधितम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.194b, S1.1403.  
 Cf: तस्माद्वस्तुयथारूपं द्वेयं द्वेयं च सर्वदा ।  
 कारणं पुरुषार्थस्य नान्यथा भवति क्वचित् ॥

...  
 प्रतीकसंस्थितत्पेन द्वेयो विष्णुर्विद्या ॥  
 Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ-Vol.1) p.195.

915. Supra. fn 546A

916. उपास्योपासकत्वस्य मुक्तावप्यनुवर्तनम् ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.196, S1.1423.

917. उपास्यते हि यदिदं नेदं ब्रह्मेति तु श्रुतिः ।  
उपास्यमानप्रतिमा नैव ब्रह्मेति शंशति ॥  
Ibid, p.197b, S1.1425.
918. ब्रह्मणस्तन्निधानाच्य तदुपास्तिर्दिवृक्षताम् ॥  
Ibid, S1.1426.
919. उपासते तु यदिदं नेदं ब्रह्मेति तु श्रुतिः ।  
यदुपास्यं न तदुब्रह्मेत्याह सेयं श्रुतिः किं ॥  
Ibid, p.198, S1.1441.
920. तस्माज्जीवेशभेदस्य साधिकेयमभूच्छ्रुतिः ।  
Ibid, p.199b, S1.1447.
- 920A. मिथ्यार्थज्ञवणे तु स्या अन्यथार्थस्यापि भावना ।  
तस्मादुपास्यो भेदोस्तु सत्योप्यस्तु श्रुतीरितः ॥  
Ibid, p.200, S1.1464.
921. Mund. Up. III-3.
922. इति जीवेशभेदस्य साक्षात्कारेण हि श्रुतिः ।  
परमं मोक्षमाचष्ट मुक्तस्यापि च भिन्नतम् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.201b, S1.1469.  
भेदसापेक्षसाम्यस्यैव फलतया कथनात्  
मुक्तस्यापि च भिन्नता मित्युक्तम् ।  
Bh. VI., com. on. Y.M., B.S., p.201b.
923. Supra. P. 299
924. भिन्ना भिन्नादिकल्पो वतद्वृष्णैर्भद्रद्वृष्णम् ।  
जात्युत्तरं हि तत्सर्वं यत्खण्डनकृताकृतम् ।  
व्यावहारिक-भेदस्याप्यपलापप्रसंगतः ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.201, S1.1476.
925. Brih. Up. III-9-26.

926. या श्रुतिर्नेति नेत्यात्मा ॥ गृह्य हत्यादिहपिणी ।  
 साप्यात्मानं जडाज्जीवाद् भिन्नं वर्णतिस्फुटम् ॥  
 जहं नात्मा जीवचित्त्वं नात्मेत्यर्थं अवेन्मम ।  
 तत् द्रिधा निषेधत्याभावेन दौ नभौ वृथा ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.202, Slokas, 1484 & 1485,

927. Śvet.Up. IV-7.

927A. त्रितयज्ञानातो जीवो वीतशोकोभ्येत्किल ।  
Y.M., B.S., p.203b, Sl.1491,

928. तस्मादभेदः साम्यं च नैरुण्यं च निराकृतम् ।  
Ibid, Sl.1492.

929. Bṛih.Up. IV-4-22.

930. See; Bhagavadgītā XV-17.

931. विद्यात्मानि भिदा बोध इति भागवते हरिः ।  
 विद्या केति पुरापूष्टो भिदा बोधं किलोक्तवान् ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.203, Sl.1497.

932. विद्यात्मनि भिदा बोधः  
Bhāg.XI-19-40.

933. भेदद्वृष्टेयाभिमानेन  
Bhāg.III-32-13.

934. भगवत्थभिमानो हि भवितर्निःसंग स्व च ।  
 निवृत्तिसैव विददिभर्विरकितरिति घोच्यते ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.206b, Sl.1516.

935. Prasna,Up. III-3.

936. यथैषापुरुषे छाया स्तस्मन्नेतदाततम् ।  
 इति श्रुत्या युतो बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बत्वमुच्यते ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.206, Sl.1521.

937. छाया हि पुरुषाकारा पुरुषाधीन-धेष्ठिता ।  
भिन्ना च जीवे ताद्वृक्तवं सिद्धं दृष्टान्त-शोधने ॥  
Ibid, S1.1523.

937A. आधारता स्वामिता च तथा स्वाकारता हरेः । सिद्धदा....।  
Y.M., B.S., p.207, S1.1528.

938. Brih.Up.II-5-19.  
Katha.Up.V-9-10.

939. विष्णोऽस्य बिम्बता तस्मादिभन्नस्यैवात्र वर्णयते ॥  
Y.M., B.S., p.208b, S1.1537.

940. बिम्बस्य प्रतिबिम्बैक्यं न स्मरोक्तं न विस्मर ।  
...  
छाया पुरुषदृष्टान्तादिबिम्बस्य परमात्मनः ।  
प्रतिबिम्बात्मकाज्जीवादभिम्बस्योक्तश्चृतौश्रुतेः ॥  
Ibid, Pp208b & 208. Slokas 1539 & 1540.

940A. सत्यश्चायमबाध्यत्वाद्ब्रह्मवत्प्रतिबिम्बकः ।  
न हि साद्वश्यमप्यस्य कात्तर्यैक्येतुका कथा ॥  
Ibid, p.208., S1.1543.

941. विन्रसिंहो यथा सिंहो मुख्यातिमुखं तथा ॥  
Ibid, p.210b, S1.1552.

941A. औपाधिकं प्रतिमुखं मुखेसत्येव दृश्यते ।  
मुखस्थापगमे चास्य न दृष्टत्वाष्टता च न ॥  
Ibid, p.210b, S1.1560.

942. निर्निमित्तं बिम्बसान्निध्यं कर्ता नारायणः प्रभुः ।  
उपादानमुपाधिरचेत्कार्यं वार्यमिदं कथम् ॥  
Ibid, S1.1561.

943. घटात्मना विकरणं मनसो योनुमन्यते ।  
प्रतिबिम्बात्मनोषाधेर्विकारोऽयं कुतोऽस्य न ॥  
Ibid., p.211b, S1.1564.

943A. प्रतिबिम्बस्यमिथ्यात्चे सत्यबिम्बादभवेदिभदा ।  
प्रतिबिम्बस्य सत्यत्वे द्विस्वभावत्वतो भिदा ।  
Ibid., p.213b, S1.1582.

944. न ह्यस्ति बाधिका नायं प्रतिबिम्ब इति प्रमा ।  
Ibid., S1.1583.

945. संज्ञाभेदात्कर्मभेदादिबम्बोन्यः प्रतिबिम्बतः ।  
Ibid., 214b, S1.1590.

946. पृपंचो यदि विधेत निवर्तते न संशयः ।  
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥  
Mānd. Up., I-2-9.  
विकल्पो विनिवर्तते कल्पितो यदि केनचित् ।  
उपदेशादयं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ।  
Ibid-10.

The passages given here are considered as Gaudapāda-kārikā (I-17) by the Advaita. But in the Dvaita, there lies no such opinion. The passages are considered as a part Upaniṣad.

सत्यं स्वं स्थात् पृपंचो पृपंचो यदि विधेत । रञ्ज्वां सर्प इव  
कल्पितत्वात् न तु स विद्यते । न हि रञ्ज्वां भ्रान्तिबुद्ध्या कल्पितः  
सर्पः विद्यमानः सन् विवेकतो निवृत्तः । न च माया मायाविना प्रयुक्ता  
तददर्शिनां चक्षुर्बन्धाधगमे विद्यमाना सती निवृत्ता, तथा इदं पृपंचाख्यं  
मायामात्रं द्वैतं रञ्जुवत् मायाविवच्य अद्वैतं परमार्थतः । तस्मात् न कश्चित्  
पृपंचः प्रवृत्तः निवृत्तो वा अस्ति इत्युभिपायः ॥

विकल्पो निविवर्तते यदि केनचित् कल्पितः स्थात् । यथा अर्यं पृपंचः  
मायारञ्जुसर्पवत्, तथा अर्यं शिष्यादिभेदविकल्पोऽपि प्राकृपुष्पोधादेव उपदेश-  
निमित्तः । अतः उपदेशादयं वादः शिष्यः शास्त्रा शास्त्रमिति ।  
उपदेशकार्यं तु ज्ञाने निवृत्ते ज्ञाते परमार्थतत्त्वे द्वैतं न विद्यते ।  
Śaṅkara: Māndūkyopaniṣadbhaṣya, (Kārikā -I-17 and 18)

947. भेदसौरभसर्वस्वं नित्यं सत्यमतो भवत् ।  
 धर्मस्य धर्मिमूलत्वाज्जीवनित्यजडात्मकम् ।  
 विश्वसौरभसर्वस्वमपि तादृग्भूद्बलात् ॥  
Yuktimallikā (Y.M.) 'Viśvasaurabha (V.S) Pp.6b & 6,  
 Slokas 47 & 48.

948. अतःपञ्चविधो भेदः प्रपञ्चोभूद्विचारणे ॥  
Y.M., B.S, p.2b, Sl.7.

949. एवं चब्रह्मणो हत्री किं न व्याप्तिरियं तव ।  
Ibid, p.3, Sl.19.

950. यदिव्यते तद्बाध्यते इति व्याप्त्यंगीकारे ब्रह्मण एव  
 बाध्यत्वप्रसंगादिति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., B.S, p.3.

951. Mānd.Up. I-2-8,

952. See: The reality as a whole expressed in a system of  
 five fold distinction, which gives it its philosophical  
 designation of "Prapañca".

"Prakṛṣṭah pañcavidho bhedah Prapañcaḥ" (V.T.N.P.27)  
 "This valuable five-fold difference is "Prapañca".

The word "Pra-panca" is derived from the substantive  
 "Pañcan" with the suffix "da" (a) signifying 'kind'. The  
 prefix "pra" denotes 'excellence' or value. It is excellent  
 in the sense that the knowledge of this five fold difference  
 constitutes right knowledge that leads to Mokṣa.

Sharma B.N.K., 'Madhva's teachings in his own words'  
 Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1979, p.78.

953. भेदवर्गः प्रपञ्चाख्यो यद्युत्पधेत तद्वर्यसौ ।  
 निनश्येन्न च नाशो स्ति तस्मान्नोत्पद्यते च सः ॥  
Y.M., V.S, p.4b, Slokas 25,26.

954. मात्रालेशस्तद्विहीनस्त्यादमात्रो विवेकिनाम् ।  
मायालेशो जिङ्गतं वस्तु मायामात्रं ततोऽभवत् ॥  
Ibid., S1.28.
955. यदद्वैतं तत्र तत्र श्रूयते स्मर्यतेपिवा ।  
सर्वोत्तमत्वात्परमर्थं हरिमपेक्षयतत् ॥  
Ibid., p.4, S1.33.  
सर्वं च स्वसर्वोत्तममीभूत द्वितीयरहित इत्यर्थमपेक्षय  
तदद्वैतपदं श्रुतौ श्रूयते इति भावः ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., V.S., p.4.
956. Supra.
957. अथवा ऐदतत्त्वेऽस्मिन् भिन्नाभिन्नादिरूपकः ।  
विकल्पो यदि केनापि कल्पितस्त्यात् ..... ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.5, S1.40.  
निविशेष्यहमकोदिनापरेणास्मद्वत्परिहर्तुमशक्यत्वेन  
अपरिहार्यं निवृत्तिः ..... ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., V.S., p.5.  
अद्वैते तस्य दुस्तत्त्वे विनिवर्तेत तर्हि॑तः ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.5, S1.41.
958. अतः श्रुतिरियं रम्या दैहलीदीपवद्बभौ ।  
यतः स्थानद्वयस्यार्थमुदमीमलदुच्यकैः ॥  
Ibid., p.6, S1.50.
959. See, जगतः सत्यं प्रतिष्ठां इश्वरश्च विष्णुः ।  
Madhva, Gitābhāṣya (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ-Vol.1) p.143.
960. अतः जगन्मध्यात्वस्य कृष्णानभिप्रैतत्वात् ।  
Bh.Vi., com.on. Y.M., V.S., p.7b,
961. निमित्तं कालकर्मादि कर्तनारायणःप्रभुः ।  
उपादानं तु सैवेकाप्रकृतिः त्रिगुणात्मिका ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.7b, S1.60.

962. See: सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिसम्भवाः  
Bhagavadgītā, XIV-5.

963. मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।  
Śvet. Up.

964. मायाख्या प्रकृतेरस्ति तेन मायामयाभिदा ।  
प्राकृताख्या य जगतः प्रोच्यते तत्र तत्र हि ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.7b, 61.

965. Bhagavadgītā IX-10.

मयाद्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते स चराचरम् ।  
इति प्रकृतिकार्यत्वं जीतो कतमुनुसंस्मर ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.7b, Sl.63.

966. अज्ञानीपादानकत्वाभावान्न मृषा जगत् ।  
अनाद्यनन्तकालेषु नैवात्योपरमः किल ॥  
Ibid, p.7, Sl.64.

967. एवमेतदनाद्यत्तं भूतसंधातकारकम् ।  
अनादिनिधनं लोके चक्रं संपरिवर्तते ॥  
Q.Y.M., V.S., p.7.

968. इति भारतवाक्येन हयनाद्यन्तत्वमुच्यते ।  
अनन्तत्वादबाध्यं च जगद्ब्रह्मवदेव हि ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.7, Sl.66.

969. विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः ।  
स्वप्नमायासल्पेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ॥  
Mānd. Up. I-i-15, (G.K.I-7)

970. विभूतिर्वित्तार ईरवरस्य सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिचिन्तका  
मन्यन्ते न तु परमार्थं चिन्तकानां सृष्टावादर इत्यर्थः ।  
“इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते” इति श्रुतेः । न हि मायाविनं  
सूत्रमाकाशे निक्षिप्य तेन सायुधमारुत्य चक्षुर्गचिरतामतीत्य युद्धेन  
खण्डशिष्ठन्नं पतितं पुनरुत्थितं पश्यातां तत्कृतमायादिसतत्य-  
चिन्तायानादरो भवति । तथैवायं मायाविनः सूत्रप्रसारणसमः  
सुक्षुप्तस्वप्नादिविकासः तदाख्यमायाविसमश्च तत्स्थः  
प्राज्ञतैजसादिः, सूत्र तदाख्यामन्यः परमार्थमायावी ।  
त एव भूमिष्ठो मायाछन्नो द्वृश्यमान एव स्थितो यथा  
तथा तुरीयाख्यं परमार्थसतत्यम् । अतस्तच्चिन्तायामेव दरो  
मुमुक्षुणामायर्णां न त्रिष्ठूयोजनायां सृष्टावादरः इत्यतः  
सृष्टिचिन्तकानामेवैते विकल्पा इत्याह - स्वप्नमाया सर्वपेति ।  
स्वप्नरूपा मायासरूपा चेति ।

971. अव्यक्तोयमिचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते ।  
Bhagavadgītā, II-25.

972. स्वप्नमाया सर्वपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकल्पिता ।  
मिथ्यासृष्टिकथा येयं सान्येषां कल्पना किल ॥  
इत्यन्यमतमाक्षिप्य श्रुतिस्वमतमाह च ।  
इच्छासात्रं प्रभोस्त्रृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः ॥  
स्वेच्छैवप्रभुसर्वं सृजतीशो न मायया ॥  
Y.M., V.S., Pp. 7 & 8b, Stokas 68, 69, 70.

972A. Māṇḍ.Up.I-i-15.

973. देवस्यैषस्वभावोयमाप्तकामस्य कास्पृहा ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.8, Sl.75.

974. Rāmānuja takes the Upaniṣadic accounts of creation, stated previously, in a literal sense. He holds that God, who is omnipotent, creates the mani-fold world out of Himself by a gracious out of will.  
Chatterji & Dattā, 'An Introduction to Indian Philosophy', Pp.418 & 419.

975. इच्छामात्रमितीशत्य सृष्टिचैवास्ति केवलम् ।  
न फलोच्छेत्याह तत्तान् पक्षानेषां प्यदुष्यत् ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.9, Sl.90.
976. प्रभोस्तकाशाद्या सृष्टिः स्रुत्यकूर्मादिरूपिणी ।  
सात्त्विच्छामात्रमेवेति भावाद्बाप्राहतां तथा ।  
....  
अतस्तस्याः प्रधानत्वात्तैव सृष्टिरितीरितम् ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.11, Slokas, 107, 108 & 109.
977. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च  
यदनुग्रहतस्सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्ष्या ॥  
Madhva, Anuvyākhyāna, (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ-Vol.1) p.2.
978. स्वाज्ञानतो जगत्सृष्टिं तस्यास्त्वानिष्टरूपताम् ।  
न्यवारयत् ... ।  
तस्मात्प्रकृतिः सृष्टिर्जीवानां सुखदुःखदा ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.11, Sl.111.
979. यतःक्रिया नित्यतोक्तया कार्यस्यापि प्रवाहतः ।  
नित्यत्वमुदितंसर्वलयं तेनन्यवारयत् ॥  
...  
तदपि प्रभुतामाह यतश्चयपरमात्मनः ।  
Ibid, p.12, Slokas 121 & 125.
980. .... न स्वप्नादि प्रत्ययवज्जाग्रत्प्रत्यया भवितु-  
मर्हन्ति । कस्मात् १ वैधम्यति । वैधम्यं हि  
भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः । .... बाध्यते हि स्वप्नोपलब्धं  
वस्तु ... एवं मायादिष्वपि भवति यथायथं बाधः ।  
Saṭśāstri, Śāṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhaṣya, Vol.1, p.505.
981. स्वप्नेऽपि द्रष्ट्रदेहोऽस्ति शश्या भूवतनादिकम् ।  
अन्ये च जाग्रतस्सन्ति स्वाप्नं तन्नास्ति किंचन ॥  
मायायां च स्वदेहोऽस्ति चधुरादीन्द्रियाणि च ।  
भूदृष्टाशश्च ते सर्वे मायिकं नास्ति किंचन ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.12 & 13b, Slokas 127 & 128.

982. विष्वसत्यत्ववादोनश्चात्मुक्तमध्योभतेराम् ।

Ibid, p.14-b, Sl.143.

983. कविर्मनीषी परिभूः स्वयम्भूर्यथातथ्यतोऽर्थन्

व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्यः समाभ्यः ।

Īśa Up. I-8.

See; ... स सत्यं जगदेता द्वृहि नित्यमेव प्रवाहतः ।

अनाद्यनन्तकालेषु प्रवाहैक प्रकारकम् ।

नियमेनैव सूजे भगवान्पुरुषो त्तमः ॥

..... ।

Madhya. Īśāvāsyopniśadbhāṣya (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ- Vol.1) c, 511,

984. शश्वद्धर्थार्थो हयर्थन् व्यदधात् परिभूः कविः ।

इत्यर्थनां यथार्थत्वं श्रुतिरन्या जगाद ह ॥

Y.M., V.S. p.14b, Sl.145.

985. Rv. II-24-12.

986. विष्वं सत्यमिति श्रुत्या सत्यत्वं स्पष्टमुच्यते ।

प्रमाणसिद्धतां चात्य प्रमिनन्तीति सा जगौ ॥

Y.M., V.S. p.14, Sl.147.

987. व्यावहारिकतावाणीं वाणीर्यं धिक्करोतिते ॥

Ibid, p.15b, Sl.150.

988. इवं च बाध्यान्यत्वा जगव्यब्रह्मपत्सदा ।

अव्यावहारिकं चासीदार्थिक्यानुमयामुया ॥

Ibid, p.16b, Sl.159.

989. अनीद्वृग् जगतो ब्रह्म भेदं सर्वेशतां गुणान् ।

दोषोद्दूनन शक्तिं वक्तिसर्वपदावली ॥

Ibid, p.17b, Sl.165.

990. सच्चिकेत सत्यमित् तत्त्वं मौर्यं वसुस्थार्हमुत  
जेता उत दाता ।  
Q., Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., V.S, p.17.
991. यच्चिकेतेति वाक्याह सत्यमेतज्जगत्रयम् ।  
Y.M., V.S, p.17, S1.169.
992. अतश्चृतिमहातात्पर्यस्यगोचरभावतः ।  
ब्रह्मवज्जगदेतत्य परमार्थसदेव हि ॥  
युक्तिःपश्य श्रुतीःपश्य मिथ्यादृष्टिं परित्यज ।  
सत्यं वद जगत्सर्वं मुकितं मुकितं यदीच्छसि ॥  
Ibid, Pp.19b, & 19, Slokas 179 & 180.
993. सत्यं प्रकृत्युपादानं सर्वं जगदितिस्थितम् ।  
Y.M., V.S, p.10, S1.182.
994. यद्वान्मुपादानं मूदानयन्यत्नवत् ।  
तदर्थमपि किं कोऽपि यत्नं कुर्यान्तं कुत्रचित् ॥  
Ibid, p.20b, S1.184.
995. .... तथ्य ब्रह्मविज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थ  
दर्शयति "ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्" इत्यादिः  
.... ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म ।  
ब्रह्मावगतिर्हिपुरुषार्थः, निःशेष संसारबीजा-  
विद्याद्यनर्थनिर्बहुणात् । तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् ।  
Sāstāstri, Saṅkara, Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya, VolI, Pp.24 & 25.
996. अनादिः किल संसारस्तवापि च ममापि च ।  
यदनादिन तत्कार्यमितिव्याप्तिर्वलीयसी ॥  
Y.M., V. S, p.20, S1.191.
997. अधिकायथिभावश्च परिहाराय सुत्रितम् ।  
यत् सूत्रं तत्र सर्वस्थाभावे भावः कथं वद ॥  
Ibid.., V.S, p.20b, S1.187.

998. उपादानमुपादेयसमानाश्रयमेवयत् ।  
 अनादिबन्धस्याधोरो जीव एव ततस्तव ॥  
Ibid, V.S., p.21, S1.197.  
 ततः उपादानोपादेयोस्तामानाधिकरण्य-  
 नियमात् । इति हेतोः संकेटं ब्रह्माश्रिताङ्गानप्रतिक्षेपः ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., V.S., p.21.
999. अनादिभावरूपं ते यदग्नानमभीस्पतम् ।  
 अनादिभावरूपं च वस्तुनैव निवर्तते ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.22b, S1.200.
1000. अनादेष्टपि बन्धस्य नाशस्याद्वि श्रुतेर्वलात् ।  
Ibid, S1.202.
2001. नित्यं स्वरूपविज्ञानं स्वकार्यस्त्वद वर्तते ।  
 इति तेऽभिमतं श्री तस्मात्तत्रावरणवाण् वृथा ॥  
 आवृणीते गनोवृत्तिग्नानमित्येव तत् त्वया ॥  
 वाच्यमावरणं तस्मात् कथं नान्योन्याश्रयः ।  
 यदावरणनाशे स्यादपरोक्षप्रमा तव ।  
 तथैव तस्य नाशे च कथं नान्योन्याश्रयः ॥  
Ibid, Pp.24b, & 24, Slokas, 221, 222 & 223.
1002. यदि ज्ञानाभावो, यदि संशयज्ञानम्, यदि विपरीत-  
 ज्ञानम् वा उच्यते "अज्ञानमिति" सर्वे हि तत् ज्ञाने-  
 नैव बिपत्त्यते ।  
Brih.Up.III-3-1 (Sankara)
- 1002A. आधारमानन्दमखण्डबोधम् ।  
Kaivalya Up.15.
1003. अण्डब्रह्मप्रतिपादकशब्दैः । अपरोक्षधीः  
 ब्रह्मापरोक्षधीः । ब्रह्मणि यदायदा तत्प्रतिपादकशब्दप्रयोगः  
 तदातदा ब्रह्मापरोक्षधीरस्ति । अज्ञाननिवृत्तिश्च नास्तीति मायिनो मतम् ।  
 अतश्चरमज्ञानादपि नाज्ञाननिवृत्तिरितिभावः ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., V.S., p.24.

1004. अतो ज्ञानादेव बन्धनाशोऽस्तु श्रुतेर्बलात् ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.24, S1.229.

1005. Mund. Up. III-3.

1005A. किंच ज्ञानेन दुष्कर्मनाशः सपक्षाच्छ्रूतौ श्रुतः ।  
 तदा विद्वान् पूर्णयपापे विध्येति न किं श्रुतिः ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.25b, S1.235.

1006. See: ... तदधिगमे ब्रह्माधिगमे सत्युत्तरपूर्वयोरध्यो-  
 रश्लेष विनाशौ भवतः, उत्तरस्याश्लेषः,  
 पूर्वस्य विनाशः । कस्मात् १ व्यष्टदेशात् ।  
 Satśāstri, Śankara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Vol.2, p.985.  
 ... ब्रह्मदर्शन उत्तराधस्याश्लेषः पूर्वस्य विनाशश्च ।  
Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, (Sarvamūl agranthalā-Vol.1)p.198

1007. किंच सर्वस्य कार्यस्य जन्मस्थिति-विनिष्ठिषु ।  
 निमित्तमीश्वरज्ञानमस्तीत्यखिल-सम्मतम् ।  
 दैनंदिने च प्रलये नाज्ञानस्य विनाशनम् ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.26, Slokas 252 & 253.  
 अतोऽपि ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति व्याप्ति-  
 रनुपपन्ना .... ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on. Y.M., V.S., p.26.

1008. यदि तदभगवदभक्तिमुत्पाद्य दृढया तथा ।  
 बन्धं विनाशयेत्तर्हि क्वावसरो वद ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.27b, S1.261.

1009. भक्तिश्च भगवत्स्तेषु: ... ।  
 भक्त्या च बन्धविरच्छेदः श्रूयते यौक्तिकश्चसः ।  
Ibid, p.27, Slokas 263 & 264.

1010. तस्मादनाशेनाशे च सत्यत्वादेनसंगतिः ।  
 कार्यताकार्यते एव नाज्ञानाभ्युयोजिके ॥  
Ibid, p.28b, Slokas 270 & 271.

1011. अधिकायां दिसदभावादगुरुशिष्यां दिसम्भवात् ।  
 मीमांस्य वेदसदभावान्मीमांसा शास्त्रसम्भवात् ।  
 कार्यैव ब्रह्ममीमांसा सदेत्यादावसूत्रयत् ॥  
Ibid, p.30, Slokas, 298, 299 and 300.
1012. यस्मूकारस्ते जगन्मिथ्यात्वं नैव मन्यते ।  
Ibid.
1013. जगज्जन्मादि हेतुत्वं यः प्रदीपमदीपयत् ।  
 स्वदत्तदीपतैलस्याभावं स मनुते कथम् ॥  
Ibid, p.31b, S1.301.
1014. स्वं प्रकृतिपर्यन्तं नाशोऽधोऽधः क्रमात्कल ।  
 एवं घोपादाननाशात् कार्यनाशः कदा वद ॥  
Ibid, S1.305.
1015. अतो ज्ञानं सुपादानमिति रिक्तं वयस्त्वं ।  
 तद्ज्ञानानुपादानवस्तुत्पादब्रह्मवज्जगत् ॥  
Ibid, Pp.32b & 32, Slokas 317 & 318.
1016. अपसार्यैव हृन्मायां दर्शनं द्विशति प्रभुः ।  
Ibid, p.32, S1.322.  
 तस्मादावृणाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यनन्तरमेव ज्ञानोदयसम्भवात् ।  
Bh.Vi, com.on. Y.M., V.S., p.32.
1017. अतो ज्ञानविनाशयत्वस्यान्यानुपपत्तिः ।  
 अज्ञानोपादानकर्त्वं केनोपाधेन साध्यते ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.33, S1.333.
1018. अनादित्वाच्य बन्धोऽयं न स्यादज्ञानकल्पितः ।  
 ...  
 किंच बाध्यमानाशयं नैकं किंचित्प्रदर्शयति ।  
Ibid, p.34b, Slokas, 339 & 340.
1019. तस्माज्ज्ञानेनाविनाशयत्वस्तुत्पादब्रह्मवत् जगत् ।  
 परमार्थसदेवाभूत् ... ।  
Ibid, p.34, S1.344.

1020. अनादित्वादनाशित्वाज्ञानानाशयत्वतस्तथा ।

अज्ञानाकार्यवस्तुत्वाद्बहुमवत्सकलं जगत् ॥

Ibid, p.36b, Slokas 355 & 356.

1021. किंचाज्ञानं ज्ञाननाशयं विरोधादेव केवलम् ।

 न हि दीपस्तमोनाशो तन्मध्यात्वमपेक्षते ॥

अतो ज्ञानमिदं ज्ञाननाशयं सत्यं च सम्भवेत् ।

सत्याज्ञानभवं विश्वं सत्यमेव भविष्यति ॥

Ibid, p.36, Slokas, 359 & 360.

1022. अज्ञानद्वारतोनाशो स्यादन्योन्याश्रयादिकम् ।

Ibid, p.39b, S1.378.

1022A ज्ञानैव च तन्नाशो स्यादन्योन्याश्रयोद्धृष्टम् ।

Ibid, S1.380.

1023. यदुत्पत्तौ विरोधोन नाशयत्त्वैव केवलम् ।

विरोध्यज्ञानमुच्येत बन्ध स्वात्मु ताद्वशः ॥

Ibid, p.39b, S1.384.

1024. प्राक्य तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रं

अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवत्ति ।

Adhyāsa bhāṣya:

... इत्यादिना अप्रबुद्धविषये "यत्र त्वस्य तर्व-

मात्मैवाभूत तत्केन कंपश्येत्" इत्यादिना

तदभावं दर्शयति ॥

Br.Su.IV-iii-14. Saṁ.

न हि आत्मस्वरूपाधिगमे सति पुनः प्रमाण -

प्रमेयव्यवहारः सम्भवति । प्रमातृत्वं हि आत्मानो

निवर्तयति अन्त्यं प्रमाणम् । निवर्तयदेव च

अप्रमाणीभवति स्वप्नकालप्रमाणमिव प्रबोधे ।

लोके च वस्त्वधिगमे प्रवृत्तिहेतत्वादर्शनात् प्रमाणस्य ।

Sankara: Gitabhasya, II-69.

1025. यज्ञानेन ज्ञाननाशमाशास्ते हास्यमेवत् ।

...

वेणुं दंदहते वहिनर्नस्वयं तेन दहयते ॥

Y.M., V.S., p.41, Slokas, 398 & 399.

1026. अतो देधापि न ज्ञानं स्वयमेवस्वधातकम् ।

ज्ञानाविनाशयं तज्ज्ञानं केनोपाधेन ते मृषा ।

Ibid, p.43, S1.415.

1027. अथ स्वरूपज्ञानं च स्वकार्यस्तह वर्तते ।

अखण्डार्थपदश्रुत्या मानसी चापरोक्षधीः ॥

ज्ञानद्वयमरुन्धत्या स्थितया गतया च किम् ॥

Ibid, Pp.44b, & 44, Slokas 418 & 421.

1028. यो विद्यास्तमयो मोक्षः सा संसार उदाहृतः ।

Ibid, p.45b, S1.427.

1029. ज्ञानोदयादाविमोक्षं जीवन्मुक्तिदशा किल ।

Ibid, p.45, S1.436.

1030. महा विद्यानिवृत्तिष्ठय तदैवस्यान्मुक्षतां ।

Ibid, S1.433.

1031. एवं च लिंगदेहास्ते सा विद्या तन्निमित्तकाः ।

अनन्ता मुक्तिपर्यन्ता ..... ।

Ibid, p.46b, S1.437.

1032. पुनर्ज्ञानिशतेनापि निवर्त्या नेति मे मतिः ।

दावाग्निना यो न हर्ग्यः किं तद्वदाहो गृहाग्निना ॥

Ibid, S1.439.

1033. मयि भक्तिर्हि लोकानाममृतत्वाय कल्पते ।

इति भागवते योत्तौ मुक्तेद्वारमबूबुधत् ॥

Ibid, S1.442.

1034. अतद्वाकारविकृतिरधिष्ठानावृतिस्तथा ।

दे शक्ती किल ते ज्ञाने वैकल्यस्यैव कर्तृ तत् ॥

Ibid, p.47b, S1.450.

1035. तस्मादभमसिद्धत्वाद्ब्रह्मवत्परमार्थस्त् ।

परप्रक्रियैवाभूच्यरावरमिदं जगत् ॥

Ibid, p.47, S1.455.

1036. सर्वं मायाभयं यस्य तस्य देहेन्द्रियादिकं ।

कस्यवा मायया सृष्टं न हि मायाविनि भ्रमः ॥

Ibid, S1.460.

1037. मायाविनो नै चेद्भान्तिर्विश्वमासीदनाकुलम् ।

मायाविनो यदि भ्रान्तिर्विवं नारोपितं मम ॥

Ibid, p.48b, S1.464.

1038. यदि स्वाज्ञानतो ब्रह्म घटं कल्पयति भ्रमात् ।

कुलाल मृत्तिका दण्ड घ्रादैः किं प्रयोजनम् ।

...

सत्यत्वादेव नारोप्यास्तर्वं ब्रह्मवदेव हि ।

Ibid, Pp.49 & 50, S1okas, 478 & 485.

1039. एकस्य भ्रमनाशस्त्यादेकाज्ञानं विनाशने ।

तत्रैव पुनरन्येषां स्वस्वाज्ञानैर्भ्रमः किल ॥

सर्वं च तत्तद्भ्रम्त्यर्थं ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रकल्पने ।

अतिस्थिरतरे वस्तुन्यनन्ताज्ञानकल्पना ।

भावरूपं च ते ज्ञानं तेनस्यादणुरद्विवत् ॥

Ibid, Pp.51b, & 51, S1okas 490, 490 & 492.

1040. Supra.

1041. देहान्तस्तर्हिंजीवस्याभावान्नर्जीविता तनोः ।

अणुर्निरंशो जीवोयं कथमन्तर्बहिश्चरेत् ॥

Y.M., V.S., p.52, S1okas 500,501.

वृत्तिद्वाराबहिर्गमनमेवासम्भावितमित्युक्तम् ।

Bh.Vi, com.on Y.M., V.S., p.52.

1042. घटोहमित्येव तेन जन्या व्यवृत्तिभूते ।  
 कुतो घटोयमित्येवमाकारां सा प्रजायते ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.52, Slokas 502 & 503.
1043. अतो नैताद्वृशारोप इत्यनारोपितं जगत् ।  
Ibid, p.53b, S1.504.
1044. भ्रात्युर्वं च सन्धर्भं ब्रह्मवन्नभ्रमोदभ्रः ।  
 किंचाहं घट इत्येव चैतन्यं येष्टभ्रमः ॥  
 गौरोहमितिवत्तर्हि भ्रान्तिस्ता प्रातिभ्रासिकी ।  
 न चैतनो घट इति .....।  
 व्यावहारिकता तस्माद्वादेर्जतो गता ॥  
Ibid, p.54b, Slokas 514, 515 & 516.  
 व्यावहारिकत्वाख्यस्वेष्टलाभाय प्रयत्नानस्य  
 प्रातिभ्रासिकत्वाख्य महादोषप्राप्तेरिति भ्रावः ॥  
Bh.Vi, com.on.Y.M., V.S, p.55b,
1045. अतो देशे च काले च घटोस्तीत्येव सोलिखेत् ।  
 अयं च न घटारोपः प्राक्षिलद्वस्य विशिष्टधीः ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.55b, S1.525.
1046. यदरापं विनापि स्याद्वादीनां व्यवस्थितिः ।  
 तद्वर्णनारोपितं सर्वं जगद्ब्रह्मवदेव हि ॥  
Ibid, p. S1.527.
1047. यस्य हयम्मकालेपि सिद्धिस्त्वमतस्मता ।  
 अनारोपितेवेदं ब्रह्मवद्वि घटादिकम् ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.56, S1.542.
1048. शुद्धब्रह्मण्यधिष्ठाने विश्वविभ्रमसिद्धये ।  
 स्वभावसिद्धा सिद्धाभज्जगदाकारवर्जता ॥  
Ibid, p.57b, S1.546.

1049. इदानीमेव ब्राधेन त्रारोपोपि ब्राधितः ।  
तदासत्यं जगदिदं भवेन्ममनिराकुलम् ॥  
Ibid, p.58, S1.558.

1050. अधिष्ठानं प्रधानं च समसत्ताकमेव ।  
दृश्यते रजतारोपे सपरिरोपादिकेषु च ॥  
Ibid, p.59, S1.562.

1051. उपादानं तवाङ्गानं तन्तुवत्कार्यकारकम् ।  
भ्रमकालेतु यन्नश्येत्कः पश्येत्तस्यदोषताम् ।  
यत्प्रवृत्तौ भ्रमस्यापि प्रवृत्तिस्यात्पदेपदे ।  
यन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तिश्च भ्रमस्य ....।  
Ibid, p.61, S1okas, 581 & 582.

1052. ज्ञानमात्रनिरोधेन न प्रमा नापि चाप्रमा ।  
....  
तस्मादावरणाङ्गानं स्याज्ञानप्रतिष्ठकम् ॥  
Ibid, p.62b, S1.584 & 585.

1053. तस्माद्योग्यप्रधानादेशभावान्नजगन्मूषा ।  
Ibid, S1.587.

1054. आरोपयोग्याधिष्ठान शून्यत्वात्परमार्थस्त् ।  
ब्रह्मवज्जगदेतत्स्यादिति सर्वं समंजसम् ॥  
Ibid, p.63, S1.596.

1055. अनारोपित वस्तुत्वादिश्वरं स्यात्परमार्थस्त् ।  
ब्रह्मवद्भाष्मोत्तीनामन्यार्थत्वं च तद्बलात् ॥  
Ibid, p.64, S1.607.

1056. नमस्तुभ्यं भ्रगवते ब्रह्मणे परमात्मने ।  
न यत्र श्रुयते माया लोकद्वृष्टिविकल्पना ॥  
Bhāg, X-28-6.

1057. त्वमाद्यः पुरुषः साक्षादीश्वरः प्रकृतेः परः ।  
मायां व्युदस्य चिच्छक्त्या कैवल्ये स्थित आत्मनि ॥  
Bhāg., I-7-23.
1058. इति श्रगवते प्रोक्ते माया भ्रमकरीश्वरी ।  
यस्मान्निन्दिष्टा तेनेदं कथं मायामर्यं जगत् ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.66b, S1.631.
1059. ब्रह्माण्डान्तर्बहिर्भन्ति किंमहान्तो महेश्वरम् ।  
तंमानयन्ति ध्यायन्ति श्रृण्वते मन्वते सदा ॥  
Ibid, p.67b, S1.634.
1060. सर्वथान्विपरीतांच ब्रुद्धिः सा पार्थ तामसी ।  
Bhagavadgītā XVIII-32.
1061. किं रज्जुसपलिंकारः शुद्धितरूप्याचक्षे शिवः ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.67, S1.639.
1062. अथ द्वृग्द्वृश्यसंबन्धायोगात् केवलमीदृशी ।  
कुसूष्टिर्हि त्वया वाच्या सापि सौच्या महात्मनाम् ॥  
आरोपरूपज्ञानत्वमध्यासत्त्वं हि केवलम् ।  
अध्यस्तत्त्वं च तज्ज्ञानज्ञेयत्वं च ततो परम् ।  
Ibid, Slokas, 642 & 644.
1063. तस्मात्कीलस्य लाभाय न देवालयनाशनम् ।  
कुरु स्त्रीकुरु विश्वस्य सत्यतां भूत्यतां भज ॥  
Ibid, p.68, S1.659.
1064. असत्यमप्तिष्ठै ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् ।  
अपरस्परसम्भूतं किमन्यत्कामहृतुकम् ॥  
स्तां द्वृष्टिमवष्टम्य नष्टात्मानौल्पबृद्धयः ।  
प्रभवन्त्युग्रकर्मणः क्षयाय जगतो हिताः ॥  
Bhagavadgītā, XVI-8,9.  
इति गीतात्थकृष्णोक्त्या मिथ्यांत्वाशां परित्यज ।  
Y.M., V.S., p.69b, S1.662.

1065. अतो घटादेरध्यातः शुद्धचित्यैव ते मते ।  
 निरंश मुद्दैतन्यमेकमेव हि तत्तदा ।  
 तस्मात्सर्वस्य चाध्यासात् सा सर्वस्य च दृग् भवेत् ।  
Ibid, Slokas 664 & 666.
1066. दृष्टं चेद्ब्रह्म मुक्तिस्त्याद् दृष्ट्यैव किलमुच्यते ॥  
Ibid, p.70, §1.682.
1067. तृणच्छन्नोऽपि किं वहिनः न दहेत् सतृणं वनम् ॥  
Ibid, §1.685.
1068. तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं  
 तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥  
Kath.V-15.  
 ....। यत् सर्वं तदेव ब्रह्म भाति च विभाति कार्यगतेन विविधेन  
 भासा । ३५अतः ४५ तस्य ब्रह्मणो भास्त्रपत्वं स्वतोऽवगम्यते ।  
 न हि स्वतो विद्यमानं भासनमन्यस्य कर्तुं शक्यम् ।  
 घटादीमन्यावभासकत्वादर्शनात् , .....।  
Sachchidanandendrasarasvati: Kaṭhakopanisad, Adhyatma-  
 Prakasha Karyalaya, Holenarasipur, 1968, p.160.
1069. यदादित्यगतं तेजो जगद्भासयते श्लिम् ।  
 यच्चन्द्रमसि यच्याग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्वि भाग्मम् ॥  
Bhagavadgītā, XV-12.
1070. भासमानमिदं सर्वं रत्नाकैन्द्रनलादिकम् ।  
 तं भान्तमनुभातीति तस्य भासा विभाति च ॥  
Y.M., V.S., p.72b, §1.697.
1071. अथवा स्वस्वरूपेण ज्ञानेन परमेश्वरम् ।  
 स्वशक्त्यैव सदा भान्तमनुसृत्यान्यदेहिनाम् ॥  
 ....  
 भातीदं स्कलं विश्वमित्यर्थस्त्वतिनिर्मलः ॥  
Ibid, p.73b, Slokas, 703 & 704.

1072. स्वगोदरं सर्वजगद्गोदरां च श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥  
Ibid, p.73, §1.709.
1073. अस्ति देन्नास्तिता बोधो बाधस्तर्वस्यनाभवत् ।  
 नास्ति देन्नास्तिता बोधो बाधस्तर्वस्य नाभवत् ॥  
Ibid, p.74, §1.719.
1074. कालत्रयेषि सत्ताया निषेधः कुत्र विद्यते ॥  
Ibid, p.75b, §1.727.
1075. व्यावहारिकसत्त्वं तु नास्तित्वापरनाम हि ।  
Ibid, p.78b, §1.739.
- 1075A. Mund. Up. II-2-8.
- 1075B. RV. II-24-12.
1076. विश्वं सत्यमिति स्पष्टं सत्यत्वं गर्जति श्रुतिः ।  
 विश्वं मिथ्येति विस्पष्टं मिथ्यात्वं कुत्र कथयते ॥  
Ibid, p.82b, §1.777.
- 1076A. RV. X-129.
1077. हन्त मिथ्याभवद्ब्रह्म सत्यं जगद्भूदिदम् ।  
Ibid, p.83, §1.788.
1078. असन्नकृष्ट द्रुष्टिस्तु समा पक्षद्वयेऽपि ते ॥  
Ibid, p.88b, §1.821.
1079. शब्दादसन्नकृष्टस्य शशाङ्गस्य धीर्यथा ।  
 अक्षादसन्नकृष्टस्य शक्तिरूप्यस्य धीस्तथा ।  
Ibid, p.89, §1.827.
1080. एवं च रूपसाहृश्यात् शुक्तौ रूप्यत्वधीभवित् ।  
Ibid, p.91, §1.840.

1081. सन्धिटसन्धिटस्तमसन्नित्यादीनि देहिनाम् ।  
सत्त्वापरोक्षज्ञानानि वर्तन्ते तत्र तत्र हि ॥  
Ibid, p.95b, S1.860.
1082. असद्रजतमित्यत्रासत्त्वं ब्रह्मगतं भवेत् ।  
Ibid, p.96, S1.867.
1083. किंचाधिष्ठानगासत्ता घटाद्युगतेति सा ।  
घटोऽपि द्वृशयते किं वा तन्निष्ठारोप्यते घटे ॥  
उत तत्रैव सा दृष्टा घटो घटतयेक्षयते ।  
किं वा घटे पृथग्सत्त्वं तत्स्थमेव निरीक्षयते ॥  
Ibid, Pp.97, 98b, S1okas, 875 & 876.
1084. चिदिभन्नत्वेनैव दृष्टघटादौ जडवस्तुनि ।  
सत्सत्त्वं द्वृशयते तद्य तद्यं स्यान्न तु चिदगतम् ॥  
Ibid, p.98, S1.882.
1085. प्रत्यक्षबाधे वाक्यस्यैवान्यार्थसर्व-संमतः ॥  
Ibid, p.100b, S1.893.
1086. जडे नाज्ञानदोषोत्तित न च काचादि द्वृशयते ।  
Ibid, p.100b, S1.903.
1087. अतोच्यबाधितं विश्वमिद्मासीदनाकुलम् ॥  
Ibid, p.103b, S1.919.
1088. मुख्यं जडाजडैक्यं च वाक्यैत्तैः किं न साध्यते ॥  
Ibid, p.106b, S1.950.
1089. सन्धये सूष्ठिराहं हि ॥ Br.Su.III-ii-1.  
स्वप्नार्थोपि यथार्थो हि सन्धये सूष्ठिरितिसृतेः ।  
....  
सत्यतां सूहमतां चासौ वकितनानुततां प्रभुः ।  
Ibid, p.109,b S1okas, 978 & 979.

1090. मिथ्याभूतोऽर्थकरी चेत्युक्तिस्तद्व्याहृतैव ते ॥  
Ibid, 110b, §1.982.
1091. सदा सर्वत्र सद्ब्रह्म सदा सर्वत्र चार्थकृत् ।  
 आकाशवत्कालवच्च त्रिकालासत्कदापिन ॥  
Ibid, p.111b, §1.988,
1092. अतःप्रामाणिकं ब्रह्म त्वापि च ममापि च ।  
 परमार्थसदैव स्याद्ब्रह्मवत्तेन मे जगत् ॥  
Ibid, p.117b, §1.1038.
1093. सर्वं ज्ञानं यतो धर्मिण्यग्रान्तं सर्वदेहिनाम् ।  
 तस्मादनन्तव्यकितनां सत्यतां युक्तितोभवत् ।  
Ibid, Pp.120b, & 121b, Slokas, 1059 & 1064.
1094. तदभान्तसृष्टत्वकथाप्येषां तस्माद् वृथा भवेत् ।  
Ibid, p.123b, §1.1073.
1095. अतो जडस्थ रूपाद्विगुणानां कर्मणामयि ।  
 जात्यादीनां च सर्वेषामबाध्यत्वेन सर्वदा ॥  
 व्यावहारिकता योगात्तस्तत्त्वं ब्रह्मसत्त्ववत् ।  
Ibid, p.124, Slokas, 1084 & 1085.
1096. अथमानाभावतोर्थभावस्तेन च धीर्घमः ।  
 भ्रमाच्य दोषो दोषेण मानता हीनतेति तु ॥  
 अन्योन्याश्रयतस्तस्य कुरुते बोधहीनताम् ॥  
Ibid, p.125, §1.1094.
1097. यदिमिथ्याजगत्सर्वं कथमर्थक्रिया ततः ।  
 मरीचिकाजलैः किं स्याद्वावतस्तूइविमोचनम् ॥  
Ibid, p.130, §1.1142.
1098. अर्थक्रियायोर्थभावादप्येषामध्यमभूज्जगत् ।  
Ibid, p.133, §1.1172.

1099. किंचेन्द्रियेण संबन्धात् घटायं परमार्थसत् ।

अथवा स्तम्भुम्भादिद्रव्यं नः परमार्थसत् । संयुक्तत्वात् ॥  
Ibid, p.135b, Slokas 1188 & 1190.

1100. See Pp.139b, to 140, Slokas 1208-1211.

1101. यद्ग्रानं मनोदृष्टिप्रतिबन्धकमेव न ।

मनसा ब्रह्मणस्तद्विं साक्षात्कारः सदा भवेत् ॥  
Yuktimallikā (Y.M.) Phalasourabha (P.S.) p.1, Sl.1.

1102. मनसः प्रतिरोधे हि स्यादन्योन्याश्रयो धूमँ ।

मनसो प्रतिरोधेषि स्यादन्योन्याश्रयो धूमँ ॥  
Ibid.

1103. श्रवणमननं चैव ध्यानं चेति क्रमात्रयं ।

प्रधानांगं हि मनसो द्रष्टव्ये परमात्मनि ।  
 प्रतिबन्धनिरुद्धं हि मनो दृष्टुं न शक्नुते ॥  
Ibid, 2b, Slokas 6 & 7.

1104. परोक्षज्ञानरूपात्तु सदाध्यानात्प्रसन्नधीः ।

अपसार्थनिरोधं तं स्वप्तमानं दशित्प्रभुः ॥  
Ibid, 2, Sl.2,

1105. दृष्टश्चभगवानेकं हृदयंथिं स्वं मिनत्त्यजः ।

अन्यंयापलृतं कृप्तितेनाच्छादयति क्वचित् ॥  
Ibid, p.3b, Sl.10.

1106. मुक्तौस्वरूपनिषेषत्या तत्य स्वच्छंदर्शनं ।

Ibid, 4b, Sl.15.

1106A. साक्षादेव कारणत्वात् श्रवणमनननिधिध्यासनानाम् ।

Tait.Bhā.1.12.

Saccidānandendrasarasvati, Taittirīyopanisad, p.108.

1106B. आत्मा वा अरे द्वृष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निधिध्यासितव्यः ।

Brih.Up.I V-5-6.

1107. दशमस्त्वमसीत्युक्तिरपिशाब्धाधियास्वया ।

चित्तव्याक्षेपदंत्रयेव दशमोहमितिप्रमा ॥

Y.M., P.S., p.6b, S1.29.

1108. श्रुतिस्तु श्रवणं वक्ति मननं ध्यानमन्ततः ।

पारंपर्यात्तु तत्राद्य हेतुः ध्यानं तु मुख्यतः ॥

Ibid, p.8b, S1.49.

1109. यदि श्रवणमात्रैपि सर्वेषां ब्रह्मदर्शनं ।

जीवन्मुक्ताः कुतस्तर्हि शुकाद्या एव योगिनः ।

Ibid, p.8, S1.52.

1110. ध्यानमेव प्रधानांगं तेनयान्नानधीमलं ।

क्षात्यते धौतक्षीरेव दशनि कारणं किल ।

Ibid, p.9b, S1.59.

1111. हर्यनुग्रह एवेभ्यस्त्वर्भयो बलवत्तरः ।

Ibid, p.11b, S1.74.

1111A. Mund.Up.III-2-3.

1112. हरिभक्त्यादेश्च लोकेवेदेषु राणादौच क्वापि दोषतया

अकथनेन गुणतयैव कथनेन च मानांतुरा विरुद्धमानप्रति-

पादितानां श्रवणमननादीनामेव साधनत्वौ चित्यात् ।

Bh.Vi., com.on.Y.M., P.S. p.12.

1112A. Bhāg.VII-1-30.

1112B. S.Y.S. Ch.35.17.

1113. श्रवणं मननं तस्माद्यानं साक्षात्कृतिहरेः ।  
 भक्तिप्रसादहत्यैते मुक्तेसोपानपंक्त्यः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.13b, S1.93.
1114. ज्ञानी ज्ञानोदये जाते ब्रह्मनाइयाविनिर्गतः ।  
 अर्धिराघवनाप्राप्य ब्रह्म लोके चिरं वसेत् ।  
 जीवन्मुक्तिदशा सैव ज्ञानिनां कीर्त्यते ब्रूधैः ।  
 तेनैव ब्रह्मणासाकं महामोक्षो भविष्यति ।  
Ibid, p.15, Slokas 104, 105 107.
1115. प्रकृतिश्च स्वभावस्था स्वभावं प्रकृतिं विदुः ।  
 अतस्तस्यास्तुन लयः सा नित्यैव परात्मवत् ॥  
Ibid, p.17b, S1.122.
1116. घटादिसर्वनाशो हि स्वस्वकारणोष्टान् ।  
 दाहेन कार्यनाशेऽपि भस्मशेषः प्रदश्यते ।  
 स्वस्वावयवनाशेऽपि त्रूपमत्क्रमतदेशक ।  
 शिष्टाभवन्ति तदस्तु कथं स्यादसदेव हि ।  
Ibid, pp.17b, 17, Slokas 127,128.
1117. परंपराद्विल्पयं प्रकृतौपर्यवस्थति ।  
 सर्वस्यान्ते यतसैव शिष्टा नष्टा च नैवसा ॥  
 ....  
 निशेषवस्तुनाशास्यनाशमात्रैप्यदर्शनात् ।  
Ibid, p.17, S1.130.
1118. ब्रह्मभिन्नस्य भावस्य नाशो जीवोपि नंक्षयति ।  
Ibid, p.18b, S1.135.
1119. ततो वैकुण्ठगमदभास्वरं तमसःपरं ।  
 यत्र नोरायणसाक्षान्न्यासिनां परमा गतिः ॥  
Ibid, p.20b, S1.151.

1120. सा च विष्णों समीपाप्तिस्तदंश्रिप्राप्तिरेव वा ।  
तल्लोकेषु स्थितिवभूतेनैक्यं त्वष्टमौरसः ॥  
Ibid, p.21b, S1.158.
1121. सर्वलोकक्षये यस्तु मोक्षोसौ नेक्यते कवचित् ।  
Ibid, p.21, S1.165.
1122. अतो जीवेषाभेदस्य मुक्तावप्यनुवर्तनं ।  
तारतम्यं च जीवेषु खोन्द्रत्वस्यकीर्तनात् ।  
Ibid, p.24, Slokas 187,188.
1123. न तदभासयते सूर्यो न शशांको न पावकः ।  
यद्गत्वा न निवर्तन्ते तद्वामपरमं मम ॥  
पुनरावृत्तिशून्यत्वं परमत्वं च कीर्तिं ।  
Ibid, p.25b, Slokas, 192, 193.
1124. एवं परान्तकालेत्यान्मुक्तत्वं योग्ययोगिनां ।  
Ibid, p.27, S1.214.
- 1124A. RV.VI-47-16.
- 1124B. RV.VI-47-17.
1125. अतस्सर्वविमोक्षच सर्वेक्यं च कथं वद ॥  
Y.M., P.S. p.30b, S1.225.
- 1125A. RV-VI-47-16.
1126. एध्मानद्विडित्युक्तया त्वात्मसाम्यं सहेत न ।  
तस्माद्बहुमत्वमेतेषां दुरापमितिमे मतिः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.30b, S1.227.
- 1126A. RV. X-90-16.

1127. यस्माधनैचित्र्यं देवर्ष्यादिषु दृश्यते ।  
 अतःपलेपिवैचित्र्यं ततो मक्ताः परावराः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.32, Sl.251.

1127A. Tait.Up.II-4-1.

1128. सर्वप्यानन्दमीमांसा स्वरूपानन्दगोचरा ।  
Y.M., P.S., p.33b, Sl.253.

1129. जीवस्वरूपानन्दस्य ताद्वृक्त्वे किं गतं तव ।  
 ऐक्यायोगाधिदि भयं भेदोस्तु सततं सतां ॥  
Ibid, p.34b, Sl.264.

1130. भोग्यार्थारतम्ये स्यात्तारतम्यं सुखस्य च ।  
 तत्त्यागोपि सुखस्योद्यनीचेत्यदभुतं वचः ॥  
Ibid, p.35b, Sl.275.

1131. अतो मिथो जीवभेदो जीवब्रह्मविभिन्नता ।  
 तत्तदानन्दवैचित्र्यात् सिद्धा सिद्धान्तवेदिनां ॥  
Ibid, p.35b, Sl.281.

1131A. Bhagavadgītā.XIV-2.

1131A. Brih.Up.I V-5-15.

1131B. Brih-II-4-14, IV-5-15.

1132. अप्राकृतपाकृताभ्यां द्वाभ्यां द्वित्वो भवे भवेत् ।  
 द्वितास्तसंसारिणस्तस्मात्तत्संबंधिषुस्तिवदेव ।  
 ब्राह्मणं द्वैतमितिप्रोक्तमस्वभावत्वतश्चतत् ।  
Y.M., B.P.S., Pp.38, 39b, Sl.304, 305.

1132A. Mund.Up.III-1-3.  
Tait.Up.II-1-1.  
Chā.Up.VIII-3-4.  
Tait.Up.II-8-1.

1133. साक्षाज्ञानफलं मोक्षं भूसंत्यस्तत्रत्र हि ।  
कथं घटेरन्सर्वेक्ये बहव्योर्थन्तरवर्जिताः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.39, S1.310.

1133A. Mund.Up.I-1-4.

1134. अथाप्राहसामुक्तौ सुख्लपेन्द्रियादिकं ।  
एकीभवन्ति च परे मुक्ताश्च धीरनीरवत् ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.40, S1.315.

1134A. Tait.Up.II-5-1.

1135. कथं जीवेषमेदो न यं मुक्तोपि न मुंयति ।  
तस्मादेदात्तवाक्यानां अस्मिन्नर्थं महान्भरः ॥  
Y.M., P.42, S1.336.

1136. स्वाधीनं स्वतमं कर्तुं नोत्सहस्रकदाघन ।  
सारुप्यदोपि किं श्रीशो दत्ते श्रीवत्सकौस्तुभौ ॥  
हृष्टोपि राजा न स्वीयां जायां दिशति कस्यचित् ।  
प्रपञ्चाय प्रसन्नोपि स्वात्मैक्यं न दिशेद्धरिः ॥  
Ibid., p.43,b, Slokas, 344 ,346.

1136A. Bhāq.II-8-10.

1137. एवं च युक्तितो वैकुंठादिलोकारिचदात्मकाः ।  
लक्ष्म्यात्मका सत्यस्पा नित्याश्चासन्नसंशयः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.44b, S1.355.

1138. हरेरनुव्रता एव मुक्तास्तत्रापि ते किल ।  
सर्वे चतुष्बहिवश्च ॥  
Ibid., p.45b, S1.367.

1139. ज्ञानानन्दमयाकारा नित्यं च सुखभूक्त्वतः ।  
 .....  
 त्रिविधाः सन्ति संसारे शुद्धाः एव बिमुक्तिगाः ॥  
Ibid, p.45, S1.373.

1140. भिन्ना मिथः परेशाच्य मुक्ता विसद्वशत्वतः ।  
Ibid, p.46, S1.385.

1140A. Brih.Up.II-1-8.

1141. पुरुषपत्य तस्ये प्रतिरूपाः किलाखिलाः ।  
 श्रुतिसिद्धं ततो जीवनानारूपं न संशयः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.48b, S1.399.

1142. तत्तद्वापरोद्धेण मोक्षत्तेषां भवेत्तिल ।  
Ibid, p.49b, S1.403.

1142A. Brih.Up.II-5-19.

1143. तस्माज्जीवेशवराभेदो जीवाभेदो द्वितीयता ।  
 निराकारत्वमज्ञत्वं निर्गुण ब्रह्म यत्तत्व ॥  
 अपाणिकभेदं सर्वमातीन्न संशयः ।  
 उक्तेपरममोक्षेस्मिन्यन्नाभूत्कृतदभवेत् ॥  
Y.M., P. S., p.51, S1okas 432, 433.

1144. मुक्तानां च मिथस्सर्वशाच्य द्वैतमिवांजसा ।  
 द्वैतोपमो विशेषश्च भवति स्वगुणादिभिः ।  
Ibid, p. 52b, S1.444.

1145. अतो हरौ विशेषोऽस्ति तन्नियम्यश्च द्वैद्विषु ।  
Ibid, p.52, S1.452.

1146. अतो मुक्ताश्रयो ब्रह्मरूपाद्युत्कृष्टयेतनः ॥  
Ibid, p.53, S1.464.

1146A. Brih.Up. I-4-2.

1146B. Brih.Up. I-4-3.

1147. एवं द्वितीयाज्जगतो भयं मृत्युर्यतोनृणां ।  
तन्मृत्युभयमाय पृथमे पुरुषोत्तमं ॥  
भजेद्दनन्यभक्तस्तसन्निन्निति वाशास्ति सज्जनान् ।  
Y.M., B.S. p.54., Slokas 469, 470.

1148. अनुकूलं द्वितीयं तच्छ्रुतिश्च न निषेधति ।  
Ibid, p.55, S1. 482.

1149. स्वाखंडवादखण्डेन मृतमृत्यै न मेकृतिः ।  
स्वयूध्यानां मनस्तृप्त्यै भक्त्यै मुक्त्यै च केवलं ॥  
Ibid, p.56b, S1. 485.

1149A. Mund.Up. I-1-5,

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1150. RV. IX-77-2.

1151. स मध्वङ्गति तत्रैव पवमानस्य मध्वता ।  
यत्स्पष्टं श्रूयते तस्मान्यध्वाख्या मालतीतनुः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.57, S1. 500.

1152. RV. IX-96-4.

1153. RV. IX.96-1.

1154. RV. 96-5, IX-96-6.

1155. Y.M., P.S., p.62b, S1. 523.

1156. RV., IX-96-7.

1157. पवमानो मुख्यवायुरवतीर्णे महीतले ।  
प्रावी विपद्विषेण प्रावर्तयदितिस्फुटं ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.63b, S1.532.  
भावददत्तसामधर्येनैव गिरामुद्बोधः इति भावः ।  
Bh. Vi., com.on.Y.M., P.S., p.63b,
1158. RV.IX-96-40.  
उन्मध्यवद्वितिचान्यावाकसूक्तेतिमंस्तौतिमदगुरुं ।  
वसानोभूतले मध्वोमहिषः सर्वतो महान् ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.64b, S1.538.
1159. RV.X-5-5.  
सप्तस्वसूरितिश्रुत्या मध्वः प्रस्तूयते स्फुटं ।  
Y.M., P.S., p.65b, S1.545.
1160. इत्यस्तौत्पवमानस्य सूक्ते यं स्पष्टवाग्निं ।  
समध्वः पवमानं शस्त्रो विद्वच्छ्रोमणिः ॥  
Ibid, p.66, S1.554.
1161. RV.I X-89-6.  
विष्टम्भोदिष्वित्यत्राप्यक्तो मध्वो गुरुर्मम ।  
Y.M., P.S., p.66, S1.555.
1162. RV.IX-89-3.  
सिंहं न सतेति वाक्य मध्वस्य चरितं जगौ ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.67b, S1.569.
1163. मध्वो मध्वाभिधोयोगी श्रोतृष्ठपथमः सदा ।  
Y.M., P.S., p.67, S1.
1164. RV.IX-7-2.
1165. RV.IX-2-9.  
अस्मभ्यमिन्दवित्यत्राप्यस्मदगुरुर्भिष्टुतः ।  
Y.M., P.S., p.68, S1.574.

1166. येन देवाः पवित्रेण आत्मानं पुनते सदा ।  
 तेन सहस्रधारेण पावमान्यः पुनर्न्तु मा ॥  
 प्राजापत्यं पवित्रं शतोद्यामं हिरण्यमयं ।  
 तेन ब्रह्मविदो वयं पूतं ब्रह्म पुनीमहे ॥  
 देवाश्च येन घ्रेण लाञ्छितेन भुजेसदा ।  
 स्वस्वदेहं मनश्चापि पुनते वैष्णवोक्तमाः ॥  
 तेन घ्रेण मरुतो मूर्तयो मां पुनर्न्तु इति ।  
 मुनिः प्रार्थयते कश्चिच्छदित्यर्थोत्र प्रदर्शयति ॥  
 Q. Ibid, Pp.69b, 69, 70b, Slokas 578,579,580.

1167. अर्धमानं तु मुनिनां तत्त्वचक्रस्य लाञ्छनं ।  
 गुरुणां करकंजेन धार्य चक्रं तदेव हि ॥  
Ibid, p.70, S1.585.

1168. RV.IX-67-23.  
 यत्ते पवित्रमर्धिष्यग्ने विततमन्तरा ।  
 ब्रह्म तेन पुनीहोति तस्यैव प्रार्थनान्तरं ॥  
Y.M.,P.S, p.71, 595.

1169. चक्रं सुवर्णतः कुयचिंहं तु रजतेन च ।  
Ibid, p.73b, S1.608.

1170. अतोऽनावाहितं चक्रं स्वर्धिषा पुण्यदायिना ।  
 स एव तप्तकुरुते गुरुभूत्वा स एव च ॥  
 सतां भुजे धारयति मुनीनां मध्वरूपधूम् ।  
 स एव धारयेद्वायुरन्यत्र गुरुषुस्थितः ॥  
Ibid, p.74b, Slokas 615,616.

1171. RV.IX-83-1.  
 अत्रापि च पवित्रिं हतिवाङ्वायुगं हरिं ।  
 स्तुवन्ती तप्तचक्रं कधारणं वक्तिसुस्फुटं ।  
Y.M.,P.S, p.79b, S1.642.

1172. अस्तु न्मध्यसन्ना भूमिसेयं वायर्महास्तुतिः ।

Ibid, p.81, S1.654.

1173. RV,X-116-2.

इदं ते पात्रं सनवित्तमिदं षिवासोमयेनाशतक्रतो ।

पूर्ण आहावो मदिरस्य मध्योयं विश्व इदमिह्यन्त देवाः ।

1174. सनवित्तं ज्ञानभक्तिविरकृत्या दिगुणोर्जितं ।

Y.M.,P.S, p.82b, S1.656.

1175. योयं मध्यो मध्यवनामा मदिरस्य मदीरणात् ।

जातस्य वैदशास्त्रदेव्यनाद्विदितस्य वा ॥

Ibid, p.83b, S1.660.

1176. मध्यो वो नामेति वाप्तुमलत्सूक्तो तमुज्जगौ ।

Y.M.,P.S, p.83, S1.666.

1177. RV,I-54-5,

1178. तदस्येति श्रुतौ प्रोक्तो विष्णोस्तुपरमे पदे ।

उत्स औत्सुक्यवान्मध्यः कोवा सिद्धो निगदतां ।

मध्य श्रुतेर्विष्णुभक्तिलिङ्गाच्यासौ गुरुर्दीनः ।

Y.M.,P.S, p.84b, S1.673.

1179. RV,I-141.

ब्रित्या तद्वप्ये धायि दर्शतं द्वेषस्य भर्गः सहसो

यतोजनि । यदीमुपहवरते साधते मतिर्वतस्य धेना

अनयन्त तस्तुतः ।

पृष्ठो वपुः पितुमान्वित्य आशये द्वितीयमास्त्रिष्ठिवासु मातृषु ।

तृतीयमस्य वृषभस्य दोहसे दशप्रमतिं जनयन्त योष्णः ।

1180. किंच श्रुतौमतिपदं हनुमद्वाचकं भवेत् ।

....

तज्ज्ञानशीलं तद्वन्तं निर्वक्तहनुमत्पदं ॥

Y.M.,P.S, p.87, S1.695.

1181. द्वितीयं च वपुलमा वाक् पितुमानिति शंसति ।

.....

ब्रह्मवन्नवानभूद्भीमो .....

Ibid, p.88b, S1.697.

1182. तृतीयं तु वपुः प्राह दशप्रमतिनामि सा ।

Ibid, S1.698.

1183. यदी मनुप्रदिवो मध्व आधवे गुहासन्तं

मातरिष्वा मथायति ।

यतो मध्वो मातरिष्वा गुहासन्तं मथायति ।

.....

दशप्रमतिनामात्र स एवातो न संशयः ॥

गुहासन्तं हृदगुहायौं वसन्तं पुरुषोत्तमं ।

.....

वेदशास्त्रादिमथनं कृत्वा दर्शयति प्रभुः ॥

Ibid, Pp.88, 89,b, Slokas, 702,709.

1184. हितं न जानाम्यहितं न जाने

नार्कर्तुमीशो न च कर्तुमीशः ।

यथा नटान्नाटकदास्यन्तं

तथा हरेःप्रेरणैव वर्ते ॥

Ibid, p. 95b, S1.721.

1185. कर्मणो यदि तत्कर्म स्वानिष्टं कुरुते कुतः ।

अनाद्यनिष्टकमर्णि करोत्यन्यवशो धूवम् ॥

स्वस्यैव स्वतन्त्रकर्तृत्वे स्वतन्त्रकर्त्रिष्वराभिन्नत्वे च

स्वानिष्टद्वःसादिकरणायोगात् ।

Ibid, p.95, S1.723.

1186. जीवगतयोग्यताया जीववदस्वतन्त्रतया

परनियम्यत्वावश्यंभावाच्य । नित्यस्य चेतनस्य

जीवस्य स्वातन्त्र्याभावेन, कर्मसाधिव्यांगीकारे

अनित्यस्य जडस्य च कर्मणः सुतरां स्वातन्त्र्यायोगेन,

उभयोरपिनियामकः किञ्चिदीशो बलात्सिद्धयति ।

Ibid, p.96.

1187. न च कालादिकं तस्य प्रेरकं जडवस्तुनः ।  
 स्वतःप्रवृत्त्ययोगेन प्रेर्यत्वात् कर्तृतो न्यतः ॥  
Y.M., P.S., p.97, Sl.730.
1188. अतस्मयोग्यकार्यस्य कर्तरौ हरीच्छया ।  
 हरिस्तु कर्ता सर्वस्य भर्ता हर्ता त्रिशक्तिधृत् ॥  
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 and Buddhism, do not believe in the existence of God and  
 in the testimony of the Vedas. But, Barring Cārvāka,  
 others do have faith in spirituality with difference in  
 sense.
1195. Radhakrishnan, 'Indian Philosophy' Vol.1, p.32.

1196. स्थात्तत्र युक्त श्वार्थो युक्तिश्च त्रिविधा मता ।  
 व्याप्तिः प्रत्यक्षगा यस्या युक्तिगा . गमणा तथा ।  
 प्रत्यक्षागम मूला तु युक्तिस्तत्र बलीयसी ।  
 ....  
 यथार्थज्ञानजनका यथार्था युक्तयस्त्वृताः ।  
 Madhva. Anuvyākhyāna, (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ) Pp.60 & 61.

1197. बलं ज्ञानबलं चैव बाह्यं वेति द्विधामतम् ॥  
 युक्तिज्ञता, ज्ञानबलं सा ज्ञानाधिका मतेति तत्त्वसारे ॥  
 Māhva. Chāndogyopaniṣad-bhāṣya (Sarvamūlagranthāḥ)-Vol.1.  
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1201. श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिःपरतरः सत्यं जगत्तत्त्वतो  
 भेदो जीवगणा हरेरनु-धरा नीचोच्य भावं गताः ।  
 मुकित्तर्जसुखानुभूतिरमला भवितश्च तत्साधनं  
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1206. Sharma B.N.K., 'A History of the Dvaita School of  
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A P P E N D I X  
RJUTVA OF VĀDIRĀJA

1. What is Rjutva?

The prime-meaning of the term Rju is absence of demerits.<sup>1</sup> Rju is he who has no sufferings of birth. So Rjutva means an attribute or characteristic of Nirdosatva and here it is referred to with special application wherein the prime sense is not given up.

Contextually, the term Rju is referred to the group or a class of esteemed souls. The highest, Four-faced Brahmā is called Rju-King who is the creator of this world. The four-faced Brahmā, when completes the prescribed period of hundred ages and fulfils the Sādhana, gets retired and attains the final liberation along with qualified souls. Then that post will be graced by the next qualified and competent Rju who is in the order of succession. Thus, by turn, this takes place. So here the term Rju is referred to those souls who are fit and qualified to attain and occupy the seat of Four-faced Brahmā.

Here also, the prime meaning of the term is not given up. The Rjutva also denotes the Nirdosatva. So Rjutva is an inherent capability of the souls who attain Brahmā's seat. And this capability is Anādisiddha i.e. established since beginningless.

## 2. Who is a Rju?

As stated above, a Rju is he, who is endowed with the eternally inherent capability of attaining the Brahma-pada.

The Rjus are the lords of gods, superior to all other souls, competent to attain the Vāyu-seat. Since beginning-less time, they are free from any demerits and are endowed with auspicious qualities.<sup>2</sup>

In this class, there are infinite souls. All these souls attain the Brahma-pada in order. Though they possess inherent ability of attaining the Brahma-pada, a Sādhana of a period of hundred ages is prescribed for them. The hundred Rjus enlisted from Kalki to Brahma attain the Brahma-pada in order. The names of hundred Rjus are given in the Vāmana Purāṇa. It is said that the next group of 100 Rjus is also engaged in the prescribed Sādhana. All the Rjus are graced with 32 auspicious marks (characteristics). Their physic is of Śuddhasattva only.

## 3. Necessity of the Rjujnāna

As the knowledge of Brahman and His grace are essential to attain the Mokṣa, so also the knowledge pertaining to the Gurus and their blessings are also equally essential. The Gurvanugraha is the sole means for securing the God's grace.

As supreme and pure devotion, at the feet of the Lord, is required, so also with gradation Gurubhakti is required.<sup>3</sup> Among Gurus, the four-faced Brahmā and other Rjus are superior. They are the prime-statues of having more Sannidhāna of the Lord. Thus, all these Rjus know the Lord better than other souls. They are also called Nityāparoksins - since they have the Aparokṣajnāna of the Lord always. Their blessings and advice are essential for all other souls. Thus, headed by Brahmā, all of them are Gurus to others.<sup>4</sup>

It is also said that God Vāyu giving the secret Upadeśa to all the eligible souls of that age, conducts them to the Lord and appeals Him on their behalf of their liberation. Thus, next to the Lord, the power of bestowing liberation with Lord's permission is seen in Vāyu. And this greatness is found in all the Rjus, since they too, without fail, attain the Vāyupada.<sup>5</sup>

Gradation should not be traced among the Rjus regarding their inherent capability. So far as cadre is concerned, all Rjus are equal.<sup>6</sup> On this ground, all Rjus shall be given equal importance and be worshipped equally with the feeling of Mukhyaguru. Thus they are Gurus to all others.<sup>7</sup>

The apparent gradation or order seems to be on account of the post occupied by them, the work entrusted with them by the Lord and the period of Sādhana observed and undergone. This will always be in accordance with the difference of course of Sādhana which is a factor of time in their case. It has nothing to do with their inherent ability. By the time they undergo and fulfil the course of Sādhana, they attain the next post. They are endowed with the power of fulfilling the course of Sādhana without any interruption.

The four-faced Brahmā tops the Rjus class and his greatness is glorified in Vedas, Purāṇas and the like. The god Vāyu, next to Brahmā, in the list is too referred to as Bhavibrahma and worshipped accordingly. He is the regulator and actual performer of the breathing in all the souls of this creation and glory of his incarnation is being narrated and praised in all the works. At this point, one may raise the doubt or objection as to, what is the post occupied by the next Rju? What is his function and how to worship him?

The reply is very simple and sound. The post is nothing but, their getting engaged in the observance of the prescribed Sādhana. And their function is other than the control over breathing. One should chant the holy names of

the hundred Rjus given in the Vāmana-Purāṇa. It is the general and common way of showing respect. Secondly, the Rjus, other than Brahma and Vāyu, whose reference is clearly made in scriptures, mythology and also by seers, must also be taken into account without fail. Thus Vādirāja comes in this category, since reference about him is found in authentic works of ancient seers, Purāṇas and also in other works.

### 3. Evidences to prove Vādirāja as Rju

The topic as to whether Vādirāja is a Rju or not has become the object of controversy. There is not much difference of opinion among scholars with regard to the Svarūpa of others, viz., Jayatīrtha, Rāghavendratīrtha, Purandaradāsa, Vijayadāsa and others. This conviction is widely accepted and followed without any objections on the basis of mythological evidences and others. In the case of Vādirāja also we get more and more authentic and valid proofs of all kinds.

The aspect of Rjutva appears as a Tattva and not an imagined factor. One has to accept the Tattva as determined by stock evidences. It is but natural that sometimes, there are available clear and explicit proofs and sometimes implicit on account of some reasons. The implicit proofs too are more powerful when reflected upon.

In the case of Madhva, it is well-known that there are available more clear and explicit Pramāṇas. It is acclaimed in Veda, scriptures and Purāṇas that Madhva is the incarnation of god Vāyu. It is also made known in his own works. The relevancy of this fact could be realised through scriptures, evidences upheld by the tradition and the like.

So Tattva or reality may be of any kind, can be determined and understood, only when Vedas are admitted as real, flawless, Apauroṣeya and so on and when other works, closely following the Vedas in respect of purport, are admitted as authority and also when reliable sources from history and tradition are taken for granted. Referring to the relevant Pramāṇas, explained in these works, one can determine and know the Tattva as it is.

Now the question may be asked whether the Rjutva of Vādirāja is referred to in these works. The Rjutva of Vādirāja might not have been referred to directly and explicitly in the Vedas, but its reference is found in other works such as Purāṇas that are subservient to Vedas. Mention is also seen in biographical works that relate the life-history of Vādirāja.<sup>8</sup>

The reference of this may not be found in the works published recently, but this can be seen in ancient manuscripts. Therefore, ancient manuscripts and reference of them in other works are to be taken for granted. So many additions and omissions have been taken place since long. It was also there before and at the time of Madhva.<sup>9</sup>

Some say that the very discussion of Svarūpa is not relevant and an agreeable one, since it serves no purpose. Let all be worshipped with due respect. But this trend of avoiding discussion is harmful in the Siddhānta for gradation is the criterion for worshipping. And this gradation is established taking the inner ability of the soul as the criterion. So knowing the nature and status as determined, one has to accept accordingly. Equal worship is nowhere preferred.<sup>10</sup> And moreover, relevancy of the discussion of the Svarūpa, is seen elaborately in the M.B.T.N. (III) of Madhva. There he has cleared the doubts regarding the inner ability (Svarūpa) of the personalities seen in the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata.

We may not get the very statements of Madhva in respect of those Jñānis, born after him due to the difference of time. But we do get the valid statements of evidences of the then Aparokṣajñānis that indeed help us to ascertain the Svarūpa aspect.

#### A. Internal Evidences

- i) Information about the Rjutva of Vādirāja in his own works:

It is true that as Madhva declared openly and clearly his Svarūpa, Vādirāja has not, when he was alive. But he has suggested this indirectly in his works.

In the Tīrthaprabandha, while praising his Guru Vāgiśatīrtha, he suggests that he will never be affected by Kali. Effect of Kali is seen in the gods upto Śesa and not in Vāyu and other Rjus. So Kalividūratva, which is an indicatory mark of Rjutva is seen in Vādirāja. In the same work, while praising Goddess Mūkambikā and also Lord Varadarāja of Kāncī, he treats himself as Ekāntabhakta. All Rjus are Ekāntabhaktas.<sup>11</sup>

In the Rukminiśavijaya, he suggests that he is like Vāyu. The term Soham in the verse<sup>12</sup> indicates that he is also like Vāyu, glorifying the greatness of the Lord. Soham means "That I" which gives the sense of equality. So he regards himself as equivalent to Vāyu. In a different context, he indirectly refers to his past life. It is said that he was born as a Brahmin in the Dvāparayuga and played the role of an ambassador. The word Kśacit, used in that verse<sup>13</sup> hints at some deep and suggested meaning. Here Kśacit does not stand for any common man,

but conveys the sense as equivalent to Brahma. 'Kah' means 'four-faced Brahma' and 'Cit' means 'like' or 'similar.' It gives the sense of similarity or likeness. Here without using the terms Dvijavara, Dvijottama etc., Vadiraja has purposely used the term Kaścit with an intention to suggest that he was that Brahmin and equivalent to Brahma.

In the Sarasabharativilāsa, he mentions that Lord Hayagrīva is his father, mother, Guru and the like. It is a well-known fact that the Lord is the father, mother and Guru to all the Rjus.<sup>14</sup> In the same work, he has referred to the four-faced Brahma as the eldest of his race or class. Brahma is the eldest and he tops the Rju class.<sup>15</sup> In another context, Vadiraja refers or attributes to himself the worthy title Mahāmati. The same term is used in the M.V. in praise of Madhva. 'Maha' means complete and 'Mati' means knowledge. Thus, it is a synonym of Purnaprajna, Purnabodha and the like. By using the term Mahāmati Vadiraja suggests that he would be the future Purnabodha.<sup>16</sup>

It is a well-known fact that Vadiraja has composed a good number of Kannada songs in praise of Viṣṇu and Vaiṣṇavism. In one of the songs he says: Anudinava śravanamananādiśadhana mādo...<sup>17</sup> and it is as if he is taking the oath, claims that he too is capable to fulfil

the conditions and to perform the functions or deeds of Vāyu and Brahmā. This song indirectly refers to the greatness of Vādirāja, that could be seen in the future age. General oath-taking, in defence of Viṣṇu and Vaisṇavism, may be seen in the works of others. But there, we do not have the subjective reference of the greatness of Vāyu and Brahmā as a support or substantiation of oath-taking. So above song is peculiar in its kind and that suggests the Rjutva of Vādirāja.

### ii) Svapnavṛndāvanākhyānam

It is a work of Vādirāja, which is being narrated in the dream of a Brahmin. The validity of this work could be realized by the information available in the V.G.C.<sup>18</sup> and also by the inscription,<sup>19</sup> related to the banner-pillar, seen even today in Sonda, the mention of which could be seen in the S.Vr.A.<sup>20</sup>

Vādirāja claims in the S.Vr.A. that he is endowed with auspicious characteristics of Rju, such as the fact of being defectless, the fact of being graced with more auspicious qualities Sarvajnatva. Vādirāja declares that he is Nirdusta and Gunādhika.<sup>21</sup> The Rjutva of Vādirāja is clearly mentioned in this work in so many times. He claims himself as Bhāviśvāsaprāneta, Bhāvibharati-pati

and the like.<sup>22</sup> He declares that he too is graced with all dignity and prosperity of god Vāyu and Brahmā in this age but except being the lord of Vāṇī and Bhāratī.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, the S.Vr.A. is a stock and valid proof of Rjutva of Vādirāja.

#### B. External evidences

##### I. Sanskrit Works

i) Vrttaratnasaṅgraha: This work was written by Raghunāthācārya when Vādirāja was alive. Therefore, openly and explicitly, he has not mentioned the Rjutva of Vādirāja. But there are some verses which, when being reflected on, indeed suggest the Rjutva of Vādirāja implicitly.<sup>24</sup>

ii) Vādirāja guruvavaracaritāmṛta: This work, written by Rāmacandrācārya, a disciple of Vedanidhi.<sup>25</sup> openly declares the Rjutva of Vādirāja. The validity of the work is beyond doubt and it could be realized by the description of the installation<sup>26</sup> of the statue of Goddess Lakṣmī, which is in accordance with the Vr.R.S.<sup>27</sup> The inscription of Anuvṛndāvanākhyāna also substantiates and proves the validity of the work.<sup>28</sup> The eighth chapter of the work is solely devoted for the Rjutva of Vādirāja. The author has given solid statements of different Purāṇas

that declare Vādirāja a Rju.<sup>29</sup> Those statements, like others, may not be seen in present published editions. But on that ground, the very statements cannot be rejected. And moreover, not only in the eighth chapter but also in the other chapters, Vādirāja is described as a Rju.<sup>30</sup>

iii) Viśvapriyallilāvilāsa of Setumādhavasūri and Viśvapriyavilāsa of Kocci Rangappācārya:<sup>31</sup> These two works, though narrate the life-story of Viśvapriyatīrtha,<sup>32</sup> incidentally describe the greatness of Vādirāja and promise his Rjutva.

iv) Commentary on S.Vr.A. of Śrīmuṣṇacārya: This Com. an exhaustive one, points out the relevancy of S.Vr.A. and helps to ascertain the Rjutva of Vādirāja.

v) Other works:

- a) Gurvastakam - Kocci Rangappācārya
- b) Gurustavanam - Vāsudevācārya
- c) Vādirājāṣṭakam - N. Vāsudevācārya
- d) Sudhākaragunaratnamālā - N. Vāsudevācārya
- and e) other works.

The above mentioned works glorify Vādirāja and declare that he is a Rju.

vi) Vādirāja gunaratnamālā: This work has been written in argumentative form, when Satyavīratīrtha<sup>34</sup> of Uttarādi mutt opposed the Rjutva of Vādirāja openly for the first time. To tackle and to refute the opposing views, the scholars of different regions wrote different works independently in defence of Vādirāja's Rjutva. They upheld the views of ancient works and also sayings. They brought out the discussion in Śāstric method and proved the Rjutva with solid evidences. Some of those works are:-

- a) Prāmānyabodhini
- b) Rjutvacandrodayah
- c) Rjutvamallikā
- d) Rjutvaśaṅkāpankaprakṣālanam
- e) Rjutvadarpanam
- f) Rjutvavirodhikapolacapetikā
- g) Rjutvamandanam

and others.

In these works, the opposing statements of others are shown baseless and proofless. 35

## II. Kannada songs of Aparokṣajnānins

Right from Nijapurandaravittala<sup>36</sup> to Prānapati vittala<sup>37</sup> all the Haridāsas, without any hesitation, have glorified the greatness of Vādirāja particularly referring

to his Rjutva. He is acclaimed as Latavya, Bhavivayu and the like.<sup>38</sup> The validity of these songs could not be doubted at, because all these songs are found written in old and ancient manuscripts. These are not written separately but are intervened with other written songs, the authenticity of which is beyond doubt. As we regard the validity of other songs of same author written in the same bundle of manuscripts, in the same way, the songs found written in the same bundle and that extract the import of the ancient Sanskrit works and describe the Rjutva of Vadirāja must also be taken for granted.

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तस्यैते कथिता हयथर्थः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः ॥  
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.... अतो ब्रह्मपदेयोग्या जीवा हंसाः प्रकीर्तिर्ताः ।  
ऋषोऽ परंपराप्राप्तं धैर्घ्यनिन्दितमेन तु ॥  
  
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Madhva, Brahmasūtrabṛhmaśya, p.29.
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8. See: V.G.C. - I-2, IV-43.  
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10. समानां विषमा पूजा विषमानां समा तथा ।  
 क्रियते येन देवो पि स्वपदाद् भ्रष्यते पुमान् ॥  
 Madhva, Gitābhāśya, (Sarvamūlagrānthaḥ) Vol.1, p.67.
11. See; Vādirāja, 'Tīrthaprabandha' I-4, I-56, III-32.
12. Vādirāja, 'Rukminiśavijaya' I-7.
13. Ibid, XIV - 38.
14. कर्त्रै धर्त्रै च संहने पात्रै च हयवक्त्रमे ।  
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20. ध्वजस्तम्भो द्विजश्रेष्ठं भुजस्तम्भे धूतो मया ।  
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 1980, p.66, Ch.XI-82.
21. Ibid, III-6, VII-48.
22. Ibid, III-5,7, VIII-52, 53,97, IV-48-50,74,  
 VI-67, IX-4,102, X-50,  
S.Vr.A.-III-7.
23. Ibid XXI-11.
24. Raghunathacharya, Vṛttaratnasaṃgrahah I-16.
25. V.G.C., I-3.
26. V.G.C., VI-45.
27. V.R.S., II-41.
28. अण्वृन्दावनाख्यानं श्रीवेदनिधिसद्गुरुः ।  
 स्वाप्नवृन्दावनाख्यानात्संगृहयालेख्य भक्तितः ।  
 लेखयित्वा शिलायां स वृन्दावनतटे बहिः ।  
 स्थापयत्मास . . . . ।  
V.G.C., VII-21-22.
29. Ref: V.G.C., VIII, Chapter.
30. V.G.C., I-2, IV-43.

31. Setumadhava Suri - 1865. A.D.  
 Kocci Rangappacarya - 1867 A.D.,  
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 Sri Siruru mutt, Udupi, 1972. Pp.117, 119.
32. 1776 - 1865 A.D.
33. V.G.M., III-68, IV-34.
34. 1879. A.D
35. For details, See; H.Subbarao, 'Srimadvādirājarjutva-siddhānta'
36. Nijapurandaravithala or Gurupurandaravithala,  
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37. Ref: 'Srivādirājaguruvarakīrtanamañjari'  
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38. See; Srivādirājaguruvara Kīrtanamañjari (Kannada),  
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